The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 15 Issue 76

Monday 18 April 1994

Contents

o "Friendly Fire" --- U.S. F-15s take out U.S. Black Hawks
PGN
o The Green-Card Flap
PGN
o Data-storage technique provides copy protection
Meine van der Meulen
o Yet another example of software modification risks
Jim Dukelow
o Re: Risks ... to the quality of science [randomness]
Steen Hansen
o MIT student arrested for BBS used for pirate software
Fredrick B. Cohen
o Credit-Card Fraud
Greg Philmon
o NII and the US Card
Bill Murray
o Reckless Baby Bell Marketing
Alan Miller
o Re: P.R. China Computer Security Rules
Tom Albertson
Dan Sorenson
o Delayed Dial Tone causes unintentional 911 calls
Chonoles Michael Jesse
o Information resource
Michael Enlow
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

"Friendly Fire" --- U.S. F-15s take out U.S. Black Hawks

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Mon, 18 Apr 94 14:51:28 PDT
  [This item may be old news now, but is included for the archives.]

Despite elaborate precautions designed to prevent such an occurrence, two
American F-15C fighter planes shot down two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters in the no-fly zone over northern Iraq on 14 Apr 1994, in broad
daylight, in an area that had been devoid of Iraqi aircraft for many months.
One Sidewinder heat-seeking missile and one Amraam radar-guided missile were
fired.  The fighters were operating under the communication control of an
AWACS plane, which was the first to detect the helicopters, and instructed the
F-15s to check the situation out.  The helicopters were carrying U.S.,
British, French and Turkish officers from the U.N. office in Zakho, in
northern Iraq, and were heading eastward for a meeting with Kurdish leaders in
Salahaddin.  Both towns are close to the Turkish border, well north of the
26th parallel that delimits the no-fly zone.  All 26 aboard were killed.

Both helicopter pilots apparently failed to perform the routine operation of
notifying the AWACS plane after their last takeoff.  Both helicopters
apparently failed to respond to the Identification: Friend or Foe (IFF)
requests from the fighters.  Both fighter pilots apparently did not try voice
communications.  A visual flyby apparently misidentified the clearly marked
("U.N.") planes as Iranian MI-24s.  Furthermore, a briefing had apparently
been held the day before for the appropriate personnel of all of those
aircraft (F-15s, UH-60s, and AWACS).  There was speculation as to whether the
pilots of both helicopters might have neglected to turn on their transponders,
or whether the frequencies were set incorrectly, or whether both transponders
failed (or perhaps some hybrid scenario).  There was speculation that the
fighter pilots did not try all three of the IFF modes available to them.
There was also speculation that the Black Hawks may have visually resembled
Russian helicopters because they were carrying extra external fuel tanks.  But
the AWACS plane personnel should have been aware of the entire operation,
because they were acting as battlefield coordinators.

Perhaps someone panicked.  An unidentified senior Pentagon offical was quoted
as asking "What was the hurry to shoot them down?"

[Sources: various press reports in The New York Times and other papers,
15 Apr 1994 and 18 Apr 1994.]

"Friendly fire" (also called fratricide, amicicide, and "misadventure") is not
uncommon.  An item by Rick Atkinson in The Washington Post (15 Apr 1994) noted
that 24 percent of the Americans killed in action -- 35 out of 146 -- in the
Persian Gulf war were killed by U.S. forces.  Also, 15 percent of those
wounded -- 72 out of 467 -- were similarly victimized.  RISKS noted earlier
the British Warrior armored vehicles that, mistaken for Iraqi T-55 tanks, were
zapped by U.S. Maverick missiles, killing 9 men and wounding 11 others.
Atkinson's article noted that this is an old problem, citing a Confederate
sentry who shot his commander, Stonewall Jackson, in 1863, during the Civil
War; an allied bomber that bombed the 30th Infantry Division after the
invasion of Normandy in July 1944; and a confused bomber pilot who killed 42
U.S.  paratroopers and wounded 45 in the November 1967 battle of Hill 875 in
Vietnam.  The old adage was never more appropriate: With friends like this,
who needs enemies?

The Black Hawk incident also brings back memories of the Soviet shootdown of
the Korean KAL 007 flight and the Vincennes' shootdown of an Iranian Airbus.


