>From April 9, 1996 Albuquerque Tribune: Computer-chip-manufacturing operations at Intel Corp.'s Rio Rancho plant were back to normal today after a five-hour power failure, the company said. Intel Corp. spokesman Richard Draper said today that Monday's power failure, which ruined an undisclosed number of chips, including some of the plant's Pentium microprocessors, was caused by a malfunction of Public Service Company of New Mexico software. "For business reasons, we're not going to provide exact numbers as to the product loss from the shutdown," Draper said. "However, the power outage won't have significant impact on Intel or its earnings. It's expensive, but again, it's not a significant impact on our bottom line." Draper said the power failure occurred about 9 a.m. Monday; full power was restored about 2 p.m. Monday. Intel evacuated about 600 workers during the outage because of dark and potentially unsafe working conditions. "The PNM people told us it was a glitch in a switching system," Draper said. "The original glitch lasted a few seconds, but we waited to start operations because we were uncertain about what happened and wanted to make sure we could restore full power." Draper said PNM's apparent software error is believed to have caused the wrong circuit breaker to open at a substation, incapacitating three of six transformers. Karin Stangl, a Public Service Company of New Mexico spokeswoman, said power was restored after about a minute, and she could not explain the longer problem at Intel. Stangl said PNM and Intel are investigating. [I find Intel's conservative response, both in evacuation, and waiting to be sure the power was back, interesting. Maybe the software was running on a non-Intel processor trying to get even with the Pentiums... BEW-are] Bruce E. Wampler, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor, Department of Computer Science, University of New Mexico email@example.com http://www.cs.unm.edu/~wampler
I was hit by a daylight savings time problem Monday, the day after the time changed here. My machine is running four different operating systems: Windows 95, Windows NT, OS/2, and Linux. Since I'd doing cross platform development, I usually boot at least two different OS's a day. Monday, I booted Windows 95 first. At startup, I was greeted by a polite messages asking if the time should be changed to DST. Fine. Time changed and correct. Later in the day, after booting both NT and Linux, I noticed the time was yet another hour ahead. Either NT or Linux (and I suspect NT, but can't confirm that) had also, but invisibly, changed to DST. After some thought, and a class discussion in the software engineering class I teach, I've concluded this is not an easy problem to solve. In this case, there were two basic contributing factors I can figure out. First, PCs keep the internal clock in local time. Not a good idea — it should be Universal Time — but reality. The problem is then that NT or Linux made the assumption it was the only OS on the machine, and was free to update the time. Unlike Win95, which could be polite about the change because it is normally a single user system, NT and Linux both could reasonably assume they don't normally get shut down each evening, and thus the silent time update (I'm guessing). It would be unreasonable to expect confirmation from an operator. In this case, however, the time update did come at boot time. It seems to me a better update policy for NT/Linux would be to silently update the time if the change happened while running, and require a confirmation if it happens at boot time. Not perfect, but better. I tried OS/2, also, and it just ignored the time change. Bruce E. Wampler, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor, Department of Computer Science, University of New Mexico firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.cs.unm.edu/~wampler
> At http://www.timing.se/Daylight.html there is a brief discussion > of the rules for Daylight Savings Time changeovers for central Europe > and the UK. At the end of the page it says: ... > > The rule is a "de facto standard," not a law. ... > With all of our scrambling about to deal with the Year 2000 problem, > shouldn't we be just as concerned with this inconsistency that arises > yearly (especially if there are no 'hard and fast' laws/standards to dictate > DST changeovers)? But there *are* 'hard and fast' laws that dictate DST changeovers. There is however *not* a law that dictates this far into the future but only for a few coming years. (Note that these laws, EU directives, are made up far in advance. It was already known a few years ago that the EU would change the rule this year.) It appears not to be very advisable to cast changeover dates in concrete. It is up to the software to deal with this flexibility and Andrew Olson's timezone package deals very well with it. (And some software does not handle it well at all. Most annoying was a bug in SGI's software which thought the last Sunday in September last year was October 1, and so switched out of DST one week late. Exactly the same bug stroke again this time when the software thought that the last Sunday of March was March 24, and so switched into DST one week early. Surprising that the bug was not fixed in that half year.) dik t. winter, cwi, kruislaan 413, 1098 sj amsterdam, nederland, +31205924098 home: bovenover 215, 1025 jn amsterdam, nederland; http://www.cwi.nl/~dik/
