The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 23 Issue 52

Thurs 9 September 2004

Contents

Shutting the train door before the commuter has bolted?
Michael Bacon
Illinois Secretary of State computer outage
J H Haynes
Overcomputerization enlightenment
Joseph A. Dellinger
More ID theft, via laptop
David Lesher
Missouri vote-by-fax
PGN
E-voting in Nevada
NewsScan
Diebold GEMS central tabulator contains a stunning security hole
Bev Harris via EEkid
Using a paper trail to verify electronic voting machine results
Diomidis Spinellis
Election verification in Venezuela
Peter B. Ladkin
ATMs offer too much information
Brendan Kehoe
Risk of using open forums for disaster recovery
Espen Andersen
Re: NASA Spirit nearly done in by DOS
Gene S. Berkowitz
REVIEW: "Security Assessment", Greg Miles et al.
Rob Slade
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Shutting the train door before the commuter has bolted?

<"Michael \(Streaky\) Bacon" <himself@streaky-bacon.co.uk>>
Sun, 5 Sep 2004 12:16:15 +0100

There are reports in today's UK press (echoing previous reports) that
"Southern" (New Southern Railway Ltd - a railway operator around London,
England) is having problems with the doors in its new, multi-million (Pounds
Sterling), trains.  In some cases these will not open even when the train is
stopped at a platform.  One train is reported to have trapped its passengers
inside for 45 minutes.

It appears that the new trains are equipped with a GPS-based system to
determine whether the train is stopped at a platform or not and whether the
platform is long enough to allow (all) the doors to be opened.  If the
system does not determine this, the doors will not open.  There have been a
number of accounts of the system failing to detect the GPS signal and
reports too that the received signal has overloaded the system.  The problem
has been compounded by some drivers' inexperience of the new trains leading
to their inability to determine promptly how to open the doors manually.

Quoting a spokesperson for Southern, "[The trains] have a selective door
opening system on board which takes a combination of GPS satellite signals
to tell the train exactly which station it is located at and then ensure
only the number of doors that are accommodated on the platform are opened.
[ ... ]  Sometimes we have had problems with the train not locating itself
and thus not opening the doors at all."

Apparently, in addition, the system sometimes does not recognise that the
train has stopped at a longer platform (than originally scheduled) and the
system has to be "reprogrammed" by the driver before the train can proceed.

Well, I never!  The train has a driver, but a complex technology-based
system is installed to open the doors.  The driver can override the system,
but doesn't know how to - but has been instructed how to reprogram certain
parameters into the computer.

The RISKS are too obvious and too numerous to mention, but isn't this so
typical of many designs today?  Throw out the simple, well-tried and working
system and introduce a complex, untried and liable-to-failure system.  One
can assume that someone thought this was a safety feature, but is this a
"fail-safe" system?

One would have assumed that the designers would have taken cognisance of the
fiasco on the (London's) Docklands Light Railway when the inaugural train
carrying Her Majesty the Queen failed to align properly (by a few inches,
IIRC) at one station and the system locked her inside the carriage ... but
that's clearly a naive assumption!


Illinois Secretary of State computer outage

<jhhaynes@earthlink.net>
Fri, 3 Sep 2004 12:13:58 -0500 (CDT)

A computer glitch shut down computers for more than an hour at all 136
secretary of state offices in Illinois beginning at 9:30am on 2 Sep 2004.
This delayed people who were trying to obtain driver's licenses, renew
registrations, or conduct other business -- although those with preprinted
renewal forms were able to be helped.  [Source: *Chicago Tribune*, 3 Sep
2004; PGN-ed]


Overcomputerization enlightenment

<"Joseph A. Dellinger" <geojoe@freeusp.org>>
Tue, 31 Aug 2004 22:56:47 -0500

I just went to set up our conference room for a meeting tomorrow morning. I
had to blunder around in the dark, at first. The light switches have been
replaced by a computerized lighting control. Turning on the lights requires
finding the control, selecting the appropriate menu, and then selecting the
appropriate item to turn on the room lights. Once I'd done that, I was able
to see that the computer that turns the room projectors on and off needed
urgent virus updates run on it. Thankfully, nobody has thought to
computerize the toilets yet. :-)

  [Nobody?  See RISKS-21.35, 22.73, and 23.20, for example.
  It may be a slippery slope, but it's happening!  PGN]


More ID theft, via laptop

<David Lesher <wb8foz@nrk.com>>
Fri, 3 Sep 2004 11:41:43 -0400 (EDT)

Calif. Schools Warned of Identity Theft, Associated Press, 2 Sep 2004
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A57539-2004Sep2?language=printer

California university officials have warned nearly
600,000 students and faculty that they might be exposed to identity
theft following incidents where computer hard drives loaded with
their private information were lost or hacked into.

