The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 20 Issue 53

Tuesday 10 August 1999

Contents

o Cell Phones Become Instant Bugs!
Lauren Weinstein
o Cell phone sends jet off-course
David Clark
o Sharing files via Yahoo
Morten Welinder
o Executive Order on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet
Bill Clinton via PGN
o California's "shameful reputation"!
PGN
o NCIC 2000 Begins Operations
Jack N. Fenner
o Complexity and Safety in Medical Electronics
Dr D John Doyle
o Re: Go FORTH
M. Simon
o E-Trade and long passwords
Mark Harrison
o Security sites vandalized
NewsScan
o SPAM causes major ISP crash
Peter Leeson
o Re: PCS, IMRSS, Mobile phones in airplanes
Peter Houppermans
o Cell phones and aviation electronics
Glenn Carroll
o REVIEW: "Kerberos: A Network Authentication System", Brian Tung
Rob Slade
o UPCOMING EVENT- USENIX Security Symposium, 23-26 Aug 1999 in DC
Moun Chau
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Cell Phones Become Instant Bugs!

Lauren Weinstein <lauren@vortex.com>
Mon, 09 Aug 99 14:37:28 PDT
Greetings.  A disturbing application for the new generations of digital cell
phones appears to be developing -- many models can be easily used as
remote-controlled clandestine listening devices ("bugs"), often with little
or no modification.

It turns out that many current cell phone models can be set into modes where
they are completely silent (no "boops" or "beeps") and will answer incoming
calls automatically.  This latter mode is designed for use in hands-free
(headset) situations.  A cell phone left in a strategic location set in such
modes may be silently interrogated from virtually anywhere on the planet
with a simple phone call, and will happily transmit the room conversations
back to the caller.  When the caller hangs up, the cell phone resets, ready
for the next call.

In some cases, phones can be placed into this "automatic answer" mode
without any accessories being required.  For some models, a headset
connector needs to be plugged into the phone, which may be modified to allow
the phone to continue using its built-in microphone when in its "bugging"
mode, or could trivially have a remote microphone wired via a very thin
cable to the actual cell phone some distance away.

Even without an outside source of power, many modern digital cell phones can
have standby times of a week or more, and be able to transmit conversations
for a number of hours.  With an outside power source, they could perform
their bugging functions indefinitely.

Since various commercial firms are now planning to offer a wide variety of
location-based services using cell phone location tracking capabilities,
(which were originally mandated for 911 use), it seems likely that planted
cell phones may soon be usable to track the location of persons or moving
vehicles as well.  Just picture a cell phone hidden in a car trunk with a
tiny microphone wired up behind the rear seat, for example.  The car wiring
would also provide an ideal source of continuing power for both bugging and
tracking via the cell phone.  Simple, cheap, and accessible from practically
anywhere!

Cell phones can also of course act as communications platforms for a variety
of other add-on devices, such as tiny cameras, small Global Positioning
System (GPS) units (for highly accurate location tracking that works
*today*), and so on.  While the current generations of cell phones have
fairly limited data rates, and there are a variety of technical analog vs.
digital issues involved, many cell phones can still be used for such
"enhanced" applications even in the existing limited data bandwidth
environment.  It must also be pointed out that a hidden cell phone could
also be used to remotely control or trigger apparatus connected to the
phone, under the command of the caller.

With cell phones becoming smaller and the associated networks ever more
ubiquitous, this whole area has a great deal of potential for serious
privacy-invasive and other abuses.
                                     Lauren Weinstein <lauren@vortex.com>
Moderator, PRIVACY Forum --- http://www.vortex.com; Host, "Vortex Daily
Reality Report & Unreality Trivia Quiz" --- http://www.vortex.com/reality

  [An earlier version of this appeared in Lauren's PRIVACY Forum Digest,
    (http://www.vortex.com/privacy/priv.08.11)
  Saturday, 7 August 1999 Volume 08 : Issue 11, which he has augmented for
  RISKS.  PGN]


Cell phone sends jet off-course

"Clark, David" <Dave.Clark@BCHydro.bc.ca>
Mon, 9 Aug 1999 12:28:45 -0700
>From: "Telecom News - August 6-9, 1999" News Summary

