On Friday, Sept. 22, 2006, the German magnetic levitation train Transrapid (running along a 31,8 km long test loop in Emsland) slammed into a maintenance car on the track while traveling at approx. 200 km/h. Officials have been quick to assure that this was not a technical error -- although how they can know this before even all of the 23 dead had been retrieved from the wreckage is an open question. The cause was quickly put down to "human failure" — but has not been elaborated on, probably because Germany was in the process of trying to sell a second Transrapid to China. Since the test loop is built on 4-meter high stilts and runs through a wooded area, a maintenence car runs once in the morning to clean off leaves and twigs that have gathered overnight and have detrimental effects on magnetic levitation. The local fire departments did appear to have extra long ladders in order to reach the track, but cranes were necessary in order to lift the maintenance car off the flattened front part of the Transrapid train. The train does not have a driver, who might have noticed something on the track and hit the brakes. Officials say that it is impossible to detect something like this, although I know that for rail-bound trains there are actually detectors that will not signal a train to proceed unless the track portion ahead is clear. [Perhaps they don't have signals, since only one train runs on this track? My speculation - dww] The train does not offer regular service, but rather takes tourists for a fast trip. The passengers at the time of the accident are said to have been workers for a subcontractor. From the pictures it seems that some sort of slide construction helped people get out of the (intact) back of the train (the blue things in one of the pictures). The Transrapid has been sold as a collision-free system, because it cannot fall off the track (it wraps around), nothing can cross its path, and two mag lev trains cannot physically use the same piece of track. The maintenance car, however, was *not* maglev equipment. So we again have the case of the system being logically fine if you stay inside the system, but introducing one piece that is from a different context completely changes the situation. Article (in German): http://www1.ndr.de/ndr_pages_std/0,2570,OID3129340_SPC3131186,00.html Pictures of the wreck: http://www1.ndr.de/ndrde_slideshow/0,2964,OID3132196_SIX0,00.html Diagram of the track loop: http://www.tagesschau.de/aktuell/meldungen/0,1185,OID5938672_REF1_NAV_BAB,00.html Pictures (with captions in German) explaining how maglev works: http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/0,5538,PB64-SUQ9MTYzNTMmbnI9MQ_3_3,00.html Prof.Dr. Debora Weber-Wulff, FHTW Berlin, FB 4, Treskowallee 8, 10313 Berlin +49-30-5019-2320 http://www.f4.fhtw-berlin.de/people/weberwu/ [Two other reports follow, and provide some diversity of views, although I have trimmed some of the duplications. PGN]
The two workers on the maintenance vehicle saw things coming and jumped, saving their lives. The test track, which is used as a technology showcase and transports curious tourists and potential customers of the technology, had been approved for driverless operation only last year. Right now after the accident, engineers assure us that In theory, maglev technology is the safest transport in the world, because the propulsion is done by magnets in the rail - two maglev vehicles on the same part of the track would run in the same direction, so a crash between them is indeed impossible. Apparently, nobody thought about non-maglev vehicles on the same track, although these vehicles stick around for routine maintenance. Which is really tragic, because railways, a 19th century technology, normally do have the technology to ensure that only one vehicle is on a given part of the track, and they used to have drivers on board as a fall-back. And, of course, unspecified "human error" is cited as the most probable cause for the accident, the second theory being a disruption of an unspecified wireless communication system. http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/0,1518,438706,00.html Martin Virtel, Redakteur Forschen & Entwickeln, FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND Stubbenhuk 3, 20459 Hamburg +49/40/319 90 469 http://www.ftd.de
The International Herald Tribune (IHT) has a story by Mark Landler of the NYT. Our local paper, the Neue Westfälische (NW) is running a story from the Associated Press (AP). The IHT says it was traveling about 200kph. The NW says about 180kph. The IHT is reporting 25 dead and 10 seriously injured. The NW is reporting 23 dead and 10 seriously injured. The IHT says that "The authorities declined to speculate on the cause, though experts on maglev technology said it appeared to have been caused by a communications breakdown rather than a flaw in the technology." The AP quotes the state lawyer involved saying "it is probably the result of human error." The AP also says that the state justice department and the operating company IABG are assuming it is human error. It astonishes me that some authorities are willing to speculate in public on the root cause of the crash only a day after it has happened. The NW said that [my translation] "according to the state legal department, the Transrapid can only travel [on its test track] when the maintenance vehicle has left the track. The maintenance workers confirm this by telephone. it is open [that is, it has not been determined PBL] why the train controller gave permission for the train to proceed." So let me join in, but without speculating. Any collision between two rail vehicles demonstrates that the means of ensuring that two vehicles are not in the same place at the same time is inadequate. The reason I can say this is because it is an analytic statement: a collision happened, therefore the means of hindering collisions was inadequate. (The classic example of an analytic statement is that a bachelor is an unmarried man.) On a single-vehicle short track, one imagines there are lots of economical ways of checking that the track is free which do not involve merely telephone calls. People obviously thought that what they had was adequate. Turns out it wasn't. (Remember: this is an analytic statement.) Peter B. Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de