The Green-Card Flap

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Mon, 18 Apr 94 15:12:17 PDT
RISKS received a huge amount of mail relating to the husband-and-wife Phoenix
immigration-law-firm, Canter & Siegel.  Offering their legal services, they
posted an advertisement on 5000 newsgroups, and gave information on a
forthcoming lottery that will give out 55,000 green cards (granting permanent
residency in the United States).  C&S received at least 30,000 responses,
mostly protesting their use of the Internet for advertising.

Internet Direct suspended the C&S account for violation of the customer
service agreement.  I.D. had to put up with the thousands of pieces of
objections.  [This gives a new meaning to OBJECT-oriented E-mail.]  C&S
threatened to sue for I.D. for $250,000 for the lost responses.  At least one
site crashed repeatedly because of mail saturation.

This reminds me once again of all the varied problems that I have with the
fly-by-night it's-not-quite-the-Internet providers.  One of them rejects mail
after you hit your quota of external mail for the month.  Some include the
entire mailing list on each RISKS mailing, as noted earlier.  Many do not
permit FTP, but offer thousands of users the opportunity to invoke the
almost-costfree availability of my pro-bono but not timefree services.  Is
regulation an answer?  I shudder at the thought.

I cannot begin to summarize the RISKS mail on this subject, and certainly
would risk losing most of our subscribers if I ran the whole collection.  The
issues include the usual stuff about whether the no-advertising policy even
exists, whether it is a per-newsgroup question or an Internet policy question,
who actually controls the Internet, and all those topics familiar to RISKS
folks.  Perhaps we are waiting in expectation of the ultimate scam from New
Haven, which might be considered a violation of Con-netiquette.


Data-storage technique provides copy protection

<MEULEN@tno.nl>
Thu, 14 Apr 1994 13:26 +0100 (MET)
Data storage technique provides copy protection

Summarized and translated from
 "Intermediair", 1 April 1994, Vol. 30, Nr. 13, p. 35.

Universities of Plymouth (in the U.K.) and Washington DC developed a technique
to write five times as much information on magnetic media as floppy discs or
bank cards.  The magnetic layer is composed of small magnetic particles. Every
bit is "remembered" by polarising several thousands of them in the same
direction.  This is done to overcome noise, due to the random orientation of
the particles.  The new technique only uses a fifth of the number of particles
used in conventional techniques. It reads the information on the medium
directly after writing it. By comparing the real magnetisation with the
expected one, a chip determines the deviations in the medium. Based on that,
information about these deviations is also written on the medium. Later, this
enables flawless read out.  An extra feature of this technique is that the
information about the deviations is unique for every medium, comparable to a
fingerprint. This means that when a bank cheques this fingerprint, it can
detect fraud copies of bank cards.

Meine van der Meulen  TNO-Industrial Safety Department  meulen@tno.nl


Yet another example of software modification risks

<js_dukelow@gate.pnl.gov>
Fri, 15 Apr 1994 13:16 -0800 (PST)
The following is a slightly edited version of a report from the latest issue
of the Department of Energy Operating Experience Weekly Summary, which is a
vehicle for rapid dissemination to other DOE organizations and contractors of
occurrences at DOE facilities.

"On January 17, 1994, the earthquake in Southern California caused
widespread power outages in the western portion of the United States, and
commercial power was lost at a DOE chemical processing facility.  When
commercial power was lost, a standby diesel generator automatically
started and supplied power to critical loads.  During a power transient
caused by starting a large load on the diesel generator, four electric
motors dropped off line and did not respond to a start command even though
individual controllers indicated a ready-to-start condition.  Facility
personnel had to completely de-energize and then re-energize the motor
controllers before the motors could be re-started.

"After commercial power was restored, facility personnel determined that
the porblem could not be duplicated for partially loaded generator
conditions or with commercial power supplying the standby motor control
center.  Investigators determined that all the affected motors were
connected to the same standby motor control center which was equipped with
new digital motor protectors.  Facility personnel developed a series of
test procedures to determine the cause of the problem.  After extensive
testing, they determined that the motor protectors developed a software
lockup after a power transient.  During a simulation of the loss of
commercial power, investigators determined that there was a correlation
between voltage swings caused by starting a large load on the standby
generator and the software lockup of the motor protector.  The motor
protector lockup resulted in the motor tripping off and not restarting
until control power was removed and re-applied.

"Facility personnel contacted the motor protector vendor with the results
of the tests conducted at the facility.  Vendor personnel confirmed
the test results and reported that they had isolated the problem to
specific units with firmware version F3, introduced in the fourth
quarter of 1991.  The vendor reported that units manufactured from
1987 through the third quarter of 1991 were not affected.

