What, in this day and age, would cause a complete more-than-5-hour outage of an system mission critical for an airline? According to AP and Reuters: "Computer Glitch Delays United Air Flights In US, 3 Jan 2006 United Airlines' domestic flights were delayed up to 90 minutes Tuesday night because of an outage in the computer system controlling United's check-ins and reservations, which went down for about five hours around 5 p.m. CST Wednesday. Passengers were checked manually, and flights were delayed up to 90 minutes. [PGN-ed] But according to me, who was at LAX yesterday trying to get to Oakland at 5pm on their one-and-only flight, the outage was complete and system-wide. * No self-check-in kiosks working, reservationists answering the phone with "our computers are still down", which meant every queue had more than 500 people in it, spilling out on the sidewalk outside the terminal, and they were using "the manual procedure". the people close to the head of the queue had been waiting for more than two hours, they said, and they dispensed with the special queues for premier or 1k, just to spread the pain equally. * They weren't calling out specific flights to try to fill them. * They had most of the check-in desks empty. Obviously they don't have enough people trained in the manual procedure to alleviate the bottleneck. * The woman working the lines (with a megaphone) was apologetic, but wouldn't answer questions, not even frequently asked questions which did not have to with individual problems, such as "if I miss my last flight will you provide a hotel? or is my ticket now refundable if I fly another carrier? * some reports are they were flying planes half-empty because people couldn't get to the gates. of course, they weren't announcing how long they were holding flights to try to board them. * TSA, not known for their flexibility, was not allowing people to go to the gates directly with a boarding pass. Even an e-ticket receipt with a seat assignment wouldn't get you there. United stock is down 2% today, trading at around a buck a share. their earnings are -$43 per share at the moment. I'll bet this was an expensive failure. (As for me, I scooted right over to Southwest, and got out only 1.5 hours later, but buying a one-way last minute ticket guarantees you'll get the dreaded four ssss "special screening" on your boarding pass.) [IP Archives: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/]
See details in http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10663270/?GT1=7538 . (I think there was a similar report on RISKS a few years back, that time about a dog). [Yes. For example, The risks of Canadian Poodles using 911, RISKS-15.70. PGN]<corrected in archive>
The RISKS archives include several cases of prisoners being erroneously released by errant computer systems. This might be the first case of a system that only pretended to release them. CNN reports at http://us.cnn.com/2005/LAW/12/31/inmate.scare.ap/index.html that an automated notification system at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction telephoned about 3,000 people the day before New Year's Eve to inform them of the recent release of a prisoner that had victimized them or a family member. Unfortunately - or fortunately, depending on how charitable you are - that wasn't the truth. The prisoners had not been released but were listed in a file accidentally sent to the contractor that handled notifications. No word on whether the size of that file was unusually large.
The timeshare unit of Marriott International Inc. is notifying more than 200,000 people that their personal data are missing after backup computer tapes went missing from a Florida office. The data relates to 206,000 employees, timeshare owners and timeshare customers of Marriott Vacation Club International, the company said in a statement Tuesday. The computer tapes were stored in Orlando, where the unit is based. The company did not say when the tapes disappeared. They contained Social Security numbers, bank and credit card numbers, according to letters the company began sending customers on Saturday. ... [*The Boston Globe*, 28 Dec 2005] http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2005/12/28/marriott_customer_data_for_200000_missing/
Go to http://www.protopage.com . This is a free site where you can design aa home page for yourself. There is a calendar in the upper right hand corner. Hover your cursor on it and it will change to a full calendar for the current month. Use the left arrow on this calendar to go back one month. Continue doing this until you get to January, 2001. Then go back one more time. You are now in December 3900. (!)