> "CELL PHONE SENDS JET OFF-COURSE", *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 Aug 1999
>
> "A Chinese plane drifted 30 degrees off course because a passenger failed
> to switch off his mobile telephone. A crash was narrowly avoided after the
> cabin crew found the phone during a desperate search while approaching
> Beijing airport. Mobile phones are banned on planes worldwide but a direct
> link with instrument failure has never been proved.  The Beijing incident
> is likely to provoke new air safely fears in Asia where at least one crash
> is attributed to on-board phone use."


Sharing files via Yahoo

Morten Welinder <terra@diku.dk>
Mon, 9 Aug 1999 21:02:59 +0200 (METDST)
I just met this ad on Yahoo:

    Share all your important files with friends and co-workers
    with Yahoo! Briefcase

I am tempted to upload a few years' worth of comp.risks archives.
Risks (familiar to faithful readers):

* Yahoo knows your secrets.

* Anyone who snoops their traffic knows them too.

* Anyone who asks Yahoo for your secrets knows them too.  (Yahoo
  has a bad reputation for just handing over stuff in order to
  avoid trouble.)

* When your boss finds out who knows his secrets, he probably will
  not remain your boss.

* "Make telecommuting even easier!"  Convenience for security.

* "Access and share files, documents and photos from anywhere."
  Your files or anyone else's, that is.

* "You'll be registered with all of Yahoo!'s services."  Just in
  case you don't get enough e-mail as it is.

The only thing missing seems to be a small sign saying "Just kidding --
gotcha!".

Morten


Executive Order on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Mon, 09 Aug 99 20:50:48 PDT
                            THE WHITE HOUSE

                     Office of the Press Secretary
                        (Little Rock, Arkansas)

For Immediate Release                                     August 6, 1999

                           EXECUTIVE ORDER
                            - - - - - - -

          WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET

   By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, and in order to address unlawful
conduct that involves the use of the Internet, it is hereby ordered as
follows:

   Section 1.  Establishment and Purpose.  (a) There is hereby established a
working group to address unlawful conduct that involves the use of the
Internet ("Working Group").  The purpose of the Working Group shall be to
prepare a report and recommendations concerning:

     (1)  The extent to which existing Federal laws provide a sufficient
          basis for effective investigation and prosecution of unlawful
          conduct that involves the use of the Internet, such as the
          illegal sale of guns, explosives, controlled substances, and
          prescription drugs, as well as fraud and child pornography.

     (2)  The extent to which new technology tools, capabilities, or
          legal authorities may be required for effective investigation
          and prosecution of unlawful conduct that involves the use of
          the Internet; and

     (3)  The potential for new or existing tools and capabilities to
          educate and empower parents, teachers, and others to prevent
          or to minimize the risks from unlawful conduct that involves
          the use of the Internet.

   (b) The Working Group shall undertake this review in the context of
current Administration Internet policy, which includes support for industry
self-regulation where possible, technology-neutral laws and regulations, and
an appreciation of the Internet as an important medium both domestically and
internationally for commerce and free speech.

   Sec. 2.  Schedule.  The Working Group shall complete its work to the
greatest extent possible and present its report and recommendations to the
President and Vice President within 120 days of the date of this order.
Prior to such presentation, the report and recommendations shall be
circulated through the Office of Management and Budget for review and
comment by all appropriate Federal agencies.

   Sec. 3.  Membership.

   (a)  The Working Group shall be composed of the following members:

          (1)  The Attorney General (who shall serve as Chair of the
               Working Group).

          (2)  The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

          (3)  The Secretary of the Treasury.

          (4)  The Secretary of Commerce.

          (5)  The Secretary of Education.

          (6)  The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

          (7)  The Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
               Firearms.

          (8)  The Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

          (9)  The Chair of the Federal Trade Commission.

          (10) The Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration; and

          (11) Other Federal officials deemed appropriate by the Chair
               of the Working Group.

