L-Vis (Live Video Insertion System) allows arbitrary images to be superimposed on television pictures (for example, for advertising purposes) but without those images appearing to live audiences or on instant replays. The Princeton Video Image system "uses missile guidance technology and a customized computer" to insert electronic billboards in the viewer-perceived program. The computer system recognizes familiar patterns (such as the wall behind home plate in a baseball stadium) and automagically inserts the desired logo or other graphic in the specified location. The image is logically removed whenever it would in the real world be physically obscured from camera view (e.g., by a batter or umpire). [Source: *San Francisco Chronicle*, 6 Jun 1996, p. A1 and A13.] Subliminal advertising was tried in movies back in the 1950s. This is perhaps more insidious, because you can no longer tell what is real and what is virtual. Added icons of virtual victuals depicting the sponsor's products all over the ball park -- perhaps even on the pitched balls, with adjustments for spin? The label on the Cincinnati Reds' owner's favorite beverage transformed into the sponsor's label, or Schottzie overlayed as a pit bull? Think how the TV producers could alter Chicago Bulls' Dennis Rodman's appearance (pet bull?), dynamically color coordinating to adapt to the arena surroundings. Signs visible to the live audience (such as "Smoke El Hempos") could be transformed appropriately (e.g., "DON'T Smoke El Hempos") for the TV audience, to satisfy an emerging FCC broadcast regulation against tobacco. L-vis has absolutely glorious RISKS-related possibilities, such as when the pattern recognizer indentifies something that unexpectedly happens to match the given rules. A contradictory message might get added to the sponsor's message, or an obscenity might emerge as an inadvertent juxtaposition of symbols. Stay tuned for more excitement appearing in RISKS on this one! PGN
There is another serious security bug in the class loading code for all currently available Java browsers: Netscape up to versions 2.02 and 3.0beta4 (except Windows 3.x) Oracle PowerBrowser for Win32 HotJava 1.0beta 'appletviewer' from the Java Development Kit up to version 1.0.2 Sun, Netscape, and Oracle have been sent details of the problem (which is partly related to the ClassLoader attack found by Drew Dean, et al. in March). The attack works by exploiting a design flaw in the mechanism that separates JVM classes into different namespaces. Using this bug, an attacker can bypass all of Java's security restrictions. This includes reading and writing files, and executing native code on the client with the same permissions as the user of the browser. The only way to avoid this problem at the moment is to disable Java. For more details see http://ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk/~david/java/bugs/ Technical details will be posted when Sun, Netscape, and Oracle release patches. David Hopwood email@example.com http://ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk/~david/
David Hopwood, a Java researcher in the UK, has uncovered a new security bug in Java [RISKS-18.18]. In simple terms, he has been able to manipulate the way objects are assigned and the way they collaborate, in order to undermine the applet security manager. Hopwood contacted JavaSoft directly re: the bug, and we have had a team working on a fix for the past 72 hours. In addition, we are applying Hopwood's model to conduct a security review, to determine if there are other bugs that may apply. We are currently thoroughly testing the fix, and plan to release a patch as soon as possible. As we complete more testing of the fix, a more detailed description of the bug and the fix will be added to the JavaSoft security FAQ at http://java.sun.com/sfaq/. JavaSoft is grateful for the internet security community's active interest in reviewing our code and we welcome feedback that makes Java better technology.
This is an old hat, but it still keeps coming up. A co - worker of mine was doing experiments on a heat exchanger; he was also modelling it with a FORTRAN (77) program that ran on a PC. One dimensionless quantity used in heat-exchanger theory is the Nusselt number, defined as Nu = alpha * l / lambda (alpha is the heat transfer coefficient, l a characteristic length, and lambda the thermal conductivity). The name of the variable he chose was NU; he did not declare this variable, so the FORTRAN compiler implicitly typed it as an integer. Since the range of NU was between 10 and 200, this introduced a maximum error of 10% to 0.5% in his calculations - small enough not to be noticed immediately. I don't want to make a bet on how many commercial heat-exchanger design codes make the same error. Related is the "5/9" problem (this expression silently evaluates to 0 in FORTRAN and C), which often bugs translations of formulas by hand into FORTRAN, which makes a**(5/9) equal to 1. Some tools (notably ftnchek for FORTRAN 77) recognize this, and issue a warning. Unfortunately, these tools are not in wide use in the scientific community. [NUsseltov! PGN]
>From the "Electronic Telegraph" (UK Daily Telegraph) - June 6, 1996 "A COMPUTER error swivelled the nozzles of Ariane 5's two giant boosters, sending Europe's most powerful rocket off course to its destruction, the European Space Agency said yesterday. [...] "Investigators do not have to collect debris or hunt for a black box. Final analysis of what confused the guidance system will come from a study of the tapes that contain the telemetry messages that constantly reported the status of the launcher's computer and on-board systems. The data will be fed into computer simulators, run by Aerospatiale and CNES, the French space agency." Given Aerospatiale's record with the Airbus, it'll be interesting to see if they come up with "pilot error" as the cause! :-)) [Also commented on by "Otto J. Makela" <firstname.lastname@example.org> and Paul Ferguson <email@example.com>. PGN.]
