The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 1 Issue 23

Tuesday, 19 Nov 1985

Contents

oExpecting the unexpected
Peter G. Neumann
o Safety Group Activities in the U.S.
Nancy Leveson
o Automobile computer control systems susceptible to interference
Bennett Smith
o Irresponsible computer "game"; BBS Legislation
Ted Shapin
o SDI Debate at MIT
John L. Mills

Expecting the unexpected

Peter G. Neumann <Neumann@SRI-CSL.ARPA>
Mon 18 Nov 85 12:57:03-PST
To: RISKS@SRI-CSL.ARPA

We have been talking about risks to the public in the use of computer
systems in this forum since 1 August, and trying to keep the discussions
mostly technical -- but not political or polemical.  On the other hand, I
have noted on various occasions that it is sometimes hard to exclude
nontechnical arguments.  This message may initially seem off the mark, but I
think it has some subliminal relevance that might help put into perspective
the importance of the underlying assumptions that we make and the need to
anticipate essentially all possible unusual circumstances.

On 13 October 1985, in Florence, Italy, at about 10:05 PM, European Standard
Time, my apparently very healthy 19-year-old son Chris -- never having had a
medical problem in his life -- suddenly had his heart stop and died within
moments.  Resuscitation attempts failed.  The autopsy found no discernible
apparent cause of death.  A neurophysiologist friend who joined me in
Florence suggested ventricular fibrillation as the most likely actual cause.
The heart muscles receive signals from distributed sources via independent
paths, and normally all of the signals arrive sufficiently synchronously to
trigger heart contraction.  Under fibrillation, the signals arrive
incoherently, and cannot be integrated sufficiently to trigger contraction.
So, why do I mention this in a RISKS Forum?  Well, even in an apparently
completely healthy person there exists some risk of spontaneous malfunction.
It seems to me that in making arguments about how hardware and software will
operate correctly or will continue to operate correctly if they once did, we
make all sorts of implicit underlying assumptions that may be true most of
the time, but that may indeed break down -- particularly in times of stress.
The nastiest problems of all seem to involve unanticipated conditions in
timing and sequencing, in both synchronous and ansynchronous systems, and
particularly in distributed systems.  We have seen various problems in the
past -- the ARPANET collapse (due to an accidentally propagated virus, after
years of successful operation) and the first shuttle launch immediately come
to mind as specific well-documented examples.  In some cases there is also
signal inference -- as in the pacemaker problems (see Nancy Leveson's
message in RISKS-1.22).  I think that in our lives as in computer systems,
we tend to make unjustified or oversimplified assumptions.  In life, this
makes it possible for us to go on living without inordinate worrying.
However, in computer systems, greater concern is often warranted.  So, my
point in introducing this message into the RISKS Forum is to urge us to try
to make our assumptions both more explicit and more realistic.  Basing a
system design on assumptions that are almost but not quite always true may
seem like a close approximation, but may imply the presence of enormous
unanticipated risks.  In systems such as those involved in Strategic
Defense, for example, every one of the potentially critical assumptions must
be sufficiently correct.

                 Peter G. Neumann (back again on the net)


Safety Group Activities in the U.S.

Nancy Leveson <nancy@ICSD.UCI.EDU>
09 Nov 85 13:04:51 PST (Sat)
Udo wrote about the EWICS TC7 in a previous RISKS forum and said that
such a group died through lack of interest in the U.S.  Actually, there
is a similar group which has been active in the U.S. for about three
years.  It is called the Software System Safety Working Group and was
started by the Air Force although it is now a tri-service group.  Although
sponsored by the DoD, it is not limited to military applications and has
participants from other branches of the government and industry.  The latest
meeting was held in conjunction with a conference on computers in medicine.

Meetings are held approximately twice a year and usually have from 50-200
participants.  One of the products of the group is a Software Safety Handbook
which is meant to accompany the recent MIL-STD-882b (System Safety) update.  
The main purpose of the group has been to meet and discuss new techniques,
share experiences, exchange ideas, etc.  There is tentatively a meeting
planned for January in Washington D.C.  Anybody interested in the group should
contact me (nancy@uci.edu) or Al Friend (friend@nrl-css) who is with the Navy 
and is currently chairing the group.  A future plan is to have an on-line
safety database which will reside at the SRI NIC.  

