The RISKS Digest
Volume 20 Issue 44

Tuesday, 15th June 1999

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Please try the URL privacy information feature enabled by clicking the flashlight icon above. This will reveal two icons after each link the body of the digest. The shield takes you to a breakdown of Terms of Service for the site - however only a small number of sites are covered at the moment. The flashlight take you to an analysis of the various trackers etc. that the linked site delivers. Please let the website maintainer know if you find this useful or not. As a RISKS reader, you will probably not be surprised by what is revealed…


o GPS kills 8 in air
Lloyd Wood
o W32/ExploreZip.worm "virus" and user interfaces
Steven M. Bellovin
o CERT Advisory CA-99.06 - New information regarding ExploreZip
o Downloading Y2K fixes to Internet Explorer leads to clock problem
Paul Karger
o ActiveX Security Revisited
Steve Loughran
o Unwanted wildcard match
Nick Brown
o Bank sued over client data sale
Monty Solomon
o UAL — the UnFriendly Cybersky?
David Lesher
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

GPS kills 8 in air

Lloyd Wood <>
Mon, 7 Jun 1999 15:46:47 +0100 (BST)
 [...] The probability of a collision between aircraft using GPS on
 established air routes is significantly higher than between aircraft
 using conventional navigation aids because of the greater accuracy of
 navigation using a GPS.


  [Quite old, but not previously covered.  PGN]

W32/ExploreZip.worm "virus" and user interfaces

"Steven M. Bellovin" <>
Fri, 11 Jun 1999 13:26:33 -0400
Subtitle: "I got it from Agnes, she got it from Jim"...  (Tom Lehrer)

Another month, another killer "virus".  By now, everyone has heard about
this latest piece of malware.  But what's interesting is that part of the
way it spread appears to be dependent on the user interface.

The actual damage was done by an executable, a .EXE file.  However,
according to some reports the file itself contained the icon of a .ZIP
file.  Thus, even moderately cautious users could be tricked into opening
the file — which in this case meant executing it.

The underlying problem is that there are two different mechanisms used to
determine file type, and hence how it should be "opened".  One is what
is displayed to the user; the other is what is actually used.  That way
lies danger.

  [But it can also spread worm-like without your help.  Some folks still
  need to learn some of the lessons from the 1965 efforts on Multics!  See

CERT Advisory CA-99.06 - New information regarding ExploreZip

CERT Advisory <>
Mon, 14 Jun 1999 07:16:05 -0400
CERT Advisory CA-99-06-explorezip

   Original issue date: Thursday June 10, 1999
   Last Revised Date: June 14, 1999
   Added information about the program's self-propagation via networked
   shares; also updated anti-virus vendor URLs.

   Source: CERT/CC

Note: The CERT Coordination Center has discovered new information
regarding the ExploreZip worm. This re-issue of CERT Advisory CA-99-06
contains new information regarding an additional means by which the
Worm can spread, and a caution about disinfecting your systems. We
will continue to update this advisory as new information is
discovered. We encourage you to check our web site frequently for any
new information.

Systems Affected

     * Machines running Windows 95, Windows 98, or Windows NT.
     * Machines with filesystems and/or shares that are writable by a
       user of an infected system.
     * Any mail handling system could experience performance problems or
       a denial of service as a result of the propagation of this Trojan
       horse program.


   The CERT Coordination Center continues to receive reports and
   inquiries regarding various forms of malicious executable files that
   are propagated as file attachments in electronic mail.

   During the second week of June 1999, the CERT/CC began receiving
   reports of sites affected by ExploreZip, a Trojan horse/worm program
   that affects Windows systems and has propagated in e-mail attachments.
   The number and variety of reports we have received indicate that this
   has the potential to be a widespread attack affecting a variety of

I. Description

   Our original analysis indicated that the ExploreZip program is a
   Trojan horse, since it initially requires a victim to open or run an
   e-mail attachment in order for the program to install a copy of itself
   and enable further propagation. Further analysis has shown that, once
   installed, the program may also behave as a worm, and it may be able
   to propagate itself, without any human interaction, to other networked
   machines that have certain writable shares.

