The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 16 Issue 93

Monday 20 March 1995

Contents

o About the "Altona Railway software glitch"
Klaus Brunnstein
o Credit-Card Fraud
NYT via Edupage
o Keeping buses on time plus a little eavesdropping
Mark Kruse
o Does Internet threaten civilization?
Dick Mills
o Latent risks of cost-benefit analysis
Phil Brown
o Re: Internet-Finland Privacy
Peter Kaiser
o Risks of doing date arithmetic early in the year without FP
Peter Ludemann
o Phone companies with wrong 555-1212 databases
Frederick B. Cohen
o Re: The Manchurian Printer & Prodigy Spies on Users
Frank C Ferguson
o Software System Safety Class
Nancy Leveson
o First Bank of Internet (FBOI) Opens
Vinn Beigh
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

About the "Altona Railway software glitch"

Klaus Brunnstein <brunnstein@rz.informatik.uni-hamburg.d400.de>
Fri, 17 Mar 1995 17:48:54 +0100
German Railway attempted, Sunday March 12 1995 evening, to replace its long
established railway switch tower at Hamburg-Altona station by a fully
computerized system manufactured by Siemens branch on railway technology.
Altona station is one of Germany's large station, with many national and
international lines starting or ending here or passing through. Each day,
about 30,000 travellers arrive or depart here, in addition to more than
100,000 passengers using local rapid (S-Bahn) or regional trains.

With about 250 rail shunts and an equivalent number of signals, the old
system consisted of 7 major switch-stands, controlled by roughly 50
experienced switchmen. Siemens and German Railway decided to completely
change the topology with now about 18 switch-stands to be controlled by
INTEL-486 based Real-Time systems. The different switch computers are
coordinated by one central operating and display system (BAR 16, for Bedien-
und-Anzeige-Rechner, and 16 standing for 16-Bit connection). PC hardware is
redundant (2 processors, modular RAM, no disk) to enhance availability and
reliability as requested by the certification authority (Eisenbahn
Bundes-Amt, EBA). The new architecture is incompatible with the old one and
it cannot run in parallel to the old; one economic advantage is that the new
system needs about 40 switchmen less which only control the central BAR
site.

Immediately after starting the new systems, the central computer (BAR 16)
failed. Siemens' experts could not find the cause for hours, so German
Railway decided to close up the whole station, forcing passengers to North
and South to start from locations up to 25 kilometers away. Search for the
fault was difficult as it were very rare. Only on Tuesday afternoon, experts
detected that under certain conditions a stack overflow happened. When
looking into the routine which should handle stack overflows, they found
that this went into a deadloop due to a programming error. Though sufficient
free space was available in principle, the allocation of the stack required
to build a new RAM with 4,000 bytes onstead of 3,500 as foreseen (indeed,
overflow was only with few bytes, so +500 bytes adds some safety :-). Only
on Wednesday morning, the bug (which appeared only 4 times in 2 days) was
fixed, and rail traffic began to return to Altona station on Wednesday 1:59
pm. But as the switchmen are not accustomed to the new system, even days
later allowed restricted traffic.

In a press conference, the responsible Siemens manager argued that the
"hidden" faults were difficult to find, and that Siemens experts had assumed
that the routine handling stack overflow would NEVER be used! The related
operating system is regarded by Siemens as rather safe RT system :-)

In German media (you know: Hamburg is media capital of Germany :-), a
discussion on overreliance on computers started. This was stimulated by
statements of Siemens and German Railway that any future computer failure
will require to again stop the whole switching system to avoid any safety
hazard. This is very bad news as the same system is being installed at
another site connecting main railway station (Hauptbahnhof) with Berlin and
controlling all goods transport originating and ending in Hamburg harbour
(Europes 2nd largest container harbour). [Another reason for discussing
overreliance are recent bad news on Airbuses, most of which are finally
assembled in Hamburg-Finkenwerder's Airbus factories, with many operational
Airbuses being maintained in Lufthansa's Hamburg workshops].

The Altona Railway software glitch is another example where (for purposes of
rationalisation) all customers become fully dependent of a computerized
system.  Moreover, the few remaining switchmen will NOT be able to
understand, in critical situations, why the computer system behaves as it
does, and they will ONLY be able to switch off the whole system as NO manual
mode is foreseen!