   (b) The co-chairs of the Interagency Working Group on Electronic Commerce
shall serve as liaison to and attend meetings of the Working Group.  Members
of the Working Group may serve on the Working Group through designees.

                                 WILLIAM J. CLINTON

                                 THE WHITE HOUSE,
                                 August 5, 1999.

<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/8/9/11.text.1>

[For those of you whose systems lose the line overflow, that is
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R concatenated with
?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/8/9/11.text.1]


California's "shameful reputation"!

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Sun, 8 Aug 99 13:32:01 PDT
In the *Sunday Examiner and Chronicle*, 8 Aug 1999, the *Chronicle's*
editorial ("Sunday" section, p.6) is titled "Silicon Valley Expertise Stops
at Capitol Steps"; it begins with this statement:

  In a cruel irony, the state that gave birth to Silicon Valley is
  also the state with one of the worst reputations for high-tech
  know-how at the government level.  And it is a well-deserved, if
  shameful reputation.

This is prompted by the latest fiasco, the demise of

 * A system supposedly linking county welfare offices (scrapped, $18M lost)

The editorial notes the earlier failures familiar to long-time RISKS readers:

 * Deadbeat parents' system ($111M, abandoned) [RISKS-19.12, .43, .73, .82]
 * DMV upgrade ($51M, abandoned) [RISKS-15.80, .82, RISKS-16.01, .07]
 * California Lottery agreement to improve Scratcher game (contract
   cancelled, $52M lost after both sides sued) [not previously reported,
   although premonitions are noted in RISKS-14.18 and 14.20]

The editorial suggests that the new governor (Gray Davis) appears to
recognize "that he has a critical role" to play, while asserting that the
previous governor (Pete Wilson) "lacked sufficient interest".. The
charge to improve matters rests with Elias Cortez, Davis' head of the
Department of Information Technology (nicknamed ``DO IT''), who has
put all new procurements on hold until Y2K is sorted out.


NCIC 2000 Begins Operations

"Jack N." <jnf@pcisys.net>
Fri, 6 Aug 1999 14:21:32 -0700 (PDT)
The FBI has announced that the National Crime Information Center 2000
began operations on July 11.  According to the FBI announcement
(http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/pressrel/ncic2000.htm), this is a major
upgrade of the NCIC system which provides police officers nationwide
with the ability to view mugshots, and perform fingerprint searches from
their patrol vehicles.  It also adds additional persons to the
NCIC database, including persons on probation, on parole, in federal
prison or with records as sexual offenders.

There are any number of risks associated with this system.  Here are a few:

1) False positive matches on the fingerprint search.  According to
http://www.civic.com/pubs/1998/september/civ-techside1-9-14-98.html, the
NCIC 2000 fingerprint scan has an accuracy rate of 92 percent.  (The
original contract called for 100% accurate positive matches and 98% negative
matches.)  If false positives are a significant element of the 8% error
rate, lots of people will be hauled to police stations and at least
inconvenienced based on incorrect NCIC matches.

2) Lots more people in the database.  The accuracy and timeliness of the
information in this database must be questioned.

3) According to the same www.civic.com article noted above, no probable
cause is needed for an officer to require a fingerprint image.  In fact, the
system is intended to be used to establish probable cause.  If a match is
indicated, the suspect is then to be taken in to a police station and the
larger IAFIS fingerprint scan system used to confirm identification.  (IAFIS
automates the entire FBI fingerprint database, is not yet online, has an
unknown accuracy rate, and takes 2 hours to perform searches.)

4) The NCIC 2000 project was twice as expensive (US$183M vs US$80M) and a
took twice as long (7 years vs 3 years) as originally projected.  Also, at
least one of the original requirements (accuracy) was relaxed.  Thus it
shows the cost increases, schedule delay, and requirements fade often
associated with large, ambitious projects.

5) One wonders how long it will be until this system will be used as a
method of collecting and storing fingerprints on citizens not convicted--or
even charged with--any crime.

Jack Fenner


Complexity and Safety in Medical Electronics

"Dr D John Doyle" <djdoyle@home.com>
Thu, 5 Aug 1999 22:34:26 -0400
Some technologies, like scissors and chop sticks, are inherently simple.