Since January, at least 580,000 people who had personal information about
them stored in university computers received warnings they might be at risk.

The latest instance of missing equipment occurred in June at California
State University, San Marcos.  An auditor lost a small external hard drive
for a laptop computer. Personal data, including names, addresses, Social
Security numbers and other identifiers for 23,500 students, faculty and
staff in the California State University system were contained on the
missing hard drive.

At the University of California, San Diego, and San Diego State University,
hackers broke into computers and obtained access to files of personal data
for more than 500,000 current or former students, applicants, staff, faculty
and alumni.  Officials from the Cal State system and UC San Diego said they
have no evidence any personal data were stolen.  At the University of
California, Los Angeles, a stolen laptop in June led officials to notify as
many as 145,000 blood donors that their data might be in the open.

A California law requiring people be notified when they might be exposed to
identity theft took effect in July 2003. Officials say that might explain
the rash of notices.  "There's no reason to assume that suddenly in July
2003 all these computer security breaches started occurring," said Joanne
McNabb of the Office of Privacy Protection in the California Department of
Consumer Affairs. "It's just that we know about them now, when we didn't
hear before."  ....

 = ================

And yet, most schools still try and require students to furnish
SSN's to register. I've never once seen a good reason for it,
and in fact, they regularly furnish "shadow numbers" for foreign
students, and upon request, others.

And why is this "auditor" carrying the data around at all?

As for blood donations; the Red Cross is regularly crying for more
donors. Wonder how many others, like me, refuse because they started
demanding SSN's?


Missouri vote-by-fax

<"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>>
Tue, 31 Aug 2004 11:10:33 PDT

Missouri's Secretary of State Matt Blunt (who also happens to be a candidate
for the Governor of Missouri in the November election) has announced plans
to allow Missouri voters in the military to send in their ballots by
unencrypted e-mail.  A supposedly trusted third party (Omega Technologies)
will handle the unencrypted ballots and redistribute them to the appropriate
ballot counters.  Apparently North Dakota is also contemplating a similar
scheme.  Those voters will have to sign a waiver acknowledging that their
votes need not be kept secret.  I suspect regular RISKS readers will be (1)
astounded, (2) horrified, and (3) concerned that certain e-mail messages
could be altered or "accidentally" lost, (4) concerned that the acknowledged
loss of privacy might be used to coerce votes or prompt vote selling, (5)
etc.  There are reportedly at least six million eligible overseas voters who
might wish to have the instant satisfaction in believing that their votes
might be counted, but there are also at least six million votes that might
thereby be subject to compromise.

  [This story may have even more legs than the many on electronic voting
  systems.  For example, see *The New York Times* editorial,
  The Pentagon's Troubling Role, 31 Aug 2004.]


E-voting in Nevada

<"NewsScan" <newsscan@newsscan.com>>
Wed, 08 Sep 2004 07:36:55 -0700

Nevada voters have become the first in the nation to cast ballots in a
statewide election using computers that produced printed paper records of
electronic ballots. "Knock on wood, so far things have been working
flawlessly," said Secretary of State Dean Heller. Nevada's $9.3 million
voting system includes more than 2,600 computers and printers deployed in
every county. The system, developed by California-based Sequoia Voting
Systems, aims to address concerns that paperless touchscreen votes cannot be
properly audited or recounted. "From what I've seen, voters seem to enjoy
the experience," says DeForest B. Soaries Jr., chairman of the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission. "There hasn't been frustration or confusion."
[AP/*USA Today*, 8 Sep 2004; NewsScan Daily, 8 Sep 2004]
<http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/evoting/2004-09-08-nv-evote-system_x.htm


<EEkid@aol.com>
Tue, 31 Aug 2004 17:48:10 -0400 (EDT)

  [From Dave Farber's IP distribution, excerpted for RISKS by PGN]

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

Consumer Report Part 1: Look at this -- the Diebold GEMS central tabulator
contains a stunning security hole

Submitted by Bev Harris on Thu, 08/26/2004 - 11:43. Investigations
Issue: Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator --
1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million votes
at a time.