   The ExploreZip Trojan horse has been propagated between users in the
   form of e-mail messages containing an attached file named
   zipped_files.exe. Some e-mail programs may display this attachment
   with a "WinZip" icon. The body of the e-mail message usually appears to
   come from a known e-mail correspondent, and typically contains the
   following text:

   I received your email and I shall send you a reply ASAP.
          Till then, take a look at the attached zipped docs.

   The subject line of the message may not be predictable and may appear
   to be sent in reply to previous e-mail.

   Opening the zipped_files.exe file causes the program to execute. It is
   possible under some mailer configurations that a user might
   automatically open a malicious file received in the form of an e-mail
   attachment. When the program is run, an error message is displayed:

   Cannot open file: it does not appear to be a valid archive. If this
   file is part of a ZIP format backup set, insert the last disk
   of the backup set and try again. Please press F1 for help.

Destruction of files

     * The program searches local and networked drives (drive letters C
       through Z) for specific file types and attempts to erase the
       contents of the files, leaving a zero byte file. The targets may
       include Microsoft Office files, such as .doc, .xls, and .ppt, and
       various source code files, such as .c, .cpp, .h, and .asm.
     * The program may also be able to delete files that are writable to
       it via SMB/CIFS file sharing. The program appears to look through
       the network neighborhood and delete any files that are shared and
       writable, even if those shares are not mapped to networked drives
       on the infected computer.
     * The program appears to continually delete the contents of targeted
       files on any mapped networked drives.
       The program does not appear to delete files with the "hidden" or
       "system" attribute, regardless of their extension.

System modifications

     * The zipped_files.exe program creates a copy of itself in a file
       called explore.exe in the following location(s):

        On Windows 98 - C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\Explore.exe
                On Windows NT - C:\WINNT\System32\Explore.exe

       This explore.exe file is an identical copy of the zipped_files.exe
       Trojan horse, and the file size is 210432 bytes.
       MD5 (Explore.exe) = 0e10993050e5ed199e90f7372259e44b
     * On Windows 98 systems, the zipped_files.exe program creates an
       entry in the WIN.INI file:


       On Windows NT systems, an entry is made in the system registry:

                run = "C:\WINNT\System32\Explore.exe"

Propagation via file sharing

   Once explore.exe is running, it takes the following steps to propagate
   to other systems via file sharing:

     * Each time the program is executed, the program will search the
       network for all shares that contain a WIN.INI file with a valid
       "[windows]" section in the file.
     * For each such share that it finds, the program will attempt to
          + copy itself to a file named _setup.exe on that share
          + modify the WIN.INI file on that share by adding the entry
       The account running the program on the original infected machine
       needs to have permission to write to the second victim's shared
       directory. (That is, no vulnerabilities are being exploited in
       order for the program to spread in this manner.)
       The _setup.exe file is identical to the zipped_files.exe and
       explore.exe files on the original infected machine.
     * The original infected system will continue to scan shares that
       have been mapped to a local drive letter containing a valid
       WIN.INI file. For each such share that is found, the program will
       "re-infect" the victim system as described above.

   On Windows 98 systems that have a "run=_setup.exe" entry in the
   WIN.INI file (as described previously), the C:\WINDOWS\_setup.exe
   program is executed automatically whenever a user logs in. On Windows
   NT systems, a "run=_setup.exe" entry in the WIN.INI file does not
   appear to cause the program to be executed automatically.

   When run as _setup.exe, the program will attempt to

     * make another copy of itself in C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\Explore.exe
     * modify the WIN.INI file again by replacing the "run=_setup.exe"
       entry with "run=C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\Explore.exe"

   Note that when the program is run as _setup.exe, it configures the
   system to later run as explore.exe. But when run as explore.exe, it
   attempts to infect shares with valid WIN.INI files by configuring
   those files to run _setup.exe. Since this infection process includes
   local shares, affected systems may exhibit a "ping pong" behavior in
   which the infected host alternates between the two states.

Propagation via e-mail

   The program propagates by replying to any new e-mail that is received
   by the infected computer. The reply messages are similar to the
   original e-mail described above, each containing another copy of the
   zipped_files.exe attachment.