Infoworld interviewed: * Alan Paller, director of research at the SANS Institute, and * Eric Byres, director of industrial cyber security at Symantec, on some topics of interest to us. SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems, essential to the nation's critical infrastructure, have been hacked. What's happening today is that terrorists are using cybercrime to get the money to buy the bombs to blow people up. They are not using cyberattacks against physical things. There have been cases where SCADA systems that run power plants, were taken over, but the crime was about financial extortion. SCADA systems are becoming more vulnerable to cyber attack because obscure operating systems are being replaced with Windows connected to corporate networks, that are vulnerable to breaches. The GAO did a great report on this in 2004. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04354.pdf Then there is the military statement that the Chinese downloaded 10-20 terabytes of sensitive information from NIPRNet. What the government is doing is producing mountains to reports whose only function is to gather dust. The best thing that can be done with them is pile in front of government buildings as protection against a car bomb. http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/09/11/37NMmain_1.html
On 17 Sep 2006, Vancouver International Airport was locked down for several hours because a security guard noticed what appeared to be an explosive on an X-ray screen. The bag in question could not be located in the screening area, so the decision was made to re-screen all passengers in the waiting areas. The "lock down" procedure also required many flights that had just taken off to return to Vancouver so that all passengers could be re-screened. As it turns out, the bag was not found because it did not exist. The image seen by the guard was from training software installed on the screening machine. The image in question should have appeared only during a training exercise, according to a spokesperson from Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA). Furthermore: "They're investigating how that feature of the tool got inadvertently activated. And while they're doing that investigation, they've deactivated the tool itself." None of the basic facts here will be a surprise to RISKers. However, one thought crossing my mind is whether the training software was executed as a prank, and if so, how (i.e., I have no idea whether it's possible to interact with the screening machines remotely). But if a "false positive" image could be inserted into a live, in-service screening machine, then it's possible that a "false negative" could also be inserted. The CBC story shortly after the incident, describing the lock down: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2006/09/17/vancouver-airport.html And the recent story describing the cause: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2006/09/22/bc-airport-screening.html [Also noted by Robert Israel, UBC, Vancouver] http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060921/yvr_security_060921/20060921
On 6 Sep I faxed the paperwork to TIAA-CREF requesting a withdrawal from my retirement account expecting that it might take as long as a week before the money was wired to my account. It is now 25 Sep and I am still waiting. I have spoken to several consultants about this problem. The first just said that it should not have taken that long and that he would see if he could get it expedited. The next consultant was more forthcoming and said that the delay was caused by the fact that TIAA-CREF was installing a new computer system. (I had earlier been told in another context that the old system was written in COBOL back in the 1960s.) Later consultants told me that as a University's account is transferred to the new system, withdrawal applications from retirees from that University have to be processed manually, rather than by the computer system. That strongly suggests that as more and more accounts are transferred to the new system the delays will get longer and longer. There apparently has been no public announcement of this problem. (At least I found nothing in a Google search.) When I mentioned this to one of the consultants, she said that information that there was going to be a switch-over to a new system was sent to account holders last year, but, when I pointed out to her that that announcement said nothing about delays, she said that she did not believe that they had been anticipated. When I asked what happened to people who couldn't make a mortgage payment or something like that I was told by one of the consultants that TIAA-CREF was reimbursing people who had to pay late charges because of the delay. He didn't say what they did for people whose credit reports were damaged or those who lost a deal because they could not come up with a down payment in time or something like that. One of consultants also told me that it might be six months before the switch-over to the new system was complete. The consultants, who were all very considerate, all said that they had no contact the people responsible for the actual processing of the withdrawal applications. Peter D. Junger, Case Western Reserve University Law School, Cleveland, OH email@example.com http://samsara.law.cwru.edu
Look at the button layout on this portable DVD player. http://www.dpbsmith.com/buttons.jpg In case it still isn't clear--it sure wasn't clear to me--the northeast button navigates east; the southeast button navigates south; the southwest button navigates west; and the northwest button navigates north. The silkscreened little arrows _next to_ each button are apparently intended to convey this, and to help you ignore the engraved little arrows in the buttons themselves. An awful lot of modern user interface design seems to me to amount to printing little silkscreened arrows next to buttons that were hopelessly misplaced to begin with. [This of course might reminds us of John Denver's final flight, in which he thought he had run out of gas on one tank and tried to switch tanks. The lever positions were UP for both tanks off, RIGHT for the left tank, and DOWN for the right tank. PGN]
