NASDAQ Computers Crash, Halting Trading for More Than Two Hours By Diana B. Henriques, The N.Y. Times, 16 July 1994 [PGN ABSTRACTING] The U.S. automated over-the-counter NASDAQ marketplace went down for 2.5 hours on the morning of Friday, 15 July 1994 when the computer system died. (It was finally restored just before N.Y. lunchtime.) The problem was traced to an upgrading to new communications software. One new feature was added each morning, beginning on Monday. Thursday's fourth new feature resulted in some glitches, but the systems folks decided to go ahead with the fifth feature on Friday morning anyway. It overloaded the mainframes (in Connecticut). Unfortunately, the backup system (in Rockville, MD) was also being upgraded, in order to ensure real-time compatibility. The backup of course died as well. ``[The backup system is] really for natural disasters, power failures, hardware problems that sort of thing,'' said Joseph R. Hardiman, Pres and CEO of NASDAQ. ``When you're dealing with operating software or communication software, it really doesn't help you.'' Volume on the day was cut by about one third, down from a typical 300 million shares. The effects were noted elsewhere as well, including several stock indexes, spreading to the Chicago options pits, trading desks, and the media. That in turn affected the large stock-index mutual funds.
Cable TV fiddlers ensnared by Garda's World Cup trap Alan Murdoch in Dublin, The Independent, 15 Jul 1994 HUNDREDS of fraudsters in Cork have been nabbed in an ingenious "sting" targeting three human weaknesses: greed, cable television, and the World Cup. For two years Cork Communications, a cable television supplier to 30,000 homes, has been plagued by revenue-sapping fiddles. Former subscribers were getting their "black box" cable decoders tampered with to let them watch pay-only channels such as Sky Sport and the Movie Channel for free. An illicit black-box black market appeared, supplied by a wave of house burglaries. "Hot" decoders were sold at an average Ir#60 a time. The result was 4,500 miscreants watching on the cheap, defrauding the firm of an annual Ir#750,000. The solution had echoes of an FBI sting in the mid Eighties when dozens of US crooks were lured with congratulations on winning a non-existent competition, only to be arrested on arriving to collect their "winnings". The solution devised by Cork Communications blended hi-tech ingenuity with an unerring sense of the one passion guaranteed to unite criminal classes this summer. A continuous message was broadcast on a cable channel which could be received only by decoders on which the scrambler system had been illegally by-passed. "To mark Ireland's first ever May Day bank holiday, YFBT Promotions is offering an Irish World Cup T-shirt absolutely free," if promised, giving a freephone number. Some 2,000 replies were taped. Weeding out those who heard about the offer in the pub, local gardai focused on former subscribers among the earliest callers. Last Monday Cork District Court granted 416 search warrants. The next 48 hours saw a blitz of raids such as J Edgar Hoover would have relished. An initial 150 people face charges and possible fines or imprisonment. A Garda spokesman said. "I hope this will prove a deterrent. We've scared a lot of people." Incidentally, three letters of the name YFBT Promotions stand for "Your Box is Tampered". Dept. of Computing Science, Univ. of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk PHONE = +44 91 222 7923 FAX = +44 91 222 8232
Some of you may have seen the rather unbalanced piece NBC Dateline piece on the aircraft collision avoidance system, TCAS (July 14). The Dateline piece implied that TCAS was unsafe and, in fact, increased the risk of flying. Before the piece was aired, The Air Transport Association (ATA), Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and the Allied Pilots Association (APA), along with TCAS manufacturers, sent a joint letter to the President of NBC News expressing concern about the Dateline: NBC segment on TCAS. The letter states that indications from those already interviewed, "as well as promotional pieces already aired, clearly suggest that the segment will not present a factual, balanced viewpoint of TCAS." The fact is that TCAS substantially reduces the risk of midair collisions. Airlines and pilots overwhelmingly support it, and in a number of incidents pilots credit TCAS with saving lives. The most recent testimony involved a situation over the Pacific between Northwest and Cathay Pacific jumbo jets in which TCAS helped avert a potential disaster. The Northwest pilot later said something to the effect that "700 people owe their lives to TCAS." (No mention of this by NBC.) FAA's R&D Service has concluded after extensive analysis that when both aircraft are equipped with TCAS 2, the risk of collision is reduced by a factor of 26. And, despite what was reported on Dateline, TCAS has not induced a single collision or near collision. These assertions are not made lightly. They come after four years of experience with the operational evaluation of TCAS II that FAA began in 1990 in cooperation with the aviation community, including pilots and controllers. This represents some 25 million hours of TCAS operation. During that time, almost 14,000 reports from pilots and controllers have been received. A quote from one of FAA's Public Affairs staffers puts this in context: "Clearly, the trend in television news is towards the news magazine shows, versus the straight news news programs. Even CNN, whose straight news broadcasts are among the best, is losing audience share, according to recent statistics. Bucking this trend, I plan to focus a lot more of my attention on televised sports, although I haven't broached that subject with my wife yet. Sports is one thing that TV does exceptionally well. Which reminds, if you still think soccer is boring after watching Romario of Brazil and Baggio of Italy, then you need help. Might as well just jump in your jammies, put on your slippers, watch the news magazine shows, and wait for the final bell."
