The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 15 Issue 65

Friday 11 March 1994


o Using Caller ID to catch obscene callers
o Hard-drive headache
Robert Telka
o Digital Detritus
Eric Sosman
Stephen D Crocker
o Re: Maybe appalling grammar is bad language design
Mark Jackson
Alayne McGregor
o RISK to freedom of information
Philip Overy
o Re: Clipper
Mark Eckenwiler
Daniel B. Dobkin
o 13th Intrusion-Detection Workshop
Teresa Lunt
o First announcement of COMPASS '94, program and info
Teresa Lunt
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Using Caller ID to catch obscene callers

<[an anonymous contributor]>
Thu, 10 Mar 94 xx:yy:zz xxT
   The recently reported case of the woman using caller ID to catch an obscene
caller was noteworthy only because of its relative rarity.  Fewer and fewer
such callers are stupid enough these days to make such calls from other than
payphones, and most won't hang around the phone long enough to get caught.  To
the extent that an idiot does stay around, use of the call-trace feature that
is an integral part of the new systems (which provides the number instantly to
the telco, rather than to the callee) would provide the same info in a much
less invasive manner.
   The telcos know full well (all you have to do is read their own literature)
that the real reason they push caller ID is to provide businesses with tools
for phone number collection of inbound callers for building of telemarketing
lists.  Its overall usefulness for dealing with harassing calls is quite
limited, and becoming less so every day as more and more of the callers catch

Hard-drive headache!

Robert Telka <>
Thu, 10 Mar 94 16:03:42 EST
Lisa Balkes' story of the Janitor interrupting the UPS brought back to mind a
problem which I ran into this past summer.  I will keep the company anonymous
to protect it's identity.  I was employed there during the summer as a student
programmer/analyst.  On with the story!

A new alarm system was being installed at company P over one weekend.
The installers had to access the climate controlled computer room
where company P's Prime system was located to incorporate the
thermometer with the alarm system (if the air conditioner conks out,
and the room gets too warm, the alarm is set off).

The installers were let into the room by the plant manager who was
working that week, however there is an unwritten rule that only
authorized personnel are to enter the room, and any unauthorized
people are to be escorted.

When we arrived Monday morning, two of our three hard drives in the
drive cabinet where crashed.  We also noticed that the cabinet had
been physically moved a few centimetres (there was an imprint of its
original position left on the floor).  The security alarm installers
insisted that they did not move the units, yet they must have since
they were the only people to enter the locked room that weekend.
Since nobody saw them do it, we had no proof (the plant manager left
them alone in the room).

We were supposedly prepared for an event where one of our boot-up
drives crashed, however the backup unit and the main unit were the two
which crashed.  It took about a month and a half and 4 refurbished
drives later to get us up and running.

A few weeks after we were up and running fully, there was an
electrical fire in the manufacturing plant, at the point were the
electricity came into the plant.  Fortunately, the system was saved
from being fried, but we had to deal with the soot from the fire.

Because there was no electricity, we were able to bring in diesel
electric generators and get the computers up and running (since our
computer was accessed by our salesmen and by company P's other
manufacturing plants).  The generated electricity was "dirty" and our
UPS consistently complained and would go online.

Also, during the evenings when no one was around, the electricity
consumption decreased, and somehow the generator would detect that and
do something to the electricity such that the UPS would kick in.  For
a week we came into work with the UPS beeping in morse code SOS, and
our system would be down, until we temporarily solved the problem by
leaving all the lights and personal computers on during the evenings.

Needless to say, it was an exciting and unpredictable summer, with
lots of long hours, frustrations, and rewards.  And company P is still
operating today.

Risks?  No matter how prepared you are, you are never prepared enough.

Robert Telka, Computing & Communications Services, Carleton University, Ottawa,
Ontario, Canada

Digital Detritus

Eric Sosman x4425 <>
Thu, 10 Mar 94 16:12:48 EST
In RISKS-15.64, (John C. Rivard) reports that "A News editor had
a composting room worker sneak along a copy of the digital photo file, without
the knowledge of the Free Press."