More than 1,100 laptop computers have vanished from the Department of Commerce since 2001, including nearly 250 from the Census Bureau containing personal information. This was revealed in response to a request from the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, which is surveying 17 federal departments about such losses. Of the 10 thus far responding, Commerce is "by far the most egregious." This leaves questions about the 7 departments that have not responded! [Source: Alan Sipress, *The Washington Post*, 22 Sep 2006; PGN-ed] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/21/AR2006092101602.html
I swear I am not making this up. Today I got a call from the company that monitors our home security system. They said that they had received a trouble report from our system. But our panel said everything was hunky-dory. All the self- tests were normal, and the sensor in question was operating properly. This is not the first time this has happened, so I decided to escalate. Long story short: the only plausible theory that anyone has been able to come up with is that somewhere in the country another security system has mistakenly been programmed with our ID code (the ID codes are assigned and programmed manually) and it is THAT system that is calling in the trouble reports. The central monitoring system uses the self-reported ID codes to identify the system calling in, not caller-id. Therefore (assuming this theory is correct) there is no way to know where the system with the duplicate ID actually is. I pointed out to them that if this theory is correct then the system with the duplicate ID code is essentially useless, and that if and when the owners of that system learn this they may not be too happy about having paid their monthly fees for essentially no value whatsoever. If a burglar ever breaks into that house (wherever it is) it will appear to the monitoring office that someone has broken into OUR house. The police will be dispatched to our house and we'll be charged for a false alarm. Meanwhile the real burglars will be happily unmolested in some unknown and unknowable location. Furthermore, if a burglar ever breaks into OUR house through the location corresponding to the (evidently) faulty sensor on the house with the duplicate ID they might be tempted to write this off as just the faulty sensor acting up and not call the police. Even the possibility that such events might result in (it seems to me, IANAL) easily winnable lawsuits now that the company has been made aware of the problem has not motivated them to find a solution as far as I can tell.
I'm a mathematician in Microsoft's Cryptography group. On September 19, during the Washington State primary, I was a King County (Seattle area) election judge. This seemed a good use of my expiring vacation hours. The pay is about $115 for working about 6 am - 9:30 pm, with a one-hour lunch break and two 15-minute breaks. A four-hour pre-election training session is also reimbursed. This is more than I've received for equivalent jury duty. The polling station where I was assigned is supposed to have 14 workers, but only 9 had been recruited. Some of us doubled up to do two precincts. I brought a copy of Avi Rubin's report, but most other judges weren't interested. For those voting in person, this was the first time they could choose electronic voting (AVU, Accessible Voting Unit) or paper ballots. I was across the room from the (one) AVU but understood you touched the screen to pick a candidate. Supposedly it could (slowly) read the ballot aloud in English or Chinese, for those who are visually disabled. A printed copy of your ballot passed under a glass — you had to affirm that the choices printed there are correct before casting your ballot. If a voter chose AVU, I (as judge) needed to fill in a form with the voter's name and precinct information. Another judge types this precinct information into the AVU so the voter gets a proper ballot. Paper ballots could be marked (fill in an oval) and dropped in an Accuvote machine, which checked for consistency (e.g., don't vote for two candidates for same office) and tallied the votes. Before opening the polls, we needed to check that all tallies were zero. The end-of-day counts were printed on the same roll of adding-machine tape. Ballots with a write-in candidate automatically went into a separate cannister beneath the Accuvote machine, so they could be separated at days' end. The County will recount all paper ballots by hand in 4% of the polling places. The Accuvote machine also checked that a political party (Democratic or Republican) had been declared. Some voters deliberately declined this, not voting for partisan offices. The inspector (= chief judge) had to unlock the Accuvote machine and tell it to allow this ballot. Many King County voters vote absentee, and there are plans to go fully absentee around 2008. The voter lists supplied To election judges omit absentee voters. The precincts at this polling place had a combined 1500 or so registered non-absentee voters, of which about 250 chose paper ballots and 30 chose AVU (30% turnout. I heard those who used the AVU liked it. There were about 60 absentee ballots dropped off at this polling place. Occasionally multiple members of a neighborhood would show up together, and there would be a wait in the line for that precinct. But delays were short -- having only nine workers wasn't so bad after all). My usual polling place is elsewhere, and I could not access it during voting hours. I cast a provisional ballot, where my name is outside an envelope and the ballot inside. Provisional ballots must be paper. I was able to cast a vote on many judges as well as state legislators, US Senator, and a county tax, but not for US Representative, because my residence is in another congressional district. Several voters who walked in, claiming they had not received their absentee ballot (and were not on our lists), were allowed to vote provisionally. At the end of the day, many items to be returned to the county were delivered by the inspector, who needed an accomplice of the opposite political party. There were three bags supplied for these items, but it was hard to fit everything in. Some items, such as the privacy booths used by paper voters, were left behind for the county to pick up later. King County election procedures came under criticism in 2004-2005, while the 2004 gubernatorial election results were being challenged. I saw no severe anomalies Tuesday. A technician stopped by during the morning, to check that things were going well.