By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of votes is
created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no longer matches the
correct votes. The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus
vote set. It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a
single location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully
mitigate the risks.

This program is not "stupidity" or sloppiness. It was designed and tested
over a series of a dozen version adjustments.

Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS
1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told you
about this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is tampered
with. Find out for yourself if you have this problem: Black Box Voting will
be happy to walk you through a diagnostic procedure over the phone. E-mail
Bev Harris or Andy Stephenson to set up a time to do this.  [...]

Full item archived at
  http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/


Using a paper trail to verify electronic voting machine results

<Diomidis Spinellis <dds@aueb.gr>>
Thu, 09 Sep 2004 11:49:30 +0300

*The Economist* (4-10 Sep 2004) has an interesting article covering the
verification of Venezuela's referendum on the recall of President Hugo
Chavez ("What really happened in Venezuela?", pp. 52-54).  The article is
written by Jennifer McCoy who directed the Carter Center's observer mission
in Venezuela.

Two separate tests were used to verify the transmission of the results from
the polling stations to the Venezuela National Election Council (CNE)
headquarters and the tabulation of the results by the CNE's computers.  Note
that these tests have nothing to do with the electronic voting machines,
they cover other elements of the election system that could also be
manipulated.

The verification of the electronic voting machine results was performed
using paper ballots that the machines printed and the voters inspected
before depositing in a ballot box.  According to McCoy, the existence of
this paper trail allowed the observers to verify what happened "within the
black box of the voting machines".  Two audits were performed on these paper
ballots: a half-completed immediate "hot audit", and a second audit three
days after the election.  Interestingly, the observers also covered the
possibility of someone having the machines reprogrammed to produce new paper
ballots matching the results and inserting them into the ballot boxes.
Specifically, observers were placed in the military garrisons where the
ballot boxes were kept, before drawing the random sample of the voting
machines to be audited.

I can see two aspects of this story that will interest RISKS readers.  First
of all, the successful use of the electronic voting machine paper trail to
verify a crucial element of the election process.  Secondly, the fact that
the mere existence of a paper trail does not in itself guarantee fair, or
even verifiable, election results.  The election process is a complex
system; its auditing must take into consideration all elements of the
system.  In this case the Carter Center had been mediating in Venezuela for
two years, and all tests and observer accessibility requirements were
planned in advance.

The complete article is available on-line
  http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3157671
More information, including the audit of the results, can be found on
the Carter Center's Web site http://www.cartercenter.org/doc1690.htm

Diomidis Spinellis - http://www.dmst.aueb.gr/dds
Athens University of Economics and Business


Election verification in Venezuela

<"Peter B. Ladkin" <ladkin@rvs.uni-bielefeld.de>>
Thu, 09 Sep 2004 10:04:36 +0200

  [A second report on the same article, different enough for inclusion.  PGN]

*The Economist*, 4-10 Sep 2004, contains an article by Jennifer McCoy, who
directed the Carter Center's observer mission during the Venezuelan
election.

According to Ms. McCoy, the opposition, who lost the election, contested the
results based on three phenomena. The second was that "there was a pattern
of polling stations where several electronic voting machines returned an
identical result, in what looked like a pre-programmed "cap" on the number
of opposition votes."

The Carter Center planned three tests of the electronic voting system.
First, their observers at a random sample of polling stations called in
results to mission headquarters, so they could be checked against the
official results transmitted from the machines to the National Election
Council (CNE). Second, they drew a larger sample of poll results from those
received at CNE headquarters, to test the accuracy of tabulation by CNE
computers. But as McCoy says, "missing from those tests was what happened
within the black box of the voting machines." They approached that issue as
follows.

The voting machines had a paper trail. The machines printed a record for the
voter of hisher vote, and after inspection were deposited by himher in a
cardboard ballot box. The Carter Center was able to perform a "hot audit" of
about 1% of the machines, but only managed halfway to complete it.  They
proposed and completed a second audit three days after the vote.  The audit
was suitably blind and insulated from manipulation (McCoy gives the
details), and verified in a practical manner that the machines had
accurately reported results. The identical results from some machines fell
within the range of probability, as shown by Stanford University
statistician Jonathan Taylor.