Others, like nuclear reactors or life support electronics, are inherently
complex. By nature, the safety issues associated with complex systems are
more involved than those associated with simple systems. There are always
added cost requirements in complexity, such as special requirements for
ensuring the safe operation of the system. But the very subsystems added to
increase safety necessarily add to complexity, and, ironically, enrich the
number of possible failure modes in the overall system. Thus there is the
concern that the failure of any addon safety system may sometimes actually
lead to new system failure modes that would not have otherwise occurred.

Consider the following hypothetical example:

A sensor failure or algorithm failure in a patient monitoring system results
in a false "asystole" alarm in a patient monitored during general
anesthesia. (This alarm indicates that the patient is in cardiac arrest, an
obviously grave situation. However, every single unexpected asystole alarm I
have witnessed to date has been false.) In a panic from seeing this
unexpected alarm, an inexperienced physician taking care of the patient
forgets to check for the absence of a pulse to confirm that there is indeed
a problem.  Instead, the doctor calls for the crash cart and immediately
administers a full ampoule (1000 micrograms) of adrenaline to restart the
heart.

Trouble is, the heart was doing just fine until then. There was no asystole,
no cardiac arrest, just an algorithm failure that occurred from a normal but
low-amplitude electrocardiogram, possibly due to electrode misplacement.

Now the patient really is in trouble from a massive cardiac stimulant
overdose!

Of course, this failure mode would not have occurred if no asystole monitor
was used.

An interesting book which discusses these and other issues is: Robert Pool.
Beyond Engineering: How Society Shapes Technology. Oxford University Press.
New York. 1997. 358 p. $30. (Reviewed in IEEE Spectrum May 1998).

D. John Doyle MD PhD FRCPC
University of Toronto and Toronto General Hospital
djdoyle@home.com
http://doyle.ibme.utoronto.ca

APPENDIX
While 1000 micrograms (mcg) is a good starting dose in a full cardiac arrest
setting, in the normal intact heart it is a massive amount. Only a 10 mcg
dose of adrenaline is needed to "rev up" a normal heart. With a 100 mcg the
heart operates well beyond its safety region, at least in the elderly or the
sedentary. With 1000 mcg doses of adrenaline most healthy hearts are at
least moderately damaged, even when aggressive attempts at correction with
other (also dangerous) drugs is attempted (as many published clinical
reports of such drug error accidents will attest to).


Re: Go FORTH

"M. Simon" <mlsimon@mail.rkd.snds.com>
Fri, 06 Aug 1999 17:57:01 -0700
Elizabeth Rather might disagree with you about large FORTH projects
(President of FORTH Inc). FED-EX has 1500 programmers doing mostly
FORTH. They claim it is at least 6X to 10X as productive as C.

Let's suppose FORTH does not scale well with more than 10 programmers. If
you get a 10:1 productivity improvement you might handle projects up to 100
ordinary programmers/coder/testers.  The product will be better designed and
likely better debugged.

Very few projects require more than 100 software people.

I have found that testing each module as it is designed (easy in FORTH)
eliminates the need for type checking. Generally the quality of the code is
better because of this as well.

A 10-fold improvement in software engineering productivity is nothing to
sneeze at.

PS. Every place I have been allowed to use FORTH, it has been a magic
bullet.  Perhaps I am unique.


E-Trade and long passwords

"Mark Harrison" <markh@usai.asiainfo.com>
Sun, 8 Aug 1999 22:31:13 +0800
I recently filled in an account application at etrade.com.
I selected a RISKS-aware password, submitted the form,
and received the following error message:

>Please correct the following information:
>
>        Your Password must be 6 characters or less.

Yikes!

