<http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/bulletins_2009/bulletin_03_2009.cfm> During a switching movement at a siding, a locomotive's automatic brake valve handle suddenly has no effect. Engineer applied independent brakes, but they can't stop the train due to its weight. [Broken valve roll pin] Paul Hirose <firstname.lastname@example.org>: Releasing the deadman pedal was no help because the brake system was designed to ignore it if the locomotive brake cylinders had at least 30 PSI. There was no other means in the cab to exhaust the train line. Risks? First, not having a second, independent emergency valve. Second, the override on the deadman almost lead to dead men..... MetaRISK? How long have we been making trains with Westinghouse air brakes, and we still have not found all possible critical failures? How will we ever do so for complex systems? [Attribution to Paul Hirose added in archive copy. PGN]
The report is at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7892294.stm Quote "*A Royal Navy nuclear submarine was involved in a collision with a French nuclear sub in the middle of the Atlantic, the MoD has confirmed.*" What is interesting is the potential causes of this incident. The British published point of view is that it is a random accident caused by two extremely stealthy submarines accidentally colliding. May I suggest two alternative hypotheses? First: The collision was a result of one of the submarines stalking the other, and as an unexpected outcome, colliding with the target? Second: Perhaps current submarine navigation systems constrain the vessels to travel at specific, and integral, depths and tracks? The second hypothesis has an all too real correspondent in the present air navigation systems. The precision of current air navigation systems means that aircraft fly within metres of expected altitude and track. The result of such precision is an increased risk of collision in case of accidental assignment to conflicting air routes. A case in point is the collision on September 26, 2006 over Brazil. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/08/AR2006120800835.html
[Source: UPI, 7 Feb 2009] A computer virus infected French military databases and grounded some navy fighter jets for two days last month, a navy spokesman says. Naval spokesman Jerome Erulin said the recent computer security breach was limited but prevented the aircraft from downloading flight plans, The Daily Telegraph reported Saturday. "It affected exchanges of information but no information was lost. It was a security problem we had already simulated," Erulin said. "We cut the communication links that could have transmitted the virus and 99 percent of the network is safe." The database infection by "Conficker," a malicious software virus publicly reported by Microsoft last October, likely was the result of negligence, naval officials said. *The Telegraph* said, according to a report by French newspaper *Liberation*, the infection involved France's Villacoublay air base and the 8th Transmissions Regiment and left fighter jets grounded for two days starting Jan. 15. [Also noted by Mark J Bennison on Dave Farber's IP list, with the article by Kim Willsher in Paris. PGN] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/4547649/French-fighter-planes-grounded-by-computer-virus.html
Announcing GCTIP - New Forums for Internet Transparency, Performance, and ISP Issues http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/000506.html Greetings. I'm pleased to announce the availability of a new venue for discussion, reporting, analysis, information sharing, queries, and consumer assistance regarding Internet performance, transparency, and measurement, plus a wide range of topics associated with consumers and their interactions with Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Called GCTIP Forums: http://forums.gctip.org this project -- The "Global Coalition for Transparent Internet Performance" -- is the outgrowth of a network measurement workshop meeting sponsored by Vint Cerf and Google at their headquarters in June, 2008 for a number of academic network measurement researchers and other related parties. This is the same meeting that formed the genesis of the open platform M-Lab ("Measurement Lab") project that was recently announced ( http://www.measurementlab.net ). GCTIP was the original name for the mailing list that I maintained for that Google meeting and subsequent discussions (full disclosure: I helped to organize the agenda for the meeting and also attended). Unless we know what the performance of the Internet for any given users really is -- true bandwidth performance, traffic management, port blocking, server prohibitions, Terms of Service concerns, and a wide range of other parameters, it's impossible for anyone who uses Internet services to really know if they're getting what they're paying for, if their data is being handled appropriately in terms of privacy and security, and all manner of other crucial related issues. While transparency and related concerns do have impacts on "network neutrality" issues, neither GCTIP nor GCTIP Forums are oriented toward network neutrality discussions. The purpose of GCTIP Forums is to provide a free discussion environment to act as a clearinghouse for all stakeholders (technical, consumers, ISPs, government-related, etc.) to interact on the range of "network transparency" and associated topics. The focus is on collecting, analyzing, and disseminating reports relating to Internet measurement/test data -- plus associated concerns, discussions, etc., in manners that are most useful to the network community at large. There are many groups working in the network measurement area, but surprisingly little data sharing, coordination, or ongoing reporting in a form that is useful to most ordinary Internet consumers or other