Please try the URL privacy information feature enabled by clicking the flashlight icon above. This will reveal two icons after each link the body of the digest. The shield takes you to a breakdown of Terms of Service for the site - however only a small number of sites are covered at the moment. The flashlight take you to an analysis of the various trackers etc. that the linked site delivers. Please let the website maintainer know if you find this useful or not. As a RISKS reader, you will probably not be surprised by what is revealed…
A computer glitch in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange caused panic selling on 12 Dec 1996 when its Teletext information system incorrectly reported a drop of 515 points (or about 4%) of the Hang Seng Index during the opening minutes of trading. The error was blamed by a malfunction in the Automatic Order Matching and Execution System (AMS), which calculates up to the minute stock prices during trading hours. The Stock Exchange had apparently alerted dealers that there was a problem with the computer before trading began and were advised to use prices shown in free text areas for calculating opening quotations. However, the Teletext system made no indication of the computer glitch and instead displayed inaccurate stock prices until 20 minutes after trading began. The stock exchange is reviewing the incident. Official figures for all indices and stock prices were finally released the evening after the exchange closed. The Hang Seng index, Hong Kong's main stock index, ended the day down 136 points (1.0%) at 13053.28. Volume was just over US$1 billion. The loss was partly blamed by the computer glitch.
>From the KOMO (Radio/Television station) news web site, 12 Dec 96: "A state computer might be the Grinch that is stealing Christmas for some unemployed people. The computers cranked up two weeks ago to process claims for unemployment insurance have "mislaid" checks for up to two-thousand jobless people. The weekly checks are as much as 365 dollars each. Employment Security commissioner Gary Moore notes that tens of thousands of checks were properly sent out. He says the system works well, but has some bugs that need to be worked out. But Moore also acknowledged that people who haven't gotten their checks need the money, and waiting for checks from the state is unacceptable."
As an "old-timer" in this field (and an IBM systems engineer — customer rep), we knew better than to assume that new software or hardware would work correctly when first installed. It would be considered negligence to install something without running in parallel with the old system or installing it at anything but a low-activity time. There are way too many untrained and ignorant people out there selling themselves as "consultants" or programmers. I've even had high school students tell me that they were hired to write safety-critical software. Is this their fault or the fault of people who think they can hire someone without training or proper credentials to do these jobs? I have never understood what it is about computers that that makes people believe that anyone can be an instant expert. Nancy
A lot of the user manuals for Macintosh applications are now published using the .pdf format. They are expensive to print and hard to read on a monitor with less than 1800 x 2400 pixel resolution. So a lot of people don't read them. Are there increased risks of various kinds from making user instructions less accessible? - Bill Ehrich
For a while I would have my Netscape browser alert me every time a cookie was sent, so I could refuse it. Some pages send three of more cookies upon loading, and this quickly became annoying. Recently I set up a batch file that trashes my cookie file every time I boot my computer up. Works great. Bruce Schneier Counterpane Systems firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.counterpane.com/ APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY
As reported in the New York Times, "Failure of Ticket Computer Snarls Amtrak at Busy Time", Saturday 11/30/96, page 30. Amtrak's Central Computer did not go "belly up", but the communications/networking hardware that connects the ticketing agents around the country to the Central Computer failed. Starting about 12:30pm on friday, Thanksgiving weekend, Amtrak's reservation and ticketing system for the entire country broke down causing total chaos and long lines. As of late friday night the system was still not working, But no train delays were reported. Ticketing agents, dependent on the system and lacking printed tables of fares, in many cases guessed at fares and overcharged passengers. While more information is needed, it seems strange that no Risk Analysis was done prior to the breakdown to identify the piece of communications hardware as a possible single point failure (SPF)? Why wasn't a redundant communications link to the central computer available? This is standard Avoidance and Diversity (A&D) provisioning. Plus, a manual backup system should have been in place. Ticketing agents should have had up-to-date printed tables of fares and forms, like the train conductors carry. Robert Perillo, Perillo@dockmaster.ncsc.com
The trouble with the aviation accident statistics is that they only show that new airframe and engine designs with glass cockpits are safer than old airframe and engine designs with traditional controls. It could very well be the case that great improvements in the reliability of new airframes and engines are offsetting serious deficiencies in the modern controls. There is a risk that manufacturers will hide behind the statistics and resist efforts to determine the dangers and benefits of high levels of cockpit automation. Mark Stalzer, email@example.com