Now it seems that since an aviation authoritative source is talking about the RISKS that I have been identifying for over 4 years, it's OK to be wary. But how easy people forget. It is not in the best interest of the government, the FAA, the airlines or the aircraft manufacturers to openly discuss, much less admit what *could* go wrooonnngggg. RISKS readers should be referred to my original works on the subject which appear in: RISKS: (You know the issue better than I do.) Security Insider Report, August, 1993. "The FAA Discovers HERF: Is John Q. Flyer in Danger?" "Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway," Thunder's Mouth Press. ISBN 1-56025-080-1. In ongoing research in related areas, we are presently identifying at least 19 (nineteen) actual HERF attacks against high tech organizations. We will be publishing the results of this work when we are permitted to release the names and events. I stand by the original work despite the nay-sayers. If anything, recent events and current discussions fully support what I have been saying since 1990: Magnetic weapons are the nuclear arms of the Information Age, and governments from hither and yon are trying to figure out what to do about it. Kind of puts Michelangelo in perspective, doesn't it. Thanks to RISKS for staying on the leading edge of technology and for not being distracted by those who would prefer the subject be kept in the closet.
Since Lockerbie was caused by a device hidden by consumer electronics, and since it appears to be at least suspected that navigational devices are vulnerable to interference from outside consumer devices carried by passengers, has anyone thought that a terrorist attack might be carried out on the avionics instead?. It is not easy to screen for electronic devices in baggage etc. After all the mail about the A320, I have come to realise that avionics are already past the point of no return in modern jets - on an architecture programme last night, Norman Foster was extolling the virtues of the 747; on the flight deck was a very simple layout using four CRTs; is anyone claiming that the plane is not avionics-dependent when the instruments are condensed in this manner?. I am sure there are means of switching it all off, however what is the plane like to fly after the switch-off? When my car's power steering failed, I was VERY glad to be travelling slowly even though the steering would have been quite normal to a van driver: I can imagine that this effect is at its worst in helicopters. In the more mundane computer world, are any desktops vulnerable to reverse TEMPEST attacks aimed at denying service? We have some 286s I would quite gladly test.. Phil Overy
In RISKS DIGEST 16.23 it was reported: > A cellular phone was also found on, although its owner claimed it had not > been used. ^ It should be noted that a cell phone periodically transmits to the control site so that the system knows its location, even if it's not 'in use'. A powered-up phone could easily generate the intermittent problems reported.