Klaus Brunnstein (Univ Hamburg, 17 March 1995)


Credit-Card Fraud (NYT via Edupage 19 Mar 1995)

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Mon, 20 Mar 95 11:24:48 PST
Security experts are disdainful of the low level of programming talent
displayed in the pirate program Credit Master, which generates phony credit
card numbers.  The program works by mimicking the simple "checksum"
algorithm that creates the last four digits of a credit card; the checksum
formula was developed merely to prevent data-entry errors and never meant to
be high-tech security screening.  Four college students were arrested last
week in Nassau County, NY, charged with using a program to generate false
credit numbers and order thousands of dollars of goods.  The students then
had the merchandise shipped to addresses staked out by the police -- a
mistake almost as bad as using cheap programs.  (The New York Times, 19 Mar
1995, p.18)


Keeping buses on time plus a little eavesdropping

Mark Kruse <kruse@sector.kodak.com>
Sat, 18 Mar 1995 08:48:33 -0500
Seen in the Washington Post:

  As part of a war on traffic congestion, Montgomery County Maryland
  transit officials plan to use the satellite <GPS - "one of the same
  satellites the Pentagon used during the Persian Gulf War"> to keep buses
  on time and increase safety for Ride-On's 58,000 weekday riders.  ...
  When the system is begun countywide later this year, county technicians
  will be able to change traffic signals to green as a tardy bus approaches
  an intersection.  When people call to ask for bus information, a county
  transit employee will be able to give them the precise time a buss will
  arrive instead of when it is scheduled to be there.  In an emergency,
  police will know the bus's exact location and will be able ***to listen in
  over a microphone installed in the bus."

I see two risks here:

- If riders become dependent on calling in for information on EXACTLY when
  a bus will be at a particular location, the transit authority will soon
  be overloaded with phone calls and thus probably making it more difficult
  for people calling for other reasons to get through (a relatively minor
  risk given that this is probably not a critical service phone number?)

- What are the criteria for when the police are allowed to listen in over
  the microphone installed in the bus?  Slowly, but surely, 1984 is approaching
  (or is time just flowing backwards :-)

Mark W. Kruse


Does Internet threaten civilization?

Dick Mills <rj.mills@pti-us.com>
Sat, 18 Mar 1995 10:29:11 -0500
An attribute of the Internet it that it makes one-to-many personal
communication more effective and more resistant to censorship than any prior
form of communication. Therein lies some risks.  I am not sure which are
most real. Consider the following.

It seems that everyone from Scientologists, to United States senators, to
Swedish journalists, to the National Security Agency, to holocaust
survivors, wants to censor or constrain the net in some way. Indeed, nearly
everyone on this planet seems to believe that we must, at all costs, censor
some other person or group. If net censorship proves to be impossible, then
the logical conclusion is that everyone, ourselves included, will come to
oppose the net. The continued existence of the net must therefore be at
risk; right?

Can it be that the stability of civilization is dependent on the natural
barriers to effective one-to-many communication?  Without the barriers,
criminals, pranksters, demagogues, exploiters, fanatics, the politically
incorrect, and the religiously incorrect, will all be able to do their thing
more effectively.  Society becomes more vulnerable, to hoaxes, scams, spams,
diatribes, sensationalism, and manipulation. Many laws may become
unenforceable. Is it the net that threatens civilization?

More speculative, but perhaps more likely, is the eventual development of a
number of object-oriented virus-like agents able to police the net for us.
Call it distributed RoboCop. The risk then will be to prevent it from
becoming RoboSoverign.  :-/

Dick Mills, Power Technologies, Inc., P.O. Box 1058 Schenectady, NY 12301-1058
  rj.mills@pti-us.com     phone +1(518)395-5154      fax   +1(518)346-2777


Latent risks of cost-benefit analysis

Phil Brown <pdbrown@mindspring.com>
Fri, 17 Mar 1995 17:25:57 -0600
Recently there was an article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution about an
association of pediatricians (I forget the group's exact name offhand) that
was lobbying for a complete ban on advertising for alcoholic beverages,
citing health and economic benefits.  What makes this issue pertinent for
Risks readers, I believe, is the risk of rampant cost-benefit analysis.  The
problem is not so much with the technique itself, which I have often used
with great success, as it is with the slippery slope people find themselves
on once they try to apply it to social situations and human behavior that
have strong intangible elements.  Alcohol consumption is a case in point.
Even in my surliest moods toward purveyors of political correctness, I would
agree that alcohol can carry a heavy social burden.  So what?  Societies are
good at identifying and labelling (and then castigating!) perceived burdens.
While not a raving libertarian, I am disturbed by forces that trot
"scientific method" out on a leash (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) to determine
social "costs" and "benefits" and use the results to try and dictate
behavior.