I wondered idly what kind of pitchfork would be best for digital compost, but
came to no earth-shaking conclusions.  Despite mental ferment, I made, as they
say, no hay.  Eventually, I moved on to the next article ... in which (Don Norman) speculated that "Maybe appalling grammar is bad
language design."

There are moments when the enjoyment to be derived from digitized
debate seems to outweigh almost any RISK.

Eric Sosman, Interleaf, Inc., Prospect Place, 9 Hillside Ave.
Waltham, MA 02154

Digital Destritus (Re: RISKS-15.64)

Stephen D Crocker <>
Thu, 10 Mar 94 13:21:31 -0500
> ... a composting room worker ...

Hmmm... We always known what news people handle, but it's nice to know they
know too.

I don't recall the outcome, but there were some lawsuits a while ago
concerning the government's right to paw through your trash after you put it
on the street.  Is compost material protected by intellectual property laws or
the first amendment?  I suppose one could argue about a right to privacy...


   [An interesting question relates to information residues and remanence.
   When can useful information be reconstructed from compost?  PGN]

Maybe appalling grammar is bad language design (RISKS-15.64)

Thu, 10 Mar 1994 11:29:04 PST
> With words that are homonyms, so the same spelling indicates contraction
> and possession, the rule is that contraction wins use of the '.  Hence,
> "It's not its fault," where "it's" is a contraction and "its" is a
> possessive.

> Try explaining that to a non-native speaker of English.  Hell, try
> explaining that to a native speaker.

In either case, try explaining it *correctly*.  There is no such "contraction
wins" rule.  "Its", like "his" and "her," is a possessive pronoun, not a noun
requiring "'s" (or "'", if already ending in s) to form a possessive.  One
does not even think of writing "I threw hi's ball over the fence,"
notwithstanding the fact that "his" has no homonym.

> If English weren't so stingy with symbols and used different symbols for
> possession and contraction, then we wouldn't have any problem.

An extremely unlikely statement on its face, and completely unsupported by the
preceding argument.

Mark Jackson

Which Johnson? (was Maybe appalling grammar is bad language design)

Alayne McGregor <>
Fri, 11 Mar 1994 09:31:49 -0500
I would have more sympathy with Don Norman's comments about bad language
design (RISKS-15.64) if he hadn't confused the great lexicographer with a
[...] runner.

  _Samuel_ Johnson, please!

Mr. Norman has, however, produced an interesting analogy. Any software
designer who thinks that his/her design will survive many iterations of fixes
and upgrades might look at the evolution of languages for a cautionary

Alayne McGregor,

RISK to freedom of information

Philip Overy <>
Fri, 11 Mar 94 09:53:33 GMT
"Freedom of information" means literally "freedom to defend yourself", ie "the
right to live". States can falsify information on a grand scale (eg make
computers) and do pretend to respect human rights (which I would argue is a
weak claim, but the UK and the USA do indeed make that claim, and spend a
fairly derisory but not non-existent sum to "prove" it); if you can attribute
heinous crimes, such as child pornography, to someone, then you can destroy
them.  Clipper in effect destroys the value of computer evidence ("it must be
faked"), so I am glad in a way that the public scepticism of computer
"evidence" is about to be reinforced.  I don't believe that the law enforcers
will thank Clinton, once they realise the true effect of Clipper on their
cases - everyone will claim that the police "of course" knew all about their
personal life and then falsified suitable evidence to substantiate a
tailor-made case.  They will edit their own version and insert points at which
the police "made it all up" (as they do in many non-computerised defences).  I
await with interest the first defence on these lines when Clipper hits the

Phil Overy, Rutherford-Appleton Laboratory

Re: Clipper (Henson, RISKS-15.64)

Mark Eckenwiler <>
11 Mar 1994 03:02:02 -0500
Since Mr. Henson speaks of "Clipper" (and not Skipjack generally), I
assume he's referring strictly to telephonic communications.  He's
incorrect in implying that a Magistrate Judge can issue a wiretap
warrant; Title III makes quite clear that they *cannot*.  See _In re
United States_, 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993).