>From cnn's web page www.cnn.com: Faulty computer blamed in Ariane rocket failure Experts studying the moments before the Ariane-5 rocket explosion say faulty computer software may be to blame for the rocket veering off course. Apparently, the rocket was misfed information that made it think it was not following the right path. The rocket then changed direction, causing the upper part to began to break apart.
After the European Space Agency's little problem this week and the reports now filtering out that is was 'a computer error', it sounds more like a sensor fault or a wiring fault. (Apparently, the computer tried to correct for what it thought was a disturbance to its trajectory and then set the thrusters full over - one big disturbance or was it positive feedback). Anyway, the ground controls hit the 'explode' button. Why O why didn't the payload have a chute. After all it must have had separator blasts. The 'abort and blow up' sequence could have consisted of a 'separate and chute' the payload stage followed by blow up the rest. Didn't the early Apollo missions do this, or some other satellite launchers. Is this complacency at work here. What a risk - millions of (pounds, dollars, whatever - big in anyone's currency) and all that work. David Wood firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com
On 4 June 1996 the Ariane 5 prototype European space launcher veered off course and was destroyed by its controllers 40 seconds after blast-off (details from *The Guardian*, UK 5th June 1996). The launcher development had cost UKP5bn (pounds sterling) and the explosion destroyed a UKP500M four-satellite experiment to monitor the sun, and as the headline says..."And It Wasn't Insured". Leaving consideration of what went wrong until details emerge, it is worth noting aspects that were successful or at least were not as poorly managed as may appear. Firstly, there was no loss of life - the safety precautions for destruction by ground control worked as planned (the TV pictures showed the destruction happened within seconds of the off-course problems becoming visible, suggesting that either data had already indicated problems or that the controllers were remarkably responsive at pressing a pretty expensive button). Secondly, the European Space Agency is in a risk taking business, and the price of risk taking is occasional failure - Ariane 5 is the follow on to existing Ariane rockets that bring the agency's commercial arm UKP666M per year, with a waiting list valued at nearly UKP3.3bn. Thirdly, regarding the financial losses, it is nigh on impossible to obtain insurance for test flights, and the cargo was being flown for free (the scientists responsible for the experiments didn't have the budget for a paying flight, so took the risk of a prototype launch). It is certain that there will be lessons from the investigation, but it is worth noting that, but for some risk management at the high level, it could have been much worse and that risks were recognised by the participants, even if not adequately protected against. Richard Butlin Data Sciences UK (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Although the uninsured satellite was carried on a free flight with known risks that it wouldn't work right first time, I think we now know that there's no such thing as a free launch. Personally I think they should bring back Blue Streak. Actually, as readers of the Airbus thread will know, I have a bias in favour of the European aircraft industry - whether I would travel in a capsule on Ariane Five is another matter, but I remember the quote about what either John Glenn or Alan Shepherd thought about when waiting to launch ("the rocket contains 5 million parts, all made by the lowest bidder" , approximately) so I suppose launch vehicles will inevitably be either unreliable, or Bad Value For Money - so make sure your satellites are all reproducible by CAD/CAM. And perhaps there should be a few more CASE and automatic testing systems around?. So for a change the risk is, there might not be enough computerisation? Although I sign this stating where I work, this is very definitely my personal opinion, not RAL's!!!, however the destruction of the rocket when it went off course and tried to attack French Guiana made the national news here: I don't think my bad publicity will equal what Ariane has had from the press. The satellite design computer was attacked by organised hackers via Sweden a month or so ago - perhaps this was an indication of how the Eastern Bloc intends to prop up its launcher industry?. In any case, it's worth bearing in mind that this sort of"navigation error" could easily creep in if a virus or a hacker gets onto the development computers. Computer security that's worth money isn't only confined to banks. Phil Overy Rutherford-Appleton Laboratory, UK
