The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 10 Issue 77

Friday 11 January 1991

Contents

o Computer program gives police a bum rap
David A Smallberg
o Unusual distance metric could waste consumers' time and gas
David A Smallberg
o Computers Stolen in the USSR
Sanford Sherizen
o Re: British military information stolen
Stephen Carter
o Vicious Subway Cars
Ed Ravin
o Vicious Doors on London Underground/Network South-East
Pete Mellor
o Defence of British Rail/Network SouthEast
David Green
o RISKS of computer-assisted emergency dispatch systems
Ed Ravin
o 2nd IFIP Dependable Computing Conference
Rick Schlichting
o First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy
Dorothy Denning
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Computer program gives police a bum rap

David A Smallberg <das@CS.UCLA.EDU>
Fri, 11 Jan 91 11:54:34 PST
Summarized from an article by Roxana Kopetman, Los Angeles Times, 10 Jan 1991:

Long Beach, California, police officials believe that a programming error
partly explains why their department has the worst crime solving record among
11 large California cities.

The California Department of Justice ranks departments by their rate of solving
crimes.  Long Beach has placed last 11 times in the last 15 years.  Last year,
for example, the city solved 14.2% of its cases; the statewide average is 22%.

However, the department just found out that their system lists a crime as
solved only if it is solved in the same month it was reported.  Other police
departments don't do this.  The tallies are done by a program in the city's
information services bureau.

Police don't put all the blame on the program.  They cite an understaffed
detective bureau and officers taking time off for job-related injuries at a
rate three times the state average, taking twice as long as average to return
to work.

-- David Smallberg, das@cs.ucla.edu


Unusual distance metric could waste consumers' time and gas

David A Smallberg <das@CS.UCLA.EDU>
Fri, 11 Jan 91 13:00:23 PST
A friend related an experience he had calling a swimming pool supply company's
800 number to find a local distributor.  The operator asked for his zip code
and told him the address of the nearest distributor, saying it was 3.5 miles
away.  It actually was more like 8 miles, so my friend figured the distance
was measured from his post office.  Since he lives near a zip code boundary,
he asked for the nearest distributor from the neighboring zip code, hoping to
find something closer.  This is where things started to get weird, so he tried
zip codes from his office and parents' home:

  Start location & Zip      Nearest distributor location & distance
   Sherman Oaks, CA 91423     Reseda (3.5 reported miles, 8 actual miles)
   North Hollywood  91607     Hacienda Heights (30 miles! Reseda's closer!)
   Santa Monica     90405     Torrance (15 miles)
   West Los Angeles 90064     Carson City, Nevada (400 miles!)

At this point my friend figured out what was happening:

   Sherman Oaks     91423  ==>  91335  Reseda
   North Hollywood  91607  ==>   917xx  Hacienda Heights
   Santa Monica     90405  ==>   905xx  Torrance
   West Los Angeles 90064  ==>   897xx  Carson City, Nevada

The programmer obviously assumed that proximity in zip codes meant proximity in
space.  E.g., for 90064, since there was no distributor in 900xx, the program
tried 901xx and 899xx, then 902xx and 898xx, etc.   How many customers wasted
their time and gas going to the wrong store?  How much business did the company
lose from people who decided not to make a long trip?

I've noticed similar foolishness from companies that assume that any store
location in my telephone area code (818) is worth telling me about, while none
of the nearer stores in neighboring 213 are.

-- David Smallberg, das@cs.ucla.edu


Computers Stolen in the USSR

Sanford Sherizen <0003965782@mcimail.com>
Thu, 10 Jan 91 21:01 GMT
The following falls into the "Isn't this a small world" category.  It appears
that the Soviet Union is getting more Westernized by the moment.  Their
criminals and police seem to be just like ours.

The message originally appeared on internet news and then was posted on a net
concerned with Soviet computing (USSRECOM).

Sandy

*********
In article <1991Jan7.150851.2143@hq.demos.su>, avg@hq.demos.su (Vadim Antonov)
 writes:
|> Hi, our small team just faced to a new problem: some thieves
|> stole our net's major backbone machine (a 486 :-). These guys are
|> already caught but the machine is still a "material evidence" and
|> we had to switch to (much heavier :-) VAX. Is it a first actual
|> case of stealing of a backbone hardware? :-) :-) :-) At least we found
|> that all the messages were stolen together with the machine :-).
|>
|> Vadim Antonov
|> DEMOS, Moscow, USSR


Re: British military information stolen (Bryant, RISKS-10.75)

Stephen Carter <stevedc@syma.sussex.ac.uk>
Thu, 10 Jan 91 18:14:17 GMT
> An article in `The Irish Times' Jan 3 states that extremely sensitive
> information relating to British military operations in the Gulf may
> still be on a computer which was stolen from a staff car ...