>These magistrates (who are *not* judges, but work for the US Attorney's
>office) tend to be busy, or lazy or corrupt or all three.

Mr. Henson also misstates the facts here.  Magistrate Judges most assuredly do
not work for the US Attorneys nor for the Department of Justice.  They are
Article I judicial officers; in my experience, they are no more or less "lazy
or corrupt" than life-tenure, Article III federal judges.

And for the record, I oppose Clipper.

Magistrate-Judges (hkhenson, RISKS 15.64)

"Daniel B. Dobkin" <>
Fri, 11 Mar 94 11:38:41 EST
In RISKS-15.64, hkhenson notes that

   The risk under Clipper is that your private communications will be
   protected by the *weakest* link in the chain--one of the thousands of
   low level Magistrate-Judges among whom corrupt or zealous law
   enforcement agents shop for warrants and will shop for keys.

This is hardly the only risk under Clipper, nor are the federal magistrates
necessarily the weakest link in the chain: your conclusion is based on an
incorrect understanding of the law and the role of U.S. Magistrate-Judges.

   These magistrates (who are *not* judges, but work for the US Attorney's
   office) tend to be busy, or lazy or corrupt or all three.

The magistrates *are* judges.  They do not work for the U.S. Attorney's
office, but for the United States District Court.  The magistrates are
appointed by the District Court which they serve, for nine-year terms; the
District Court judges (who appoint the magistrates) are appointees of the
President, and serve for life.  Magistrates are as well-qualified as the
judges they serve, and have the same duties, responsibilities, and powers.
They do tend to be busy; in my experience, they are not likely to be any
more lazy or corrupt than any other federal judge.

   As in this case, even if the law is *directly quoted* in search warrant
   affidavits or key requests, and these laws *expressly forbid* granting
   warrants or key requests under the conditions cited, the magistrate may
   not even read the supporting affidavit before approving it.  He is
   *very* unlikely to read or consider the underlying laws when granting a

This is no more true of a federal magistrate than of any other judge, in
either the federal or state court systems.  As a rule, judges *do* try to
make sure that the application is lawful and that the rules for granting it
are applied appropriately.  Sometimes a bad application gets through, and
some judges unquestionably treat such applications more favorably than
others.  This is a general problem with "the system" and is not unique to
Clipper.  There *might* be an enhanced risk with Clipper because the bench
(almost by definition) is inhabited by generalists who are called upon to
be "instant experts" in many areas; they must rely on others to provide
them with sufficient technical insight to allow an informed decision.
Sometimes that insight is provided entirely by the applicant; very often,
it is provided by the judge's law clerk.

   The key escrow agents provide no protection whatsoever since they simply
   fill orders from agents with approved applications.

This, in fact, is a much more troubling weakness with the Clipper proposal,
and one which has been discussed at length in other fora.  While Clipper does
introduce some very weak links into the security chain, judicial oversight is
not one of them --- that particular link is not changed at all.  (One could
even argue that because the technology makes wiretaps so much easier, judges
might actually be less inclined to approve every application that comes their


13th Intrusion-Detection Workshop

Teresa Lunt <>
Thu, 10 Mar 94 10:35:03 -0800
                             May 19-20, 1994
                            SRI International
                       Menlo Park, California, USA

You are invited to attend a two-day workshop on intrusion detection to be held
at SRI International in Menlo Park, California on May 19-20, 1994, which are
the Thursday and Friday following the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Research in
Security and Privacy in Oakland, California.  This will be the thirteenth in a
series of intrusion-detection workshops.  The workshop will begin at 9am and
will conclude at 5pm on Thursday, and will be from 9am to 2pm on Friday.