I understand that proponents of the Republican Contract With America
want to use cost-benefit analysis as a tool to determine when environmental
regulation is appropriate.  This is a seductive idea on its face, and
speaks to the same general problem of trying to reduce human value
judgments to the level of dollars and cents.  The yin and yang of
individual right versus social responsibility is ancient and irremediable.
Where one triumphs the other suffers.  Yet the human spirit dwells most
often in the wasteland between libertarianism and communitarianism, in
my humble opinion.  As much as the engineering side of my nature wants to
believe we all benefit from being able to analyze social issues in the
mathematical realm, mathematics is about probing the edges of problems
and not about dwelling in the comfortable middle ground.

I guess my real beef with cost-benefit analysis, at least as I have seen it
practiced by social policy types, is that it skews in favor of social
benefit, given that quantizing individual liberty is at best an ethereal
exercise.  When confronted with a statistic such as one shouting out that
"alcohol consumption costs the US in excess of $100 billion per year in
illness, disability, and lost productivity", is one to assume that otherwise
rational individuals are wantonly placing some tremendous burden on society
with no commensurate return?  That's a statistic racing away from the center
of any reasoned debate.

We are shackling ourselves with tautologies, brought on by a desire
to remove judgment from public discourse. Oppression flows from within.

Phil Brown, Atlanta, GA  pdbrown@mindspring.com -or-  xstential1@aol.com


Re: Internet-Finland Privacy (Green, RISKS-16.92)

Peter Kaiser 16-Mar-1995 1925 <kaiser@heron.enet.dec.com>
Thu, 16 Mar 95 19:23:31 MET
Jon Green says about anon remailers that if "you use them illegally, you may
well be identified.  Them's the breaks."

Not so fast.  A friend of mine, a political activist of the 1960s, says of
his political activities, that "I've been jailed several times, always for
something I actually did.  But none of it was illegal."  And he points out
that in court all the cases were either dismissed or found in his favor.

So the risk of abuse is clear: you may be identified, and pursued by
authority (or by the Church of Scientology) even if you have done nothing
illegal.  This has a lot to do with the original point of this thread.

___Pete  kaiser@acm.org  +33 92.95.62.97 FAX +33 92.95.50.50


Risks of doing date arithmetic early in the year without floating point

Peter Ludemann <ludemann@netcom.netcom.com>
Fri, 17 Mar 95 17:44 PST
The recent discussions of risks-of-dates (RISK-16.74, etc.) and Pentium
floating point bugs reminded me ...

Some years ago, I had to write a program to match the accounting
records from the database server with those of the batch system.  The
records were in different formats: the database server used the system
clock and the batch system used day-of-year+hhmmss.

The database vendor had provided a conversion routine which I happily
used, only to discover that there were discrepancies of up to 3
minutes between the two systems' records.  Eventually I determined
that the database vendor's conversion routine was faulty.

I quickly wrote some code in PL/I using double-precision floating
point arithmetic (which gave me 55-bit precision, more than enough)
and everything worked fine.  My code was only a few lines, compared
with the pages of convolution that the vendor had provided (it was in
assembler, emulating 48-bit integer arithmetic on a 32-bit system).

The only reason I caught this error was that I happened to be writing
the program near the end of the year: the conversion routine's error
increased from almost nothing in January to about 3 minutes in
December.  If I had written the code in January, I probably wouldn't
have caught the error.  But the error probably wouldn't have existed
in the first place if the conversion code had been written with
floating point instead of integer arithmetic.

- peter ludemann    ludemann@netcom.com


Phone companies with wrong 555-1212 databases

Dr. Frederick B. Cohen <fc@all.net>
Fri, 17 Mar 1995 17:53:49 -0500 (EST)
For the last 6 months, people trying to reach my company have been
misdirected to the phone number of some poor woman whose family has had
ever-increasing numbers of telephone calls for a company she has never heard
of.  We finally talked to her today and found out that she has been
inundated over the last few weeks as a result of articles in Newsweek and
the Wall Street journal mentioning my company's name.

She has been trying to get the phone company information operator to
make the change since December of 1994, but they have repeatedly told
her that her phone number was that of my company and they they could not
change it for her.

