The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 15 Issue 80

Thursday 28 April 1994

Contents

o DMV Computer upgrade goes awry...
Marshall Clow
o Time-series wins jackpot
Mich Kabay
o Drunk in charge.....
Kearton Rees
o Stress Analysis of a Software Project [long]
Jerry Leichter
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

DMV Computer upgrade goes awry...

Marshall Clow <mclow@coyote.csusm.edu>
Wed, 27 Apr 1994 11:03:47 -0700
DMV careens into $44 million dead-end
By Gary Webb, Knight-Ridder News Service
(From the San Diego Union, April 27, 1994, page A-3)

SACRAMENTO - The California Department of Motor Vehicles has informed a
flabbergasted legislative committee that it has spent $44.3 million on a
computer modernization program that will never work.
    "This is unconscionable to me!" Assemblywoman Valerie Brown, D_Santa Rosa
spluttered. "I can't even explain this to people!"
    DMV Director Frank Zolin muttered: "I'm having a difficult time explaining
it myself." [...]
    "The department's position is that the software maker isn't responsible,
the hardware maker isn't responsible, and the taxpayers are just going to eat
the cost", Transportation Committee Chairman Richard Katz, D-Panorama Ciry,
said after the Monday hearing.  [...]
    The DMV started the project in 1988 and has been quietly spending millions
of dollars a year on it with little oversight - and even less success.  ...
Dan Foulk, a Sacramento computer consultant who has been working with the DMV
on the ill-fated venture, called it "a combination of errors from the
beginning".  Faulk said that the plan - to invisibly convert a circa-1965
database to a modern relational database using Tandem Cyclone mainframes - was
"too giant a leap of technology" and involved insurmountable incompatibilities
beween hardware platforms and program code.  [...]
    The $7.5 million the DMV was requesting in next year's budget was to be
used to start redesigning the database from scratch, records show. But Zolin
said that it is "not exactly" a back-to-square-one proposition.
    "We've learned a lot from mistakes we made", he said.

                          ==============

  (Excerpt from the San Jose Mercury News, April 27, 1994 online version:)
  Ernst & Young, an accounting and consulting firm hired to oversee the
  five-year project, was fired by the state in June 1990 after just eight
  months on the job.  DMV then took on the task of project management itself
  -- a herculean undertaking that legislative analysts now say was well beyond
  the department's ability.  ...

We've all seen this before, this is just larger and more public than many.

Marshall Clow, mclow@san_marcos.csusm.edu


Time-series wins jackpot

"Mich Kabay / JINBU Corp." <75300.3232@CompuServe.COM>
28 Apr 94 14:40:25 EDT
  "Casino finally pays big keno winners: Montreal computer analyst hopes
  $620,000 jackpot will give others hope.  By Andre Picard, Quebec Bureau.
  The _Globe and Mail_ (Canada), 28 Apr 1994, p. A6 [MK comments in brackets]

     Montreal -- Daniel Corriveau said he hopes that his 'victory over the
system will give hope to others.'
     The computer analyst and his family received more than $620,000 [1C$ =
U$0.75], including interest, from the Montreal casino yesterday, weeks
after they overcame odds of one in six billion and beat an electronic keno
game three times in a row."

The author explains the following key points:

o Corriveau used an "antique 286" computer to analyse 7,000 combinations from
  the keno game, [which uses an electronic pseudo-random number generator].

o Corriveau noticed that the electronic game was repeating numbers in a
  predictable pattern.

o Corriveau and several family members bet on what they predicted would be due
  to come up; they won three times in succession.

o The Casino managers shut the game down and called the police.

o The Surete du Quebec [provincial police] fraud squad investigated; Corriveau
  and his family even took polygraph tests.

o The president of Loto-Quebec, the Crown Corporation which owns the Montreal
  Casino, admitted that the problem was theirs: they had failed to test the
  electronic game before using it.

o The keno game is missing its clock, [used to reset the pseudo-random
  number generator]; therefore it started all over again every time it was
  powered off.

o Police are continuing their investigation to find out if the clock was
  missing when the game was delivered or whether it has been stolen.

[Sigh... quality assurance rears its missing head once again.  And bravo for
the successful time-series analyst.  Wonder if he'd like to have a go at the
Clipper Chip?]

Michel E. Kabay, Ph.D. / Dir. Education / Natl Computer Security Assoc.


drunk in charge.....