McCoy suggests that cooperation from the CNE was less than perfect, but
largely harmed itself: "the vote itself was secret and free, but the CNE's
lack of openness, last-minute changes and internal divisions harmed public
confidence in that vital institution both before and after the vote." She
suggests that in general Venezuelans have become more cynical towards
elections and that it will take a "huge effort by both sides to restore
trust in this fundamental democratic right before next month's election for
governors and mayors."

It appears to have been essential to the efforts to verify the accuracy of
the election that the voting machines generated a paper trail in a specific
manner. One imagines from McCoy's comments that without the successful
effort to verify the results of the machine voting through that trail, any
faith in the democratic process could well have been irretrievably lost
during this election. I worry that North America and Europe might suffer a
similar loss of faith, over a longer time period, unless similar effective
backups, and verifications, are required for electronic voting methods in
our supposedly more mature democracies.  For motives for manipulation are
just as strong no matter where one lives, and no country anywhere lacks
people who rate voting accuracy less important than obtaining their favored
result.

Peter B. Ladkin, University of Bielefeld, Germany
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de


ATMs offer too much information

<Brendan Kehoe <brendan@zen.org>>
Wed, 1 Sep 2004 09:18:03 +0100

At a bank recently I watched someone use the ATM to pay their Mastercard
bill.  Since they weren't making an effort to be very close to the screen, I
was able to watch as they went through the menu choices. Then onto the
screen popped their credit card number: all 16 digits of it, large and
readable from a few feet away.

The customer went on to continue the transaction, but it mystified me that
the bank saw it necessary to display the entire number. Even if you've got
multiple cards, it would seem to me that only the last four digits, perhaps,
are what a customer would need to make sure they're paying off the card they
intended.

Right now, the design lets anyone who can see the screen a brief view of the
number---in my case approximately 5 seconds.  The biggest risk was possibly
the most threatening: the number was certainly there long enough for someone
talented in number memorization to walk away with it.

Brendan Kehoe <brendan@zen.org>  http://www.zen.org/~brendan/

  [Don't forget the ease of digital cameras, long lenses, etc.  PGN]


Risk of using open forums for disaster recovery

<Espen Andersen <self@espen.com>>
Thu, 09 Sep 2004 16:28:21 +0200

Dan Bricklin's elegant essay on the lessons for system design and use of
on-line and other information sources
  http://www.bricklin.com/learningfromaccidents.htm
is very informative and makes some excellent points around the ability and
availability of the general public as a participant in disaster recovery.
It nicely validates what every IT prophet has been saying, in one form or
another, since the early 90s: Increases in communications and information
processing capability will lead to more consumption of that resource,
enabling organizations to quickly respond to outside changes -- indeed of
"spontaneous" organizations to quickly form to address issues.  Dan makes
some great points around what this means for systems and component design.

However, there is one problem with using open tools, such as RSS feeds,
blogs, wikis and open conference calls: Their very openness makes them a
path for a future terrorist. A group of terrorists wanting to do something
akin to the 9/11 action could now learn from what happened then, and include
a number of on-line participants with a role in spreading misinformation,
increasing fear and diverting resources.  There were instances of
misinformation during 9/11 -- I remember news items about a carful of bombs
being stopped on some bridge in New York for instance -- and the news
channels normally apply some form of fact-checking.  While the Wikipedia
model works great when there is time -- and people check changes against a
contributor's past behavior, I think we should be careful with too much
openness in a time-pressured situation. Some form of validation needs to be
in place.

Espen Andersen (self@espen.com), Norwegian School of Management (www.bi.no)
www.espen.com, +47 6755 7177; The Concours Group www.concoursgroup.com


Re: NASA Spirit nearly done in by DOS (RISKS-23.51)

<"Gene S. Berkowitz" <gene.berkowitz@comcast.net>>
Wed, 01 Sep 2004 22:54:06 -0400

..and as usual, Wired gets the story sideways.

The file system used is a FAT (File Allocation Table) system that was
popularized by MS-DOS.  The rovers use VxWorks as their operating system; a
FAT-compatible file system is provided with VxWorks, but is not the only
option.  The FAT system is a notoriously bad choice for use with Flash
memory devices, because any changes to the files requires an update to the
table.  This would quickly wear out the flash sectors where the FAT is
stored.  For this reason, the FAT and directory structure is copied to RAM,
changes are made there, and at some point the updated FAT and directory are
written back to Flash.  The fact is, the rover filesystems contained
hundreds of files from the flight portion of the mission; these files were
not deleted, resulting in a directory that grew too large for available RAM.
Regardless, the directory never shrinks; the directory entry for a deleted
file is simply marked with a special character, and its chain of FAT entries
are marked as available.