The workshop will consist of several short presentations as well as discussion
periods.  If you and/or your colleagues wish to attend or have questions,
please send E-mail to Liz Luntzel,, or call her at
415-859-3285.  Specify your name, title, affiliation, address, and phone
number.  You can also send us a fax at 415-859-2844.  Directions to SRI will
be provided on request.

If you have any progress to report on an intrusion-detection project or some
related work that would be appropriate for a short presentation, please
indicate the title and a paragraph describing your proposed talk.  You can
also indicate suggestions for discussion topics.

There will be a $100 charge for the workshop.  This fee includes lunches in
SRI's International Dining Room.  Please send your check to Liz Luntzel,
EL248, SRI International, Computer Science Laboratory, 333 Ravenswood Avenue,
Menlo Park, California 94025-3493.

First announcement of COMPASS '94, program and info

Teresa Lunt <>
Fri, 11 Mar 94 15:17:31 -0800
                           COMPASS '94
                     June 27 - July 1, 1994
            Ninth Annual Conference on Computer Assurance
      Systems Integrity, Software Safety, and Process Security
   National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD

COMPASS Sponsors    IEEE Aerospace and Electronics Systems Society
                    IEEE National Capital Area Council

In Cooperation With British Computer Society

    FOR General Information, Registration Form, and Hotel Info,
    PLEASE SEND E-mail to or FTP from
    RISKS archives on CRVAX.SRI.COM
                    CD RISKS:
                    GET compass.94

Conference Sponsors
  Arca Systems, Inc.  ARINC Research Corporation  Control Systems Analysis, Inc
  CTA, Inc.  Logicon, Inc.  National Institute of Standards and Technology
  Naval Research Laboratory  Naval Surface Warfare Center  Systems Safety Soc.
  TRW Systems Division   U.S. General Accounting Office

COMPASS is an annual conference committed to bringing together researchers,
developers, and evaluators who work on problems related to specifying,
building, and certifying high-assurance computer systems.  What distinguishes
COMPASS from similar conferences is its emphasis on bridging the gap between
research and practice.  Researchers are provided an opportunity to present
results, new theories, and new technologies to both other researchers and
practitioners who can put them to practice.  They can also learn from
practitioners of new research problem domains and of problems encountered in
building real systems.  Practitioners have an opportunity to share lessons
learned, to learn of new research, and to influence future research.

Welcome to COMPASS 94, the ninth in a series of annual symposia on Computer
Assurance. This year's conference focuses on both the use and assessment of
formal methods and on alternatives to formal verification in a variety of
critical areas:
                       * Safety
                       * Reliability
                       * Fault Tolerance
                       * Concurrency and Real Time
                       * Security

At COMPASS, the diverse program and small conference atmosphere provide plenty
of opportunity for audience and speakers to mingle and share their
experiences.  The audience bring their own wealth of knowledge, and
interchanges among industry, members of government agencies, and academia
provide unique opportunities to discuss current requirements and future needs.
We invite you to participate and increase the benefits of COMPASS by your


 8:00 am            Registration Opens

 9:00 am - 4:00 pm  Tutorial (Lunch on your own)

1.  "Formal Software Development Using Z", John McDermid, University of York

Much has been written about the benefit of formal methods for developing high
integrity software — but there are relatively few examples of successful use
of formal methods on large scale projects.  This tutorial demonstrates that
cost-effective formal software development is now possible, using Z and a
refinement approach into Ada that is supported by two tools: CADiZ and ZETA.
CADiZ supports the production and analysis of Z specifications.  ZETA supports
formal, rigorous or informal stepwise development of Ada from Z specifications
(in compliance with the UK Interim Defence Standard 00-55) in a cost-effective
way that enables the user to determine the level of rigor for the refinement.
Examples will be offered, and the tools will be demonstrated in support of the