Other activities in which I have been asked to participate and which might
be of interest to readers of this forum are a conference on safety
which will be held in Washington D.C. next July and a workshop on safety and
security sponsored by the Center for Software Reliability in England next
September.  I am also considering organizing a workshop in California on safety
which would be held right before the next International Conference on Software
Engineering in Spring 1987.  Anyone interested in more information on any
of these activities can again contact me and I will direct you to the
right people.
 
Nancy Leveson
University of California, Irvine


Automobile computer control systems susceptible to interference

Bennett Smith <ircam!bks@seismo.CSS.GOV >
Wed, 23 Oct 85 11:14:29 -0100
By chance I saw an article in an issue of the
"Journal of Environmental Engineers" (published in England, date of
issue about 10 months ago, I believe) about the sensitivity of
a microprocessor-controlled automobile control system to external
electromagnetic radiation.  As I recall, a CB transmitter near the car
could, at the right frequency, make the engine slow down or speed up.
Perhaps this article would interest some of your contributors.

Bennett Smith                   
IRCAM
31, Rue Saint Merri
75004 Paris, France     {seismo,philabs,decvax}!mcvax!ircam


Irresponsible computer "game"

Ted Shapin <BEC.SHAPIN@USC-ECL.ARPA>
Mon 18 Nov 85 11:54:52-PST
To: risks@SRI-CSL.ARPA, human-nets@RED.RUTGERS.EDU
Phone: (714)961-3393; Mail:Beckman Instruments, Inc.
Mail-addr: 2500 Harbor Blvd., X-11, Fullerton CA 92634

From a Toys R Us ad in the L.A. Times, 11/17/85:

Activision
HACKER
Makes you feel like you've unlocked someone else's computer system!
For C-64, C-128. $24.97.

[And on the package:]

TEMPTATION
HACKER
To stumble into somebody else's computer system.  To be someplace
you're really not supposed to be.  And to get the strange feeling
that it really does matter.  "LOGON PLEASE" is all you get to
start with. That's it.  From there, it's up to you.  If you're
clever enough and smart enough, you could discover a world you've
never before experienced on your computer. Very temptimg.
- - -

This "product" is socially irresponsible!  It leads young people
to think breaking into unknown systems is OK. The "world" they
discover may be the world of the penal system!

Ted Shapin


BBS Legislation

Ted Shapin <BEC.SHAPIN@USC-ECL.ARPA>
Thu 14 Nov 85 10:34:50-PST
To: human-nets@RED.RUTGERS.EDU, risks@SRI-CSL.ARPA

I have remailed several messages on pending BBS legislation to
INFO-LAW@sri-CSL.  One is a draft of a bill by Senator Leahy's aid Podesta
which is a good bill.  People interested in preserving open communcation via
BBS's may wish to read these items.  Ted Shapin.


Arms-Discussion Digest V5 #8 [EXCERPT: SDI Debate]

Moderator <ARMS-D-Request%MIT-MC.ARPA@MIT-XX.ARPA>
29 Oct 85 09:33-EST
To: ARMS-D%MIT-MC.ARPA@MIT-XX.ARPA
Reply-To: ARMS-D%MIT-MC.ARPA@MIT-XX.ARPA

EXCERPTED FROM Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, October 29, 1985 9:33AM
Volume 5, Issue 8 
                  [There is sufficient NONOVERLAP in our readerships to
                   warrant reproducing this.  Apologies to those who have
                   read it already.  PGN]

Date:  Mon, 28 Oct 85 10:58 EST
From:  Mills@CISL-SERVICE-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject:  SDI Debate

This is a summary of my impressions of the panel discussion/debate
entitile "Star Wars: Can the Computing Requirements be Met?" This
took place on Monday October 21 at MIT.  The panelists where Danny
Cohen, David L Parnas, Charles L Seitz, and Joseph Weizenbaum. The
moderator was Michael L Dertouzos.

I was basically disappointed in this panel discussion.  I was hoping
to hear a good counter to the the arguments Dr Parnas had put forth
in his papers.  Dr Cohen started what looked like an organized attack
on Dr Parnas' "Octet", refering to the series of eight papers Dr
Parnas presented his arguments in.  Dr Cohen correctly dismissed the
eighth paper,"Is SDIO An Efficient Way To Fund Worthwhile Research",
as being outside the bounds of the current discussion.  Unfortunately
Dr Cohen only further discussed one of the other papers.  The other
six where dealt with with some minor hand waving.  I have to admit I
don't remember which paper Dr Cohen "went into detail" on.  This is
because the detail amounted to a one slide outline of the major six
points of this paper.  This slide was up for no more than one minute
with some more hand waving that none of these points were true.

