Congress is apparently considering legislation that would make it illegal to post portions of the Bible on the Internet. FBI Director Louis Freeh wants to make it illegal to use secret codes on the Internet that the FBI can't break, and some members of Congress have been drafting legislation in support of Freeh's position. However, such a law might have startling consequences. A recent best-selling book, "The Bible Code," claims that the Bible is full of secret messages and codes. These messages are only partially decoded so far. If true, the proposed legislation would make it illegal to post the Bible on the Internet, unless someone provides the FBI with a way to decode all of these secret messages contained within the Bible. Another consequence would require you to register your "smiley faces" with the FBI. It is common to use smiley faces to convey meanings. For example, the face ;-) is usually interpreted as a "wink". (If you haven't seen such smiley faces before, just rotate them ninety degrees.) Such smiley faces are an example of a "substitution code", where one symbol (such as ;-) ) is substituted for another (such as "wink"). Substitution codes are a classic cryptographic technique. The proposed law would require you to register your list of smiley faces with the FBI. Otherwise, the FBI might have no way of figuring out what *you* think symbols such as 8-) or :-( might mean. ;-) Ron Rivest P.S., The proposed language would appear to ban the sale of all computers, since they are products "that can be used to encrypt communications or electronic information...". Ron [You think this is early April Fools'? WRONG. Think again. This is just a hint of some VERY SERIOUS stuff. There are many concerned people in the computer security community and in the privacy community who believe that most of the U.S. populace will be the Fools if the newly proposed legislation goes through. If you want more background, read my Senate testimony from 9 Jul 1997 <http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/judiciary.html> and my follow-up responses, 2 Sep 1997, to questions from Senators Thurmond, Grassley, Leahy, and Feinstein, directed at panelists by Senator Hatch, <http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/judiciary-ans.html> which I wrote *before* the newly proposed legislation was introduced, and which seems even more relevant now. The newly proposed legislation seems even more draconian than the earlier McCain-Kerrey bill in the Senate: MANDATORY KEY RECOVERY in sheep's clothing. PGN]
A "software snafu" at Nielsen Media Research, the company responsible for TV and cable ratings, undercounted the viewers of the USA Network on a daily basis from April 1 through July 1, according to a report by Richard Huff in the 4 Sep 1997 *NY Daily News*. The overlooked viewers, about 15,400 homes each day, were in homes with DirecTV satellite systems. The article estimates that the undercount cost USA Network $2 million. "It was a very unique and unusual circumstance, technical in nature," said a USA Network executive quoted in the story. Correcting USA's ratings, according to the story, is impossible, because "all DirecTV viewing information about USA was lost in the computer foulup." - George Mannes (also of the NY Daily News) [Bill Hensley <Bill_Hensley@smtp.rc.trw.com> spotted the *News* item in _ShopTalk_, an e-zine covering broadcast TV and radio jobs and issues. Bill wonders if the same or similar bug affects measurements for homes with different kinds of satellite systems, such as PrimeStar or Dish Network, or those with older C- or Ku-band TVRO systems. PGN]
The Social Security Administration announced today it would put a modified version of the Personal Earnings and Benefits Estimate Statement (PEBES) service back on-line before the end of the year. The service was suspended on April 9, following public concerns about the risk of improper access to personal information held by the agency. The Social Security Administration said that the new service would be based on an "opt-in" privacy standard. Individuals could affirmatively choose to request the on-line delivery of PEBES information by first obtaining an authentication code that would only be delivered to a registered email address. Records of individuals who did not request the code would not be available at the web site. The SSA also said that it would limit the amount of information made available on-line. Payment records would not be accessible at the SSA web site, although they will still be sent by the U.S. mail. Privacy experts expressed support for the SSA recommendations, saying that the agency has done a good job meeting with the public, consulting with experts, and developing sensible standards to protect personal information. The SSA experience with Internet service delivery is being watched closely by other federal agencies as well as private companies who hope to take advantage of the Internet and avoid public concerns about privacy. The SSA PEBES Service is available at: http://s3abaca.ssa.gov/pro/batch-pebes/bp-7004home.shtml More information on the SSA and Online Privacy is available at: http://www.epic.org/privacy/databases/ssa/
After installing a cc:Mail release 8 postoffice (and link to smtp) on an NT3.51 machine, I noticed that the nightly reclaim process is scheduled via the standard NT "at" command which runs %systemroot%\~callmnt.bat. This batch file simply runs yet another batch file %systemroot%\~ccmaint.bat. Why do this? Because the second batch file is "hidden", but a simple "attrib" command removes that "protection", and then your master postoffice password is nicely visible. But you might ask, what are the NT security permissions on these batch files? Simply "everyone full control". Oh well, at least I don't need to worry about forgetting that password.