   We will continue to update this advisory with more specific
   information as we are able to confirm details. Please check the
   CERT/CC web site for the current version containing a complete
   revision history.

II. Impact

     * Users who execute the zipped_files.exe Trojan horse will infect
       the host system, potentially causing targeted files to be
     * Users who execute the Trojan horse may also infect other networked
       systems that have writable shares.
     * Because of the large amount of network traffic generated by
       infected machines, network performance may suffer.
     * Indirectly, this Trojan horse could cause a denial of service on
       mail servers. Several large sites have reported performance
       problems with their mail servers as a result of the propagation of
       this Trojan horse.

III. Solution

Use virus scanners

   While many anti-virus products are able to detect and remove the
   executables locally, because of the continuous re-infection process,
   simply removing all copies of the program from an infected system may
   leave your system open to re-infection at a later time, perhaps
   immediately. To prevent re-infection, you must not serve any shares
   containing a WIN.INI file to any potentially infected machines. If you
   share files with everyone in your domain, then you must disable shares
   with WIN.INI files until every machine on your network has been

   In order to detect and clean current viruses, you must keep your
   scanning tools up to date with the latest definition files. Please see
   the following anti-virus vendor resources for more information about
   the characteristics and removal techniques for the malicious file
   known as ExploreZip.

   Aladdin Knowledge Systems, Inc.

          Central Command

          Command Software Systems, Inc

          Computer Associates

          Data Fellows

          McAfee, Inc. (a Network Associates company)

          Network Associates Incorporated


          Sophos, Incorporated



          Trend Micro Incorporated

   Additional sources of virus information are listed at

Additional suggestions

     * Blocking Netbios traffic at your network border may help prevent
       propagation via shares from outside your network perimeter.
     * Disable file serving on workstations. You will not be able to
       share your files with other computers, but you will be able to
       browse and get files from servers. This will prevent your
       workstation from being infected via file sharing propagation.
     * Maintain a regular, off-line, backup cycle.

General protection from e-mail Trojan horses and viruses

   Some previous examples of malicious files known to have propagated
   through electronic mail include
     * False upgrade to Internet Explorer - discussed in CA-99-02
     * Melissa macro virus - discussed in CA-99-04
     * Happy99.exe Trojan Horse - discussed in IN-99-02
     * CIH/Chernobyl virus - discussed in IN-99-03

   In each of the above cases, the effects of the malicious file are
   activated only when the file in question is executed. Social
   engineering is typically employed to trick a recipient into executing
   the malicious file. Some of the social engineering techniques we have
   seen used include
     * Making false claims that a file attachment contains a software
       patch or update
     * Implying or using entertaining content to entice a user into
       executing a malicious file
     * Using e-mail delivery techniques which cause the message to appear
       to have come from a familiar or trusted source
     * Packaging malicious files in deceptively familiar ways (e.g., use
       of familiar but deceptive program icons or file names)

   The best advice with regard to malicious files is to avoid executing
   them in the first place. CERT advisory CA-99-02 discusses Trojan
   horses and offers suggestions to avoid them (please see Section V).

   This document is available from:

CERT/CC Contact Information

  Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
  Fax: +1 412-268-6989
  Postal address:
    CERT Coordination Center
    Software Engineering Institute
    Carnegie Mellon University
    Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890  U.S.A.

  CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
  Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
  hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by e-mail.
   Our public PGP key is available from
   If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more

Getting security information

   CERT publications and other security information are available from
   our web site

   To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
   e-mail to and include SUBSCRIBE
   your-e-mail-address in the subject of your message.

   Copyright 1999 Carnegie Mellon University.
   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be
   found in

   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office

   Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
   Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
   Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
   implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
   fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
   results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
   does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
   patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.