Back to the side claiming the software is not feasable, Dr Weizenbaum
didn't realy add much of anything to Dr Parnas' arguments.  He thought
that Dr Parnas had done a wonderful job and there wasn't much he
could add.  He gracefully didn't take up much time saying this either.
Dr Parnas basically presented the material in his papers.  He added
the new point that even if we build this thing and it "tested OK",
we could never realy trust it and would be forced not to rely on it.

Charles Seitz made no attempt to directly attack Dr Parnas' argument.
He focused his presentation on a simplistic hierarchal structure the
software for SDI could take.  Unfortuanately this looked like a highly
centralized form of controlling all the weapons and sensors resulting
in a high degree of complexity and size.

Both Dr Cohen and Seitz hit upon the point that the software for SDI
is not necessarily as large and complex as some people might think.
They claimed that it could be built of smaller fairly independant
parts.  To me this appeared contradictory to Dr Seitz's hierarchal
control structure.  It did come through that If you had enough
totally independant platforms shotting things down, you stood a good
change of hitting most the targets.  It is also clear that you would
need a very high level of overkill to make this work since the other
platforms don't know who else is shotting at what.

Back to Dr Parnas' points,  I did get the feeling that there is some
general agreement that there is a limit to the scale and complexity
our software engineering can handle.  Dr Parnas furthered this point
by saying  large advances in the mathematics of discreet functions
are going to be a major stumbling block in the furthering software
engineering.  He doesn't expect these large advances on the grounds
that if you simplify the equations to much you are loosing
information.  A discreet function can only represent so many bits.
I may not have this argument exactly right.  He also went thru his
standing arguments against AI or automatic programing helping very
much.

    [ I think the argument is that we need concise, manipulable
    discrete functions modelling software in order to achieve what
    other fields of engineering can do with concise, manipulable
    continuous functions.  However, such concise representations may
    not be possible due to information-theoretic constraints on the
    number of bits that can be represented by a certain number of
    symbols.  --MDAY@MIT-XX ]

    [I didn't get quite this impression, though I agree with it.  Rather, I
    thought Parnas was saying that the problem was in the fact that with
    software that is fundamentally digital, there is no such thing as a
    continuous function, and that therefore the usual engineering
    assumption valid in most of the world that small changes in input or
    in correctness necessarily mean small changes in output or result
    simply isn't valid in the software engineering world.  Until it is
    possible to analyze software in terms of approximately correct
    functions, graceful software degradation (in terms of an approximately
    correct program always doing approximately correct things) is not
    really possible. -- LIN@MIT-MC]

Both sides came up with a number of interesting and colorful
analogies.  The most relavent is the Space Shuttle.  Dr Cohen claims
that the Space Shuttle works.  This is obviously true in some sense.
However, it was also pointed out that there have been times when the
software on the shuttle has not worked within seconds of launch.  It
seems that it would be impractical to ask the Soviets to wait 15
minutes while we reboot the system.

    [Indeed, Seitz conceded that under certain circumstances plausible in
    the context of a nuclear missile attack, it might be necessary to
    re-boot the system.  He then proceeed to ignore the consequences of
    that; he did not even say that there are ways to eliminate the need
    for re-booting. -- LIN@MIT-MC]

In summary it seems that there are very real limits on what our
software engineering can handle reliably.  We are actually not that
far from those limits in some of our current efforts.  If SDI is to
work its architecture must be dictated by what is doable by the
software.  It is unclear that SDI is feasably from a material cost point
of view if the platforms are small and independant enough to be
reliable from the software standpoint.

In closing I would like to say that I don't think either side did a
particularly good job sticking to just the software feasibility
issue.  One other interesting thing happened.  Dr Parnas claimed to
have asked some person with authority over SDIO whether "No, we can't
do this" was an acceptable answer.  He did this for the first time at
this debate because he did not want to say this behind this person's
back.  Unfortunately, I don't remember this other person's name, but
he was in the audience.  Dr Parnas claims that the answer was, "No is
not an accepatble answer" and challenged the other person to deny
this.  The other person promptly stood up and did exactly
that.

    [If you mean that it was political, that's certainly true.  But
    politics is really the determinant of the software specifications at
    the top level.  That is how it should be, and people who want to
    ignore that are ignoring the most important part of the problem.

    However, in other instances, the Administration has noted that the SDI
    is central to future US defense policy.  In addition, it has never
    specified what evidence it would consider adequate or sufficient to
    turn off the SDI.

    -- LIN@MIT-MC]

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