It is worth adding that this information was known and published outside
of the UK, but was not published (censorship) in the UK until (I think)
6 Jan 91 when Associated Press threatened to run the story anyway.

Stephen Carter, The University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
Tel: +44 273 678203  Fax: +44 273 678335     UUCP: stevedc@syma.uucp


Vicious Subway Cars (was: Vicious Elevators)

Unix Guru-in-Training <elr%trintex@uunet.UU.NET>
Thu, 10 Jan 91 12:42:54 EST
Here's a quick rundown on RISKS of stepping through the doors on a New York
City subway car: each of the twin doors can be as much as 3 inches open
when the train starts moving, giving you a maximum gap of 6".  Although an
interlock prevents the train from starting while the doors are open (called
the "indication" by the train crew), the sensors aren't too precise.  People
can (and do) get dragged by moving cars when they're stuck in the doors.
Usually it's their own fault -- hyped up New Yorkers who won't wait the next
three or five minutes for the next rush hour train (or ten or twenty minutes
off peak) blocking the doors open in the vain hope the conductor will
re-open and let them in.  As a previous RISK poster noted, this all depends
on the conductor's mood and if s/he is in a hurry or not.  It also depends on
their line supervisors: some managers emphasize speed, others passenger safety.

A few years ago the Transit Authority had a problem with "doors opening
enroute" on the older (pre-1976 or so) cars -- an individual door would
open while the train was in motion, once on a speeding express train
(thankfully, no one was hurt).  The TA rewired all their newer trains
with an interlock so that the emergency brake would activate if the
doors opened while the train was in motion.

You can experiment with this safety interlock by attempting to force one of the
doors open while the train is moving.  One day I observed two teenagers on the
way to Brooklyn doing exactly that, thrilling over pushing open a door two
inches as the train sped through the tunnel.  When I warned them that they
would kick in the emergency brake if they went too far they had a spell of
enlightened self-interest (it can take ten or fifteen minutes for the crew to
reset the emergency brake) and left the poor door alone.

Ed Ravin, Prodigy Services Company, White Plains, NY 10601    elr@trintex.UUCP
                                         +1-914-993-4737   philabs!trintex!elr


Vicious Doors on London Underground/Network South-East

Pete Mellor <pm@cs.city.ac.uk>
Thu, 10 Jan 91 21:33:56 PST
I was interested in Olivier M.J. Crepin-Leblond's two mailings (RISKS-10.75)
regarding the recent train crash and the behaviour of tube train doors.

I am also a victim (sorry, commuter! :-) of "Network South-East", the bit of
what used to be British Rail that serves East Anglia and the area south-east
of London. They are a by-word for discomfort and overcrowding, even where the
rolling stock is new, as it is on the lines from Peterborough and Cambridge
into London King's Cross. It was recognised at the enquiry into the Clapham
rail disaster that a large proportion of the deaths and serious injuries in
a crash can be attributed to passengers having to stand in the aisles between
the seats. Even a low-speed impact means that standing passengers who insist
on obeying Newton's first law of motion will continue their journey along the
carriage until brought to rest by their fellow passengers or by the door to
the adjoining carriage.

Even so, it does not appear to be cost-effective to supply adequate numbers
of carriages to cope with the rush-hour. After all, the management has to
show a profit so that privatisation will attract investors, and a yearly
season ticket between Stevenage and London only costs 1744 pounds sterling.

Another bit of cost-cutting is to use driver-only trains. There is no guard
to check the doors before the train pulls out. This is so on most rail and
underground services. There is usually a TV monitor which the driver can use
to check the length of the platform. This does not seem to be particularly
effective, judging by the number of incidents I have personally witnessed
over the last few years, such as:

A driver closing the automatic doors and pulling away after a mother got out
but before her children had time to leave the train. (Frantic waving and
shouting by other people on the platform made him stop.) - Network South-East.