<krees@minster.york.ac.uk>
Wed, 27 Apr 94 13:32:25
I am a member of a mailing list covering motorcycling and related topics.

Recently much discussion revolved around the issue of drinking (alcohol)
and driving, and what, if any, the limit of alcohol allowed in the blood
should be. Discussion seemed to revolve around the point that the effect
that alcohol has varies with a number of individual factors.

One comment however I think is of interest to this forum.

The comment was made that alcohol in whatever quantity, affects your ability
to judge whether you are fit to perform an act such as driving. The example
used to illustrate this was that electricians never touch any of their work
that might involve high-voltage electricity after they have been drinking,
because of the possible consequences.

Extending this argument to computing. How many people would be happy flying
in a plane, or placing their trust in a software controlled system if they
knew that it had been written, reviewed or tested after a Friday lunchtime in
a pub. To the electrician the possible are obvious and immediate. To
programmers etc. the consequences may be neither obvious nor immediate.

Should there be an offence of "drunk in charge of a computer"? Probably not.
But I think that this sort of issue be addressed, and any legal implications
considered, possibly in professional codes of conduct?

Kearton Rees, High Integrity Systems Eng. Group,  Computer Science Dept.,
University of York, Heslington Road, York, YO1 5DD.  krees@cs.york.ac.uk
        Tel.: 0904-433385


Stress Analysis of a Software Project [long]

Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>
Tue, 26 Apr 94 08:42:32 EDT
The following, which claims to be an internal Silicon Graphics memo, has
already seen fairly broad network distribution.  I have no way of verifying
that it is what it claims to be, but (a) I'm told by someone with close
dealings with SGI that it fits with what he's heard; (b) if it's a fake,
someone put a huge amount of effort into producing it.

I forward it to RISKS as a wonderful record of what goes wrong with large
software projects, and why.  It would be as useful if all the names, including
the company and product names, were removed.  This memo should not be seen as
an indictment of SGI, which is hardly unique.  There is good evidence that
Sun, for example, had very similar problems in producing Solaris; and I
watched the same thing happen with the late, unlamented DEC Professional
series of PC's, and something like it almost happen with firmware for DEC
terminals a number of years back.

I hope that Tom Davis's position hasn't been badly hurt by the broad
distribution of his memo - but based on the traditional reaction to bearers of
bad news, especially when the bad news becomes widely known, I can't say I'm
sanguine about it.
            -- Jerry

------- Begin Document -------

             Software Usability II
                October 5, 1993
                   Tom Davis

 Last May, I published my first report on software usability, which
 Rocky Rhodes and I presented to at Tom Jermoluk's staff meeting (with
 Ed, but without Tom).  Subsequently, I made it available to quite a few
 other people.

 This sequel is to satisfy all those people who have urged me to bring
 it up to date.  I begin with a summary; details follow.

 Please read at least the summary.

     SUMMARY

 Release 5.1 is a disappointment.  Performance for common operations has
 dropped 40% from 4.0.5, we shipped with 500 priority 1 and 2 bugs, and
 a base Indy is much more sluggish than a Macintosh.  Disk space
 requirements have increased dramatically.

 The primary cause is that we attempted far too much in too little
 time.  Management would not cut features early, so we were forced to
 make massive cuts in the final weeks of the release.

 What shall we do now?  Let's not look for scapegoats, but learn from
 our mistakes and do better next time.

 A December release of 5.1.2 is too early to fix much -- we'll spend
 much more time on the release process than fixing things.  Allow enough
 time for a solid release so we don't get: 5.1.2.1, 5.1.2.2, 5.1.2.3, ...

 Let's decide ahead of time exactly what features are in 5.1.2.  If we
 pick a reasonable set we'll avoid emergency feature cuts at the end.

 Nobody knows what's wrong -- opinions are as common as senior
 engineers.  The software environment is so convoluted that at times it
 seems to rival the US economy for complexity and unpredictability.  I
 propose massive code walk-throughs and design reviews to analyze the
 software.  We'll be forced to look closely at the code, and fresh
 reviewers can provide fresh insights.

 For the long term, let's change the way we do things so that the
 contents and scheduling of releases are better planned and executed.
 Make sure marketing and engineering expectations are in agreement.

