Please try the URL privacy information feature enabled by clicking the flashlight icon above. This will reveal two icons after each link the body of the digest. The shield takes you to a breakdown of Terms of Service for the site - however only a small number of sites are covered at the moment. The flashlight take you to an analysis of the various trackers etc. that the linked site delivers. Please let the website maintainer know if you find this useful or not. As a RISKS reader, you will probably not be surprised by what is revealed…
The Mars Pathfinder mission was widely proclaimed as "flawless" in the early days after its July 4th, 1997 landing on the Martian surface. Successes included its unconventional "landing" — bouncing onto the Martian surface surrounded by airbags, deploying the Sojourner rover, and gathering and transmitting voluminous data back to Earth, including the panoramic pictures that were such a hit on the Web. But a few days into the mission, not long after Pathfinder started gathering meteorological data, the spacecraft began experiencing total system resets, each resulting in losses of data. The press reported these failures in terms such as "software glitches" and "the computer was trying to do too many things at once". This week at the IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium I heard a fascinating keynote address by David Wilner, Chief Technical Officer of Wind River Systems. Wind River makes VxWorks, the real-time embedded systems kernel that was used in the Mars Pathfinder mission. In his talk, he explained in detail the actual software problems that caused the total system resets of the Pathfinder spacecraft, how they were diagnosed, and how they were solved. I wanted to share his story with each of you. VxWorks provides preemptive priority scheduling of threads. Tasks on the Pathfinder spacecraft were executed as threads with priorities that were assigned in the usual manner reflecting the relative urgency of these tasks. Pathfinder contained an "information bus", which you can think of as a shared memory area used for passing information between different components of the spacecraft. A bus management task ran frequently with high priority to move certain kinds of data in and out of the information bus. Access to the bus was synchronized with mutual exclusion locks (mutexes). The meteorological data gathering task ran as an infrequent, low priority thread, and used the information bus to publish its data. When publishing its data, it would acquire a mutex, do writes to the bus, and release the mutex. If an interrupt caused the information bus thread to be scheduled while this mutex was held, and if the information bus thread then attempted to acquire this same mutex in order to retrieve published data, this would cause it to block on the mutex, waiting until the meteorological thread released the mutex before it could continue. The spacecraft also contained a communications task that ran with medium priority. Most of the time this combination worked fine. However, very infrequently it was possible for an interrupt to occur that caused the (medium priority) communications task to be scheduled during the short interval while the (high priority) information bus thread was blocked waiting for the (low priority) meteorological data thread. In this case, the long-running communications task, having higher priority than the meteorological task, would prevent it from running, consequently preventing the blocked information bus task from running. After some time had passed, a watchdog timer would go off, notice that the data bus task had not been executed for some time, conclude that something had gone drastically wrong, and initiate a total system reset. This scenario is a classic case of priority inversion. HOW WAS THIS DEBUGGED? VxWorks can be run in a mode where it records a total trace of all interesting system events, including context switches, uses of synchronization objects, and interrupts. After the failure, JPL engineers spent hours and hours running the system on the exact spacecraft replica in their lab with tracing turned on, attempting to replicate the precise conditions under which they believed that the reset occurred. Early in the morning, after all but one engineer had gone home, the engineer finally reproduced a system reset on the replica. Analysis of the trace revealed the priority inversion. HOW WAS THE PROBLEM CORRECTED? When created, a VxWorks mutex object accepts a boolean parameter that indicates whether priority inheritance should be performed by the mutex. The mutex in question had been initialized with the parameter off; had it been on, the low-priority meteorological thread would have inherited the priority of the high-priority data bus thread blocked on it while it held the mutex, causing it be scheduled with higher priority than the medium-priority communications task, thus preventing the priority inversion. Once diagnosed, it was clear to the JPL engineers that using priority inheritance would prevent the resets they were seeing. VxWorks contains a C language interpreter intended to allow developers to type in C expressions and functions to be executed on the fly during system debugging. The JPL engineers fortuitously decided to launch the spacecraft with this feature still enabled. By coding convention, the initialization parameter for the mutex in question (and those for two others which could have caused the same problem) were stored in global variables, whose addresses were in symbol tables also included in the launch software, and available to the C interpreter. A short C program was uploaded to the spacecraft, which when interpreted, changed the values of these variables from FALSE to TRUE. No more system resets occurred. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS First and foremost, diagnosing this problem as a black box would have been impossible. Only detailed traces of actual system behavior enabled the faulty execution sequence to be captured and identified. Secondly, leaving the "debugging" facilities in the system saved the day. Without the ability to modify the system in the field, the problem could not have been corrected. Finally, the engineer's initial analysis that "the data bus task executes very frequently and is time-critical — we shouldn't spend the extra time in it to perform priority inheritance" was exactly wrong. It is precisely in such time critical and important situations where correctness is essential, even at some additional performance cost. HUMAN NATURE, DEADLINE PRESSURES David told us that the JPL engineers later confessed that one or two system resets had occurred in their months of pre-flight testing. They had never been reproducible or explainable, and so the engineers, in a very human-nature response of denial, decided that they probably weren't important, using the rationale "it was probably caused by a hardware glitch". Part of it too was the engineers' focus. They were extremely focused on ensuring the quality and flawless operation of the landing software. Should it have failed, the mission would have been lost. It is entirely understandable for the engineers to discount occasional glitches in the less-critical land-mission software, particularly given that a spacecraft reset was a viable recovery strategy at that phase of the mission. THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD THEORY/ALGORITHMS David also said that some of the real heroes of the situation were some people from CMU who had published a paper he'd heard presented many years ago who first identified the priority inversion problem and proposed the solution. He apologized for not remembering the precise details of the paper or who wrote it. Bringing things full circle, it turns out that the three authors of this result were all in the room, and at the end of the talk were encouraged by the program chair to stand and be acknowledged. They were Lui Sha, John Lehoczky, and Raj Rajkumar. When was the last time you saw a room of people cheer a group of computer science theorists for their significant practical contribution to advancing human knowledge? :-) It was quite a moment. POSTLUDE For the record, the paper was: L. Sha, R. Rajkumar, and J. P. Lehoczky. Priority Inheritance Protocols: An Approach to Real-Time Synchronization. In IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 39, pp. 1175-1185, Sep. 1990.
After reading the 8 Dec 1997 *Aviation Week and Space Technology* cover story <http://www.aviationweek.com/aviation/avi_stor.htm>, I have grave doubts about the software stability of the enormously complex International Space Station. A few months of testing in a simulated environment and up goes 3.5 million lines of code, developed by independent teams dispersed worldwide. The low-tech Mir with its straightforward computer failures may one day be day be remembered nostalgically. [PGN Excerpting:] The initial power-on testing of the U.S. Laboratory Module began at Marshall in early November 1997 and is planned to last into early 1998. Although the Lab Module is not to be launched until the fifth shuttle assembly flight, set for May 1999, it has the potential of affecting ISS launch scheduling much earlier because the Lab will be the electronic hub of the station and its software must be tested at Kennedy in connection with the two assembly flight payloads that precede it. This critical Multiple Element Integrated Test (MEIT), set between September-December 1998, will link the ISS software and hardware for shuttle assembly flights 3A, 4A and 5A, requiring that software be developed well in advance of these tests. The MEIT requirements, combined with training requirements for the first ISS crew, are creating a "huge tidal wave of software" [...] * The hardware to be linked includes the Z-1 truss carrying electrical and fluid systems; the massive U.S. Photovoltaic Module power system, and simulated Node-1 avionics. * There are at least 3.5 million lines of code from multiple U.S., Russian, European, Canadian and Japanese contractors, ``the most diverse software of any aerospace program ever conceived.'' * ``Everything is interrelated. One thing affects the other and we have some very complex integrated schedules. Software clearly has the potential for delaying the launch of the Laboratory Module and subsequent flights.''
Mail sent to AOL users by MSN members using the latest version of the service (version 2.5) is being rejected by AOL for undetermined technical reasons. Each company is convinced that the problem is at the other end, and both claim to be anxious to resolve the problem. (News.Com 1 Dec 1997; Edupage, 2 Dec 1997)
I received a spam mail today that was rather sinister. Many spams that I receive request that you click on the hyperlink to go to their site. This one, however, was much different. I am running IE4.0, and I simply highlighted the new message in my mailbox, and clicked on the subject to read it. It immediately downloaded and initialized a java applet that took control of my browser, opened a session to their site as I sat in amazement. I then quickly (out of fear) stopped the connection to that site, went back to the mail message and viewed the source to see what was in it. Here is the first few lines of the mail - I numbered the lines so they won't be interpreted as HTML/E-mail here: 1. <html> 2. <head> 3. <title>webtour
Beware of HTML MailNavindra Umanee <email@example.com> Sat, 29 Nov 1997 22:56:20 -0500I had a little chuckle when I first read Tom Brazil's little "incident" with HTML mail and Microsoft software. Surely, such a silly thing could not possibly happen to *me* on my relatively secure Linux system. Unfortunately, the exact same thing *did* happen to me and it was quite a sobering experience. Like Tom, I killed Communicator and investigated the matter. My Mail User Agent on Linux is Mutt 0.76 but the *real* culprit was a neat little entry in my ~/.mailcap, text/html; netscape -remote 'openURL(%s)' This was triggered by my MUA on finding "Content-type: text/html" in the headers of the spam mail. Fortunately, the solution in Linux is simple: Remove all such dangerous entries from ~/.mailcap and /etc/mailcap (the latter, incidentally, is maintained automatically by my Debian GNU/Linux system and had the text-browser lynx as the entry for content-type text/html). The risk? Feeling too secure and thinking that it could never happen to you... Navin