interested observers. An area of particular concern is helping to assure that measurement tests and perceived consumer problems with their ISPs aren't misinterpreted by users resulting in unfair or simply wrong accusations against those ISPs. I feel strongly that consumers need a place to go with these sorts of issues where the broader community and experts can help interpret what's really going on. Guilty firms should be exposed, but the innocent must not be inappropriately branded. All current GCTIP Forums topics can be viewed without signing up on the system. Simple registration is required to post new discussion threads and replies, but no non-administrative topics are currently pre-moderated (any reported materials confirmed to be inappropriate will be deleted promptly). GCTIP Forums exist to enable the exchange of relevant ideas, queries, data, and other information for anyone concerned about the Internet worldwide. The Forums are seeded with five top-level discussion topics to get things rolling, but suggestions for additional categories are welcome. New threads (e.g. discussions of particular measurement tools, measurement results, specific ISP issues and concerns, etc.) can be created by registered users, starting right now. Please note that I am running GCTIP on my own dime at this point. At such a time as any outside support funding becomes available for the project (which would be very much appreciated!) it will be publicly announced of course. Spread the word! This is your chance to help yourself and everyone else better understand what the Internet is *really* doing, and by extension, where it is going tomorrow. Thanks very much. Be seeing you ... at: http://forums.gctip.org ... Lauren Weinstein <email@example.com> Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800 http://www.pfir.org/lauren Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com Co-Founder, PFIR - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org Co-Founder, NNSquad - Network Neutrality Squad - http://www.nnsquad.org Founder, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
This seems to me that this is an HR and training problem. True -- it involves a computer database -- but the database is not at fault. As a preventative measure you would probably want to have "Driver's Licence" in as many different languages in said same offence database, but tagged to indicate as such just in case some untrained person makes a mistake. Ultimately, in Greater Europe (from Vladivostok to Iceland to Saint Helena) the traffic-oriented part of the police forces must be trained in knowing all the variants of driver's permits in their region. Countries that need to check their own national driving offence databases for this problem: Southern Hemisphere: Australia, NZ & Fiji. North America: US, Canada & Mexico. Max Power http://HireMe.geek.nz/ The mystery of Ireland's worst driver Details of how police in the Irish Republic finally caught up with the country's most reckless driver have emerged, the Irish Times reports. He had been wanted from counties Cork to Cavan after racking up scores of speeding tickets and parking fines. However, each time the serial offender was stopped he managed to evade justice by giving a different address. But then his cover was blown. It was discovered that the man every member of the Irish police's rank and file had been looking for - a Mr Prawo Jazdy - wasn't exactly the sort of prized villain whose apprehension leads to an officer winning an award. In fact he wasn't even human. "Prawo Jazdy is actually the Polish for driving licence and not the first and surname on the licence," read a letter from June 2007 from an officer working within the Garda's traffic division. "Having noticed this, I decided to check and see how many times officers have made this mistake. "It is quite embarrassing to see that the system has created Prawo Jazdy as a person with over 50 identities." The officer added that the "mistake" needed to be rectified immediately and asked that a memo be circulated throughout the force. In a bid to avoid similar mistakes being made in future relevant guidelines were also amended. And if nothing else is learnt from this driving-related debacle, Irish police officers should now know at least two words of Polish. As for the seemingly elusive Mr Prawo Jazdy, he has presumably become a cult hero among Ireland's largest immigrant population. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/northern_ireland/7899171.stm [Also noted by several others. PGN]
I recently started working on a project that has a * in the middle of its name - think of GM's On*Star as an example. Google (and other search engines I tried, including Microsoft Live, Yahoo!, and Lycos) all treat the * as a wildcard, and don't allow wildcard escaping. Now On*Star isn't hard to find with Google, because the words "on" and "star" rarely appear together except in this context. But if you take two other words that frequently occur together, put a * between them, and then try to find references to that unique term, you won't get very far. For example, stimulus*package would not be a good name, nor would high*tech. It's not clear to me whether the people who started this project knew that their project name would make it effectively impossible to find the project and either did that intentionally or didn't care, or whether it's a happenstance that is now a problem. But in any case, it's a way to hide in plain sight - any websites they have can be indexed by robots, but won't be found by searchers. The risk is the interaction between name selection and search engine operation. If someone deliberately picks a name this way, and then the search engines change their behavior, the value (anonymity) instantly disappears. The classic security problem of a distributed system with uncoordinated security policies....