I agree we need more information on using electronic devices in aircraft. The following article has the most particular information I've seen yet. However, Idon't know if the suspect laptop computer was examined for FCC interference compliance. If all these "electronic devices" are so dangerous, why are our aircraft so sensitive, and why aren't computer manufacturers shielding their products better? Compass Deflection [begin quote] In cruise flight at FL310 25 NM west of the VOR, the #1 compass suddenly precessed 10 degrees to the right. I asked the First Flight Attendant if any passenger-operated electronic devices were in operation in the cabin. She said that a passenger had just turned on his laptop computer. I asked that the passenger turn off his laptop computer for a period of 10 minutes, which he did. I slaved the #1 compass, and it returned to normal operation for the 10-minute period. I then asked that the passenger turn on his computer once again. The # 1 compass immediately precessed 8 degrees to the right. The computer was then turned off for a 30-minute period during which the #1 compass operation was verified as normal. It was very evident to all on the flight deck that the laptop computer operation was adversely affecting the operation of the #1 compass. I believe that the operation of all passenger-operated electronic devices should be prohibited on airlines until the safe operation of all these devices can be verified. [end quote] _Callback_, number 180, May 1994. A monthly safety bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O.Box 189, Moffett Field, CA 94035- 0189 (no copyright notice displayed). Chris Norloff firstname.lastname@example.org
I note that the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) is in the process of greatly expanding it's network of Changeable Message Signs (CMS) and freeway surveillance cameras. In many cases, cameras are being installed in locations where they can observe the text on the nearby CMS. (in many remote locations, CalTrans is using VSAT technology to feed a CMS and monitor a camera). Don Root, Assistant Chief, Telecommunications, Calif. Office of Emergency Services
F I N A L P R O G R A M EDCC-1 1st European Dependable Computing Conference Berlin, Germany October 4-6, 1994 [The original message from Erik was huge. I have excerpted the program. Send E-mail to Erik to receive the full package on-line. There is a 1 August 1994 deadline on getting the conference rate for the hotels, so act quickly. PGN] ORGANIZED BY: * Joint Technical Interest Group "Fault-Tolerant Computing Systems" of the GI, ITG and GMA, Germany * AFCET Working Group "Dependable Computing" France * AICA Working Group "Dependability in Computer Systems", Italy In association with the Council of European Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS) IN COOPERATION WITH: * GI Technical Interest Group "Dependable IT Systems" * GI Technical Interest Group "Test and Reliability of Circuits and Systems" * IFIP Working Group 10.4 "Dependable Computing and Fault-Tolerance" * IEEE TC on Fault-Tolerant Computing * IEEE TC on Real-Time Computing * EC-ESPRIT CaberNet Network of Excellence on Distributed Computing System Architecture * EWICS Technical Committee on Safety, Reliability and Security (TC7) INTRODUCTION and BACKGROUND: Organizations and individuals are becoming increasingly dependent on sophisticated computing systems. In differing circumstances, the dependency might for example center on the continuity of the service delivered by the computing system, the overall performance level achieved, the real-time response rate provided, the extent to which catastrophic failures are avoided, or confidentiality violations prevented. These various concerns can be subsumed into the single conceptual framework of dependability, for which reliability, availability, safety and security, for example, can be considered as particular attributes. This, the first European Dependable Computing Conference, aims to provide a European venue for researchers and practitioners from all over the world to present and discuss their latest research results and developments. The conference scope addresses all aspects of dependable computing, including: fault-tolerant systems and components, safety critical systems, software dependability, secure systems, validation, verification, testing and evaluation. The conference program has been purposely organized in a single track to encourage cross-fertilization between different viewpoints of dependable computing. EDCC-1 is the successor of two European conference series on fault tolerance and dependability as well as on aspects of testing and diagnosis. The first series, known as the "International Conference on Fault-Tolerant Computing Systems" was organized (from 1982 up to 1991) by the German Technical Interest Group "Fault-Tolerant Computing Systems". The other series, known as the "International Conference on Fault-Tolerant Systems and Diagnostics", was annually organized (from 1975 up to 1990) by Universities and academic research institutions in the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and the former GDR. EDCC will be organized every two or three years in different European countries. ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE: General Co-Chairs Klaus Echtle Dieter Hammer University of Dortmund Humbold-University of Berlin Germany Germany Program Chair David Powell LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse France Publicity Chair Finance Chair Erik Maehle Volker Schanz University of Paderborn VDE-ITG, Frankfurt/Main Germany Germany International Liaison Chairs North America: Jacob Abraham Asia: Yoshi Tohma University of Texas, Austin, Tokyo Institute of Technology USA Japan TECHNICAL PROGRAM Tuesday, October 4, 1994 09:30 Opening Ceremony 10:00 Session 1: Fault-Tolerance Techniques Chair: Winfried Goerke, University of Karlsruhe, Germany A model for adaptive fault-tolerant systems Matti A. Hiltunen, Richard D. Schlichting (University of Arizona, Tucson, USA) Designing secure and reliable applications using FRS: an object-oriented approach Jean-Charles Fabre, Yves Deswarte (LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse, France), Brian Randell (University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom) A fault-tolerant mechanism for simple controllers Joao Gabriel Silva, Luis Moura Silva, Henrique Madeira, Jorge Bernardino (University of Coimbra, Portugal) 11:30 Session 2: Formal Methods Chair: John McDermid, University of York, United Kingdom Formal semantics for Ward & Mellor's transformation schema Carsta Petersohn, Cornelis Huizing, Jan Peleska, Willem-Paul de Roever (Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Germany) Formal reasoning on fault coverage of fault tolerant techniques: a case study C. Bernardeschi, A. Fantechi, Luca Simoncini (University of Pisa, Italy) 12:30 Lunch 14:00 Session 3: Evaluation Chair: Bjarne Helvik, DELAB, Trondheim, Norway On performability modeling and evaluation of software fault tolerance structures Silvano Chiaradonna, Andrea Bondavalli, Lorenzo Strigini (CNUCE/CNR, Pisa, Italy) Optimal design of fault-tolerant soft-real-time systems with imprecise computations Cesare Antonelli (University of Perugia, Italy), Vincenzo Grassi (Tor Vergata University of Rome, Italy) Computational restrictions for SPN with generally distributed transition times Andrea Bobbio (University of Brescia, Italy), M. Telek (University of Budapest, Hungary) 15:30 Break 16:00 Session 4: Hardware Testing Chair: Bernd Straube, Fraunhofer - EAS, Dresden, Germany Test generation for digital systems based on alternative graph theory Raimund Ubar (Tallinn Technical University, Estonia) The configuration ratio: a model for simulating CMOS intra-gate bridge with variable logic thresholds M. Renovell, P. Huc, Y. Betrand (University of Montpellier II, France) Coverage of delay faults: when 13% and 99% mean the same Andrzej Krasniewski, Leszek B. Wronski (Warsaw University of Technology, Poland) 17:30 Session 5: Fault Injection Chair: Jean Arlat, LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse, France RIFLE: a general purpose pin-level fault injector Henrique Madeira, Mario Rela, Francisco Moreira, Joao Gabriel Silva (University of Coimbra, Portugal) On single event upset error manifestation Rolf Johansson (Chalmers University of Technology, Goteborg, Sweden) 18.30 End Wednesday, October 5, 1994 08:30 Session 6: Software Testing Chair: Pierre-Jacques Courtois, AIB-Vincotte Nuclear, Brussels, Belgium Injecting faults into environment simulators for testing safety critical software Hong Zhu, P.A.V. Hall, J.H.R. May (The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom), T. Cockram (Rolls-Royce plc, United Kingdom) On statistical testing of synchronous data flow programs Pascale Thevenod-Fosse, Christine Mazuet, Yves Crouzet (LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse, France) 09:30 Session 7: Built-in Self Test Chair: Andrzej Hlawiczka, Technical University of Gliwice, Poland Hierarchical test analysis of VLSI circuits for random BIST G. Masseboeuf, J. Pulou (Laboratoire d'Automatique de Grenoble), J.L. Rainard (CNET, Meylan, France) Zero aliasing compression based on groups of weakly independent outputs in