 8:00 am  Registration Opens

 9:00 am - 4:00 pm  Tutorials (Parallel Sessions) (Lunch on your own)

2.  [FULL DAY]  "Software System Evaluation and Certification"
Hans-Ludwig Hausen, GMD (German National Research Center for Computer Science)

Software quality evaluation and certification have been recognized as
important issues for the American, European and especially the Japanese
software industry.  This tutorial focuses on the methods and tools for the
evaluation and assessment of software products and processes. Particular
emphasis is given to identifying and selecting software characteristics and
metrics and the handling of evaluation methods and tools.  The impact of the
SEI Capability Maturity Model, SPICE, ISO 9000 series, ISO 12119, ISO 9126 and
the EVALUATION METHOD will be discussed in detail.

 9:00 am - 12 Noon [HALF DAY]
3.  "Software Hazard Analysis",  Nancy Leveson, University of Washington

The goals and techniques of software hazard analysis will be presented and
general procedures, including new state machine algorithms, discussed.  Topics
include Software System Hazard Analysis and Software Requirements Analysis.
Finally, an example using a real application (TCAS II) will be offered.

 12 Noon - 1:00 pm  Lunch (on your own)

 1:00 pm - 4:00 pm [HALF DAY]
4.  "Practicing Software Safety in a Virtual Corporation"
Frank Houston, Weinberg, Spelton, & Sax, Inc.

In this half-day tutorial, the participants will play the roles of
entrepreneurs who are developing a new medical device.  The goal is for
participants to develop the preliminary concept for the device, including
safety requirements.  If time permits, participants will develop a plan for
validation and verification of the device, addressing regulatory Good
Manufacturing Practice issues in the process.


 8:00 am Registration and Tools Fair Open (tools that will be exhibited are
listed at the end of this Agenda)

 9:30 am - 10:00 am Welcoming Remarks

James H. Burrows, Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, NIST
Jarrellann Filsinger, General Chair and John McLean, Program Chair

10:00 am - 11:00 am Keynote Address, Jerry O. Tuttle, VADM USN (RET.)

11:30 am -  1:00 pm SAFETY I

"Experience Applying the CoRE Method to the Lockheed C-130J Software
Requirements", Stuart Faulk, Lisa Finneran, James Kirby (SPC) and James Sutton
(Time Plus)

"AeSOP: An Interactive Failure Mode Analysis Tool", Stephen S. Cha (The
Aerospace Corp.)

"A Development of Hazard Analysis to Aid Software Design", John McDermid and
D. J. Pumfrey (University of York)


"Formal Methods in Language Design", David Guaspari (ORA)

"Case Study: Applying Formal Methods to the Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS)", Joan J. Britt (MITRE)

"Formal Methods and Dependability Assessment", V. Stavridou, S. Liu, and B.
Dutertre (University of London)


"Using Formal Methods to Derive Test Frames in Category-Partition Testing",
Paul Ammann and Jeff Offutt (George Mason University)

"Application of an Informal Program Verification Method to Ada", Bruce Wieand
(IBM) and William E. Howden (University of California)

 5:00 pm  Tools Fair Closes


 8:00 am  Registration and Tools Fair Open

 9:30 am - 11:00 am FAULT TOLERANCE

"Centurion Software Fault Tolerance Design and Analysis Tool", G. Steve
Wakefield (SRS), Roger Dziegiel (Air Force Rome Lab), and Laura L. Pullum
(Quality Research Associates)

"Estimation of Coverage Probabilities for Dependability Validation of
Fault-Tolerant Computing Systems", Cristian Constantinescu (Duke University)

"Formal Verification of an Interactive Consistency Algorithm for the Draper
FTP Architecture Under a Hybrid Fault Model", Patrick Lincoln and John Rushby
(SRI International)


"State Minimization for Concurrent System Analysis Based on State Space
Exploration", Inhye Kang and Insup Lee (University of Pennsylvania)

"Compositional Model Checking of Ada Tasking Programs", Jeffrey Fischer
(Verdix) and Richard Gerber (University of Maryland)

"An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Towards Physically-Correct
Specifications of Embedded Real-Time Systems", Azer Bestavros (Boston


Dick Hamlet (Portland State University)
William E. Howden (University of California)
Keith Miller (Sangamon State University)
Jeffrey Voas (Reliable Software Technologies Corp.)

