The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 23 Issue 42

Saturday 19 June 2004

Contents

Whose Data Is It, Anyway?
Matt Silberstein
E-mail needs a makeover
NewsScan
India's outsourcing business in trouble
NewsScan
Autorun considered evil
Peter da Silva
Stuck between the 2G and 3G networks
Henry Skoglund
Verity K2 is data mining?
Aahz
HTML Mail-readers
Mike Albaugh
Re: Risks of believing in testing
David Crocker
Peter B. Ladkin
Fred Cohen
Re: Daft security questions
Brian Reynolds
Lou Katz
Antonomasia
British ATC slowdown
Peter B. Ladkin
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Whose Data Is It, Anyway?

<Matt Silberstein <matts2@ix.netcom.com>>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 14:13:19 -0400 (GMT-04:00)

Encrypt your data and deprive you beneficiaries.  *The New York Times* has
an interesting article on password protection on a deceased person's
computer. What will happen when biometrics become prevalent?

"When Tomm Purnell's uncle, Keith Cochran, died last year, Mr. Purnell's
mother received two of Mr. Cochran's computers. One of them, a laptop, is
password-protected, and even though Mr. Purnell considers himself somewhat
of a computer geek, "the really obvious passwords," he said, like the names
of Mr. Cochran's cats and combinations of his Social Security number, have
failed."

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/03/technology/circuits/03data.html?8dpc

For an additional risk further on we get this gem:

"Mr. Purnell said that some of his uncle's files are gone forever.
Mr. Cochran stored digital photos on two computers that used the Linux
operating system. The machines were given to his brothers, "who are Windows
guys, so they erased and reformatted them," Mr. Purnell said."

A little knowledge is a terrible thing.


E-mail needs a makeover

<"NewsScan" <newsscan@newsscan.com>>
Thu, 03 Jun 2004 08:41:40 -0700

Forget about spam -- even your "wanted" e-mail is clogging your in-box now,
right? E-mail is "broken," says Eric Hahn, former CTO of Netscape and
current CEO of antispam firm Proofpoint. "We need to make metaphoric
changes. The [file-folder] metaphor was designed back when we were talking
about getting five messages a day." Today, many folks receive 10 to 20 times
that number and filing each one just takes too much time.  "People hate
filing. They hate it in paper. They hate it in e-mail. Could you imagine
what it would be like to have to file Web pages just to get back to them?"
Hahn suggests that in addition to overhauling the filing function, software
developers should find a way to combine instant-messaging software with
e-mail software. "Doesn't it seem odd that IM is separate from e-mail? Why
are those conversations so fundamentally different?" he asks. Ben Gross, a
researcher at the University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign, says that in
addition to incorporating IM, e-mail software developers need to integrate
RSS readers into their products, so that users can view updates to a Web
page without having to download the whole Web page into a browser. Some
e-mail software developers are already experimenting with new approaches:
Microsoft's Outlook 2003 and Google's Gmail service include a "group by
conversation" feature that enables users to view related e-mails sent to and
from a single person.  [Wired.com 3 Jun 2004; NewsScan Daily, 3 June 2004]
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,63692,00.html


India's outsourcing business in trouble

<"NewsScan" <newsscan@newsscan.com>>
Tue, 15 Jun 2004 07:47:39 -0700

High labor attrition, poor infrastructure, and lack of data protection laws
could derail India's booming outsourcing industry, says Nandan Nilekani, the
CEO of Indian software giant Infosys Technologies. Noting that business
process outsourcing (BPO) is based on reputation, Nilekani has urged the
industry to deliver quality work: "Every year, about 70,000 jobs are added
and the main challenge is how to attract people. The challenge is also how
to retain the pool. It's a collective challenge. We require a holistic
approach to expand the pool and train people. The question here is how to
retain the manpower to deliver quality and value." Analysts say outsourcing
labor attrition rates vary 20-40% in some companies while at top firms it
averages at least 15%.  [*The Age*, 11 Jun 2004; NewsScan Daily, 15 June 2004]
  http://theage.com.au/articles/2004/06/10/1086749833478.html


Autorun considered evil (Re: Evron, RISKS-23.41)

<Peter da Silva <peter@abbnm.com>>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 16:58:28 -0500 (CDT)

Any device that requires an operating system to load and install a custom
driver on its say-so without verification or even alerting the user SHOULD
be disabled and tossed on the garbage-heap of history.

Autorun must not be the default behaviour for any hot-pluggable device,
media, class of devices, downloaded content, anything, anywhere. If there is
some hardware design specification that requires it, that design should be
abandoned immediately, and any device that requires it considered obsolete.