No new physics. It's basic plasma astrophysics that's been known for over 30 years. The "solar storms" mentioned in the article are carried via the solar wind --- NOT electromagnetic radiation. That is, particles (mostly protons) are "drifting" or "streaming" toward the earth at velocities much less than the speed of light. The currents created by these particle when they interact with the Earth's magnetosphere and upper atmosphere cause electrical storms that can cause satellite and power-grid problems. Good introductory material can be found in Frank Chen's "Introduction to Plasma Physics and Controlled Fusion" vol. 1 (Plenum, New York, 1974 -- at least my copy). Another reference is Priest's "Solar Magnetohydrodynamics" (I believe that's the correct cite -- my copy is currently on loan) Chen states (p. 14) the solar wind drift velocity is 300km/sec. At that speed it would take about 90 minutes to cover 1 million miles. Given geometrical factors for the location of Earth-Sun gravi-neutral points, 1 hour is probably about right. The real risk here is one of journalistic mis-communication. So often we read common media reports of scientific matters and are left to ourselves to deduce the actual scientific content. Often the journalists mangle the scientific concept badly. However, in this case, it looks as if the journalists were correct -- if scientifically abbreviated. Sam adds inappropriate contextual information from his experience to arrive at an apparent problem where none really exists. Maybe there is a risk here worth mentioning. I've call it the risk of assuming "I know what you *meant* to say" or "introducing errors from patronizing inference". Now maybe there *is* a problem with the statement that SOHO CAN provide early warning for these storms. I mean at first blush, if SOHO blinks out, am I to take that as a flag indicating an impending storm in less than an hour? Considering the reliability of satellites -- probably not. However, these storms don't just come out of the blue (or Orange). Rather they are associated with activity on the Sun's surface such as prominences, coronal mass ejections, and such. One of the puzzles is that "events" at the sun do not necessarily imply storms at earth. How can we find out which ones do? This is a fascinating area of study in and of itself, but I don't claim to be particularly current on these issues and by now we're pretty far afield from talking about risks of computers. John W. Cobb Computing/Information/Networking Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory MS-6144 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6144 423.576.5439 firstname.lastname@example.org
I found this at <URL:http://www.electronicgizmos.com/> : Our remote-control car starter lets you start your car and turn on your heater, defroster, or air-conditioner from the comfort of your home or office, up to 400 feet away. Autocommand comes in variety of retail and installer versions. In addition to remote starting, depending on the model, you can use your Autocommand transmitter to lock/unlock the doors and trunk or even operate a complete alarm. The potential dangers seem to be immense! Think about garage door openers for one. Lindsay <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Lindsay> [Lightly edited for readability]
PL> The GPWS provides some detection of incorrect barometric altimetry PL> when this errs in the unsafe direction (when the aircraft is lower than PL> pilots think - higher is of course safe, although equally incorrect). Higher is safe in regards to ground terrain, but not necessarily safe regarding other aircraft! ==John
Previous contributors made excellent comments on whether or not cell phones actually caused the cockpit data wipeout, or merely happened to be in use at the time the data was lost. Anyone who has witnessed the office cries of VIRUS! VIRUS! every time software hiccups can appreciate the need to determine cause and effect with computer systems. A point I'd like to make is why are these aircraft systems assumed to be so vulnerable? Can you really crash a plane by turning on an ordinary FM radio like a Walkman? Can you really destroy cockpit flight data by pressing SEND on a cell phone? The US military goes to the extent of protecting their office desktop computers from sending or receiving unintentional RFI (the TEMPEST program) and airline companies don't protect 400-passenger aircraft systems from stray RFI? Either aircraft systems are shockingly vulnerable, or these common consumer electronic devices are not the problem they are made out to be. I can see it now, next year's blockbuster movie ... Nicholas Cage rushes into the 747's cockpit, "Don't anybody move! I've got a cell phone and I'm not afraid to use it!" Chris Norloff
> "Java seems to be limited to the Unix date range (1970-2038)". This is indeed wrong. The Java core package method System.currentTimeMillis() returns the current system time in milliseconds since 1/1/1970 as a Java primitive type long, which is implemented as a 64-bit two's-complement signed number. The maximum positive value is 9223372036854775807, which gives us an upper limit of sometime after 292,271,000 A.D. Java *itself* will never encounter any "Y(2...n)K problem" - any limitation will belong to the OS that is supporting that particular version of Java (such as, for instance, Solaris 2.5.1). Rodney Ryan, Software Architect email@example.com http://www.interport.net/~rer [Just to correct the record. Expiration in the year 292,271,023 was already noted in RISKS-19.21. PGN]
> ... When 64-bit operating systems finally catch on there will be a lot of > code to change when "long" becomes 8 bytes, while the data on disk is > still only 4. This ignores the fact that an enormous amount of current C software incorrectly relies upon having exactly-4-byte integers for type "long". This is so prevalent that for the upcoming C9x standard, the Powers That Be are seriously considering introducing a bastard "long long" type so as not to break code relying upon this nonstandard behavior. There is a substantial risk that systems from Sun, SGI, HP, and DG will still use 4-byte integers for "long" in 2038. Carlie J. Coats, Jr., MCNC Environmental Programs, NC Supercomputing Center, 3021 Cornwallis Road, P.O. Box 12889, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2889