"The vendor also reported that the units operated properly if the control
voltage is maintained within plus or minus ten per cent of nominal
voltage.  If the control voltage surges beyond this range, the motor
protector may trip the motor and require a power down to reset itself.
The vendor offered to modify the affected units to eliminate the power
reset after a voltage surge.

"DOE facility personnel are advised to inspect their facilities for the
suspect motor protector and take appropriate corrective actions."


The risk associated with this event is that a software modification in
1991 rendered the standby electrical power system partially unable to
fulfill its safety function.  The root cause of this situation was that
software engineer(s) involved in this modification (which was perhaps the
initial digitally-controlled version of this component) were not fully
aware of the actual operating environment (in this case, voltage swings
greater that +/- 10% when the standby power system was doing what it was
designed to do) of the digitally-controlled component.

Jim Dukelow  Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories  js_dukelow@pnl.gov


Re: Risks ... to the quality of science (Ruderman, RISKS-15.75)

Steen Hansen <steen@kiwi.swhs.ohio-state.edu>
Thu, 14 Apr 94 08:09:46 -0400
Some years ago I upgraded the operating system of a minicomputer. A few weeks
later a faculty member became very upset: his research results had changed.
Apparently the upgrade changed the random-number generator, which made his
statistical programs give a different result.  He demanded the original
generator be put back in again.

Steen Hansen, Computer Specialist, Ohio State University   hansen+@osu.edu
(614) 292-9317 (Stores/Food: Tue/Thu/Fri) (614) 292-5174 (Dentistry: Mon/Wed)


MIT student arrested for BBS used for pirate software

Fredrick B. Cohen <fc@Jupiter.SAIC.Com>
Fri, 15 Apr 94 17:11:42 PDT
An MIT student was arrested today for having a BBS at the school that was used
by the participants to store and fetch commercial software.  This one made the
national news because of the promenance of the institution and the information
superhypeway, but this sort of arrest has been going on for years in the
"hacker" bulleting boards of the US.  There is now a substantial history of
these operators being convicted, but I have to question whether MIT should be
arrested for allowing the BBS to reside on its computers.  After all, if the
BBS superuser can be arrested for unknowingly having the software on their
BBS, why can't the institution be arrested as well?

    But the issue goes far deeper than this.  At its core, we have the
multitudes of people trying to tell us that the information superHW should
have public access points and public spaces, but what happens when a public
space is used for crime? The criminal is not arrested; instead, the person who
provided the space is arrested.  If we are to have public space on our info
superHW, we had better stop arresting those who provide it for the crimes
perpetrated in it.  Otherwise, there will be a chilling effect on those who
would provide it.

    How does this relate to RISKS? It should be obvious.  If you have a
party, and someone who attends commits a crime, you may be sent to jail for
it.  No precedent? Huh! If someone is drinking at your house or bar, and you
fail to prevent them, and they drive away and get in an accident, you may be
liable.

I anxiously await your responses on the policy issues at play here.  FC


Credit-Card Fraud

Greg Philmon <philmon@netcom.com>
Thu, 14 Apr 1994 05:50:38 -0700
A friend recently applied for a credit card from a major issuer.  Later he
received a call from the bank informing him that his card was in a batch that
was stolen somewhere along the delivery route.  Over $4000 had been charged to
his card in a 24 hour period.

This was once quite common.  However, most card issuers now use an automated
system to "activate" the card.  Usually it involves dialing an 800 number and
entering some "secret" information (e.g. your birth date, ssn, etc).

As it turns out, my friend's wife had received a phone call from someone
claiming to work for the issuer.  He said that they wanted to verify his
application and asked for the his full name and SSN, which she gave.

The automated authorization system of this issuer asks for the last four
digits of your SSN.

I'm really curious what sort of success rate was achieved by the thieves.
Did they get fifty percent of the card owners to give their SSNs?  More?

Greg Philmon | philmon@netcom.com | CIS: 71161,3445 | MCI: 588-5358


NII and the US Card

<WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL>
Sat, 16 Apr 94 16:06 EDT
Last week in the security track of the CardTech/SecureTech Conference, I heard
a presentation by a representative of the U.S. Postal Service on the "US
Card."  This is a piece of the national information infrastructure intended to
mediate all government services to and controls over the citizen.