     INTRODUCTION

 We've addressed some of the problems presented in the original May
 report, but not enough.  Most of the report's warnings and predictions
 have come true in 5.1.  If we keep doing the exact same thing, we'll
 keep getting the exact same results.

 I'm preparing this report in ASCII to make it widely available.  It's
 easy to distribute via news and mail, and everyone can read it.

 An ASCII version of the May 12 report can be found in:

     bedlam.asd:/usr/tmp/report.text

 The included quotations are not verbatim.  Although the wordings
 are inexact, I believe they capture the spirit of the originals.

     BLOAT UPDATE

        "Do you want to be a bloat detective?  It's easy;
        just pick any executable.  There!  You found some!"

        -- Rolf van Widenfelt

 In the May report, I listed a bunch of executable sizes, and pointed
 out that they were unacceptable if we intended to run without serious
 paging problems on a 16 megabyte system.  Between May and the 5.1
 release, many have grown even larger.  IRIX went up from 4.8 megabytes
 to 8.1 megabytes, and has a memory leak that causes it to grow.  Within
 a week, my newly-booted 5.1 IRIX was larger than 13.8 megabytes -- a
 big chunk of a 16 megabyte system.  It's wrong to require our users to
 reboot every week.

 There are too many daemons.  In a vanilla 5.1 installation with Toto,
 there are 37 background processes.

 DSOs were supposed to reduce physical memory usage, but have had just
 the opposite effect, and their indirection has reduced performance.

 Programs like Roger Chickering's "Bloatview" based on Wiltse
 Carpenter's work make some problems obvious.  The news reader "xrn",
 starts out small, but leaks memory so badly that within a week or so it
 grows to 9 or 10 megabytes, along with plenty of other large programs.
 But what's really embarrassing is that even the kernel leaks memory
 that can't be recovered except by rebooting!

 Showcase grew from 3.2 megabytes to 4.0 megabytes, and the master and
 status gizmos which are run by default occupy another 1.7 megabytes.
 Much of this happened simply by recompiling under 5.1 -- not because of
 additional code.

 The window system (Xsgi + 4Dwm) is up from 3.2 MB to 3.6 MB, and
 the miscellaneous stuff has grown as well.  As I type now, I have the
 default non-toto environment plus a single shell and a single text
 editor, jot.  The total physical memory usage is 21.9 megabytes, and
 only because I rebooted IRIX yesterday evening to reduce the kernel
 size.  Luckily, I'm on a 32 megabyte system without Toto, or I'd be
 swamped by paging.

 Much of the problem seems to be due to DSOs that load whole libraries
 instead of individual routines.  Many SGI applications link with 20 or
 so large DSOs, virtually guaranteeing enormous executables.

 In spite of the DSOs, large chunks of Motif programs remain unshared,
 and duplicated in all Motif applications.

     PERFORMANCE UPDATE

        "Indy: an Indigo without the 'go'".

        -- Mark Hughes (?)

        "X and Motif are the reasons that UNIX deserves to die."

        -- Larry Kaplan

 The performance story is just as bad.  I was tempted to write simply,
 "Try to do some real work on a 16 megabyte Indy.  Case closed.", but
 I'll include some details.

 In May, I listed some unacceptable Motif performance measurements.
 Just before 5.1 MR, someone reran my tests and discovered that the
 performance had gotten even worse.  Some effort was expended to tune
 the software so that instead of being intolerable, it was back to
 merely unacceptable performance.

 We no longer report benchmark results on our standard system.  The
 benchmarks are not done with the DSO libraries; they are all compiled
 non-DSO so that the performance in 5.1 has not declined too much.

 Before I upgraded from 4.0.5 to the MR version of 5.1, I ran some
 timings of some everyday activities to see what would happen.  These
 timings were all made with the wall clock, so they represent precisely
 what our users will see.  I run a 32 megabyte R4000 Elan.

     Test           4.0.5                 5.1         % change
     ----                    -----                 ---         --------

    C compile of    a       25 sec              35 sec          40%
     small application

    C++ compile of a        68 sec              105 sec         54%
     small application

    Showcase startup,       13 sec              18 sec          38%
     May report file

    Start a shell       <2 sec              ~3 sec          ~50%

    Jot 2 MB file       <2 sec              ~3 sec          ~50%

 What's most frightening about the 5.1 performance is that nobody knows
 exactly where it went.  If you start asking around, you get plenty of
 finger-pointing and theories, but few facts.  In the May report, I
 proposed a "5% theory", which states that each little thing we add
 (Motif, internationalization, drag-and-drop, DSOs, multiple fonts, and
 so on) costs roughly 5% of the machine.  After 15 or 20 of these,
 most of the performance is gone.