Mark Harrison, AsiaInfo Computer Networks, Beijing, China / Santa Clara, CA
markh@usai.asiainfo.com  http://usai.asiainfo.com:8080/


Security sites vandalized

"NewsScan" <newsscan@newsscan.com>
Fri, 06 Aug 1999 07:41:58 -0700
Just days after the Symantec site was attacked, vandals intruded upon
AntiOnline, another Internet site devoted to computer security. The intruder
never directly infiltrated AntiOnline's own computers, but managed to
redirect visitors to a Web page with the image of an unblinking eye and the
message ``expensive security systems do not protect from stupidity.''
AntiOnline's manager said the attack was "clever" but not "sophisticated."
One security expert said, "All you can do is try to keep ahead of the game.
For anybody to claim they're totally secure, it's not true."  [Source:
AP/*San Jose Mercury News*, 6 Aug 1999,
  http://www.sjmercury.com/svtech/news/breaking/ap/docs/727614l.htm]

  [NewsScan Daily, 6 August 1999, with permission.  NewsScan is underwritten
  by Arthur Anderson and the IEEE Computer Society.  To subscribe to NewsScan
  Daily, send an e-mail message to NewsScan@NewsScan.com
  with 'subscribe' or 'unsubscribe' in the subject line.]


SPAM causes major ISP crash

"Peter Leeson" <Peter.Leeson@ispi.co.uk>
Fri, 6 Aug 1999 09:21:34 +0100
Globalnet, one of the main ISP in the UK had their e-mail severely
handicapped by a massive SPAM mailing from a Florida-based ISP.  Mail was
delayed by up to a day while the spam was cleared on 5 Aug 1999, slowly and
painfully...

Peter Leeson


Re: PCS, IMRSS, Mobile phones in airplanes (RISKS-20.52)

Peter Houppermans <Peter.Houppermans@pa-consulting.com>
Fri, 6 Aug 1999 03:31:36 +0100
I'd like to comment on three articles in RISKS-20.52:

1) Re: Can You Trust AT&T Wireless PCS Text Messaging?

There are generic issues of dependency with mobile phone services.  I have
experienced several times that messages left for me on voicemail (as I was
on the phone at the time) did not trigger the alarms on the voicebox to
alert me until fully 8 hours later (causing the ones that were urgent to be
mildly out of date).  This was on UK Vodaphone, and it occurred with both
the 'call-back' service -it rings you and plays back the message- and the
SMS service (it leaves an SMS alert message).  Queries to the operator
didn't yield a satisfying result, but to be fair, they didn't give me an SLA
on performance and timeliness, I was getting used to it being quite
immediate prompting an assumption on my part.

Another issue with voiceboxes is that they generally do not offer a method
to play back a message you've just left, so if the line is bad you won't
know the message (and return number) is next to useless for the recipient.

The RISK: don't rely on external facilities if the message is urgent, keep
trying.

Note: the SMS services, however, give good feedback on message receipt.
This could mean a small risk: someone can tell my phone has been switched on
and is within range of the system ;-)

2) Re: IMRSS and Open Mail Relay Scanning

Question: if IMRSS enters a company mail server into their list as 'open'
and other companies use this as 'spam relay block' source, what is the
exposure RISK to IMRSS for creating in effect a partial denial-of-service?
To leave a corporate mail server open for abuse is of course not a terribly
good idea, but entering a server in the list of doom without the target
companies' knowledge could IMO have legal consequences.  The planned
postmaster notification (maybe a with some time in between) is therefore a
good thing.

Leads to another question: how is the company going to communicate with
IMRSS?  I presume it won't be by e-mail unless IMRSS don't they use their own
list ;-).

3) Re: risk of using mobile phones in airplanes.

I've read this morning in the Hong Kong Standard of a plane that was found
30 degrees off course when they were about to land (I have to claim lack of
knowledge here: wouldn't this show up earlier?).  When researching they
found a mobile had been inadvertently left on by a passenger who was too
preoccupied with a family member being ill (the reason he was on that
flight) to check that his phone was off.  The passenger has been charged,
which must adds nicely to his worries.

The RISK: dependency on passengers to check their electronic gadgets/phones
to be switched off.  I would much rather see some form of detector being
developed, at least that would start a flight with all mobiles off.  It
would then only leave deliberate actions like the individual who continued
to use his phone despite requests to switch it off.