It will contain health care data, financial data, tax data, and identity data.
It will contain a private key (digital signatures only), a PIN, and other
identifying data.  (While emphasizing that "open to new applications" was a
requirement of the system, he was silent on arrest record, voter registration,
gender preference, and previous condition of servitude.)

Use of the card will be "voluntary."  The government is doing this for us
because it will enable them to give us better service, because the citizens
require "one card," and to protect us from the "twenty million 'little
brothers'" that we now recognize as the "real threat to our privacy."  (He did
not claim that this would protect us from terrorists, child molestors, drug
dealers, or religious cults.)  (All of this was delivered with a perfectly
straight face and without challenge from the audience.)  Of course if we do
not like it, we can do away with it, right?

The official stated that the Postal Service is prepared to issue a ahundred
million of these cards within months of getting the go ahead.

Along with the net, "voluntary" fingerprinting of the poor, CLIPPER, and the
FBI's digital telephony initiative, what more could any citizen, not to say
government, ask for?  Law and order is just around the corner.

Aren't you glad to hear that Orwell had it all wrong?

William Hugh Murray, Information System Security, 49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104
New Canaan, CT 06840  1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL


Reckless Baby Bell Marketing

Alan Miller <millera@mcs.com>
Thu, 14 Apr 1994 11:04:55 -0500 (CDT)
The following is most of a letter I sent to my local Baby Bell recently after
receiving a marketing letter aimed at increasing calling card use.  I think
the risks of the mailing are fairly obvious from the letter...  ajm

I simply wanted to inform you that I was disturbed to find in my mail an
unexpected letter from you that contained my Ameritech Calling Card PIN.
My objections to this letter are as follows:

1) Since I was not expecting the letter, if it had been removed from my
   mailbox or the U.S. Mail before I received it I would have had no way
   of knowing that something was wrong until I got my next phone bill
   (complete with calls I hadn't made).

2) Increasing the possibility of delivery problems, the address on the
   envelope was, if not wrong, at least very nonstandard.  In
   particular, it had two different forms of the town name, both on
   separate lines.  If something this easy to catch made it through
   processing (presumably for many letters), what other errors might do
   the same?  My monthly phone bill is properly addressed.

3) [Given a name and address, anyone with reason (PIN possession) can
   get my phone number]

4) [I can call customer service and get a new PIN assigned if necessary]

5) Finally, the presence of my PIN on the letter is not necessary on
   what is obviously a letter intended to increase awareness of calling
   cards.  A note that I could contact Customer Service would have
   served just as well, without any of the security risks.

Since card number theft is a serious and reportedly increasing problem,
I am surprised to see Ameritech sending mailings that include
information that consumers are told to guard carefully.  If this mailing
does result in an increase in calling card fraud, is Ameritech intending
to absorb all fraudulent charges resulting from the careless
distribution of PINs? The letter also makes me wonder about the security
of my account with Ameritech.  How simple would it be for someone
looking for the ability to make a few free phone calls to simply look up
and write down a few number+PIN combinations?


Re: P.R. China Computer Security Rules

Tom Albertson <tomalb@microsoft.com>
Wed, 13 Apr 94 09:40:10 PST
Our contacts with the PRC government say that these rules do not exist.  While
this may be only a denial of something still in the works, its quite possible
these are the work of someone with a regional axe to grind.  Would you be
willing to put me in touch with the anonymous poster, or would you debunk this
on your own?  If the rules are not legitimate, I don't think it was correct to
post without some corraboration (I thought the unwritten rules of journalism
called for two reliable sources for unsubstantiated materials?)

Tom Albertson   tomalb@microsoft.com   PH 206-936-6764


Re: P.R. China Computer Security Rules

Dan Sorenson <viking@iastate.edu>
2 Apr 94 07:32:12 GMT
Note: this is somewhat political in nature, but I believe the RISKS are known
to all in any position of responsibility or power.

China opens the "Golden Bridge" to the Internet, and I see China still writes
laws like the following:

 >Article 2. The computer information systems referred to in these regulations
 >are man-machine systems, composed of computers and their allied and
 >peripheral equipment and facilities (including networks), that collect,
 >process, store, transmit, and retrieve information according to prescribed
 >goals and rules of application.

And in all likelihood this law would cover a supermarket scanner and cash
register.  I'm not surprised.  Read any bill before Congress here in the USA
and you will find a similar lack of understanding, broadness of definition,
and lack of detail.