Speaking of not touching switches, I used to have a computer at work that had an odd button design. I don't want to say the name in public (Dell) though. The power switch was big and easy to see and stuck out from the case. The reset switch was about the size of a pencil eraser, and flush with the case so that it could not be pushed with a finger. I had to use a pen cap to push the reset. The only rational I could see is that they didn't want anyone pushing reset by accident, even though I managed to shut down power on it once by accident with my knee. Yes, pushing reset is bad (except that it's the number one solution given when you tell people that Windows isn't working right), but pushing the power button is worse. And that's exactly what's easiest to push, and if you stuck an average computer illiterate user in front of it, that's what they would push. Even those who noticed the reset button might mistakenly assume that because of the deliberate design that it would be better to push power instead of reset (and maybe even start doing so on other systems with better button design). Darin Johnson firstname.lastname@example.org
The RISKS? As Nick put it, the police in many countries have a long way to go in their understanding of computer crimes, however, just imagine what would have happened if the police had acted 'appropriately'. They would have impounded ALL servers in the building that Mr. X had a login to, or any that he might have been likely to have unauthorized access to. They might have taken ALL laser printers in the building. Or at least the one that was Mr. X's 'default' so that they could examine it. If Mr. X had access to other machines at the site, they would have taken those as well. The RISK is more complex than first thought. The Jackson Games case in the U.S. was fought on similar grounds - what is fair seizure and what is not? I imagine that the "major computer company" might have had 'major' problems had the police actually 'done their job'. Scott Gregory - Mississauga, Canada.
Council of European Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS) POLICY STATEMENT, 1996-October-20 Governmental Restrictions on Encryption Products Put Security at Risk Worldwide, there is a political debate regarding the virtue or otherwise of a control of encryption, in particular whether the import, export, and production of cryptographic tools and their use should be restricted. In several countries legal regulations exist, in some others steps are undertaken towards such regulations. At present an OECD Committee is drafting guidelines on cryptographic policy. But there are concerns; the Council of European Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS) - with nearly 200,000 professionals in its 20 member societies, the largest European association of professionals working in information technology (IT) - has agreed the following statement: Should one wish to employ electronic communication as the main vehicle for commercial and personal interaction, then one ought to be assured, and be able to prove, that messages are - not disclosed to unauthorised recipients (confidentiality), - not tampered with (integrity), - shown to be from the senders stated (authenticity). It has always been an aim of secure reliable communication to comply with these requirements. The more the information society becomes a reality, the more enterprises, administrations and private persons urgently need the absolute assurance that these requirements are met. To achieve this, so called "strong" cryptography is available. Several tools based on strong crypto-algorithms are in the public domain and offered on the Internet, others are integrated within commercial products. A different technique for confidential and even unobservable communication is to use steganography, where secret data are hidden within larger inconspicuous everyday data in such a way that third parties are unable even to detect their existence. Hence there is no way of preventing unobservable secret communication. To enable surveillance of electronic messaging, many criminal and national security investigators, i.e. police and secret services, demand access to keys used for encrypted communication. In order for this to be effective, escrowing (bonding) of these keys is advocated. However, for the reasons given above, key escrow (i.e. depositing copies of the keys with a "trusted third party",including back ups) cannot even guarantee effective monitoring. Moreover, key escrow already constitutes a risk for the secrecy of the keys and therefore for the secrecy of the data. This risk is exacerbated in cases of central escrowing. Besides, the burdens of cost and administrative effort as well as the loss of trust in communications could be significant and are prone to deter individuals and organisations, especially small business users, from gaining the benefits of modern information and communications systems. Effective electronic surveillance of digital networks is difficult and time consuming, and requires extensive resources. In particular, closed groups such as criminal organisations might even use steganographic techniques to avoid any detection short of physical access to the terminals they use. Thus restrictions on encryption may be of very limited help in the fight against organised crime. On the other hand, the essential security of business and private communication may be seriously imperiled and economically hampered should they be subjected to insufficiently secured key escrow. On these grounds, CEPIS recommends the following: (1) The use of cryptography for identifying data corruption or authenticating people/organisations should be free of restrictions and encouraged by governments. (2) All individuals and organisations in the private and public sectors should be able to store and transmit data to others, with confidentiality protection appropriate for their requirements, and should have ready access to the technology to achieve this. (3) The opportunity for individuals or organisations in the private and public sectors to benefit from information systems should not be reduced by incommensurable measures considered necessary for the enforcement of law. (4) The governments of the world should agree on a policy