An elderly woman boards the train (Underground: Piccadilly Line), and the
driver closes the doors and moves off before her equally elderly husband can
get on.

I leaped onto a crowded tube train (Underground: Metropolitan Line) carrying a
shoulder bag just as the doors were closing. I got on, but my bag didn't. The
doors closed around the strap, and the train moved away with the bag hanging
outside the carriage, and me pinned to the door by the strap around my shoulder,
just waiting for the first obstruction to snag the bag. Fortunately, someone
pulled the emergency handle, and the train stopped before it entered the tunnel.

What has this got to do with computers? Not a lot! All these incidents occurred
with a human in the loop (just one human, and obviously not very firmly in the
loop!). I think that less, not more, automation is the answer to safety here.
Bring back the guard!

(I went through King's Cross on the Circle Line while the fire was raging a
few years ago. They're gonna get me one day! :-)

Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq.,
London EC1V 0HB +44(0)71-253-4399 Ext. 4162/3/1 p.mellor@uk.ac.city (JANET)


Defence of British Rail/Network SouthEast

David Green (MSc 90/91) <davidg@aipna.edinburgh.ac.uk>
Fri, 11 Jan 91 15:33:24 GMT
In the latest RISKS DIGEST:

Date: Wed, 9 Jan 91 13:09 BST
From: "Olivier M.J. Crepin-Leblond" <MEEM37@vaxa.cc.imperial.ac.uk>
Subject: Another train crash in London

> [general criticism of British Rail esp. Network SouthEast]

Yes, there's been a major train crash in London. But I've seen no claims that
computers were involved - as Olivier points out, BR's main problem is hardware
dating from the 1950's, and hardly the over-enthusiastic application of new
technology. The UK news reports I heard only listed 1 fatality, and I wouldn't
like to estimate the number of deaths that would be likely to result from all
of the rail commuters driving into London instead. For seven years I travelled
about 20 miles a day (going to and from school) by Network SouthEast, and
although we didn't always get seats, clean trains, or particularly punctual
arrivals, we always got there in one piece. I don't think there exists a
perfect public transport system; the UK rail network only offers one of the
better alternatives.

Unlikely though this may seem to some of your readers, I am in no way connected
to British Rail, Network SouthEast, or any of their subsidiaries.
                                                                    David Green


RISKS of computer-assisted emergency dispatch systems

Unix Guru-in-Training <elr%trintex@uunet.UU.NET>
Thu, 10 Jan 91 13:08:34 EST
Thanks to budget cuts a fire company was recently closed near Richmond Hill,
in Queens (New York City).  This past Monday, two people died in a fire
nine blocks from the closed engine company.  It's been getting lots of local
news coverage, because the firefighter's union, in a bid to reverse the
closures, has claimed that those persons might have lived if the engine
company had not been shut down.

In the post-mortem analysis of the response to the fire, several other
problems were turned up that cost time in getting water pumped into the
burning building.  The biggest one was that the engine company that was
dispatched (engine companies have the pumps and hoses that will squirt water
from a hydrant into the fire, ladder companies have the rescue team for
clambering into the building and recovering people stuck inside) was told
that they were the "auxiliary" engine company.  So they did what an auxilliary
company is supposed to do, namely hook up to the second-closest hydrant and
let the "main" company get the first assault into the fire.  But the "main"
company was supposed to be the engine that had been closed down, and so no
other water-pumping equipment was sent.  The firefighters quickly realized
the mistake, and lost only a couple of minutes putting back their hoses and
moving to the closer hydrant.

Apparently the Fire Department's computer dispatch system was not updated
about the demise of the engine company, and thus designated the remaining
engine in the area as the auxiliary.  And despite news headlines about
firehouse closings, none of the dispatchers realized in time that they were
making an error.

It looks like the people who build dispatch systems (or telephone
operator's consoles, airline reservation systems, etc) are interesting only
in improving "efficiency", which usually translates to less operators and
lesser-trained operators.  In a place like NYC, without computer assistance
dispatchers would have to be well versed in the operations of the emergency
service they were controlling, if not the local neighborhood their units
were operating in.  Now, from what I've heard over my scanner, dispatchers
can be almost anyone who can sit in front of the computer console that's
supposedly keeping track of which units are where and which calls from 911
haven't been answered yet.  Operators can be changed or transferred frequently
because the computer is supposed to "remember" the status of all outstanding
calls.  So more work is dumped on lesser-trained people, and the results
are degraded service and mistakes like that described above.  (To be fair,
this is less true of the NYC Fire Department than of the Police Department.)