Who thought this was a good idea, and why weren't they on their meds?

This is of course a much bigger issue than USB. Apple's Internet-enabled
disk images, Microsoft's plethora of "active content" mechanisms, anyone's
autorun media... anything that isn't specifically requested by someone who
has verified authority for it (a locally logged in user, a network
administrator, ...) that can't be run in a failsafe sandbox must not be run
at all.


Stuck between the 2G and 3G networks

<"Henry Skoglund" <henry@tungware.com>>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 23:40:46 +0200

In May this year I purchased the new SonyEricsson Z1010 mobile phone here in
Sweden, and after replacing my old SIMcard for a new one, I can make
videocalls with it as well.  Provided you're in an area covered by the 3G
network, of course.  Turns out my particular residential area (Bromma, a
suburb of Stockholm) has only a spotty coverage at best, if I venture
outdoors I might obtain a 3G-network connection, but indoors all bets are
off.

The problem is that my Z1010 phone is optimistic and switches to the
3G-network ("Sweden 3G") at every opportunity it gets. And, in theory,
should gracefully revert back to my old 2G provider ("Telia") when outside
3G coverage.

But what happens instead is that, every time I return home from the city,
the telephone having merrily been connected to a good 3G-network all day,
finds itself in a non3G area and grudgingly switches back to Telia.  But
wait, there is a faint 3G signal, let's switch back to that network.  But
no, we lost it... Yes, you might guess what's happening, the phone gets
confused, instead of a connection the display reads "Only SOS calls
available".  And people calling me end up at my answering service.

If I then succeed in bringing the phone back online and dial my own mobile
number (this is a good old GSM network test, BTW), I mostly end up at my
answering service. No busy signal. Time to go down into the basement
(luckily out of 3G-reach) and reboot the phone there to get it properly
online.

When I called Telia customer service the other day to complain, a helpful
person told me that to fix this, I needed to upgrade the software in the
phone.  Because the current software has some early version bugs, it turns
out (!).

The risk here? This stuff has obviously only been tested in a lab, where the
3G-transmitter is either on or off. My home, barely in 3G-coverage, was
obviously not in the specifications...

P.S. Otherwise I like my new phone, I've downloaded some of my DV-camcorder
videos into it, makes a good show at the pub.


Verity K2 is data mining?

<Aahz <aahz@pythoncraft.com>>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 16:39:59 -0400

In RISKS-23.39, Barry Steinhardt refers to a GAO report about government use
of data mining that mentions Verity K2 Enterprise as one of the programs.  I
wonder what definition is being used for "data mining" that covers Verity?
I ask this as someone who first used Verity software in 1990 and worked for
Verity from 1994 to 1997; judging by what I see on Verity's Web site today,
the technology hasn't changed much.

Fundamentally, the Verity technology that's being used here is precisely
equivalent to Google's News Alerts: you specify a search that gets run
against a series of documents.  When a document matches, you get some kind
of feedback.  The only difference is that Verity's query language is
enormously more powerful and flexible than Google's, with more operators and
the ability to weight sub-queries with different strengths.  (It's fairly
common in heavy-duty Verity queries to end up with queries that have more
than fifty terms and operators.)

Obviously, Verity technology can add a lot of value to a data mining
operation by pre-categorizing data very precisely.  But I'm concerned
that labeling Verity as data mining software could lead to focusing in
the wrong direction, similar to the way it's important to differentiate
between viruses, trojan horses, and worms.

Aahz (aahz@pythoncraft.com)  http://www.pythoncraft.com/


HTML Mail-readers (Weinstein, RISKS-23.41)

<albaugh@spies.com>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 13:59:03 -0700 (PDT)

Lauren Weinstein makes the reasonable suggestion:

>  Use a text-based e-mail reader, not an html mail reader, for most mail.

If one does, and also periodically samples the Spam-bucket, one will see
that many spams (especially the fake mailer-daemon ones) start out by
chiding the reader to switch to an HTML mail-reader.  If the social
engineering has been done correctly, the user will do just that, to get the
promised benefit (e.g. error notification).

The risks of trusting a burglar to recommend a lock seem obvious to me, but
apparently are not.

Another suggestion, to turn off javascript, is similarly a good idea, but
runs afoul of some widely used software (Outlook Web Agent, Oracle Workflow,
...) that _require_ javascript to function. Oracle at least snarks at you
about it. OWA simply silently fails to work.

RISKS: Your boss (or IT) may require you to compromise the security of your
system, even if it's the company's network being put at risk.