relating to their access to other people's computerised data, while seeking the best technical advice available in the world on: (4.1) whether and which access mechanisms to computerised data are an effective, efficient and adequate way to fight (organised) crime and mount effective prosecution of criminals, and (4.2) how to implement the policy whilst minimising the security risks to organisations and individual citizens. (Evaluation and implementation of the policy will require regular review as the technology evolves). Further Information: Council of European Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS) 7 Mansfield Mews GB London W1M 9FJ United Kingdom Tel/fax: +44 171 637 5607 E-mail: email@example.com URL: http://www.bcs.org.uk/cepis.htm The CEPIS Legal & Security Issues Network URL: http://www.wi.leidenuniv.nl/~verrynst/cepislsi.html E-mail: Kai Rannenberg (firstname.lastname@example.org), Secretary
(This message was also sent to comp.protocols.dns.ops .) The InterNIC (http://www.internic.net) is responsible for Internet domain name service for all top-level domains, as well as for second-level domains underneath all the old ARPA domains except MIL (EDU, GOV, NET, ORG, COM). Until a few years ago, domain registration services were provided by the InterNIC for free. That changed when they convinced the NSF that its grant money wasn't enough to cover their costs, so (amid much hubbub on the Net) they started charging $50 per year for any second-level domain registration, with the first two years (i.e., $100) payable in advance. According to <http://rs.internic.net/nic-support/nicnews/stats.html>, the InterNIC registered 638,788 new domains between August 1993 and September 1996. If I'm doing my math right, at $100 per domain, that's almost $64 million, or over $20 million per year. I would think that with that much money, they'd be able to provide competent service to their customers. Unfortunately, my experience has been that they're simply not doing an acceptable job. Some examples: ***** * Their automated systems do not function properly. They've introduced a PGP-based system for authentication of domain contacts. In other words, they allow domain contacts to register their PGP public keys in the InterNIC public-key database, and then requests which come from those contacts will only be accepted as authentic if they are signed with the corresponding provide key. Unfortunately, this system does not always work. Recently, I submitted a series of twelve database modification requests to the InterNIC in a single day. All of them were correctly signed with my PGP key. Of the twelve requests, three were returned to me in messages beginning, "We are not able to verify the PGP signed message that you sent us." To make matters worse, for one of those three failed requests, I received a message claiming the the modifications I'd requested had been completed, two days *before* I received the message informing me that they were unable to verify my PGP signature. I have asked the InterNIC multiple times why their system randomly fails to verify valid PGP signatures. They have not responded to my inquiries. Interestingly enough, another poster to comp.protocols.dns.ops claimed that when he asked an InterNIC on the telephone about their PGP authentication system, he was told that it is not currently working. That would seem to indicate that the InterNIC is aware that there are problems with it, and yet they continue to advertise it on their Web site without any indication that it might not work for any given request. * There are some data in the database which are impossible to update using the templates they provide. One of the types of data stored in the InterNIC database is hosts; in particular, hosts which act as domain-name servers for domains registered with the InterNIC have records in the database. Host records include an organization name and address associated with the host. And yet, the template for updating host records (available at <ftp://rs.internic.net/templates/host-template.txt>) does not have fields in it for updating that information! I believe that there are a couple of other record types in the database which have this same problem. This organization/address data has been described to me by an InterNIC employee as an "old hold-over;" it seems that new host records do not have organization and address data, but old ones do. Nevertheless, one would think that when switching to a new format for host records, the InterNIC would have either removed the obsolete data from the old records or established a procedure for updating it. Instead, the only way to update this information electronically is to send a plain-text message to email@example.com explaining what you're trying to do, and then hope that whoever reads your message will be competent enough to understand what you're asking for and do the update by hand. Which brings me to my next point... * When asked how to do something that is not handled automatically by their templates, their staff give incorrect answers (or simply ignore the query) more often than they give correct answers. Of the twelve requests mentioned above, six of them were handled improperly by the InterNIC staff members who processed them. Iwn several cases, I received a response instructing me to use a particular template to make the changes I had requested, when in fact those changes had nothing whatsoever to do with the template they told me to use. I finally had to escalate my requests by sending "out-of-band" E-mail to an InterNIC employee who has resolved problems of this sort for me in the past, and she was able to "bounce" my requests to a high enough level that they actually got processed. Incidentally, the InterNIC introduced one or more typographical errors into the data I sent them when processing six of my twelve requests (i.e., when they were done processing my requests, six of the twelve records I asked them to modify had one or more typographical errors in them). I suppose