Ed Ravin, Prodigy Services Company, White Plains, NY 10601    elr@trintex.UUCP
                                         +1-914-993-4737   philabs!trintex!elr


2nd IFIP Dependable Computing Conf.

Rick Schlichting <rick@cs.arizona.edu>
11 Jan 91 18:17:06 GMT
   [Please note that the preregistration and hotel reservation deadlines
    are fast approaching.]


                   *** Final Call for Registration ***
                    Second IFIP Working Conference on

              DEPENDABLE COMPUTING FOR CRITICAL APPLICATIONS
                        Can we rely on computers?

                 Hotel Park Tucson, Tucson, Arizona, USA
                          February 18-20, 1991

Organized by
    IFIP Working Group 10.4 on Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance

Registration Information:

Advance registration is strongly encouraged.  The advance registration
fee, due by January 15, is 300 U.S. dollars, by bank draft drawn on a
U.S. Bank.  Limited on-site registration will be available at a cost of
340 U.S. dollars.

The registration fee includes: attendance at the Working Conference, a welcome
reception, 3 lunches, coffee breaks, and the banquet, as well as one copy of
the conference pre-prints and a copy of the proceedings.  The proceedings will
be published as a volume of the Springer-Verlag series "Dependable Computing
and Fault-Tolerant Systems."

CONFERENCE REGISTRATION FORM

Return to: R. D. Schlichting, 2nd DCCA Working Conference, Dept. of Computer
   Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721

Name:
Affiliation:
Address:
Phone:
email:

Registration Fee:
  Advance Registration $ 300          _______
     (Must be received by Jan. 15)
  Regular Registration $ 340          _______
  Ticket to Reception and Banquet
  for guests ($60 per person)         _______

TOTAL                                 _______

Payment must be made in U.S. Dollars, by bank draft drawn on a U.S. bank.

Accommodations for the Working Conference will be provided by the Hotel Park
Tucson.  Attendees should make their reservations prior to January 17 either by
mailing in the form below or telephoning the hotel.  The hotel can be reached
from the Tucson airport via rental car, taxi, or van.  Van service is provided
by the Arizona Stagecoach, at a cost of $7.50 each direction.  To make use of
this service, exit the airport to the curb and look for a van with "Arizona
Stagecoach" printed on the side.  No reservations are necessary.

HOTEL REGISTRATION FORM

2nd IFIP Working Conf. on Dependable Computing for
Critical Applications (February 18-20, 1991)

Return to: Hotel Park Tucson, 5151 E. Grant Road, Tucson, AZ 85712
      Phone: 1 (602) 323-6262  or  1 (800) 257-7275

Please reserve accommodations for:

Name:
Address:
Smoking (Yes/No):
Will Share Room With: _________________
Arrival Date: _____________ Time: _____
Departure Date: ___________ Time: _____
Telephone: ____________________________

Check-in time is 3:00 p.m. Check-out is 12 noon.  Reservations must be received
by January 17 to insure rate.  Rooms will be held until 6:00 p.m. on the date
of arrival.  To guarantee your reservation, please enclose a check for one
night's deposit or assure your reservation with a major credit card (American
Express, VISA, Mastercard, Carte Blanche).

Card Type: _________  Exp. Date: _____
Card #: ______________________________
Signature: ___________________________

Rates:                     # rooms  # people
Suite (One Bed)     $85      ______   ______
Suite (Two Beds)    $85      ______   ______

Suite accommodations are on a space availability basis.  All reservations
subject to sales and occupancy taxes.

For More Information:

Rick Schlichting                  Bill Sanders
General Chair                     Local Arrangements Chair
Dept. of Computer Science         Dept. of Elect. and Comp. Engin.
University of Arizona             University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721  USA             Tucson, AZ 85721  USA

Voice:  1 (602) 621-4324          Voice:  1 (602) 621-6181
FAX:    1 (602) 621-4246          FAX:    1 (602) 621-8076
email:  rick@cs.arizona.edu       email:  whs@ece.arizona.edu


FIRST CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY

Dorothy Denning <denning@src.dec.com>
10 Jan 1991 1519-PST (Thursday)
Please copy, post & circulate!      [Abridged by PGN.  Send EMAIL to
                                    jwarren@well.sf.ca.us for more info.]