Finally, today, a reporter called me, told me of the problem he had in
finding me, and started me down the path to track down this problem.
Several operators and phone companies later (two phone companies were
involved here - and they don't talk to each other) I found out that
neither company could change the listing - the other one had it.

I got desperate and called the information operator (who had told me
previously that they could not change these things).  She told me she
would change it right away in both databases.

So I called again a little bit later only to find the number had not
been changed and that they could not change it except from the business
office.  The supervisor (it was now after 5PM) tried to find someone in
the business office to authorize the change.

Meanwhile, my wife had convinced the poor woman whose family has been
traumatized for the last 4 months to give people the new number by
herself - there was a certain telephone company hatred comraderie
between them - they both said that they had no problem believing that
phone companies could screw up this badly.

It is now the weekend, and I am assured by all parties that if I will
only try this whole thing again next week sometime, it will be fixed in
a jiffie.  I'm getting ready to call my lawyer.
FC


Re: The Manchurian Printer & Prodigy Spies on Users (RISKS-16.92)

Frank C Ferguson <ferguson@eri.erinet.com>
Sat, 18 Mar 1995 17:16:59 -0500 (EST)
  ... Prodigy insisted that the copied data was the result of a software
  bug, and it wasn't spying on its customers.  But fundamentally, if you use
  a modem to access ..., there is no way to be sure that your computer isn't
  spying on you while you surf the information highway."  [Simson Garfinkel]

The above is another example of insufficient research.  There was and is no
software bug.  When you delete a file in DOS, all you are deleting is the
location of the file that is stored in the FAT (File Allocation Table).  The
file itself remains on the disk until it eventually gets written over by new
files.  Prodigy software reserves a "space" on your disk, the size of which
is determined by you when you load their software.  They use this "space" to
cache data that your computer needs to display information on your screen.
Use of this space saves large amounts of time because if the data is already
on your disk, then they don't have to waste time transferring it to you from
a distant location.  Initially when this "space" is first allocated, there
will be remnants of your old files in it.  Eventually, as more and more data
is "cached" in this "space" all your old file info will be written over and
no longer viewable.  When people became concerned, Prodigy offered free
software that would erase all the users old files from that allocated space.
They also allowed an independent software auditor to inspect their software
to see if it was being used to upload the users files to Prodigy.  The
Auditor reported that it was not written to do that.  That's not to say that
it couldn't be.  Of course it could be.  But if you don't want to risk loss
of privacy, then disconnect your modem, LAN, or any other comm link you may
have.  Why?  Because any service could "sneak a peek", not just the ones you
mentioned.  You obviously are at risk yourself since your address indicates
that you are connected to the internet in some fashion.

Frank C. Ferguson  ferguson@erinet.com


Software System Safety Class, Nancy Leveson

Nancy Leveson <leveson@cs.washington.edu>
Thu, 16 Mar 1995 10:24:21 PST
LOCATION AND DATE:  Seattle, Washington,  July 24-26

TEXT: N.G. Leveson, Safeware: System Safety and Computers, Addison-Wesley,
1995.

DESCRIPTION: This class will focus on the unique problems involved in
building safety-critical software and describe some techniques that can be
used to enhance the safety of software-controlled systems.  Emphasis will
be on procedures and techniques that are practical enough to be applied to
projects today. Real-project experiences with these techniques in different
application areas will be described.   The class size will be limited to 30
in order to encourage interaction.

  Part 1 (Day 1):  Management of Safety-Critical Software Projects:
     including organizational, managerial, and technical risk factors,
     human error and safety, system and software process and tasks, role
     of management, setting up a safety organization, setting up a safety
     information system, cost and resource requirements.

  Part 2 (Days 2 and 3): Technical Aspects:
     including formal models of accidents, hazard analysis, software
     hazard analysis, software requirements completeness and analysis,
     principles of safe design, safe design of the human-machine interface,
     safety testing and software fault tree analysis (verification of safety).

The two parts may be taken separately or together.

INSTRUCTOR:  Nancy Leveson is Boeing Professor of Computer Science and
Engineering at the University of Washington (and Adjunct Professor at
the University of British Columbia).  Dr. Leveson is a founder of the
field of software safety and has been doing research and consulting on this
topic since 1980.  Before becoming a professor, she was a system engineer
for IBM.  Dr. Leveson consults widely on safety-critical systems for both
government and industry.  She has worked with aerospace, nuclear power,
transportation, aircraft, and medical systems.