circuits with high complexity for two fault models Peter Boehlau (University of Potsdam, Germany) 10:30 Break 11:00 Session 8: Software Diversity Chair: Hubert Kirrmann, ASEA Brown Boveri AG, Baden-Daetwil, Switzerland Systematic and design diversity - software techniques for hardware fault detection Tomislav Lovric (University of Dortmund, Germany) Detection of permanent hardware faults of a floating point adder by pseudoduplication S. Gerber, M. Goessel (University of Potsdam, Germany) MLDD (Multi-Layered Design Diversity) architecture for achieving high design fault tolerance capabilities Aki Watanabe, Ken Sakamura (University of Tokyo, Japan) 12:30 Lunch 14:00 Session 9: Parallel Systems Chair: Paulo Verissimo, INESC, Lisbon, Portugal Reconfiguration and checkpointing in massively parallel systems Bernd Bieker, Erik Maehle (University of Paderborn, Germany), Geert Deconinck, Johan Vounckx (Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium) An approach for hierarchical system level diagnosis of massively parallel computers combined with a simulation-based method for dependability analysis J. Altmann, F. Balbach, A. Hein (University of Erlangen-Nuernberg, Germany) Hierarchical checking of multiprocessors using watchdog processors I. Majzik, A. Pataricza (Technical University of Budapest, Hungary), M. Dal Cin, W. Hohl, J. Hoenig, V. Sieh (University of Erlangen-Nuernberg, Germany) 15:30 Break 16.00 Panel Discussion: Future directions in dependable computing Moderator: Jean-Claude Laprie, LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse, France Panelists: Algirdas Avizienis, University of California, Los Angeles, USA Jan Hlavicka, Czech Technical University, Prague, Czech Republic Michele Morganti, ITALTEL Central Reserarch Labs. Milano, Italy Brian Randell, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom Ernst Schmitter, Siemens AG, Munich, Germany 17.30 End 18.00 Boat Trip 20.30 Conference Dinner Invited Speaker: David Talbot, Head of Division, Software and Advanced Information Processing, DG III-Industry-ESPRIT, Commission of the European Commission Thursday, October 6, 1994 08:30 Session 10: Fault Tolerance in VLSI Chair: Jozsef Sziray, Computer Research and Innovation Center, Budapest, Hungary An effective reconfiguration process for fault-tolerant VLSI/WSI array processors Yung-Yuan Chen, C.-H. Cheng, Y.-C. Chou (Chung-Hua Polytechnic Institute, Hsin-Chu, Taiwan) Concurrent error detection in fast FNT networks Jamel M. Tamir, Satnam S. Dlay, Raouf N. Gorgui-Naguib, Oliver R. Hinton (University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom) Feasible regions quantify the configuration power of systems with multiple fault types Laurence E. LaForge (University of Nevada, Reno, USA) 10:00 Session 11: Measurement Chair: Tashko Nikolov, Technical University of Sofia, Bulgaria Software reliability analysis of three successive generations of a switching system M. Kaaniche, K. Kanoun, M. Cukier (LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse, France), M. Bastos Martini (CpQD-Telebras, Brazil) Performance of consistent checkpointing a modular operating system: Results of the FTM experiment Gilles Muller, Mireille Hue (IRISA/INRIA, Rennes, France), Nadine Peyrouze (Bull Research, France) 11:00 Break 11:30 Session 12: Switching Networks and Hypercubes Chair: K. Iyoudou, Moscow Aviation Institute, Russia Ring-Banyan network: a fault tolerant multistage interconnection network and its fault diagnosis Jae-Hyun Park, Heung-Kyu Lee (Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology, Taejon, Korea) Reconfiguration of faulty hypercubes Dimitri R. Avresky, K.M. Altawil (Texas A&M University, College Station, USA) Fault tolerance on Boolean n-cube architectures Chu-Sing Yang, Shun-Yue Wu (National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan) 13:00 Lunch 14:30 Session 13: Distributed Systems Chair: Jan Torin, Chalmers University of Technology, Goteborg, Sweden Relative signatures for fault tolerance and their implementation Martin Leu (University of Dortmund, Germany) GATOSTAR: a fault tolerant load sharing facility for parallel applications Bertil Folliot, Pierre Sens (MASI Laboratory, Paris, France) A hierarchical membership protocol for synchronous distributed systems P.D.V. van der Stok, M.M.M.P.J. Claessens, D. Alstein (Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands) 16:00 Break 16:15 Joint meeting of European Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance Working Groups - open to all EDCC-1 participants Chairs: E. Schmitter, J.C. Laprie. L. Simoncini 18.00 End
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