Approximately 10000 UK supporters of Greenpeace who make regular donations by direct debit have have accidentally had their bank accounts debited by a hundred times their usual amount, with its software adding two noughts to the latest batch of direct debit demands. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4567944.stm I would hazard a guess that some manual intervention was made, perhaps to update the records for a new calendar year, leading to a mistake by a real human being rather than "the computer." nick rothwell http://www.cassiel.com [A different kind of environmental hazard, the Greenpeace dreadnought strikes again. PGN]
A colleague recently provided me with a PDF of a presentation he created using Keynote on a Macintosh. I needed to use some photographs from that document in a presentation of my own, so I used pdfimages, a public-domain tool, to extract them. Imagine my surprise when I discovered several images that were not apparent in the original, including logos for Yahoo and MSN, a snapshot of a commercial Web page, and a photograph of some former students. I have not experimented with random files from the Web, so I don't know what tool is responsible for inserting the inadvertent images in the file, although it seems to be a classic case of using an existing document as a template for a new one. Clearly, however, PDF documents are capable of carrying images that are not visible to the casual user, and thus risk leaking information in the same way as Microsoft Word and Powerpoint. Geoff Kuenning firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.cs.hmc.edu/~geoff/ [For example, see RISKS-23.86-88 for the discussion on using PDF to redact classified documents. PGN]
db-) [if drunk drivers an see code, why can't voters?] ** First, let me be clear that I am not a lawyer. This ** is a political opinion piece, not legal advice. Distinguish the drunks, who are entitled by law to ``full information'', State v. Muldowny and Pitts, 871 So.2d 911 (Fla. 5DCA 2004) (discussing Fla. Stat. 316.1932(1)(f)(4)), from the voters who have no obvious similar entitlement. 1. Muldowny and Pitts prevailed under a theory that they had a right to discovery in their respective criminal cases. The court agreed, criticizing the box as ``a mystical machine'' in the absence of source: it simply inhaled breath samples and spat out a report of guilt. The burden in a criminal case is on the state to show that the machine was certified. Because the firmware is an essential component of the machine (perhaps the single most important, and easiest to change), they were entitled to see the code and verify that it was as certified. Failing that, of course, you can have a ``Wizard of Oz'' effect, where the man behind the curtain presses a secret button and the machine says ``drunk''. 2. Voter cases are different. They obviously cannot rely on a discovery theory as in _Muldowny_ because the ptfs would not be charged with any crime. Standing can probably be had by having an affected voter file a protest; a losing candidate would be the obvious ptf. However, the barrier is that the ptf must have knowledge of actual fraud, and must swear to it. This gives rise to a chicken-and-egg problem. How is the voter to know of the fraud without inspecting the machine? And how is the voter to gain access to inspect the machine, absent knowledge of fraud? The _Muldowny_ defs attacked the certification of the machine, in part. The statute required that the machine be certified, _Muldowny_ at 913 (discussing Fla. Stat. 316.1932(1)(a)), and material changes would require new certification. The defs wanted to show that the machine as used was not the same as was certified. The voter ptf will have to show that the use of uncertified equipment affected the outcome. Courts are reluctant to overturn elections. Beckstrom v. Canvassing Board, 707 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1998) (gross negligence, but no fraud, so affirming result preserving election); Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1975). Following _Beckstrom_, the ptf will have to show actual fraud in the handling of the votes in order to prevail. This will be a higher hurdle than it might appear. In _Beckstrom_, the supervisor of elections allowed Vogel supporters to ``correct'' ballots that were incorrectly marked for Beckstrom. This was held to be gross negligence but not fraud. I would expect that a pre-load, as was demonstrated in Leon, might qualify as actual fraud. A pre-load is where one sets the number of votes for one candidate to +N and for the other to -N, such that the total is still zero. The negative count rolls over, of course, during the course of the day. 3. An alternative theory is to attack under Fla. Stat. 119.07 (Public Records law). Ballots are inspectable as public records, though the conditions of inspection are onerous. It could be argued, though likely without success, that the machines' guts are public records as well. A public record is (1) a record (2) made or received (3) during the course of official business. Adv. Op, David Wagner re: Legal Bills, Fla. AGO-2000-7; Shevin v. Bryan, 379 So.2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980). Certainly the ballots qualify on all elements. It seems likely that the machines are made or received during the course of official business. But do they qualify as records? The supervisor of elections never receives the source code, and I do not believe that the Department of Elections does either. It is hard to see it as a public record on that basis. Could we at least see the machine code? I don't think this theory works, either: if it did, we could all have a copy of Windows for the cost of reproduction, assuming they use the same at City Hall. If that theory works, how about embedded devices? Could we require the road department to open up and let us dump the code out of computer-based surveying equipment? The essential quality of being ``a record'' is missing in these cases. The machine code in the voting machine, or in the desktop computer, or in the surveying equipment, is not a record: it is not the preservation and transfer of knowledge. It is more analogous to the power steering arm of a car: it is there to perform a function, not to convey knowledge; the engineering knowledge embedded in it is there only for the purpose of accomplishing the function. Accordingly, I would not expect a Public Records attack to open up the source for the machines. 4. The analysis changes if the device uses any GPL code. In such a case, delivery of the device necessarily implies delivery of the object code, and the licensing terms require that copies of the source be made available to anyone to whom the object is given. The Supervisor of elections would be entitled, under the GPL, to the source code of a machine using GPL code in its deliverables. An entity cannot defeat public records inquiry by reposing custody in a third party. Times v. St Pete, 558 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1990). The interested person may go to the Supervisor's office and require that a record of that office be produced. Such an attack seems likely to prevail, though the litigation may be expensive and time-consuming. 5. It seems unlikely that a voter could use _Muldowny_ to open up the code to black box voting machines. Nor is a general public record challenge likely to work, unless the machine uses GPL code.