Dr. Leveson is the Editor-in-Chief of IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, on the editorial board of the Journal of Reliability Engineering
and System Safety, an elected member of the Board of Directors of the Computing
Research Association, and an appointed member of the NAS/NAE National
Research Council Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems.  She
recently completed a study of the Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes
for NASA and the National Research Council and is currently on a National
Research Council committee to establish criteria for digital instrumentation
and control in nuclear power plants.

For Additional Information Contact Dr. Nancy Leveson, 206-685-1934
leveson@cs.washington.edu


First Bank of Internet (FBOI) Opens

Vinn Beigh <fboi@netcom.com>
Sun, 19 Mar 1995 23:03:43 -0800
___/\___
_|_()_|_               A N N O U C E M E N T

For immediate release:                  Contact: fboi@netcom.com
Monday, March 20, 1995                  Subject of 'info' for details
                                        Direct questions to Vinn K. Beigh

The First Bank of Internet, FBOI, is announcing the initiation of
transaction processing services for Internet electronic commerce.
Purchases over the Internet can now be made without exposing personal
credit card information.  Vendors can now sell products on the Internet
without the restrictions imposed by credit card use.

Other Internet purchase procedures require personal credit card information.
Those proceedings will be monitored by thousands of people all over
the world.  Some will attempt to either decode the credit card information
or impersonate the customer in future transactions.

The alternative to personal credit cards for electronic commerce is
based on an FBOI procured Visa (tm) Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card.
The card is prepaid, PIN protected, replaceable, disposable, and good
at over 200,000 Visa/PLUS (tm) ATMs in 83 countries.

The safety of FBOI is ensured because access to ATM funds without
possession of both the ATM card and the Personal Identification Number
(PIN) is not possible.  ATM cards are also better than credit cards because
their purchase does not require the personal, financial, and employment
background of the consumer.

The Visa ATM card is not a credit card.  It is cash.  The ATM card
will be used as a checking account.  Using an ATM card allows consumers
to set aside dedicated funds for Internet data purchases.  It provides
a safe, secure way to transfer cash from consumers to producers.  In
addition, consumers can reclaim their funds at any time using an ATM.

A check/invoice procedure is used that consumers will find familiar.
The consumer first places an order with a vendor.  The consumer then
sends to the vendor or FBOI an e-mail 'check' for the purchase of the
program/file/data product.  The vendor sends FBOI an e-mail 'invoice'.
FBOI will reconcile the transaction and send e-mail transaction receipts
to both the vendor and customer.  Cash will be taken from the customer
ATM account and credited to the vendor for later payment.  FBOI charges
a 5% vendor commission per transaction.

Producers of software, information collections, newsletters, graphics,
and other data products can use FBOI services for the sale of their
products.   These vendors can sell their products for prices that would
be too low for credit card transactions.  Subscription services that
charge an up-front fee for one time access to data depositories and
services also can participate.

Vendors will benefit from a very large consumer base because this
global solution works just as well outside the U.S. as within the U.S..
The Visa ATM network is worldwide.  Consumers will benefit from a very
large vendor base because software produced in non-North American
countries can be offered for sale much easier than now.

The worldwide producers on the Internet can use FBOI services without the
expense of owning or renting a dedicated Internet server or a World-Wide
Web site.  E-mail is the cheapest and simplest of all Internet services.
Large Internet commercial services will soon be starting that provide only
for the on-line purchase of catalog products.  It will not be possible
for the individual producer to sell a data product using those services.
Those services will collect the consumers credit card information in
advance because of Internet security problems.

FBOI transmits no sensitive information over the Internet and prevents
forgery and impersonation by using Pretty Good Privacy, PGP (tm),
software for all transactions.  This freeware provides excellent
authentication and anti-alteration security.

In addition to the unsecured nature of the Internet, consumers should be
hesitant giving out their credit card information to vendors of unknown
credibility.  Tracking is much harder on the Internet than magazine
direct marketing.  Also, it is not the same as mail order merchandise
since U.S. Postal Service and Federal Trade Commission mail order laws
do not apply to the Internet.

For high volume, low cost, transactions directly between producers and
consumers on the Internet contact FBOI.

Further information can be obtained from The First Bank of Internet
by sending an e-mail message with the subject "info" to <fboi@netcom.com>.

Visa is a trademark of Visa International Service Association.
PLUS is a trademark of Plus System, Inc.
PGP and Pretty Good Privacy are trademarks of Philip Zimmermann.
The First Bank of Internet (tm) is not a lending institution, and is not
chartered.

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