The US Struggle to Keep the Taliban From Stealing What's Inside This Box http://www.truthout.org/021209A http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/pakistan/090211/exclusive-the-wrong-hands It's one thing when banks and universities screw up by not encrypting their hard drives, but an unencrypted drive in a military laptop ostensibly filled with sensitive information in a war-zone has to win first place in the f**k-up olympics. "A good price means $800, he says. This would be a steep price in the secondhand market for a regular Intel Pentium M laptop manufactured in 2004. But this is not ordinary equipment... The computer also contained dozens of manuals on how to operate, assemble and trouble shoot U.S. Army equipment - everything from "space heaters" to "up-armored humvees." Some of the manuals contain restricted information and warn that "distribution is limited to U.S. government agencies," with instructions to "destroy by any methods that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document." But the machine - and all the information inside - was available for a price in the open market in Peshawar. And it makes an attractive investment for anyone who has in their possession any form of serious U.S. military hardware." Read the article for more alarming info about the sensitive info on this laptop. OTOH, maybe it's a honey-laptop? filled with tracking software and misinformation... but i doubt it. http://atom.smasher.org/
Re: 390,000 to access child database (RISKS-25.55) One of the risks of reading RISKS is that one may be tempted to believe that articles described as "Full story at:" do actually contain the full story. For example, hands up how many of you read "390,000 to access child database ... of all under 18 year-olds in England" and assumed that this means all 390k have full access to the whole database? [Woops! That's 390,000 pounds. See jidanni's comment in RISKS-25.57. PGN] It would help if those submitting risks items actually state what they think the risk is, so that their concerns can be allayed should they be misplaced.
As has been widely reported (but for whatever reason not in RISKS that I can find), the ability to find MD5 collisions has been used to create counterfeit intermediate certificates, thus putting users at risk of trusting incorrect sites. More detail at http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ and hundreds of news reports, such as Markoff's blog (*The NY Times) at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/30/outdated-security-software-threatens-web-commerce/?pagemode=print I got an e-mail recently from a colleague who is not a security specialist, but is a specialist in designing power plants. He read the news coverage, interpreted it as "SSL is no longer secure", and decided to roll his own security protocol for use in a new power plant where he's designing the control systems. My reaction, of course, was "NO! don't do that", but I wonder how many other people out there have drawn the same conclusion, and don't have a security expert to turn to for advice. The risk? In finding security problems, we need to carefully communicate not only the problem, but also what people should do in response, lest the cure be worse than the disease. I think the researchers did a good job of that -- explaining that use of SHA-1 hashes in certificates are much better than MD5, and eventually moving to SHA-2 or something else in the certificates is the long term solution -- but that level of detail got lost in much of the popular reporting.
Virgin America spiffs up at Logan [Excerpt] http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/02/10/virgin_america_spiffs_up_at_logan/ Of course, the fancy digs could come with unintended consequences: A few months ago at the San Francisco airport, a passenger using the check-in kiosk watered the fake orchids atop the kiosk table with leftover soda. "It leaked into the kiosks and fried our computers," Pawlowski said. So Virgin has designed its Boston kiosk tables with smaller computer processors and interior pathways to funnel fluids away from the electronics. "I'm not going to say it can't happen again, but I'm hoping it doesn't."
This article showed up on Fox News. While Fox News is noted for being somewhat a sensational tabloid I thought this was interesting. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,494064,00.html I am not a facebook fan or user but does the average "Joe" know what he is allowing them to do? Should we care? http://www.facebook.com/terms.php Licenses You are solely responsible for the User Content that you Post on or through the Facebook Service. You hereby grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license (with the right to sublicense) to (a) use, copy, publish, stream, store, retain, publicly perform or display, transmit, scan, reformat, modify, edit, frame, translate, excerpt, adapt, create derivative works and distribute (through multiple tiers), any User Content you (i) Post on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion thereof subject only to your privacy settings <http://www.facebook.com/privacy/> or (ii) enable a user to Post, including by offering a Share Link on your website and (b) to use your name, likeness and image for any purpose, including commercial or advertising, each of (a) and (b) on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion thereof. You represent and warrant that you have all rights and permissions to grant the foregoing licenses. John Kolesar, 440-871-7965 W, 248-760-4040 M, firstname.lastname@example.org
This isn't strictly a technology risk, but it's too good to ignore. The UK *Daily Telegraph*, 11 Feb 2009: "China 'sorry' for towering inferno" China central television, the official broadcasting mouthpiece of the Communist party, has apologised for burning down its new headquarters building with an illegal fireworks display. One fireman died and six were injured in the blaze on Monday night. The 30-story building, which was designed by Rem Koolhaas, a leading Dutch architect, and engineered by the British firm ARUP, was burnt out. Beware the risks and impacts of your opening ceremony David Alexander, Towcester, Northamptonshire, England