         *********************************************************
         *  THE FIRST CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY *
         *********************************************************

             Pursuing Policies for the Information Age in the
                 Bicentennial Year of the Bill of Rights

     Tutorials & Invitational Conference, Limited to 600 Participants
                   Monday-Thursday, March 25-28, 1991

Airport SFO Marriott Hotel, Burlingame, California (San Francisco Peninsula)

Co-sponsors & cooperating organizations include
  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-USA
  Association for Computing Machinery      Electronic Networking Association
  Electronic Frontier Foundation           Videotex Industry Association
  Cato Institute                           American Civil Liberties Union
  ACM Special Interest Group on Software
  IEEE-USA Intellectual Property Committee
  ACM Special Interest Group on Computers and Society
  ACM Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights
  IEEE-USA Committee on Communications and Information Policy
  Autodesk, Inc.        The WELL           Portal Communications

Sponsored by the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
  A nonprofit educational corporation
(415)322-3778,  e-mail: cfp@well.sf.ca.us.  fax: (415)851-2814

ABOUT COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY

We are at a crossroads as individuals, organizations and governments depend
more and more on computers and computer networks.  Within ten years, most
global information will be collected and utilized electronically.

The 1990's are the pivotal decade in which statutes, policies and judicial
precedents will be developed for controlling access, use -- and abuse -- of
computerized information and electronic mail.

Current government and private-sector policies are an uncoordinated jumble,
created as  each group evolves ways  to collect, manipulate, extract,
share and protect computerized and networked information and services.

Data on individuals and groups is being computerized by numerous agencies,
organizations and special interests, often without the knowledge or approval
of those it concerns, and with varying degrees of accuracy.

Computers can greatly assist individuals, organizations and government in
making sound decisions based on efficient access to adequate information --
for personal benefit, business improvement and national well-being.

Or, inappropriate use and regulation can seriously threaten fundamental
freedoms, personal privacy, and the democratic processes that are at the
very foundation of this nation and of any free society.

ABOUT THE CONFERENCE SESSIONS (Tuesday-Thursday, March 26th-28th)

PLENARY SPEAKERS:

* Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School,
offering major policy proposals in the opening Conference session, "The
Constitution in Cyberspace: Law & Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier".

* Eli M. Noam, Director of the Center for Telecommunications and Information
Studies, Columbia University, and a recognized leader in telecommunications
regulation, international communications policies and economics, will discuss,
"Network Environments of the Future: Reconciling Free Speech and Freedom of
Association."

* William A. Bayse, Assistant Director, FBI Technical Services Division,
Washington DC, providing perspectives on "Balancing Computer Security
Capabilities with Privacy and Integrity" at the Wednesday evening banquet.

THE CONFERENCE SESSIONS offer diverse speakers & panel discussions:

Trends in Computers & Networks.  Overview and prognosis of computing
capabilities and networking as they impact personal privacy, confidentiality,
security, one-to-one & many-to-one communications, and access to information
about government, business and society.

International Perspectives & Impacts.  Other nations' models for protecting
personal information and communications, and granting access to government
information; existing and developing laws; requirements for trans-national
dataflow and their implications; impacts on personal expression;
accountability.

Personal Information & Privacy.  Government and private collection, sharing,
marketing, verification, use, protection of, access to and responsibility for
personal data, including buying patterns, viewing habits, lifestyle, work,
health, school, census, voter, tax, financial and consumer information.

Law Enforcement Practices & Problems.  Issues relating to investigation,
prosecution, due process and deterring computer crimes, now and in the future;
use of computers to aid law enforcement.

Law Enforcement & Civil Liberties.  Interaction of computer crime, law
enforcement and civil liberties; issues of search, seizure and sanctions,
especially as applied to shared or networked information, software and
equipment.

Legislation & Regulation.  Legislative and regulatory roles in protecting
privacy and insuring access; legal problems posed by computing and computer
networks; approaches to improving related government processes.

Computer-based Surveillance of Individuals.  Monitoring electronic-mail, public
& private teleconferences, electronic bulletin boards, publications and
subscribers; monitoring individuals, work performance, buying habits and
lifestyles.