The article in RISKS-24.13 states that "The odds of winning the lottery are one in 1,000. The probability that the numbers will be the same three nights in a row are a staggering one in a billion." This is off by three orders of magnitude. Of course, the odds of drawing the digits 5-0-9, or any other specific combination, three nights in a row are one in a billion with an honest random number generator. But we don't care what number is drawn the first night. For a three-peat, we require only that that first night's number, whatever it is, be drawn again twice. The odds are one in a million, not one in a billion. The observed sequence is a curious fluke, but not entirely implausible for a properly functioning random number generator. Many improbable properties can be found in nearly any large dataset... [Also noted by George Kaplan. PGN]
David Wheeler's comments on double compiling (RISKS-24.13) bring to mind a paper of mine, "A Combination Hardware-Software Debugging System," *IEEE Trans. Computers*, C-17, 1, Jan 1968, pp 84-86. Briefly: Two versions of a program, logically identical, have sections of program and data mapped differently into memory; storage is initialized with the same sequences of "random" numbers. The programs are run synchronously. The hardware knows which parts of instructions and data — including data to be overwritten — should match, and complains when they don't. Several kinds of error are thus detected close on the heels of misbehavior. [There is nothing knew under the son of the farther... PGN]
You'll get the year wrong... ...and may not even notice, since you've written your date of birth so many times. (Well, it's a risk of the human computer.)
"Sean Dunn" <email@example.com> writes: > GPS systems can hardly be programmed to avoid seedy neighborhoods without > political uproar. On the other hand, there are roads that shouldn't be > traveled at some times of the day... However, the newer-generation of aftermarket units, at least those from Garmin, can be provided with both rectangular and road-based "avoidances" loaded at the user's request. In Garmin's case, the avoidances can be used for on-computer route planning with older units, but not for route planning or re-calculating on the unit itself. So, although it would be politically wrong for the GPS makers to pre-load such data, user groups could collude to fill in the gap, and provided down-loadable files that can be used to set up the programmed avoidances on the GPS units. At least, the ones that can be programmed by your PC in the first place. Mind you, this raises a new RISK of people seeding the database with bad data for other reasons: keeping folks away from competing businesses, for example. But that's not really new, downloading untrusted data from the Internet is a RISK as old as the 'net itself. GPS is a case of a technology that works more than well enough in general, that it is very easy to forget its limitations. Right up until the time you're looking at a muddy gravel road on your heavy sport-touring motorcycle because the road was supposed to have been paved, but the budget was cut so the work was never done.... [Of course, map makers always seed their maps with a few intentional errors to be able to spot ripoffs. PGN]
I use a unique email address for things I sign up for online so that I can track email leakages. The other day I received an email to my expedia email from firstname.lastname@example.org - a domain that pops up a blank page in my browser. It was offering some wonderful offer if I just clicked on an encoded link that went to expediamail.com. Q: In this day and age of phishing, how retarded does a company have to be to use a domain that is similar, but different, from its own domain to send out "wonderful offers" from? A: As retarded as only Microsoft can be apparently. I wrote to Expedia and they confirmed that they use that address to send out promotional offers. They told me how to stop receiving them, but when I went to set my preferences to not get them, they were already set to not get them. So apparently Expedia doesn't even adhere to their own members' preferences. When I asked about that, they said "yes, you aren't signed up to receive the offers, maybe someone else did it (after having confirmed that they did it), here's how you turn off receiving offers..." The risks are losing potential customers by sending out emails that look like phishing expeditions
The person operating the cash register told [Dan] Ring his account had been flagged for some reason, and he might want to contact his bank. [Excerpt from Bruce Mohl, *The Boston Globe*, 1 Jan 2006] Here's an example of Type 1 error - rejecting a good check thereby losing the retailer a sale. Of equal interest should be the approval of a bum check. It appears that the reporter really didn't dig. I wonder where the bodies are buried. It's usually found by following the money trail. Since the retailer doesn't know the customer, they probably don't value the sale properly. I know from the "publisher's free offers", that the repeat business from a satisfied customer is worth a premium. In this case, if the retailer loses the sale and the chance for repeat business, then that indeed is an expensive rejection. Hmmm? http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/01/01/check_verification_system_is_vulnerable_to_mistakes/?rss_id=Boston.com+%2F+Business+%2F+Personal+Finance+-+Money+Management+-+Financial+Management+-+Boston.com [The article points out that less than a half percent of $790 billion point-of-sale checks are erroneously rejected by a system that decides in about a third of a second whether a check might be bogus. PGN]