Re: Risks of believing in testing (Cheng, RISKS-23.40)

<"David Crocker" <dcrocker@eschertech.com>>
Fri, 4 Jun 2004 08:05:18 +0100

Spencer Cheng wrote:

<< I have looked long and hard at proof of correctness in a previous job but
other than safety critical systems, the cost is difficult to justify.

That may be true of some techniques, but not all. We routinely generate
proof of correctness, even for non-critical software. The keys to making
proof of correctness practical are:

1. Use a notation that is designed to facilitate proof of correctness. This
unfortunately rules out most standard programming languages. Better results
are obtained by using languages designed for expressing the software
specification and some of the implementation details. The full
implementation can be generated in a conventional programming language (we
use C++) by a code generator.

2. Use automated reasoning (AR) to generate the proofs. This technology has
become practical at last due to advances in the theory of AR and
improvements in processor power. We are getting successful automated proof
rates of 95% to 100% depending on the problem domain, before we provide any
hints to the prover (normally this is done by way of extra assertions). On
our current commercial project we are getting 99.89%. So nearly all proof
failures indicate either incomplete specifications or bugs.

<< In addition, proof of correctness is not very useful if the implementation
changes even slightly.

Using AR, this is not a big problem - just re-run the proof generator. Ditto
when the specification changes and the implementation is adjusted to suit.

<< A complete and optimal set of black box test cases *IS* the S/W contract
since it defines the semantics. Any implementation changes that changes
interface behaviour would fail the black box tests.  <<

I don't see how a set of black box test cases can be known to be complete,
unless the system has no internal state and the set includes all possible
combinations of inputs. Even if the system itself has no state variables
(i.e.  it just computes an output for some inputs), unless you test with all
possible inputs, you don't know that the output will always be correct. The
programmer might have "optimised" the calculation for certain values of the
input variables (i.e. defined a different path in the program), and the
optimisation may generate incorrect results. How would you have defined a
"complete and optimal" set of test cases for IEEE double-precision floating
point division, such that the Pentium FP DIV bug would have been found,
other than by testing with all 2^128 possible inputs?

If the system has a complex internal state, it is even harder to devise good
test data, unless the software provides an interface to examine the state.
Consider e.g. a word processor with an "undo" button which is good for
undoing the last 100 changes you made to the document since opening it. How
do you devise a "complete and optimal" set of test data for correct
operation of that button? OTOH it is not difficult to formally specify.

BTW I'm not against testing - until we have provably-correct compilers,
linkers, provers, code generators and hardware, testing will still be needed
even when correctness proofs are produced.

Dr. David Crocker  http://www.eschertech.com
Consultancy & contracting for dependable software development


Re: Risks of believing in testing (Cheng, RISKS-23.40)

<"Peter B. Ladkin" <ladkin@rvs.uni-bielefeld.de>>
Sat, 05 Jun 2004 09:25:44 +0200

While I might share Spencer Cheng's enthusiasm for properly-designed tests,
I regret that some claims he seems to be making exceed the known
mathematical limits of the efficacy of testing.

Basic observations by Littlewood and Strigini (Bayesian) and Butler and
Finelli (frequentist) in the 1990's established the limits of testing, at
least for systems whose failure rates must be lower than one failure in a
million hours of operation. Many safety-critical systems, for example, have
requirements for failure rates that are up to three orders of magnitude
lower than this. Those unfamiliar with this literature may find it easily on
the WWW.

It is conceivable (not necessarily practical or even possible, but
conceivable) that requirements on systems which may fail once in ten
thousand to one-hundred thousand hours could somehow be reduced to a
requirement on results from specific tests, as Cheng suggests by his
startling phrase "A complete and optimal set of black box test cases
*IS* the S/W contract since it defines the semantics." However, for
systems whose failure rates are required to be lower than this, such a
suggestion regrettably contradicts established science.

Peter B. Ladkin, University of Bielefeld, Germany
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de

  [Miscorrection uncorrected in archives.  PGN]


Risks of believing in testing (Cheng, RISKS-23.41)

<Fred Cohen <fred.cohen@all.net>>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 22:42:59 -0700 (PDT)

There are many problems with proof of correctness - perhaps the biggest one
being that "correctness" may not be the property of interest to the task at
hand.  For example, I would like to prove that programs designed to run
forever don't stop.  And I would like to prove that the green lights will
not be on in non-parallel directions at traffic lights.  And I would like to
prove that my programs properly respond to all error conditions (into known
and safe failure modes).  None of these have to do with program correctness
- per se.