Electronic Speech, Press & Assembly.  Freedoms and responsibilities regarding
electronic speech, public and private electronic assembly, electronic
publishing, prior restraint and chilling effects of monitoring.

Access to Government Information.  Implementing individual and corporate access
to federal, state & local information about communities, corporations,
legislation, administration, the courts and public figures; allowing access
while protecting confidentiality.

Ethics & Education.  Ethical principles for individuals, system administrators,
organizations, corporations and government; copying of data, copying of
software, distributing confidential information; relations to computer
education and computer law.

Where Do We Go From Here?  [closing session] Perspectives, recommendations and
commitments of participants from the major interest groups, proposed next steps
to protect personal privacy, protect fundamental freedoms and encourage
responsible policies and action.

Also: Tuesday and Wednesday will include structured opportunities for attendees
to identify groups with whom they want to establish contact and, if they wish,
announce topics they would like to discuss, one on one.

ABOUT THIS PREMIER EVENT

This is an intensive, multi-disciplinary survey Conference for those concerned
with computing, teleconferencing, electronic mail, computerized personal
information, direct marketing information, government data, etc. -- and those
concerned with computer-related legislation, regulation, computer security, law
enforcement and national and international policies that impact civil
liberties, responsible exercise of freedom and equitable protection of privacy
in this global Information Age.

For the first time, this four-day invitational event will bring together
representatives from all of these groups and more, all in one place, all at one
time.

Many of the recognized leaders and strongest advocates representing the various
groups having an interest in the issues of the conference will discuss their
concerns and proposals.

A maximum of 600 applicants will be invited to attend.  Balanced representation
from the diverse groups interested in these issues is being encouraged.  Please
see the enclosed Invitation Application for details.

To inform participants about topics beyond their specialties, half-day seminars
are scheduled for the first day (Monday, March 25th).  These parallel tutorials
will explore relevant issues in computing, networking, civil liberties,
regulation, the law and law enforcement.  Each tutorial is designed for those
who are experienced in one area, but are less knowledgeable in the subject of
that tutorial.

To explore the interactions and ramifications of the issues, conference talks
and panel discussions are scheduled for the remaining three days
(Tuesday-Thursday, March 26th-28th).  These will emphasize balanced
representation of all major views, especially including probing questions and
discussion.

Explicit Conference events to foster communication across disciplines are
planned.  Working luncheons, major breaks and two evening banquets will further
encourage individual and small-group discussions.

Speakers include (among others) Ken Allen, Sharon Beckman, Jerry Berman, Paul
Bernstein, Sally Bowman, David Burnham, Mary Culnan, Peter Denning, Dorothy
Denning, Dave Farber (UPenn), Cliff Figallo, David Flaherty, John Ford, Bob
Gellman, Janlori Goldman, Harry Hammit, Martin Hellman, Evan Hendricks, Lance
Hoffman, Don Ingraham, Bob Jacobson, Mitch Kapor, Tom Mandel, John McMullen,
Peter Neumann, Donn Parker, Ron Plesser, John Quarterman, Jack Rickard, Tom
Riley, Lance Rose, Marc Rotenberg, Noel Shipman, Harvey Silverglate, Gail
Thackeray, Robert Veeder, Willis Ware, Sheldon Zenner.

ABOUT THE LOW-COST TUTORIALS (Monday, March 25th)

Seminars on the first day offer introductions to the different disciplines
that intersect in this conference.  These are surveys for individuals not
already expert in the topics presented.  These half-day tutorials are
scheduled in four parallel tracks:

Global Communications & the Worldwide Computer Matrix.  [morning*]
  Survey of electronic-mail & teleconferencing services, global information
access, remote services and the matrix of networks.

Low-Cost Computer Networking & Computer Bulletin Board Systems. [afternoon*]
  Reviews e-mail, bulletin board and teleconferencing alternatives on
personal computers; outlines low-cost PC-based networks and their gateways
to the global matrix.
  -- Mark Graham*, co-founder of Institute for Global Communications,
PeaceNet and EcoNet; Pandora Systems

Current & Proposed International Policies.  [morning*]
  Law and regulation that will or may impact trans-border data-flow and
computer communications, impacting U.S. information practices and
international business.

Federal Legislation Impacting Computer Use.  [afternoon*]
  Detailed review of landmark federal statutes impacting access to
information, privacy of information, computer security and computer crime.
  -- Marc Rotenberg*, former congressional counsel and expert on federal
legislation, CPSR, Washington DC.