<> ... a C "long" which is currently 4 bytes. When 64-bit operating systems <> finally catch on there will be a lot of code to change when "long" <> becomes 8 bytes, while the data on disk is still only 4. C is the only language I've ever used in which the *source* code isn't even portable because such basic concepts as intrinsic datatypes are indeterminate (and are *defined* as such in the original specification). Does it worry anybody else that this is the language used by most people and taught to most beginners? I suppose at least we're not teaching BASIC using two-letter variables and GOTOs, but still . . . . -harlan
Many people call the Tamagotchi an e-pet; a lot of people think taking care of a such a pet is good training for life! Looking realistically, the Tamagotchis are nothing other than computer games, like Game-Boy, Nitendo etc. The only difference is that the game dies not after a few minutes but after a few weeks (if you play the game well). So, all the discussions are about a long-term-computer-game, not about an animal that dies! I do not think that is good for our children to teach them that playing Computer games is the same as taking care for a pet. Children should not come to the idea that taking care of a real pet is as easy as playing Games on a display and a few buttons. They should not think that the fun you can have with your real-pet can be had by playing with buttons. They must know that a real-life animal does not always react as programmed (hunger-food-OK, illness-medicine-OK, etc.). These things you cannot learn by playing on a computer -- only by taking care of a real pet. Parents should not think, that when their child asks for a pet they can put their conscience at rest by buying a computer game. I think, we should tell the children the truth -- it is a game! Then the problems in schools will be solved automatically, because children would know they cannot play with the GameBoy in school. Markus Aichholzer, CSE Systems, St. Veiter Strasse 4 A-9020 Klagenfurt Austria ++43 463 50645 34 firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.csesys.co.at
In RISKS-19.36, "Mich Kabay [NCSA]" <Mich_Kabay@compuserve.com> wrote about the risks involved in allowing virtual pets (and, as he points out, real pets) into the lives of children who must be separated from these pets for school hours. A perhaps less-visible risk is the impact the popularity of these devices has had on manufacturers. In a recent TechWire article it was noted: "Our fab capacity is fully booked for the remainder of the year [manufacturing chips for Bandai's Tamagotchi]," said a spokesman for Hsinchu-based United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC), one of the world's largest chip foundry concerns. "Some of our customers are very disappointed." Taiwan's foundry companies are making 20,000 to 30,000 8-in. wafers per month just for the Tamagotchi and its imitators, according to the UMC spokesman. By one estimate, chips consumed by the toys now account for 10 percent to 15 percent of the island's fab capacity. Full text of the article is available at: http://www.techweb.com/se/directlink.cgi?WIR1997082505 The risk here is obvious-- the computer manufacturing infrastructure is not prepared for a consumer craze that draws heavily on its resources. Other fads have had similar impact on the manufacturing bases upon which they depended. However, the industries represented by those manufacturers were rarely, if ever, the same that businesses, governments, and militaries rely upon for day-to-day supply and operation. Elf M. Sternberg, Spry Consulting Group, CompuServe Internet Division 3535 128th Ave SE, Bellevue, WA 98006 425.957.8000 email@example.com
The digital pet sold under the brand name Tamagotchi has a pause function. My nine-year-old figured this out the same afternoon he first set it up. It is also in the instructions (Read the fine insert?). One simply presses the combination of buttons that brings up the time set function and leaves it there. When the pet is to be revived, one cancels out of that function, and the pet is back where it started. I insisted my son do this the first night he had it to avoid clashes between the pet's sleep schedule and his or a "dead" pet the first morning he had it. Doris.Beers@lgtna.com
I recently received a copy of David H. Freedman and Charles C. Mann @LARGE, The Strange Case of the World's Biggest Internet Invasion Simon and Schuster, 1997. ISBN 0-684-82464-7. This is reportedly an entirely factual saga -- somewhat sociological, somewhat technical -- of the "Phantom Dialer" (whose is aliased in the book as Matt Singer). (The authors suggest that some of the dialogues may be artistic verisimilitude, but the details are claimed to be true. There are just a few minor factual errors that probably result from the authors being journalists rather than insider-techies, but the insiders will detect them without flinching, and they are not important for others.) The book is rather well told, and reads somewhat like a Clancy novel -- hopping about from one thread to another, where the threads all more or less converge. Lots of folks and institutions show up that will be very familiar to many of you. Most of the actual security vulnerabilities and types of penetration exploits should be known to many RISKS readers. This book will not break any new ground for SysAdmins, security experts, good hackers, or bad hackers, but nonetheless has some appeal. The treatment of its principal Internet intruder is perhaps somewhere between pathos and bathos. One of the chapter-head quotes is from Gene Spafford: "Using encryption on the Internet is the equivalent of arranging an armored car to deliver credit-card information from someone living in a cardboard box to someone living on a park bench."
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