> I have become a firm believer over the years in proper black box
> testing since -

Except that there are too many states.  So you can't do much of a test.
This is a big problem for me in forensics cases.  I just wrote a report in
such a case in which I would love to have been able to say that some piece
of data means some particular thing, but I cannot do so because I cannot
know for certain that that is the only thing the data represents in the
particular circumstance without either (1) access to the source code, or (2)
the ability to reverse engineer it.  The former is protected by copyright
and the latter prohibited by the DMCA.  So it will remain a question and not
an answer for the court system charged with determining the freedom or
incarceration of a defendant.

> 1) it is the only way I know to establish that mythical S/W contract
  that people have been talking about for the last 20 years.

Huh?

> 2) [...] Any implementation changes that changes interface behaviour would
  fail the black box tests.

Not hardly.  There are other behaviors of programs than "interface"
behavior unless you are very careful about the definition of interface.
How do I black box test for performance-related covert channels?

> 3) Requirement traceability can be satisfied by tracing the requirement
> to the interface specification and onward to the test cases.

And what interface specifications are those? Most products on the market
today don't have such things.  And to the extent that they do, they only
partially specify real behavior.  Can a complete specification be
written? I don't think so.

Fred Cohen - http://all.net/ - fc at all.net - fc at unhca.com - 925-454-0171
Fred Cohen & Associates	- University of New Haven - Security Posture


Re: Daft security questions (Chard, RISKS-23.40)

<Brian Reynolds <bfr@murphy.com>>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 16:15:48 -0400

After all, this is a method for identifying you, not a method for acquiring
correct answers.

When I am forced to use something like this (or the ubiquitous "State your
mother's maiden name") I make sure to give answers that have no relation to
the question asked (even when I'm also asked to provide the question).

This leads to the further problem of remembering which non-sense answer goes
with which (non-sense) security system, but at least others would have a
harder time guessing my answers based on knowledge about me.  The only time
there is a problem is when some over zealous programmer tries to enforce
formatting on the answer (e.g., requiring a valid date in answer to the
example "Memorable date" question).

Brian Reynolds  bfr@murphy.com  (212)618-0999


Re: Daft security questions (Chard, RISKS-23.40)

<Lou Katz <lou@metron.com>>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 14:31:55 -0700

The flaw in the poster's reasoning is to answer the 'question' correctly.
Why? What you have here, is in effect, another password. The system
collecting your 'answers' cannot verify their correctness. Why not use other
strings? 'f7u00Hngq' is just as good an answer as 'Boston' to the first
question, etc.

One should ask, when presented with a question or a blank to fill out:
a: Do I really have to fill this out at all? Why does the asker need to
   know this information?
b: If (a) is true, then is there a legal requirement for truthfulness?

Wherever possible, don't answer the questions. Otherwise generate random
answers and write them down, if you think you will ever need to refer to
them again. If your wallet is lost or stolen and contains such gibberish,
the correct association with where they might be needed is in your
brain and hard to deduce.

"Your mother's maiden name" need not be a name, need not have a female
association. I have found that 'blue-green algae' or 'discombustable'
work equally well.


Re: Daft security questions (Chard, RISKS-23.40)

<ant@notatla.org.uk (Antonomasia)>
Thu, 3 Jun 2004 23:17:15 +0100 (BST)

A daft answer fits a daft question.  Your memorable place might be "Ronnie
Barker"; your memorable date might be "Paris Hilton" and your mother's
maiden name might be "355/113".  It's really a matter of how well you can
remember these.

Carl Ellison has suggested (I think accurately) that events of early
childhood are the ones you won't forget.  How you make daft answers from
that is the problem each user needs to solve in his own way.


British ATC slowdown (Weber-Wulff, RISKS-23.41)

<"Peter B. Ladkin" <ladkin@rvs.uni-bielefeld.de>>
Mon, 07 Jun 2004 17:59:27 +0200

Here is some background information to the British ATC slowdown
incident on 3 June 2004 reported by Debora Weber-Wulff (Risks 23.31).

The Tageschau report appears to confuse NATS, which is the company
called National Air Traffic Services, which runs ATC in Britain,
with NAS, the National Airspace System, located at West Drayton,
which is a couple of miles from Heathrow.

I believe what happened is that Swanwick went to Manual Mode. That
is Stage 2 of a four-stage graceful degradation of air traffic control
(see below). Let me explain what that means, and what it entails.

Swanwick is a place and a facility. It is not near Heathrow (by English
standards of "near"), but on the south coast near Southampton. The London
Area Control Centre (LACC) is the main system there, but there are others.
I shall refer to LACC below because that is the system involved. LACC
controls the London Flight Information Region (FIR), which extends from
borders with continental airspace up to the Scottish border. The LACC
system is relatively new, having come on-line in January 2002 after a
ten-year development (planned: 4 years.Search the Risks archives for
"NERC").

