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I note with dismay the ad-hominem phraseology that is appearing in the SDI discussions. It is understandable but unacceptable. The issue is too important. I request that the participants review their inputs prior to submission, and edit out phraseology that is not relevant to the issue. It is not fair to expect the forum's moderator to be a censor. - Mike McLaughlin [Thanks. PGN] [I have received various complaints about some of the recent SDI verbiage — its quality, accuracy, relevance to RISKS, what right has RISKS to distribute SRI discussion when it should be in ARMS-D, etc. In general, I have to hope that our contributors exert some good sense. Some of the nit-picking should clearly be resolved privately. In some cases I might request two antagonists get together and write a single position statement to which they both agree — but that seldom works. So, at this point I would like to elevate the quality of SDI discussion — but not to stifle meaningful discussion that is really RISKS-related. SDI remains one of the most important issues confronting us, and open
Testing: Differences between SDI and other systems.
<Karl.Kluge@G.CS.CMU.EDU> 7 Jan 1986 22:41-ESTMessage-Id: <505539701/kck@G.CS.CMU.EDU> > Date: Mon 6 Jan 86 18:24:44-PST > From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM@LOTS-A> > > You are, of course, correct. The problem is that your points could > also be (and are) made about any complex weapons systems (or indeed, > any complex system at all). It is NEVER possible to fully test ANY > system until it is actually used in battle (and even then it can fail > in future battles). 1) The consequences of failure of an SDI system are orders of magnitude greater than the consequences of failure of a "normal" weapons system. We damn well should be orders of magnitude more confident in it. 2) Which is really irrelevant, since the function of the SDI is to enhance deterrence, not replace it. The SDI system doesn't have to work, it just has to create reasonable worry that it might work in the mind of a potent- ial attacker. This makes it different from most systems, which are built to be used. If the SDI system ever has to be used then it has failed, which means... (* rest of message on ARMS-D. Karl *) [THANKS... PGN] My opinion, of course, in no way reflects the opinion of anyone I'm associated with. Karl
Testing SDI
Robert Goldman <rpg%brown.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA> 8 Jan 86 (Wed) 15:26:18 ESTIn RISKS-1.34 Jim McGrath discusses testing the SDI. A common objection to the SDI is that it could not realistically be tested. McGrath correctly points out that this is true of any modern weapon system. I agree with this basic point, but of course, some weapons systems are easier to test than others. For example, Mr. McGrath points out it took WWI for the Germans to realize that the lessons of the 1880's concerning rapid infantry fire (and thus the rise of infantry over calvary) did not take artillery development adequately into account This is correct, but dodges the point that at that time, modern artillery, rifles and machine guns HAD all been fired in anger. The almost universal inability to profit from the experience was due to institutional failures, rather than lack of raw data. I need hardly point out that ICBMs and SLBMs have NOT been tested in wartime conditions, and that we have reason to believe that there won't be a second chance to correct any mistakes. Mr. McGrath goes on to suggest that the SDI might be tested against meteor storms. I question this for three reasons: 1. As I understand it, the particle-beam weapons of the SDI are not intended to destroy warheads outright, but rather prevent them from reaching their targets and detonating. How would one judge that a meteorite's fusing and guidance mechanisms had been destroyed? 2. Meteorites are not human-made objects which are designed with an eye to penetrating enemy defenses: they do not drop chaff, employ electronic counter-measures, etc. 3. Meteorites have a wholly different flight pattern. As I understand it, ICBMs have a boost phase, a cruising phase and a re-entry phase. Doesn't a missile's detectability and vulnerability depend on which of these phases it is in? Robert Goldman [I deleted a paragraph on what might happen "if the SDI accidentally (or on purpose) shot down a Soviet reconnaissance satellite?" PGN]
Summing Up on SDI
Jim McGrath <J.JPM@Epic> Thu 9 Jan 86 22:45:57-PSTTo: "risks@sri-csl"@Sushi Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa [Reminder: I have omitted a bunch of McGrath-Lin messages. If you wish to read them, see aove. PGN] From all these messages, I've come to two conclusions. First, that on the whole, I tend to feel that SDI is a more complex system (mainly because of its mission size) than existing ones, such as Aegis. But I could be wrong (either way). And I do not believe that it is "orders of magnitude" more complex than existing systems. Thus it would seem that it could be built to existing system performance standards. The second question is whether these standards are "adequate," and if not can we improve upon them? It is clear that existing systems are not being tested as fully as possible (Herb Lin's report on the Aegis tests makes them appear to be a joke). I've already pointed out that substantial testing of mid-course and terminal phases, far more extensive testing than any of our other systems have received, can be carried out. Thus, provided we have a proper commitment, even our current testing technology can be better applied (with better results) than we have done up until now. To a large extent the standard you require depends upon your definition of the mission of the system. Clearly the system was never designed to make OUR nuclear weapons obsolete (just the Soviet's). So under any mission we would probably retain a force sufficient to destroy the USSR, and so can always fall back on MAD. Any reasonable performance level would protect our weapons to a significant extent (and if not, you can always keep a sub force). So the real question is whether it can protect cities. I would tend to doubt it, under a full and unimpeded Soviet attack. But there are many scenarios (from accidental launch to a limited (decapitation or counterforce) strike to a second strike (the first perhaps going to Europe and/or China)) where it quite possibly could. In any event, I am certainly not sure enough to either commit to SDI deployment nor to terminate research. Since all SDI is at the moment is research, I have no problem with the existing program. Still, knowing how programs have a tendency to outlive their usefulness, I think strong scrutiny is appropriate. But not mindless opposition. JimPlease report problems with the web pages to the maintainer
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