Revision History

June 10, 1999:  Initial release
June 11, 1999:  Added information about the appearance of the attached file
                Added information from Aladdin Knowledge Systems, Inc.
June 14, 1999:  Added information about the program's self-propagation via
                networked shares; also updated anti-virus vendor URLs

  [(S)lightly edited for RISKS.  PGN]

Downloading Y2K fixes to Internet Explorer leads to clock problem

Paul Karger <>
Wed, 09 Jun 1999 15:54:47 -0400
I was attempting to install service pack 2 of Internet Explorer 4.01 in
order to meet corporate Y2K requirements and ran into the following
interesting problem.

To install service pack 2, you first download a small program from
Microsoft.  You run that program, and after asking you some questions, it
then downloads the full service pack 2.  One of the questions was whether
you wanted to install the service pack or just download the files.  I
replied that I just wanted to download the files.  My intention was to virus
check them, before actually performing the install.

However, when it attempted to download the full service pack, the small
downloader complained that my system clock was not set correctly, and that
therefore it could not perform the download.  I checked, and my system clock
was set correctly.  Pushing the help button on the error screen gave
information about setting the clock, followed by a somewhat cryptic comment
about security settings in Internet Explorer.

My already installed version Internet Explorer was set to high security for
all zones, as the dangers of ActiveX, Java, and Javascript are well known.
As an experiment, I lowered the security setting for the Internet zone to
medium, and the download proceeded without error.  Note that ostensibly, I
was only downloading files, not running anything, yet the security
protection level had to be lowered, not to mention the bogus error message.

I then raised the setting back to high, performed the virus check, and then
tried to install the downloaded files.  Again it complained about the clock
setting, and again I had to lower the security setting to medium to permit
the install to proceed.  (This time, I was actually executing code, so I
suppose the lowered setting was appropriate, but it still complained about
the clock, rather than the security setting.)

I suppose that downloading any code (even if not executing it) from the
Microsoft web site could be considered a security risk and therefore not
compatible with "high security".  However, I don't think that was
Microsoft's intention, and surely it should not have been reported as a
clock setting problem.

(Footnote for technical accuracy: In the above description, I said that I
used the high security setting in Internet Explorer.  This was artistic
license on my part.  Actually, I used the custom setting to get an even more
conservative setting than what Microsoft calls "high security".  "High
security" still allows certain kinds of "safe" scripts to run, and I prefer
to disable even "safe" scripts.  However, the bogus error occurred not just
on the custom very high setting, but also on Microsoft's own high security

(To be fair to Microsoft, a full viral scan of both the downloaded service
pack and of the system after the service pack was installed revealed no
problems, nor did I seriously expect any.  However, I routinely virus scan
any and all downloaded files, regardless of their source.)


ActiveX Security Revisited

"Steve Loughran" <>
Wed, 9 Jun 1999 12:22:00 +0100
The latest Microsoft security bulletin ) includes two
Internet Explorer patches. The first is a classic stack overrun -a web page
can supply an icon for use when adding to the favourite links list, and a
malformed icon could overrun the stack and so execute arbitrary code.

The second fault is a security hole in ActiveX control, and is a simple
instantiation of the problem covered in  RISKS-18.85 and  RISKS-18.86,
namely than code signing is a far less safe method of software distribution
than a 'sandbox' for untrusted code.

It so happens that one of the ActiveX controls dating from IE3 can be used
to test for the presence or absence of files on a hard disk, and while no
access to the contents is granted, it can be used to build up a picture of
what applications are installed. My demonstration page ) shows a naive script
looking for common windows files in well known places -it could just as
easily look for well known applications as a preamble to an application
specific attack.

The insecure 'Preloader' control has some interesting properties. Firstly,
it is signed by Microsoft, showing that even the inventors of ActiveX and
the entire Win32 API did not test their controls rigorously enough.
Secondly, some distributions of Internet Explorer may have automatically
installed the control, in which case the control download or signature
verification process is bypassed.

It so happens that the default security settings of the Outlook and Outlook
Express e-mail messages, which means anyone could send a web page
referencing the control to any known recipient and stand a moderate chance
of being able to enumerate some disk files, possibly with no visible
notification to the recipient. This strikes me as a more serious problem
than the risk incurred by looking at random web pages, as it enables attacks
targeted at individual recipients.