 Bloating by itself causes problems.  There's heavy paging, there's so
 much code and it's so scattered that the cache may as well not be
 there.  The window manager and X and Toto are so tangled that many
 minor operations like moving the mouse or deleting a file wake up all
 the processes on the machine, causing additional paging, and perhaps
 graphics context swaps.

 But bloat isn't the whole story.  Rocky Rhodes recently ran a small
 application on an Indy, and noticed that when he held the mouse button
 down and slid it back and forth across the menu bar, the (small) pop-up
 menus got as much as 25 seconds behind.  He submitted a bug, which was
 dismissed as paging due to lack of memory.  But Rocky was running with
 160 megabytes of memory, so there was no paging.  The problem turned
 out to be Motif code modified for the SGI look that is even more
 sluggish than regular Motif.  Perhaps the problem is simply due to the
 huge number of context swaps necessary for all the daemons we're
 shipping.

 The complexity of our system software has surpassed the ability of
 average SGI programmers to understand it.  And perhaps not just average
 programmers.  Get a room full of 10 of our best software people, and
 you'll get 10 different opinions of what's causing the lousy
 performance and bloat.  What's wrong is that the software has simply
 become too complicated for anyone to understand.

     WHAT WENT WRONG IN 5.1?

 The one sentence answer is:  we bit off more than we could chew.  As a
 company, we still don't understand how difficult software is.

 We planned to make major changes in everything -- a new operating
 system, new compilers, a new user environment, new tools, and lots of
 new features in the multi-media area.  Not only that, but the new stuff
 was promised to do everything the old software had done, and with major
 enhancements.  (Early warning:  version 6.0 promises to be even more
 disruptive.)

 About 9 months ago, Rocky and I pointed out the impossibility of what
 we were attempting.  Rather than reduce the scope of the projects, a
 decision was made to hire a couple of contractors (who know nothing
 about our system) to handle the worst user interface problems in the
 Roxy project.  In addition, promises were obtained from various
 executives that a significant effort would be made to improve software
 performance.

 Management was basically afraid to cut any features, so we continued to
 work on a project that was far too large.  The desperate attempt to do
 everything caused programmers to cut corners, with disastrous effects
 on the bug count.  And the bug count was high simply because 5.1 was so
 big.

 Only when the situation was beyond hope of repair did we start to do
 something.  Features and entire products were removed wholesale from
 the
 release, and hundreds of high-priority bugs were classified as
 exceptions, so that we could ship with "no priority 1 and 2 bugs".  We
 did, however, ship with over 500 "exceptions".  The release was deemed
 too crummy to push to all our machines, but was restricted to the
 Indys, the high-end machines, and a few others where new hardware
 required the new software.  Due to the massive bug count, virtually no
 performance tuning was done.

 When the schedule is impossible as it was in 5.1, the release process
 itself can get in the way.  The schedule imposes a code freeze long
 before the software is stable, and fixing things becomes much more
 difficult.  If you know you're going to be late, slip before the code
 freeze, not after.  We're trying to wrap up the box before the stuff
 inside is finished, and then trying to fix things inside the box
 without undoing the wrapping -- it has to be less efficient.

 Management Issues:

 There was never an overall software architect, and there still is not,
 and until Way Ting was given the job near the end, there was no manager
 in charge of the 5.1 release, either.

 I wrote a note in sgi.bad-attitude about the "optimist effect", which I
 believe is mostly true.  In condensed form:

     Optimists tend to be promoted, so the higher up in the organization
     you are, the more optimistic you tend to be.  If one manager says
     "I can do that in 4 months", and another only promises it in 6
     months, the 4 month guy gets the job.  When the software is 4
 months
     late, the overall system complexity makes it easy to assign blame
     elsewhere, so there's no way to judge mis-management when it's time
     for promotions.

     To look good to their boss, most people tend to put a positive spin
     on their reports.  With many levels of management and increasing
     optimism all the way up, the information reaching the VPs is very
     filtered, and always filtered positively.