If you have not yet seen Ron Rivest's latest offering, this one is essential reading: a three-part paper ballot that satisfies privacy and integrity while avoiding vote selling and eschewing cryptography. Very clever, very cute. Cheers! PGN http://theory.csail.mit.edu/~rivest/Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf
As I often comment, it is funny to me (not really but hold on) when people scream about this or that organization losing a laptop with 20K identities. What's 20K? Obviously that is important, and speaks volumes of corporate security and of privacy issues. Still, it is insignificant in a laughable fashion when compared to what's being stolen daily online. Every day, millions of online identities and website credentials are lost. Millions. Every day. This is done through trojan horses which are spread (bots, worm fashion) among an immense online population. There are thousands of new variants to these bots coming out every month dedicated specifically as a targeted attack on online financial institutions. These attacks target the financial online sites (banking, eCommerce, etc.) not by attacking them directly on the macro level, but rather by multiple micro-level attacks against their users, en-masse. These trojan horses (bots) are so advanced, the utilize rootkit technology, and when the user surfs to an HTTPS site, use man-in-the-middle attacks on the machine itself to steal his or her credentials. These credentials in turn are sent to the remote attackers for further processing. A lot of money is lost this way. This is a world-wide problem, but it is especially apparent (as the bad guys utilize the data more and more) in, but not limited to, the UK and Europe. In the US this is a growing trend, but it is mostly ignored by the defenders (most are not aware of it) as regular primitive "e-mail phishing" is still the most apparent threat there. This is largely due to US banks still mostly using username and password authentication. E-mail phishing is important and a large threat, but it is doomed to death (it will still be here 10 years from now, like Nigerian scams are here today, but as a specific threat it will diminish into obscurity. Phishing today should become the root in a tree called Online Financial Fraud or eFraud. That, friends, is not going away whether in blogs, trojan horses, e-mail or your cell phone. These trojan horse attacks, as they are located on the user's machine itself, are not stopped by 2-factor authentication, etc. There are things that can be done, but when the security problem is on a remote machine not under the, say, bank's control, there is not much they can do with their current confidence risk assessment systems. There are solutions, but these are to be discussed another time. It is obvious that one of the biggest problems facing banks, and ESPECIALLY eCommerce sites (without the physical-space presence) is how to establish reputation systems that will provide with a technological risk assesment confidence decision as to how safe it is to work with a remote user. The web channel is the cheapest and most effective in banking today, and banks will not want to lose it. We (Alan Solomon and myself) cover some of the market involving this technology and how it works in a recent paper we published in the Virus Bulletin September edition: http://www.beyondsecurity.com/whitepapers/SolomonEvronSept06.pdf
22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2006) December 11-15, 2006 - Miami Beach, FL http://www.acsac.org We would like to invite you to attend this year's ACSAC conference in Miami Beach, FL. We have again created an exciting program organized in three tracks, featuring invited speakers, peer-reviewed technical papers, case studies, tutorials, a workshop, a works in progress session, panels, and plenty opportunity to mingle and network with your colleagues from around the globe. The advance program is posted and registration is now open: http://www.acsac.org/2006/advance_program.html http://www.regmaster.com/conf/acsac2006.html The deadline for securing the early registration discount and hotel room discounts is November 13, 2006. Dr. Christoph Schuba, 2006 ACSAC program chair Christoph.Schuba@GMail.COM
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