Some of the readers of RISKS will recall that I reported an accidental shooting down of an F-15 fighter plane by another F-15 during interception training of the Japanese air force last December. To refresh your memory, what happened was that - Two F-15 airplanes took place in an interception training. - One of the planes carried live missiles. The reason given was that the airplanes were routinely engaged in REAL interception missions and taking missiles off takes time. (BAD decision: They ought to have unload the live missiles in the first place.) - The main fire unit was supposed to be off (by turning off main switch). - However, somehow, it got turned on. (static electricity problem?) - Despite the visual cue on the main firing display console, which showed that the main firing system was ON and live, the pilot triggered the firing button, and launched a sidewinder missile against another F-15. - The F-15 was hit and destroyed. The pilot escaped by parachute. The defense agency released its investigation report on the the accident. (I think it was released last week.) Some newspapers had articles following the release of the report, but they are all sketchy. My conclusion after reading articles is this. - Yes, indeed, the main firing system was turned on. But, they could not determine the cause of the malfunction(!). - The report seemed to imply that the visual cue on the firing console ought to have alerted the pilot that the system was live and that the pilot should have taken notice and refrained from triggering the missile. (I think Japanese pilots have less live missile traing than, say, U.S., or Israel pilots, and so pilots may have tough time figuring out what the real operating modes are from complex computer display alone. Well, this is the reason they need training in the first place anyway, though.) - (To my disbelief) It was suggested some type of plastic cap be placed on the main trigger during future training missions to prevent pilots from triggering(!?). Frankly speaking, I was pretty much dismayed at the depth of of the investigation. It didn't really go to the bottom of the malfunction. The same hardware/software problem might persist in other F-15s in Japan. (It was not clear whether same type of problems are ever reported before in the U.S.A.. My understanding is that F-15s used in Japan are licensed and manufactured in Japanese factories. But computer firing systems are often brought in as is from U.S.A. as black boxes.) The last low-tech solution to the prevention of triggering the missile was almost comical. Some conspiracy theorists could argue that the air force might want to hide some mistakes during the manufacturing of Japanese version of F-15 by shifting blame on the pilot. But I digress.. Now that the Japanese naval boat shot down a U.S. airplane off Hawaii, I am interested how far the investigation of *THIS* accident goes and what way. I hope they nail down the cause this time around. Chiaki Ishikawa Personal Media Corp. Shinagawa, Tokyo, Japan 142 email@example.com
>From the Roanoke Times (May 15th, 1996 edition): > A Virginia Tech official failed to see any humor when a student > newspaper erroneously listed her job title last month as "Director of > Butt Licking. Sharon Yeagle was so unamused she filed an $850,000 > defamation lawsuit... > ...[The paper's] editors say the phrase was part of a computer system > template never meant to be published. The newspaper involved is the Collegiate Times, the student run paper of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. In an article on page A6 of the April 30th edition, the paper ran an article about seven students who were accepted into the Governor's Fellows Program. In the center of the article was a featured quote from Sharon Yeagle, an assistant to the vice president of student affairs. Unfortunately for the newspaper, the template used for the layout contained a "humorous" title meant to be replaced. Somehow the quote and quotee were filled in but her title was never entered and the placeholder, "Director of Butt Licking" was published instead. And this is not the first time this has happened. According to the article in the Roanoke Times, in the Oct. 27th issue the phrase also appeared. However, that time an accurate quote was attributed to a false name and a false title. The risks? If you're going to have a generic template, make it generic. And if something bad happens once, it's going to happen again so fix it after the first occurrence. Personally, when I'm writing and need to leave something to be completed later I always enter in a string of at least five question marks. It has become second nature for me to search for that string before "committing" my writing. And when I've forgotten, it has resulted in some confusion but fortunately no lawsuits. Paul Wisneskey firstname.lastname@example.org http://magenta.com/~pwwisnes/
In RISKS-18.15, Bob Morrell takes an assertion (cited from RISKS-18.13) that a particular ISP would triple its throughput if it accepted alt.binaries and parlays that into a claim that the Internet is mainly about pornography. Occam's Razor suggests a more general explanation: Images contain much more information than text, regardless of content. Here is an example. I am writing a book. A picture will fill the front cover; a smaller picture will appear on the back cover. The publisher sent me a JPEG file representing the front cover; that file is 252,368 bytes. The file with the back-cover picture is 54,070 bytes. Total: slightly more than 306,000 bytes. The entire text of the book (400 pages) is just under 695,000 bytes [that is, excluding the covers]. In this case, a picture is worth much more than a thousand words.