 The problem is that the highly filtered estimates are completely out of
 line with reality (at least in recent software plans here at SGI), and
 there are no reality checks back from the VPs to the engineers on the
 bottom.  I think it's great to have aggressive schedules where you try
 to get things out 20% or so faster than you'd expect.  The problem is
 that in 5.1, the engineers were expected to get things out 80% faster,
 and it was clearly impossible, so many just gave up.

 We certainly didn't win any morale prizes among the engineers with
 5.1.  It's the first release here at SGI where most of the engineers I
 talked to are ashamed of the product.  There are always a few, but this
 time there were many.  When engineers were asked to come in over the
 weekends before the 5.1 release to fix show-stopper bugs, I heard a
 comment like: "Why bother?  SGI's going to release it anyway, whether
 they're fixed or not."

 I'm not blaming the engineers.  Most of them worked their hearts out
 for 5.1, and did the best they could, given the circumstances.  They'll
 be happy to buy into a plan where there's a 20% stretch, but not where
 there's an 80% stretch.  They figure: "It's hopeless, and I'll be late
 anyway, and I'm not going to get rewarded for that, so why kill
 myself?"

 Marketing - Engineering Disconnect

        "Marketing -- where the rubber meets the sky."

        -- Unknown

 There's a disconnect between engineering and marketing.  It's not
 surprising -- marketing wants all the whiz-bang features, it wants to
 run in 16 megabytes, and it wants it yesterday.  Although engineering
 would like the same things, it is faced with the reality of time
 limits, fixed costs, and the laws of nature.

 It's great to have pressure from marketing to do a better job, but at
 SGI, we often seem to have deadlocks that are simply not resolved.
 Marketing insists that Indy will work in 16 megabytes and engineering
 insists that it won't, but both continue to make their plans without
 resolving the conflict, so today we're shipping virtually useless 16 MB
 systems.  Similarly for feature lists, reliability requirements, and
 deadlines.

 Well, at least we met the deadline.

     WHAT TO DO -- SHORT TERM (5.1.2)

        "We should sell 'bloat credits', the way the government
        sells pollution credits.  Everybody's assigned a certain
        amount of bloat, and if they go over, they have to purchase
        bloat credits from some other group that's been more
        careful."

        -- Bent Hagemark

 There are problems in both performance and bugs, and we'd like to fix
 both.  In addition, the first thing we should do is decide exactly
 what's going into release 5.1.2.

 If we are serious about a December all-platforms release, there may be
 very little we can do other than keep stumbling along as we have been.
 Three months isn't much time to do anything, considering the overhead
 of a release, where perhaps half of the time will be spent in "code
 freeze".  After 5.1, many engineers are exhausted, and it's
 unreasonable to expect them to start hard work immediately.  500
 outstanding priority 1 and 2 bugs is a huge list, and we haven't even
 begun to hear about customer problems yet.

 What Should be in Release 5.1.2:

 I'm afraid the answer is going to be "everything that didn't make it
 into 5.1".  I know that won't be the case, but I hope that we will
 carefully select what goes in now, rather than hack things out in a
 panic in December.  The default should be "not included", and we should
 require a good reason to include things.  Let's make sure that there's
 a minimal, solid, working set before we start adding frills.

 Improving Performance:

        "SGI software has a cracked engine block, and we're trying
        to fix it with a tune-up."

        -- Mark Segal

 As stated above, we don't even know exactly what's wrong.  We probably
 never will, but we should start doing things that will have as much of
 an impact on the problem as possible.  I don't think we have time to
 study the problem in detail and then decide what to do -- we've got to
 mix the research with doing something about it.

 Before we begin, we should have definite performance goals -- lose less
 than 5% wall-clock time on compiles of some known program over 4.0.5,
 have shells come up as fast as in 4.0.5, or whatever.

 Some people claim that we need new software debugging tools to look at
 the problem, and that may be true, but it's not a short-term solution,
 and it runs the risk of causing us to spend all our time designing
 performance measurement tools, rather than fixing performance.

 In fact, I don't really believe that simple "tuning" will make a
 large dent.  To get things to run significantly faster, we've got
 to make significant changes.  And we can't beat the "5% rule" by just
 speeding up all the systems by 5% -- if everything is exactly 5%
 faster,
 the overall system will be exactly 5% faster.