Perhaps a better example shows up daily in the newsgroups rec.guns and
talk.politics.guns, where laws as passed are picked at and it is generally
determined that the law outlaws anything not specifically mentioned as exempt.

The RISK?  When people write the rules we have to live by, often times the
spirit of the rule is lost in the letter, and the RISK of abuse is increased.
One has to wonder at some of the latest anti-discrimination laws that wouldn't
allow, say, a trucking company to not hire an applicant in an iron lung.  I'm
sure you can see your own pet versions of laws gone awry by creative
interpretation.  Finally, we're left with the axiom "You can't make it
foolproof because fools are so clever."  I submit that fools, lawyers, and
government share this same affliction, and if we're not careful we shall as
well, no matter our level of power over others.

* Dan Sorenson, DoD 1066 viking@iastate.edu z1dan@exnet.iastate.edu *


Delayed Dial Tone causes unintentional 911 calls

Chonoles Michael Jesse <chonoles@acc1.acc.vf.ge.com>
Fri, 1 Apr 94 17:49:08 EST
Mostly, the problems with telephone numbers in the form x91-1xxx is the
possibility that the first digit was ignored because of a delayed dial-tone.

If the exchange is busy, and there are many people calling, the exchange may
not have enough "digit registers" to allocate. Then there is a delay before
the dial-tone appears. [Similar to what happened with the rock-concert ticket
giveaway and on Mother's day, etc.].  Since most callers often don't listen
for the dial-tone and dial anyway, dialing a number in the form of x91-1xxx
might get them 911.

As the number of central office codes (COCs), (the first three digits of a
7-digit number) is used within an area code increases, then these x91-1xxx
numbers need to be allocated. The central offices that handle the x91 COCs
need to have extra "digit registers' to lessen the chance for this problem.

Michael Jesse Chonoles   chonoles@acc.vf.ge.com mjc@eniac.seas.upenn.edu

   [This is another variation on an old problem addressed in many past
   issues of RISKS.   PGN]


Seeking lit ref: we trust calculators over ourselves

Mike Crawford <crawford@scipp.ucsc.edu>
Sun, 17 Apr 1994 21:48:54 -0700
I seek a literature reference.  The usual methods have failed so far - perhaps
someone can give me even an author, more precise subject or partial title
words?

I will persist by looking up the references in papers referring to student use
of calculators, but maybe this will ring a bell with you?

There was a study done, perhaps in the seventies, of the human tendency to
trust machines rather than our own judgement.

Subjects were given calculators, and pages of simple arithmetic problems.  The
calculators were wedged so that they gave incorrect answers sometimes.  Even
though the problems were simple enough that the subjects could figure them out
in their heads, the study showed that people will trust the machine even
though our own judgment tells us that the machine is wrong.

I want to use this as a reference in a paper I am writing on computer network
security, and another I am writing about why high-aenergy physicists should not
be so trusting of their results if they have been subjected to extensive
processing by complex, and poorly understood computer programs.

Thus, network administrators trust security software even when security
experts tell them it is easily penetrable, and physicists trust the results of
their calculations even when software experts tell them that their software is
bogus. ;-) (C'est Moi!  My own advisor does not believe me when I tell him the
results of my own work are wrong.  After all, they _were_ calculated on a
computer!)
                                Author of the Word Services Apple Event Suite.
Mike Crawford  crawford@scipp.ucsc.edu  Free Mac Source Code:
ftp sumex-aim.stanford.edu  |  get /info-mac/dev/src/writeswell-jr-102-c.hqx


Information resource

Michael Enlow <m_enlow@enlow.com>
Wed, 13 Apr 94 00:26:45 -0700
We wanted to let you know about some great info we are making freely
available on the Internet.

My name is Michael Enlow. I am a retired private/legal investigator and author
of several books regarding private investigation/electronic surveillance
technology.

I wish to extend my services to the Internet to share and exchange information
on security and privacy protection issues. We are making a lot of very
informative info available FREE on the Internet. This includes back issues of
my newsletter "Inside Secrets", my schematics and plans, resources, guides,
and other information.

For details on accessing these FREE services, send an e-mail message to
INFO@ENLOW.COM you can also FTP to ENLOW.COM or FTP.ENLOW.COM, and login as
anonymous (put your email address as the password). There is a listserver in
place to send you files if you do not have access to FTP. Your comments and
suggestions are welcome.

Thanks for your time.

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