How Computer Crackers Crack!  [morning*]
  Suggested by a deputy district attorney specializing in high-tech crime,
this is for law enforcement officials, prosecutors, systems administrators
and Bulletin Board System (BBS) sysops.
  -- Russell Brand*, computer security specialist; programmer with
Reasoning Systems, Palo Alto CA.

How Computer Crime is Investigated.
  [afternoon*]  This reviews investigation, search, seizure and evidence
requirements for pursuing computer crime.  It is for computer users,
computer owners, BBS sysops and investigators unfamiliar with computer
crime practices.

Information Security.  [afternoon*]
  Survey for systems managers of internal and external threats, security
measures, alternatives and other computer and data security issues.
  -- Donn Parker*, a leading consultant in information security and
computer crime, SRI International.

* - Lecturers, descriptions and times were confirmed as of 1/8/91, but may
be subject to change.

CONFERENCE CHAIR
Jim Warren, Autodesk, Inc. & *MicroTimes*
  415-851-7075,  jwarren@well.sf.ca.us / e-mail

                   ============================
                   =  Request for Invitation  =
                   ============================
         First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy
                       March 25-28, 1991
     Monday: Tutorials,  Tuesday-Thursday: Conference Sessions
  SFO Marriott Hotel, 1800 Old Bayshore Hwy., Burlingame CA 94010
For hotel reservations at Conference rates, call:   (800)228-9290 #3

** Invitational Conference, limited to 600 participants. **
  To facilitate useful dialogue and balanced participation by representatives
from all of the diverse groups interested in these issues, attendance is
limited.  (The capacity of the Conference facility is similarly limited).
  All interested individuals are encouraged to request an invitation.
Invitations will be primarily issued on a first-come, first-served basis within
each major interest group.

  Fees if payment is received:    by Jan.31    Feb.1-Mar.15    after Mar.15
    Tutorials (full day)          $  95           $ 145           $ 195
    Conference (3 days)           $ 295           $ 350           $ 400
Conference Registration fee includes three luncheons, two banquet meetings
and selected handouts:
  Please make checks payable to "Computers, Freedom & Privacy/CPSR".
Please don't send cash.  Invitations will be promptly issued, or the
uncashed check will be voided and promptly returned.

Please type or print.  Thank ye, kindly.
name:
title:
organization:
mailing
    address:
city, state ZIP:
phone(s):
fax:
e-mail:

Comments to assist in evaluating this request:

To aid in balancing participation among groups,
  please check all significantly applicable items.
[ ]  user of computers or computer networking
[ ]  user of electronic-mail services
[ ]  user of teleconferencing services
[ ]  user of direct marketing services
[ ]  user of computerized personal information
[ ]  user of government information
[ ]  computer professional
[ ]  BBS sysop (bulletin board system operator)
[ ]  systems administrator / infosystems manager
[ ]  network administrator
[ ]  computer / communications security specialist
[ ]  provider of data communications services
[ ]  provider of electronic-mail services
[ ]  provider of teleconferencing services
[ ]  provider of direct marketing services
[ ]  provider of computerized personal information
[ ]  provider of government information
[ ]  legislative official            [ ] federal    [ ] state
[ ]  regulatory official or staff    [ ] federal    [ ] state
[ ]  law enforcement official        [ ] federal    [ ] state    [ ] local
[ ]  prosecutor                      [ ] federal    [ ] state    [ ] local
[ ]  judicial representative         [ ] federal    [ ] state    [ ] local
[ ]  criminal defense attorney
[ ]  corporate or litigation attorney
[ ]  civil liberties specialist
[ ]  journalist  [ ] newspaper    [ ] television    [ ] radio    [ ] other
[ ]  other:
[ ]  other:
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Please mail form and payment to:
  CFP Conference, 345 Swett Road, Woodside CA 94062

Privacy Notice: This information will not be sold, rented, loaned, exchanged or
used for any purpose other than official CPSR activity.  CPSR may elect to send
information about other activities, but such mailings will always originate
with CPSR.

Sponsor:  Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, (415)322-3778
A nonprofit, educational corporation  [ Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3) ]
e-mail: cfp@well.sf.ca.us;            fax: (415)851-2814
Chair: Jim Warren, (415)851-7075

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