 There's a strong tendency to look for the "quick fix".  "Get the code
 re-arranger to work", or "Put all the non-modifiable strings in shared
 code space", for example.  These ideas are attractive, since they
 promise to speed up all the code, and they should probably be pursued,
 but I think we're not going to make a lot of progress until we identify
 the major software architectural problems and do some massive
 simplification.  Remember that DSOs were the last "quick fix".

 There's got to be more to it than tuning; there must be some amazingly
 bad software architecture -- from a novice's point of view, a 4 MB
 Macintosh runs a far more efficient, interesting system than a 16 MB
 Indy.  The Mark Segal quote above sums it up.

 Code walk-throughs and design reviews are in order for most of our
 software.  The attendees should include not only people working in the
 same area, but a small cross-section of experienced engineers from
 other areas.  Get a pool of, say, 20 experienced engineers and
 perhaps 3 at a time would sit in on code reviews together with the
 other people working in that area.

 Code reviews will help in many ways -- the engineer presenting the code
 will have to understand it thoroughly to present it, others will learn
 about it, and outside observers will provide different ways to look at
 the problems.

 The most important thing should be the focus -- we're trying to make
 the code better and faster, not to make it more general, or have new
 features, or be more reusable, or better structured.

 For complex problems, the walk-through should also include some general
 design review.  Are these daemons really necessary?  Do we really need
 this feature?  And so on.

 Fixing Bugs:

 The code walk-throughs will obviously tend to turn up some bugs, so
 they'll serve a dual purpose.

 With 500 or so priority 1 and 2 bugs, we must prioritize these as
 well.  A bug that causes a system crash only on machines with some rare
 hardware configuration is properly classified priority 1, but it's
 probably less important than a bug in a popular program like Showcase
 that causes you to lose your file every tenth time, which would
 normally rank as priority 2.  The effort involved in the fix should
 also be taken into account.  For bugs of equal frequency of occurrence,
 it's probably better to fix 20 priority 2 bugs than 1 priority 1 bug if
 the priority 2 bugs are 20 times easier to fix.

 A bunch of bugs can be eliminated by getting rid of features.  Let's
 have the courage to cut some of the fat.

     WHAT TO DO -- LONG TERM

        "Software quality is not a crime."

        -- Unknown (seen on a poster in building 7)


 It's easy to go on forever here, but I'll try to limit it to a few key
 ideas.  We don't have to do all these at once, but we'd better start.

     Have an overall SGI software plan.

     Let's get an architect, or at least a small group of highly
     technical people, not just managers, to agree on plans for
     releases.  In fact, since the release is a company-wide project,
     there ought to be company-wide participation in the decisions of
     what's in a release.  The group should include marketing,
     documentation, engineering, and management and should come up with
     a compromise that's reasonable to all.

     In every case, some attempt must be made to check reasonableness
     all the way to the bottom.  There's a long series of excuses,
     "Well, that's what my junior VPs told me.", or  "That's what my
     directors/managers/lead engineers/engineers told me."  We get
     killed by the optimist effect, and a disinclination to listen
     seriously to anyone but our direct reports.  Try to imagine the
     guts it takes for an engineer to go to his director and say: "My
     manager's out of his mind -- I can't possibly do what he's
     promised."

     Let's try to concentrate on performance and quality, not on new
     features, especially for the 5.1.2 release.  I know from my own
     experience that when I write good code, I spend 10% of the time
     adding features, and 90% debugging and tuning them.  It's the only
     way to make quality software.  In SGI's recent releases, the
     opposite proportions are often the rule.  It's much easier to add
     100 really neat features that don't work than to speed up
     performance by 1%.

     Aim for simplicity in design, not complexity.  Make a few things
     work really well; don't have 1000 flaky programs.

     Be willing to cut features; who's going to be more pissed off:  a
     customer who was promised a feature that doesn't appear, or the
     same customer who gets the promised feature, and after months of
     struggling with it, discovers he can't make it work?

     Get better agreement between the top level VPs and the lowest
     engineers that a given schedule is reasonable.

     For new development, continue the formal design reviews and code
     walk-throughs.  These shouldn't just happen once in the development
     cycle -- things are bound to change, and code reviews can be very
     valuable, even for our experienced programmers.

     ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 I take full responsibility for the opinions contained herein, but I'd
 like to thank Mark Segal, Rosemary Chang, Mary Ann Gallager, Jackie
 Neider, Sharon Fischler, Henry Moreton, and Jon Livesey for suggestions
 and comments.

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