Peter A B Houppermans, PA Consulting Group  +44 (0)207 730 9000


Cell phones and aviation electronics (re: Fear of Flying)

Glenn Carroll <gcarroll@lmi.net>
Sun, 8 Aug 1999 11:52:13 -0700 (PDT)
Both the original "Fear of Flying" post and the follow-up have glided over
another RISK: the airlines have no effective way of controlling or checking
the state of cell phones or other portable electronics.  As a sometime
cellular user, I often forget that I have the thing with me, and I do enough
flying that I tend to doze through the safety announcements, including the
one which reminds passengers to "please turn off all cell phones, portable
electronics, etc".  Thus it isn't hard for a well-intentioned but forgetful
person to create this risk-y situation.  Lacking the means to find active
portable electronics, the airline can't do much about this, nor can they
prevent quietly malicious persons from deliberately doing the same.

Even non-forgetful people can inadvertently and unknowingly have their
portable electronics on: CD players generally have their buttons placed in
such a way that squeezing the case the right way will turn them on.  Mine
has a "lock" slider to prevent this from happening, but of course that's one
more thing has to remember, and not all CD players come so equipped.

If cell phones or other p.e.s were as dangerous as some people claim, one
might have expected a terrorist attack via this channel by now.  After all,
this would solve one of the difficult problems for the terrorist, which is
how to get the Harmful Device on board the aircraft.  Either there have been
no such attacks, or they have been so ineffective as to go unnoticed...


REVIEW: "Kerberos: A Network Authentication System", Brian Tung

Rob Slade <rslade@sprint.ca>
Mon, 9 Aug 1999 08:54:34 -0800
BKKRBROS.RVW   990715

"Kerberos: A Network Authentication System", Brian Tung, 1999,
0-201-37924-4, U$19.95/C$29.95
%A   Brian Tung
%C   P.O. Box 520, 26 Prince Andrew Place, Don Mills, Ontario M3C 2T8
%D   1999
%G   0-201-37924-4
%I   Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
%O   U$19.95/C$29.95 416-447-5101 fax: 416-443-0948 bkexpress@aw.com
%P   164 p.
%T   "Kerberos: A Network Authentication System"

Part one is a user guide to the Kerberos security tool, user being defined
as both end user and administrator.  Chapter one presents a rather weak
justification for Kerberos (based on the insecurity of e-mail) and some
quick contact information for obtaining it.  End user operations for
Kerberos are described, but not always clearly, and some questions are left
open.  (Does the user have any control over ticket expiry times?)  The
administrative functions, in chapter three, are weak in regard to
installation, but reasonable in terms of maintenance operations.  Chapter
four contains quick listings of the Kerberos API (Application Programming
Interface) calls, for those who want to build Kerberized programs.

Part two provides some background.  Chapter five is a good tutorial on
the concepts: if you are having trouble with chapters two and three, a
review of five will probably help a lot.  Differences in versions of
Kerberos are listed in chapter six.  A look at various related issues
in chapter seven includes a very decent discussion of public key
encryption.

For quick coverage of Kerberos, this makes a neat and handy package.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 1999   BKKRBROS.RVW   990715
rslade@vcn.bc.ca  rslade@sprint.ca  slade@victoria.tc.ca p1@canada.com
http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev    or    http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade


UPCOMING EVENT- USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM, 23-26 Aug 1999 in DC

Moun Chau <moun@usenix.ORG>
Tue, 10 Aug 1999 00:27:34 GMT
8TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM
23-26 August 1999
JW Marriott Hotel, Washington, D.C.
Sponsored by USENIX in Cooperation with the CERT Coordination Center

See the Program and register online at http://www.usenix.org/events/sec99

* Exchange ideas with the industry's top security insiders.
* Gain command of leading-edge tools and techniques at specifics-driven
  tutorials.
* Explore the latest advances in Internet security, intrusion
  detection, distributed systems, and applications of cryptography.

USENIX, the Advanced Computing Systems Association, is the international,
not-for-profit society made up of scientists, engineers, and system
administrators working on the cutting edge of systems and software. For
25 years USENIX conferences and workshops have emphasized quality exchange
of technical ideas unfettered by stodginess or commercialism.

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