Rpbert Schaeffer's assertions in Risks-25.55 concerning what I take to be Goedel's Theorem are misleading. And I am not persuaded by a corrected version of his argument, either. Schaeffer asserts: "You can't prove that a system is both correct and complete without going outside that system." So, to begin with, let's get a more accurate expression of what Schaeffer might want to say. He doesn't explain what "correct" means in his statement. Let me assume he means "consistent" in its classical sense. First, given a theory L in first-order logic, you can, contrary to Schaeffer, indeed prove in L that L is both consistent and complete, provided that L has the resources to express those statements, if L is inconsistent. Indeed, you can prove anything in L that L can express. Second, a partial reverse: given a theory L in first-order logic that contains Peano arithmetic (indeed, it doesn't need to be full Peano arithmetic - an substantial fragment will suffice), one can prove completeness of L in L only if L is inconsistent. The conditions that Schaeffer missed was that L must be a consistent classical first-order theory containing an appropriately substantial fragment of Peano arithmetic. Then you can say that L cannot prove its own completeness. Now, consider these conditions one by one. One may think that inconsistent theories are not useful. One may also think that all useful theories must be formulated in, or contain, classical first-order logic. One may also think that all useful theories contain Peano arithmetic. All these conditions may be questioned when dealing with computer systems of any sort, as follows. The people who study and develop paraconsistent logics would disagree that inconsistent theories are not useful. Paraconsistent logics are classically inconsistent. There are obvious ways to weaken first-order logics to allow some statements of the form (A & not-A) to be proved, but not all. And even if one retains classical inference, if one uses L for reasoning (rather than for illustrating purely mathematical points) then for practical purposes one might only be interested in things one can deduce in L through proofs of bounded length (there is a limit to what we can achieve in the life of the universe), say length B. If the shortest proof of a statement of the form (A and not-A) is longer than B, then for one's purposes the inconsistency of L might not be relevant. Finally, it is questionable that Goedel's theorem could apply here at all. I don't know any computer languages or compilers, and certainly no physical machines, that implement Peano arithmetic, or indeed a sufficiently substantial fragment. All computer arithmetic I know is finite, and I confidently expect it to stay that way. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Causalis Limited and the University of Bielefeld www.causalis.com www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de
There was an even earlier language, Pascal, that provided all that security, and more. It had simultaneous advantages and disadvantages over C: Pascal was complete. You didn't need a large standard library. It was defined. This was both an advantage and a disadvantage, since you could immediately write your software, but the language couldn't evolve as easily as could C. The act of having run-time checks, and many compile-time checks, allowed the checking code to be fairly trivial. Good systems could expect about a 5% effect. In comparison equivalent C checking was (and is) virtually impossible, or requires exorbitant run-time support. The same things that create C advantages (e.g. string storage that can be a great variable) cause horrible checking problems. Pascal had an approved ISO standard about 10 years before C. Pascal suffered greatly from the Borland disease. Borland implemented a form of Pascal that did not meet the standards, and still doesn't. That meant that programmers never learned the appropriate ways to write code, especially interactive code. Pascal had the great advantage of defined i/o systems (files, etc.) which were extremely flexible. However the limitations of some of the standard procedures affected things. For example, there was no way to programatically control the error response on a "read(integer);" call. Chuck F (cbfalconer at maineline dot net) <http://cbfalconer.home.att.net>
Array bounds checking (and pointer checking) is possible in C. http://gcc.gnu.org/extensions.html http://sourceforge.net/projects/boundschecking/ http://williambader.com/bounds/example.html http://freshmeat.net/projects/valgrind/
The inventors of the C language did not merely omit array bounds checking from C; they encouraged C programmers to omit manual bounds checking as well. This is what really bothers me. Consider: 1. Early C programming books suggested the idiom while (*p++ = *q++); to copy a string from one area to another. No bounds checking was ever suggested. 2. The C library contained several functions that ignored array bounds, including the infamous "gets" function, which read an input line into a buffer - and took no length parameter for the buffer. It was impossible to use gets safely; no matter what buffer you provide, there was a potential input line long enough to cause a buffer overflow. 3. When you pass an array as a parameter, its size is lost to the called function. As with Fortran, if you care about buffer size, you must pass it as an additional parameter - a sizable (so to speak) nuisance. Omitting array bounds checking may have made sense at the time given the available hardware and compiler technology. But there was no need to create "gets" without a size parameter, or to avoid passing array sizes by default. (Cases where it would have been too inefficient to push the array size parameter onto the stack could have been handled by distinguishing between arrays and pointers.)
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