Within four weeks of notifying Microsoft via their security e-mail alias the
company announced the problem, and withdrew the control from their own web
site, which seems a reasonable response time. Of course, if ActiveX had
included a mechanism whereby the signer of a control could retroactively
revoke that control then it would have been trivial to disable the control
remotely. Instead the company had to patch IE to permanently disable the
control. Few other companies would have this luxury.

While enabling or disabling ActiveX use for web site access is entirely a
matter of preference, I would personally recommend that all users of
Microsoft e-mail applications alter their e-mail client security settings so
that neither ActiveX or scripting language is supported in incoming messages
. This can be done by setting the e-mail security zone to 'restricted'.


Unwanted wildcard match

BROWN Nick <>
Mon, 14 Jun 1999 09:46:41 +0200
I don't normally like to present individual bugs as RISKs, but this one just
bit me and is so counter-intuitive that I felt I had to report it.

It appears that when Windows NT (and, I imagine, other long-filename-enabled
Windows variants) matches a user-specified wildcard in a DOS prompt, it
matches the wildcard against both the full filename, and the pseudo-8.3
format filename.

For example, in a directory I have two files:
   Shortcut to V1.LNK
   Shortcut to V2.LNK

However, these were created in reverse order, which means that their
8.3-emulated names were also created in reverse order.  So DIR/X shows:
   Shortcut to V1.LNK   SHORTC~2.LNK
   Shortcut to V2.LNK   SHORTC~1.LNK

Now, I wanted to get rid of "Shortcut to V1.LNK", and a number of related
files, so I typed
   DEL *1.LNK
and "Shortcut to V2.LNK" disappeared as well.

The RISK ?  With Microsoft, a wildcard can match a filename character that
you didn't even know was in the filename - indeed, which is part of a
compatibility system which I don't need to use.  (There is no way to predict
a file's 8.3-emulated name from its full name - another magnificent piece of

Nick Brown, Strasbourg, France.

e-mail address updates : replaces
for more information,

Bank sued over client data sale

Monty Solomon <>
Tue, 15 Jun 1999 12:46:58 -0400
The state of Minnesota last week sued U.S. Bank for allegedly selling Social
Security numbers, account balances and other sensitive customer data to a
telemarketing company in exchange for commissions.  Apparently several other
banks are also hawking customer information, which raises serious privacy
concerns.  [Source: *ComputerWorld*, article by Kim S. Nash, 14 Jun 1999,   PGN]

UAL — the UnFriendly Cybersky?

David Lesher <>
Mon, 14 Jun 1999 20:13:31 -0400 (EDT)
Recently, I went to check the status of an incoming UAL flight.
The results were not encouraging.  Their www page informed me:

   Here is the latest information about the flight you selected. Note, the
   times listed are local airport times.

                              [United]Flight #1020
                      Departure Date: Dec 31, 1969

                               Status: Arrived
DEPARTS: San Jose, Costa Rica (SJO)   ARRIVES: Mexico City, Mexico (MEX)
Left the Gate 6:10 am (Prev. day) (2 min Early)
Flight Arrived at Gate 9:45 am (Prev. day) (3 min Early)
Gate: N/A                             Gate: E

                               Status: Arrived
DEPARTS: Mexico City, Mexico (MEX)    ARRIVES: Washington, DC (IAD)
Left the Gate 10:54 am (Prev. day) (2 min Early)
Estimated Arrival 3:51 pm (Prev. day)
Gate: 26                              Gate: C9
Flight is on time.

Besides the obvious Dec 31 1969, the page kept mentioning
"Prev. Day" even though the flight was in the air at the time!

So I called the automated telephone status number. IT told the
first leg of the flight was from not San Jose [SJO] but rather
San Francisco [SFO].

So I ended up talking to a human. She took a surprisingly long time to
check but said yes, it had originated from SJO and yes it was on
time out of MEX. (It then arrived early...)

The RISK? The real rationale for the www page is the very low cost
to service the query. But the ambiguity it created and the telco
robot reinforced, drove me to the highest transaction cost method.

  [See John Rushby's item in RISKS-20.15.  PGN]

Please report problems with the web pages to the maintainer