I have read posts recently about several risks that all boil down to one thing — the Risk of making poor information system design decisions. Poor security systems, employees selling data, even the CDA are all at least partly the result of poor technical decisions. Unfortunately, this often happens in low-bidder-gets-the-job situations. Konica, the company I work for, has come up with a partial solution to this problem. We formed a group called the Information Partners, a cross-functional group of technical people, managers, and end users from across our company. This group steers our corporate information and technology resources. We serve as an interface between programmers, users and upper management, and frequently call in outside help to get the best systems at reasonable prices. NOTE: I am not representing Konica as good, bad or otherwise, just stating how one group met a Risk. Our solution has its own Risks, but we help to highlight the importance of technology in a business environment. This usually gets us away from the lowest-bidder reasoning. The key to success seems to lie in not getting bogged down in the committee mentality, but rather contributing where we can add something. Is a committee the answer to every problem? Certainly not, but where computers and systems are concerned, more input can mean a better result.
I've seen hundreds of stories here and elsewhere about software, hardware, hybrid and other systems that get blamed for dangerous actions, actions which compromise security or confidential information, etc., and then always end with the standard "risks are obvious" caveat. So I though I'd relate a description of a tremendous danger I just discovered right here in my own residential neighborhood. There's a partly computer-controlled / partly operator-controlled mechanical system near my house that must weight a couple of thousand pounds and has what I consider to be an unacceptably dangerous user interface. Today, I noticed that the operator had the ability to operate the system in a manner that was in violation of numerous laws — local, state and federal -- without any type of lockout mechanism built in, that there were essentially NO facets of the user interface that were designed to preclude (or even hamper) the operator from exceeding the system's absolute maximum operating parameters (leading quickly to a complete, catastrophic and dangerous failure of the system), and that the system could be easily operated in a manner which very seriously jeopardized the safety of the operator and anyone else within a mile or two (easily fatally), all without even the slightest intervention by the control system's software or hardware. Of course... it's my car. My point is that, yeh... your software can make it *easier* for you to send a confidential memo to your lover and dirty pictures to your boss, or a Man-Machine Interface can make it *easier* to land a plane down with the landing gear up, or an engineer can crash a locomotive into the station *quicker* because the signals weren't triple-redundant and both warning lights had burned out... But *YOU'RE* the one that didn't carefully review the address list on that memo before you clicked [SEND], and *YOU'RE* the one that didn't religiously observe the standard landing checklist, and *YOU'RE* the one that should have realized that you shouldn't be going 65 MPH 100 yards from Grand Central. I'm not trying to defend my profession; I've cursed up and down many a poorly designed system. But I wonder: are we trying to build better MMI's or just encouraging dumber operators to distance themselves from responsibility for their own actions? Rob Bailey, Bailey Computer Systems Kanawha / Charleston WM8S (email@example.com) Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
In RISKS-17.95, Jacob Palme suggested the use of peer-review to filter out malicious software. While potentially useful, there are a wide variety of attacks such a strategy would likely miss. For example, suppose a virus / alternative-model-Java applet author specifically targetted machines which were in a particular domain. Such a form of malicious software is much less likely to be detected by however large a user pool. (And a virus targetting a single company has been found ``in the wild'' before, I believe.) It is risky to believe that our past experiences with malicious software is a completely accurate predictor of the future; riskier still not to consider the entire collective past experience. The idea of signing software is not new. Bellcore's Betsi system uses PGP to have the author sign their software, and the idea has certainly been bounced around the security community before that was implemented. The effect of CAPI signatures is to make governmental agencies happy so that the API may be exported. I doubt that Microsoft cares very much whether the cryptographic service provider code written by third parties are bug free. In the CAPI signing model, it is a central authority doing the signing. Certainly there might be liability issues if MS — or Sun/Netscape/... for centrally signed Java applets — says anything about having looked cross-eyed at the third party code (risks of deep pockets?). With author-signed code, the picture wouldn't be entirely rosy either. Given the number of potential individual coders on the 'net, the process of knowing who writes good code and who writes buggy code (and potentially cause security problems) is rather daunting.