Microsoft, CNET, BUGTRAQ and the 'land' attack (Milunovic, R-19.48)Geoffrey King <firstname.lastname@example.org> Sat, 6 Dec 1997 17:46:31 +1100I wish to point out the RISKS of relying on poorly researched media reports for information about security ... The previous issue of RISKS contained a report passed on from the CNET news service about the 'land' attack. The CNET report which appears at <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C17009%2C00.html> carries a date of 4 Dec 1997 at 5pm PST. For a start, the way in which the article was written indicates a general misunderstanding of the bug and the possible exploitation thereof. More seriously, the article also appears some 14 days after the first posting (including exploit code) of the 'land' vulnerability to the BUGTRAQ list. But todays "news" does coincide quite nicely with the announcement that Microsoft would release patches. And please also note that the statement of "Jason Grams, a product manager at Microsoft", that "[o]bviously, this isn't a Microsoft-only problem, it's a pretty big problem" is not entirely accurate. There are a number of operating systems which are not vulnerable to this attack, including current releases of Linux, Solaris, Irix, OS/2 and others ... other vendors, including CISCO, acted immediately to warn of and patch vulnerabilities in their products. Wired News published an excellent article as early as 21 Nov 1997. <http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/8707.html> While I'm writing about this particular problem, I might also quote from a Microsoft executive asked recently about the possibility that the Internet Explorer 'res://' bug and the Pentium bug could be combined. "It's not as simple as sitting down at an IE4 machine. We've tried it on several [machines] and we get a crash but that's it, which is certainly not a security hole," he said. <http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/8429.html> Is that really acceptable coming from a major OS vendor? A demonstration of the exploitation of the 'res://' Internet Explorer bug in combination with the recently discussed Pentium bug is available at <http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/L.Wood/IE4res/> [WARNING: this demonstration may crash your machine]. And here's a quote from a Microsoft technical note about security risks in Windows95 file and print sharing: "The SMBCLIENT Samba network client allows users to send illegal networking commands over the network. At this time, the Samba client is the only known SMBCLIENT that does not filter out such illegal commands. SMBCLIENT users do not automatically gain access to the Windows 95 drive; these users must know the exact steps to send these illegal commands." <http://premium.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q128/0/79.asp> Glossary: Samba <http://samba.anu.edu.au/> is an implementation of the SMB protocols to allow UNIX servers to be used in a Microsoft environment, as both servers and clients. Does anybody here want to volunteer for a trip to Seattle to explain to the Microsoft 'engineers' that client-server security mechanisms probably shouldn't rely on the good behaviour of the clients ?? It looks to me like it might be time to encourage a little more genetic diversity in operating systems ... let's not build the world around this sort of nonsense ... Hmmm ... and does anybody here still think todays "news" is news ?? Geoffrey King <www.homosapiens.org>, Australasian Legal Information Institutea Faculty of Law, University of Technology, Sydney +61(2) 9514 3176
The ATM Debit Card SwitcherooPRIVACY Forum <email@example.com> Thu, 20 Nov 97 21:44 PSTReprinted from PRIVACY Forum Digest V06 #16 with permission PRIVACY Forum Digest Thursday, 20 November 1997 Volume 06 : Issue 16 Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (firstname.lastname@example.org) Vortex Technology, Woodland Hills, CA, U.S.A. http://www.vortex.com Date: Thu, 20 Nov 97 19:46 PST >From: email@example.com (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator) Subject: The ATM Debit Card Switcheroo Greetings. Longtime readers of this digest know that I have rather mixed feelings about massive Wells Fargo Bank when it comes to security and privacy issues. When they were among the first to institute user-selected passcodes to control telephone access to accounts, I publicly applauded. On the other hand, I've condemned their moves to terminate neighborhood bank branches in favor of noisy, crowded, and privacy-unfriendly "supermarket branches". So it's been a mixed bag. Unfortunately, that bag just got substantially more moldy. Wells is in the process at this time of the unsolicited replacing of apparently millions of current ATM cards with what they call "ATM and Check Cards". What these really are is combined ATM and *debit* cards (apparently Wells doesn't like using the word "debit"--it doesn't appear anywhere in the literature that accompanies the cards). These cards, which are branded with the MC credit card logo, replace customers' current ATM cards, which customers are informed will "expire shortly". Customers need to call a toll-free number from their home phone (obviously for ANI phone number verification--which essentially is a non-blockable caller-ID) to activate their new cards. Also buried in the pile of material accompanying the card, is a number to call if for some reason the customer would prefer to keep using their old non-debit ATM card instead. (This second number is actually just the normal Wells toll-free customer service number--you need to work your way to an operator to "cancel" the new card.) Wells Fargo customers (and customers of other banks) might well want to consider refusing these sorts of debit cards--or making sure you never use them except in an ATM. While the card seems to add convenience at first glance, in reality it is a big step *backwards* toward PIN-less access by others to your