This was common knowledge circa 1985, and made Peter Norton a rich man, for his
"discovery" that the file was never truly deleted at all...


REVIEW: "Security Assessment", Greg Miles et al.

<Rob Slade <rslade@sprint.ca>>
Thu, 12 Aug 2004 08:22:47 -0800

BKSACSNI.RVW   20040721

"Security Assessment", Greg Miles et al., 2004, 1-932266-96-8,
U$69.95/C$89.95
%A   Greg Miles gmiles@securityhorizon.com
%A   Russ Rogers rrogers@securityhorizon.com
%A   Ed Fuller
%A   Matthew Paul Hoagberg
%A   Ted Dykstra
%C   800 Hingham Street, Rockland, MA   02370
%D   2004
%G   1-932266-96-8
%I   Syngress Media, Inc.
%O   U$69.95/C$89.95 781-681-5151 fax: 781-681-3585 www.syngress.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1932266968/robsladesinterne
  http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1932266968/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/1932266968/robsladesin03-20
%P   429 p.
%T   "Security Assessment: Case Studies for Implementing the NSA IAM"

The introduction tries to explain the NSA (National Security Agency) IAM
(Information Assurance Methodology), but is so heavily larded with
(management) buzzwords that no clear concept emerges.  The indications are
that the book is primarily aimed at those who have taken one of the IAM
courses, although there is an explicit statement that the material can be
used by untrained professionals and also by the "customers" who are
undergoing an assessment.

Chapter one describes IAM in words that make it seem very similar to such
tools as CoBIT (ISACA's Control Objectives for Information Technology tool),
ISO 17799, and the NIST (the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology) self-assessment guide.  However, almost all of the chapter is
devoted to a promotion of sharp negotiation of the scope of an IAM contract,
from the vendor perspective.  Chapter two reiterates the need to control
customer expectations and define contract objectives.  (There is more
jargon, and also the use of idiosyncratic and undefined acronyms like PASV
[Pre-Assessment Site Visit].)  The Organizational Information Criticality
Matrix (OICM) described in chapter three is a kind of simplistic business
impact analysis.  In chapter four, system information criticality and the
System Criticality Matrix (SCM) are said to be more detailed than the OICM.
Defining system boundaries is acknowledged to be difficult, but neither the
explanation nor the examples used are of any help in clarifying the issue.
Both the text and the tables used in the "case study" are extremely
confusing in regard to the relation between entries in the OICM and the SCM.

The system security environment, described in chapter five, is what most
people would know as corporate culture: the general attitudes and behaviours
common to an institution.  The book suggests finding and using the CONOPS
(concept of operations) documentation while admitting that it may not be
found in most commercial enterprises.  (The authors don't explain that this
is basically identical to the common policy and procedures manuals, although
they do eventually get around to mentioning these texts.)  The TAP
(Technical Assessment Plan) is actually just a specific format for a
detailed contract, so we have to go through all of that type of editorial
comment again, without really getting much information about the recommended
TAP structure.  Chapter seven involves the assessment itself, and generally
deals with administrative details--and making sure that the customer does
not modify the scope of the contract.  The eighteen basic information
security models get listed, although this seems to be almost an
afterthought, rather than the core of the IAM itself.  Findings, the report
of the assessment results, are described in chapter eight.  A sixteen page
example does little more than provide a format.  The close out report, in
chapter nine, is a final sales meeting with the customer.  The final report
is given in a different, and more general, format in chapter ten.  Cleanup
work and followup sales of consulting are discussed in chapter eleven.

The constant repetition of very basic ideas and the turgid and
buzzword-laden text make this work far longer than is justified by the
information provided.  In addition, the extreme emphasis on the viewpoint of
a vendor trying to sell a contract (and protect himself from doing any
unbillable work) is a severe limitation on the audience for this tome.
Essential components of the IAM model and process do not seem to hold any
central place in the book, and the reader discovers them almost by accident,
and despite of the writing rather than because of it.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 2004   BKSACSNI.RVW   20040721
rslade@vcn.bc.ca      slade@victoria.tc.ca      rslade@sun.soci.niu.edu
http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev    or    http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade

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