Governments aren't the only organizations that make stupid database-key decisions. Our prescription-drug plan has limitations on how much of a given drug a patient can get at a time — generally one month's supply. A reasonable restriction, all in all, and especially so with Federally controlled substances such as Ritalin and Dexedrine. The trouble is, their computer systems check this by keeping a history of each patient's prescription fills. The primary database key is the plan number (basically the primary beneficiary's SSN) and the secondary key, to distinguish family members, is the individual's birthdate. (Anybody see the problem here?) We have identical twins. Both are on similar long-term medications for asthma and ADD, which routinely sends the pharmacy nuts because they can't get approval for the second set. (A related problem would be if both parents were covered, thus having different primary keys. Why do I suspect that THAT problem was resolved early?) The RISK here is in programming for the 95% case without any provision for not-all-that-rare exceptions. D. C. Sessions firstname.lastname@example.org
In RISKS-18.02, email@example.com wrote to explain security problems with Compuserve's new client. One of the major ones was that, although they had switched the primary authentication to do a challenge handshake, the client would still happily accept a request for plaintext authentication. This actually turns out to be a relatively common problem with PPP client implementations. There are a number of public domain and commercial clients that will accept a PAP negotiation even if configured only for CHAP. Security nightmare. It seems to me that this mistake flows very naturally out of the PPP specification as a whole. A good PPP implementation will attempt to negotiate just about anything — Ask for X, if they refuse, ask for Y, if they refuse ask for Z — and that same implementation will be as generous as possible in accepting options — Sorry, we don't do X. You want to do Y? Okay. This mindset is great for interoperability, but it's a very bad failing when it comes to security. -Tim Kolar cisco Systems
> Though many machines on Usenet are eight-bit clean, NNTP is defined to be > seven-bit. There's no guarantee that the use of raw characters in > ISO-Latin-1 will come out unharmed on the other end. NNTP says nothing about character set in the text of an article. In fact, it says, "No attempt shall be made by the server to filter characters, fold or limit lines, or otherwise process incoming text" [rfc977]. I take this to mean it is intended to be 8-bit clean when used over an 8-bit clean transport, such as TCP. USENET messages are not explicitly limited to 7-bit, but "all USENET news articles must be formatted as valid ARPANET mail messages, according to the ARPANET standard RFC 822" [rfc850]. Read literally, this excludes all non-encoded non-ascii text. Current practice varies from one newsgroup to the next, and even within newsgroups. Some use 8-bit characters, others use some sort of 7-bit encoding, and there is usually nothing in the headers or the body to indicate what the encoding and character set are.