BKCBRTER.RVW 20050929 "CyberTerror", R. J. Pineiro, 2003, 0-765-34304-5 %A R. J. Pineiro email@example.com %C 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010 %D 2003 %G 0-765-34304-5 %I Tor Books/Tom Doherty Assoc. %O firstname.lastname@example.org www.tor.com %O http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0765343045/robsladesinterne http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0765343045/robsladesinte-21 %O http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0765343045/robsladesin03-20 %O Audience n- Tech 0 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation) %P 493 p. %T "CyberTerror" Now, those who follow this series will know that, in my opinion, most of the hype over cyberterrorism is a) overblown, and b) looking at the wrong things anyway. However, this book goes beyond the norm. It reminds me of that old joke about the difference between a used car salesman and a computer salesman being that the used car salesman knows when he is lying to you. All right, let's look at what he got right. Yes, computers do control a lot of "infrastructure." Yes, the worst disasters are when there are multiple (and usually cascading) failures in both control and safety systems. Yes, developers, maintainers, and even service people do leave trapdoors in systems. And, yes again, if you were going to perform terrorist acts, it would be best to target a number of interrelated systems. Now, before we look at the technical problems, a few practical ones. The advantage of cyberterrorism is said to be that you can, from the comfort of your own (remote and safe) hacienda, blow up your enemy's city with a few keystrokes. The terrorists in this book must be pretty unskilled, because they seem to need money, traitors, advance information, bomb materials--in short, everything that any other terrorists need when they are doing noncyberterrorism. (The characters aren't terribly consistent: for example, we have one Middle Eastern terrorist who reverts to Hispanic at moments of stress.) As for the technology, it isn't good. We have the usual movie-script- oriented virtual reality interface, completely ignoring the realities of internal computer operations, and the fact that providing complicated forensic information via a simple graphical interface would be a very difficult task indeed. (Oh, and we also have the famous, mythical "digital-pulse-bomb-that-gets-from-the-computer-into- your-head-and-gives-you-a-stroke" program.) Pineiro contradicts himself, telling us that there is a virus, then that there is no evidence of a virus (the mythical "undetectable" virus: a virus *always* changes *something*), and then that there is a virus. (The author never defines what a virus is, which, given how much else he gets wrong, is probably a good thing. Supposedly a virus can be used as traceroute, a RAT, a trojan, or anything you want.) While it was a big deal fifteen years ago, a T1 carrier is hardly high-speed anymore, particularly between related companies. As a devotee of software forensics, I approve of the fact that characteristics of a computer system can be used to gain information about the user, but I hardly think it boils down to a choice of pink defensive software for girls and blue for boys. Pineiro does not seem to know the difference between computer hardware and computer software. (We have, of course, already seen that computer software can generate sufficient power to fry circuitry, and even people.) Programs (some of which can be as small as two bytes long) communicate via certain frequencies, like radio signals. When you stop the system clock, somehow memory locations begin to lose charge. (No, I don't think he is referring to the fact that DRAM needs to refresh every millisecond or so.) The author also doesn't seem to realize that, regardless of what language was used to write the original program, most software in production systems tends to be object code. (He also seems to think that you can stop the system clock and thus halt programs originally written in Ada, but leave programs originally written in C still running.) With their magical virtual reality interface, the blackhats never seem to need to know what system they are attacking. It's got some UNIX- like characteristics, but that blue screen just has to be Windows. Which is too bad, given that most embedded systems tend to be specialized hardware, and not subject to any off-the-shelf malware. (As of the mid-90s, most nuclear power plants still used PDPs, keeping at least one plant running turning out replacement parts for them.) Pineiro also displays his ignorance of artificial intelligence. Despite his "neural-like" type of expert system program that amalgamates all known AI techniques, a neural net is one approach to AI, while an expert system is quite a different one. Not all AI systems are capable of learning: in fact, it's quite a feat to put learning capability into a package. (And I love the "Turing Society": I'm sure that those in Turing's home country of Britain would be thrilled to have the US defence department deciding who can, and can't, mess around with their AI programs. The implication of the Society is rather Frankensteinish, although Hans Moravec, in "Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind" [cf.BKRBTMMT.RVW], would probably agree with the possibility of AI taking over, if not the necessity of inhibiting it.) Cyberterrorism is certainly possible, and a lot of systems should be protected more rigorously than they are at present. However, this book provides no feeling for the realities of cyberterrorism--or anything else, for that matter. copyright Robert M. Slade, 2005 BKCBRTER.RVW 20050929 email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev or http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade
Please report problems with the web pages to the maintainer