<> Personally, I view this story with marked scepticism. I have no <> doubt that it is true to a certain extent, but the idea of banks <> forking out ten million pounds (circa $14m [sic]) to a <> blackmailer is one I find slightly unrealistic. I have in the past done computer security work for several large banking institutions which everyone has heard of. In my opinion, with respect to the business case of choosing to pay blackmail or fix the problem, it is cheaper to make a few blackmail payments than to protect an entire multinational (or even single-nation) banking organization with strong information security (cryptography, of course). This is probably true even with five "cyber terrorist" organizations operating, but this obviously does not scale well. This is, of course, disappointing (especially speaking as someone who might attempt to make all that money legitimately designing security systems). However, I don't find it surprising at all. One blackmail payment of this level approximates the daily operating expenses of one of these organizations. Consider this loss alone, ignoring the lost profits and public relations nightmare, and you might pay the blackmail, too. What these banks are surely not considering is that there are many other advantages to strong information security. Some bans are considering this, but not quickly enough, IMHO. I've believed for a long time that the people who need security most won't do anything until they personally feel some intense pain. (This is analogous to the multitude of people who didn't believe in regular backups until one of their disks crashed.) If there was another Barings which folded due to inadequate security instead of financial mismanagement, maybe then the banking industry would do something real, and stop complaining at how painful security was. An ounce of prevention, and all that. Marc [I have some private reports suggesting that the story in RISKS-18.17 is largely overhyped, but no complete denials at this time. I hope someone will eventually set the record straight. PGN]
Call for Papers Fourth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security Zurich, Switzerland April 2-4, 1997 Sponsored by ACM SIGSAC Papers pertaining to all aspect of computer security are solicited for submission to the Fourth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Papers may present theory, technique, applications, and practical experience on a variety of topics including access control, accounting and audit, applied cryptography and cryptographic protocols, authentication and authorization, data/system integrity, electronic commerce, intrusion detection, key management, privacy, protection of software and intellectual property, run-time system security, secure networking, secure operating systems, security architectures and models, security management, security of distributed systems and databases, security protocols, and smart-cards and secure PDAs. Instruction for authors: Papers should be of high quality, original, unpublished, and not submitted elsewhere. Submit six (6) copies of your paper (not exceeding 7500 words or 25 pages) to Clifford Neuman at the address below in a form suitable for anonymous review (no author names, affiliations, obvious references), with a cover letter indicating that your paper is a submission for the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, and listing the authors names, email and postal addresses, phone and fax numbers, and identifying the contact author. Electronic, faxed, or late submissions will be rejected without review. Send also via email email@example.com an online plain ASCII text version of your paper title, abstract, and authors and contact information. Where possible all further communications to authors will be via email. Paper submission: September 2, 1996 Acceptance decision: October 21, 1996 Final papers due: December 9, 1996 Steering Committee Chair: Ravi Sandhu, George Mason University, USA General Chairs: Richard Graveman, Bellcore, USA Phil Janson, IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland Program chairs: Clifford Neuman (4th ACM CCS) University of Southern California Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way Marina del Rey, California 90292-6695 U.S.A. Tel: +1 (310) 822-1511 Fax: +1 (310) 823-6714 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Li Gong SRI International Computer Science Laboratory 333 Ravenswood Avenue Menlo Park, California 94025, U.S.A. Email: email@example.com Awards chair: Jacques Stern, ENS/DMI, France Publication chair: Tsutomu Matsumoto, Yokohama National University, Japan Publicity chair: Michael Reiter, AT&T Research, USA Program committee members: Martin Abadi, DEC Systems Research Center Carlisle Adams, Bell Northern Research Hugo Krawczyk, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center Arjen Lenstra, Bellcore Mark Lomas, University of Cambridge Wenbo Mao, HP Labs, Bristol, U.K. Tsutomu Matsumoto, Yokohama National University, Japan Xiaolei Qian, SRI International Michael Reiter, AT&T Research Avi Rubin, Bellcore Karen Sollins, MIT Stuart Stubblebine, AT&T Research Jacques Stern, ENS/DMI, France Gene Tsudik, USC Information Sciences Institute Vijay Varadharajan, University of Western Sydney Michael Waidner, IBM Zurich Research Laboratory Raphael Yahalom, Hebrew University, Israel Moti Yung, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center For more information, access http://www.csl.sri.com/acm-ccs/ccs.html.
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