 4:00 pm  - 5:00 pm HARDWARE VERIFICATION

"A Formal Model of Several Fundamental VHDL Concepts", David M. Goldschlag

"Experiences Formally Verifying a Network Component", Paul Curzon (University
of Cambridge)

 5:00 pm  Tools Fair Closes

 6:30 pm  BANQUET, Speaker: Brian Randell (University of Newcastle)


 8:00 am  Registration and Tools Fair Open
 9:30 am -11:00 am  SAFETY II

"Evaluating Software for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Plants", J. Dennis
Lawrence, Warren L. Persons, and G. Gary Preckshot (Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory)

"An Approach for the Quality Analysis of Safety Specifications", Amer Saeed,
Rogerio de Lemos, and Tom Anderson (University of Newcastle)

"Causality as a Means for the Expression of Requirements for Safety Critical
Systems", Andrew Coombes, John McDermid, and Philip Morris (University of

11:30 am  Tools Fair Closes

11:30 am -  1:00 pm SECURITY

"Covert Channels — Here to Stay?", Ira S. Moskowitz and Myong H. Kang (NRL)

"An Experience Modeling Critical Requirements", Charles N. Payne, Andrew P.
Moore, and David M. Mihelcic (NRL)

"On Measurement of Operational Security", Sarah Brocklehurst and Bev
Littlewood (City University) and Tomas Olovsson and Erland Jonsson (Chalmers
University of Technology)

 1:00 pm  Adjourn Technical Program


AdaWise, Penelope Romulus, Larch-Ada
McCabe Toolset
ModeChart Toolset
Boundary Flow Covert Channel Analysis

Conference General Co-Chairs:
    Jarrellann Filsinger, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, H.O. Lubbes, NRL
Program Chair: John McLean, NRL
Arrangements: Laura M. Ippolito, NIST
Publications: Ann Boyer, Control Systems Analysis
Publicity:  Paul Anderson, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
Registration:  Karen Ferraiolo, Arca Systems, Inc.
Treasurer:  Bonnie P. Danner, TRW Systems Division
Tutorials:  John J. Marciniak, CTA, Inc.
Tools Fair:  Charles N. Payne, NRL

Program Committee   Paul Ammann, George Mason University
George Dinolt, Loral
Jarrellann Filsinger, Booz-Allen & Hamilton
Virgil Gligor, University of Maryland
Li Gong, SRI International
Connie Heitmeyer, NRL
Jeremy Jacob, University of York
Carl Landwehr, NRL
Teresa Lunt, SRI International
John J. Marciniak, CTA, Inc.
John McDermid, University of York
John McHugh, Portland State University
Jon Millen, MITRE
David Parnas, McMaster University
John Rushby, SRI International
Ravi Sandhu, George Mason University
Jeannette Wing, Carnegie Mellon University

Board of Directors  Chair:  Dolores R. Wallace, NIST
Vice-Chair:  Anthony Shumskas, Logicon, Inc.
Treasurer:  Dario DeAngelis, Logicon, Inc.
Secretary:  Judy Bramlage, U.S. General Accounting Office
IEEE AESS:  Robert Ayers, ARINC, Inc.
IEEE NCAC:  Arthur Cotts
Members: Michael L. Brown, Naval Surface Warfare Center;
         Jarrellann Filsinger, Booz-Allen & Hamilton;
         Frank Houston, Weinberg, Spelton, & Sax, Inc.;
         H.O. Lubbes, Naval Research Laboratory

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