In RISKS-18.02, John Hoffman (<firstname.lastname@example.org>) describes risks that he felt were associated with the methods used by the Microsoft Exchange e-mail client to resolve partial addresses in outgoing messages. As it happens, there are two features of Exchange that can help to avoid or eliminate these risks: the Check Names feature, and an option in the client that controls the query order for address providers. The first feature (activated by a toolbar button or Alt-K on the keyboard) resolves all partial addresses in a message header before the message is actually sent; the user may then verify that the selections made by Exchange actually correspond to the recipients he has in mind. The second feature (found on the Tools | Options | Addressing property sheet) lets the user change the order in which address providers are queried. By placing the Global Address List ahead of the Personal Address Book (the opposite of the default) in this way, Exchange can be forced to look for a match within the user's organization before checking any (possibly external) addresses in his Personal Address Book. (As John has correctly surmised, Exchange stops at the first address book that contains one or more matches for a partial address.) I use both of these features, and I rarely encounter any problems with incorrect resolution of ambiguous partial addresses. If I have any doubt, I do a quick double-click on the resolved name in order to verify that it is really pointing to the recipient I have in mind. I do try to use display names in my Personal Address Book that do not match anything in the Global Address List, so that I can spot incorrect resolution of an address at a glance (e.g., the display name for my own CompuServe address in my Personal Address Book is slightly different from the display name of my internal address on the Global Address List). Anthony Atkielski
I haven't used this particular mailer, but maybe part of the risk is in the design of the mailer. The free UNIX mailer I use allows a long name to be assigned to an alias (e.g., the person's real full name). When I enter an alias, that name immediately appears on the "To:" line in front of me. That's saved me from embarrassment more than once. Being extra paranoid, I almost always also use a feature of the mailer that lets me see all the headers before I send a message (and change them if I've goofed). Silent mapping of aliases is not something I would want. Steve Sapovits Telebase Systems email@example.com http://www.telebase.com
COMPASS '96 11th Annual Conference on Computer Assurance National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD June 17-21, 1996 ADVANCE PROGRAM [abridged for RISKS] Monday, June 17 (Tutorials) Safety Case Construction and Management by John A. McDermid (University of York, UK) — FULL DAY Automatic Formal Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols by Stephen Brackin (ARCA Systems, Inc., USA) — HALF DAY Impact and Design of the Human-Machine Interface by Michael Harrison (University of York, UK) — HALF DAY) Tuesday, June 18 (Tutorials) ACL2, An Extended Reimplemented Version of Nqthm Logic Theorem Prover by J Strother Moore and William D. Young (Computational Logic, Inc., USA) — FULL DAY A Framework for Reasoning About Assurance by Jeffrey R. Williams (ARCA Systems, Inc.,USA) — HALF DAY Wednesday, June 19 8:45 am--Welcome and Keynote Welcoming Remarks: Karen Ferraiolo, General Chair Stuart Faulk and Connie Heitmeyer, Program Chairs Keynote Address I "The FAST Process (Family-Oriented Abstraction, Specification and Translation)--A Study in Successful Technology Transfer" David Weiss (Lucent Technologies, Bell Laboratories, USA) 10am--Formal Specification and Analysis I "Table Transformation Tools: Why and How" H. Shen, J. Zucker, D.L. Parnas (McMaster University, Canada) "Simulation vs. Verification: Getting the Best of Both Worlds" Aloysius K. Mok and Douglas Stuart (University of Texas, USA) 11:30 am--Applying Mechanical Theorem Provers "ACL2: An Industrial Strength Version of Nqthm" Matt Kaufmann and J Strother Moore (Computational Logic, Inc., USA) "Comparing Verification Systems: Interactive Consistency in ACL2" William D. Young (Computational Logic, Inc., USA) "Mechanical Verification of Object Code Against Source Code" Sakthi Subramanian and Jeffery V. Cook (Trusted Information Systems, USA) 2 pm--Practical Applications of Formal Methods "Industrial Usage of Formal Development Methods: The VSE-Tool Applied in Pilot Projects" Frank Koob, Markus Ullmann, and Stefan Wittmann (Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Germany) "Specifying, Validating and Testing a Semaphore System