money, with a range of potential problems--it could actually be more dangerous than a conventional credit card! A debit card of the kind Wells is distributing is used like a credit card. Anywhere a MC would be accepted, the new card can be used. The banks promote this as a major value of the card (along with some credit-card like "purchase protection" programs). But just like with a real credit card, no PIN is needed for purchases, only a signature. And not even the signature is required for telephone purchases, again, just like a conventional credit card. But unlike credit cards, the debit card doesn't result in a bill mailed to you later, rather, it draws money immediately from your checking account. Banks love this--it's like instant money with no float (the merchant pays the same percentage for accepting the debit card as he or she would for a normal credit card purchase). But with a "real" credit card, you have a chance to go over your bill and search for erroneous purchases *before* paying. Sure, it's a hassle if someone uses your credit card number for unauthorized purchases, but a debit card usable without a PIN opens up a whole new dimension. The problem of course is that since the debit card draws immediately from your checking account, without the protection of a PIN, anyone who has ever seen your debit card, and has the number and expiration date, could use it for purchases which will immediately draw down your checking account. When you get your monthly checking statement, these purchases will be itemized--but the money has *already* long since been pulled from your checking account by the time you get the statement. Folks who check their account status online every day will be in better shape, but most people don't do this and shouldn't need to. Having your checking account suddenly go dropping down toward zero has an important side-effect. The legitimate checks you've written can start merrily bouncing, unless you're fortunate enough to have plenty of money in an associated "overdraft" account of some sort. Wells suggests that there are protections built into their debit card system. You're not responsible for purchases made by unauthorized parties if you notify Wells what's going on. That's well and good, but hardly compensates for the hassle of bounced checks with potentially numerous entities that can result from misuse of your debit card numbers. Wells also points out that there is a daily limit on debit card activity. This is true, but as far as I can tell that limit has no obvious relationship to the amount of money in the checking account. In cases I've seen myself, the assigned daily limit was up to 10 times the average account balance! PIN-less access of this sort to checking accounts is full of problems. The account can be accessed without a physical check, without a PIN, and without your immediate knowledge. For anyone who has "real" credit cards, ones which bill and are paid conventionally, there seems to be little benefit (for the customer!) to a debit card of this sort, at least compared with the negatives and potential hassles that could result. Even persons without real credit cards might wish to think long and hard about the wisdom of using a card that could so easily result in their checking account being drained and their checks being bounced. The irony of all this is that at a time when what we really need is some form of PIN protection on conventional credit cards, the introduction (especially unsolicited) of a PIN-less financial instrument of this sort can only be viewed as a very bad idea. The losses that are certain to accrue will no doubt be handled like the untold millions in credit card losses each year, via higher costs and bank fees for merchants and other customers alike. Lauren Weinstein, Moderator, PRIVACY Forum http://www.vortex.com [I called and cancelled mine immediately upon receipt. no point playing "PIN, the tale on the don('t)key.~ PGN]
Reminder on Privacy Digests<RISKS moderator> 17 Apr 1997Periodically I remind you of TWO useful digests related to privacy, both of which are siphoning off some of the material that would otherwise appear in RISKS, but which should be read by those of you vitally interested in privacy problems. RISKS will continue to carry general discussions in which risks to privacy are a concern. * The PRIVACY Forum is run by Lauren Weinstein. It includes a digest (which he moderates quite selectively), archive, and other features, such as PRIVACY Forum Radio interviews. It is somewhat akin to RISKS; it spans the full range of both technological and nontechnological privacy-related issues (with an emphasis on the former). For information regarding the PRIVACY Forum, please send the exact line: information privacy as the BODY of a message to "firstname.lastname@example.org"; you will receive a response from an automated listserv system. To submit contributions, send to "email@example.com". PRIVACY Forum materials, including archive access/searching, additional information, and all other facets, are available on the Web via: http://www.vortex.com * The Computer PRIVACY Digest (CPD) (formerly the Telecom Privacy digest) is run by Leonard P. Levine. It is gatewayed to the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy. It is a relatively open (i.e., less tightly moderated) forum, and was established to provide a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy. All too often technology is way ahead of the law and society as it presents us with new devices and applications. Technology can enhance and detract from privacy. Submissions should go to firstname.lastname@example.org and administrative requests to email@example.com. There is clearly much potential for overlap between the two digests, although contributions tend not to appear in both places. If you are very short of time and can scan only one, you might want to try the former. If you are interested in ongoing discussions, try the latter. Otherwise, it may well be appropriate for you to read both, depending on the strength of your interests and time available. PGN
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