that sending incorrect answers is better than how things were a few months ago — then, if you sent a request that the person who read your message did not know how to answer, he/she simply ignored it and sent no response whatsoever. * There are some data in their database which are impossible to update using their current procedures. Imagine this scenario... Joe Admin at Foo, Inc. is responsible for system administration, including DNS administration. He therefore has a contact record in the InterNIC database indicating that he works for Foo, Inc., and he is listed as a contact for various domain, network, and host records, in the InterNIC database. Now, he leaves the company and takes a new job, with no further contact with Foo, Inc. He doesn't bother to update his contact record in the InterNIC database before he leaves. Foo, Inc. would rather not let records remain in the InterNIC database claiming that Joe works for them when in fact he does not. Therefore, they want to contact the InterNIC and tell them, "Look, the information in Joe Admin's contact record which says that he for us is incorrect. You can confirm this by attempting to send E-mail to the address in the record, or by calling the phone number in the record and asking to speak to him. The person who answers will confirm that he no longer works there. Please either delete the contact record completely or remove the information in it which associates Joe Admin with Foo, Inc." Sounds reasonable, right? Well, unfortunately, the InterNIC has *no procedures whatsoever* for allowing a company to remove contact information which incorrectly lists them. I attempted to do just what I described, i.e., to get the InterNIC to remove the contact record for a former employee of OpenVision who no longer works here, and who I cannot contact to ask him to update his own record (and considering that it's not hurting him in any way, I don't see that he'd have any incentive to update it even if I could ask him to). After several rounds of E-mail with the InterNIC, they called me on the telephone to discuss what I was trying to do. Once on the phone with them, I was "bounced up" through several layers of InterNIC staff, until I was finally able to speak to a woman who was perfectly willing to admit that yes, the scenario I described was a somewhat common one, and yes, it was perfectly reasonable for a company not to want the InterNIC database to associate non-employees with the company, but no, there's no way for anyone but the owner of a contact handle to update it. "Perhaps we need to establish a procedure for that, and I'll be glad to discuss that for you with our customer service manager, but we don't have one right now," she said, and she did not offer to make an exception and handle my particular request manually without the blessing of a "procedure". Presumably, this means that I could edit my own contact handle to indicate that I work for any company that I want, and that company would have no way to get the InterNIC to remove the fraudulent information. Similarly, presumably, that means that (to be a little morbid for a moment), if someone listed in the InterNIC database dies, there's no way for anyone else to get the InterNIC to remove the deceased's record from the database. When I pressed the woman about this, she said to me, "If you're a network administrator at this company, you presumably have control over the mail server" (an assumption which is not always true, and indeed isn't true in this case; although I can ask the people who administer the mail server to make changes and hope that they'll listen, I don't have the ability to make the changes directly). "Well," she continued," if you send us a mail message which claims to be from the former employee, asking for his record to be deleted, we'll process it." "Let me get this straight," I responded. "You're telling me that I should forge E-mail to your system in order to delete this record." She confirmed that interpretation. I said, "Surely you see the absurdity of that." She responded, "Well, obviously, ideally we wouldn't want anyone forging requests to our system, but in this case, that's the only way for you to delete the record." "What if the former employee had associated a PGP key with his contact record before he left the company." "Well, in that case, you'd need his private PGP key in order to delete the record." "But surely you know that's impossible — the whole point of PGP is that only the owner a private key has access to it. Even if I had access to the file in which it was stored, I wouldn't know the correct password to unlock it." "Well, in that case, there would be no way for you to delete the record." ***** There are a number of countries with strict laws about the collection of private information in computerized databases. Database maintainers are required to seek permission from all individuals who have data about them stored in the database, to guarantee the security of the database, and to establish working procedures for keeping the data in the databases up-to-date. The United States has few such laws (there are laws about specific types of databases, such as credit and medical records, but no laws about databases in general). Until I started dealing with the InterNIC, I didn't see much point to them. Well, I've changed my mind. the InterNIC proves rather clearly that left to their own devices, companies will not maintain databases in a responsible manner. Incidentally, nowhere on the InterNIC's WWW site can I find the address or telephone number of the governmental office which oversees their grant and handles complaints about their services. Several months ago, I sent them E-mail asking for them so that I could file a complaint, to be considered the next time their grant comes up for renewal. Like many of my other messages to them, that request was ignored. Jonathan Kamens | OpenVision Technologies, Inc. | firstname.lastname@example.org
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