in the TRIO Environment" Angelo Gargantini, Lilia Liberati, Angelo Morzenti (Politecnico di Milano), and Cristiano Zacchetti (ATM-Azienda Trasporti Municipale, Italy) "Feasibility of Model Checking Software Requirements" Tirumale Sreemani and Joanne M. Atlee (University of Waterloo, Canada) 4 pm--Panel: From Theory to Practice---Bridging the Gap Chair — John Rushby (SRI Intern., USA) Thursday, June 20 9 am--Keynote Talk "Ontario Hydro's Experience with New Methods for Engineering Safety-Critical Software", Mike Viola (Ontario Hydro, Canada) 10am--Program Verification "Developing a Translator from C Programs to Data Flow Graphs Using RAISE" Anne Elizabeth Haxthausen (Technical University of Denmark, Denmark) "Verification of Consistency between Concurrent Program Designs and their Requirements" Marsha Chechik and John Gannon (University of Maryland, USA) 11:30 am--Formal Specification and Verification II "Verifying SOS Specifications" Bard Bloom, Allan Cheng, and Ashvin Dsouza (Cornell University) "A Correctness Proof of a Cache Coherence Protocol" Amy Felty and Frank Stomp (Bell Laboratories, USA) "The Specification of an Asynchronous Router" Faron Moller (Kungl Tekniska Hogskolan, Sweden) 2 pm--Software Safety "Safety Analysis Tools for Requirements Specifications" Vivek Ratan, Kurt Partridge, Jon Reese, and Nancy Leveson (Univ. of Wash., USA) "Impact and the Design of the Human-Machine Interface" A. M. Dearden and M. D. Harrison (University of York, UK) "Object-Oriented - No Panacea for Safety" Reginald Meeson (Institute for Defense Analyses, USA) 4 pm--Panel on High Assurance Computing Chair — Richard Gerber (University of Maryland, USA) 6:30 Banquet Guest Speaker: Nancy Leveson (University of Washington, USA) Friday, June 21 9 am--Computer Security "An Empirical Model of the Security Intrusion Process" Erland Jonsson and Tomas Olovsson (Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden) "Increasing Assurance Through Literate Programming Techniques" Andrew Moore (Naval Research Laboratory) and Charles Payne (Secure Computing Corp., USA) "A Framework for Composition" Todd Fine (Secure Computing Corporation) "Composition of a secure system based on trusted components" Ulf Lindqvist, Tomas Olovsson, Erland Jonsson (Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden) 11:30 am--Testing "Detecting Equivalent Mutants and the Possible Path Problem" A. Jefferson Offut (George Mason University) and Jie Pan (PRC, Inc., USA) "T-VEC: A Tool for Developing Critical Systems" Mark R. Blackburn (Software Productivity Consortium) and Robert D. Busser (Motorola, USA) "Defining an Adaptive Software Security Metric From a Dynamic Software Fault -Tolerance Measure" J. Voas, A. Ghosh, G. McGraw, F. Charron (Reliable Software Technologies) and K. Miller (University of Illinois Springfield, USA) 1 pm--Conference ends [Breaks, lunches omitted above. PGN] TOOLS FAIR 8 am--5:30 pm on Wed. and Thurs., 8 am--11:30 pm on Fri. See demonstrations of NRL's requirements toolset SCR*, CLInc's ACL2 theorem prover, two model checkers, and more... FOR MORE INFORMATION, VIST OUR WEB SITE at http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/conf/compass96 or contact Karen Ferraiolo, General Chair (firstname.lastname@example.org) Stuart Faulk, Program Cochair (email@example.com) Connie Heitmeyer, Program Cochair (firstname.lastname@example.org)
See <URL:http://www.usenix.org/ec.html> for full details. Or you can send e-mail to our mailserver at email@example.com. Your message should contain the line: send catalog. A catalog will be returned to you. Announcement and Call for Papers [abridged for RISKS] The Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce November 18-20, 1996, Claremont Hotel & Resort, Oakland, CA Sponsored by the USENIX Association Co-Sponsored by Fisher Center for Information Technology Management, UC Berkeley, and the School of Information Management and Systems, UC Berkeley Extended abstracts due: July 16, 1996 The Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce will provide a major opportunity for researchers, experimenters, and practitioners in this rapidly self-defining field to exchange ideas and present results of their work. This meeting will set the technical agenda for work in the area of Electronic Commerce by examining urgent questions, discovering directions in which answers might be pursued, and revealing cross-connections that otherwise might go unnoticed. Doug Tygar (program chair) Computer Science Dept, CMU 5000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3891 firstname.lastname@example.org Fax: +1-412-268-5576
Please report problems with the web pages to the maintainer