NAS is at least 30 years old. It has been rehosted, so I think we can
probably guess that the Tageschau also confused the system with the kit
that runs the system.

NAS provides the master flight data planning for British airspace. This
includes flight plans, predicted tracks and control sector boundary
crossings for aircraft in the airspace system. I do not know if
the primary and secondary radar data normally used by LACC comes
through NAS as well, or whether LACC in normal mode generates its own
radar data. In any case, LACC does have a radar data feed from its own
direct connection with RadNet, which distributes that data from the
radars throughout the ATC system. "Radar data" here means current 2-D
position, "squawk" code (a 4-octal-digit temporary ID assigned dynamically
by ATC), and aircraft pressure altitude.

Now, flight planning, and "handoffs" between sector controllers as aircraft
cross sector boundaries, using the info on the "flight data strips", is a
very important part of air traffic management. Wendy Mackay studied this in
Paris with the French controllers, and found that the rituals involved with
handing off and passing data strips were crucial to successful operations,
which might help to explain why attempts to move to automatic systems for
flight data passing and handoffs have often failed (Is Paper Safer? The
Role of Paper Flight Strips in Air Traffic Control, ACM TOCHI 6(4):311-40,
Dec. 1999).

LACC does have a partly automated and predictive system to aid controllers
with passing the flight data and handing off (autocoordination). When NAS
goes down, most of the predictive data feed goes away. The data on the
screen at Swanwick starts to "age", and the colors start to change to
indicate how old the data is. Controllers can work with aging data up to a
certain point, but then it would become misleading and ultimately
dangerous. There has to be a point at which a decision is made to ignore
the aging data and perform the flight planning locally in LACC. This point
is well-defined. At this point, LACC turns autocoordination off and starts
manual coordination, called Manual Mode.

In Manual Mode, the controllers at LACC work with their radar data and
their voice contact only. They have lost automatic track and handoff
prediction, and they have to perform this function explicitly using the
old-style handoff routines between sector controllers. This is
resource-intensive, as is the switch to Manual Mode itself.

When LACC switches to Manual Mode, they also impose flow control
to conform with the resources now available. Inter alia, continental
controllers with flights whose destination lies within or which are to
transit the London FIR and which are not yet airborne are to hold those
flights on the ground. Traffic already in the air continues, but is
controlled to conform with the reduced flow into and in the London FIR
(lots of holding!). Manual mode is intense work for the LACC controllers,
and it continues until
* NAS comes back up (obviously!), and
* the traffic flow has reduced to a stable maintainable level, and
* the controllers are rested enough to perform the reversion
    to the NAS flight-planning-data feed (which is itself a non-trivial
    operation akin in resource consumption to the Manual Mode change), and
* somebody decides everybody's up for it.

So, no matter how quickly NAS comes back up, once the decision is made to
go to Manual Mode, LACC is there for a while. There seems to me to be no
obvious way around this feature.

The NAS has a failure-recovery strategy which is reasonably effective,
considering when it was designed, and many NAS failures are recovered
without LACC having to go into Manual Mode. It is moderately
loosely-coupled.

So there is graceful degradation. First stage: NAS failures are recovered
without LACC noticing. Second stage: LACC goes to Manual Mode, which means
it works as a typical control center usually does, but has to impose flow
control because there is simply too much traffic to work in the traditional
way. Third stage: if LACC loses its secondary radar data things get hairier
(primary returns, that is, radar bounces off the airplane without
transponder data, provide only two-dimensional positional data, and
that not as accurately). Fourth stage: if all radar data is lost,
controllers revert to voice-only. Fifth stage: there isn't one; voice-only
does not fail, on pain of going to bed without its supper. The whole
process is quite well layered.

So what about replacing NAS? Well, sure, but recall it is a system that
works, and has done for 30 years. And recall that attempts to replace
old systems with newer ones, such as Swanwick LACC replacing the area
control function of LATCC at West Drayton, often end in tears (op. cit.).
So the people responsible for replacing NAS would be wise to proceed
vveeeerrrry carefully.

I thank Martyn Thomas for catching myriad mistakes in an earlier version of
this note.  Its accuracy is largely owing to him, and remaining inaccuracy
still to me.  He also pointed out to me NATS's statement on the slowdown, at
  http://www.nats.co.uk/news/news_stories/2004_06_03.html

Peter B. Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de

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