The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 25 Issue 60

Friday 6 March 2009

Contents

Health-care: The Computer Will See You Now
Anne Armstrong-Cohen via PGN
Turkish Airline disaster and the Altimeter
Turgut Kalfaoglu
Britain's Chinook helicopters unusable for years due to software
Mark Brader
Conviction in attempted 229 million GBP theft
Mark Brader
Altimeter and autopilot possible cause of plane crash near Schiphol
Ben Blout
Normal Accidents and Black Swans
Jerry Leichter
Building-Security-In Maturity Model: BSIMM
Gary McGraw
An insider attack... in the police
Jeremy Epstein
Diebold delete button for erasing audit logs
Kim Zetter via PGN
Re-examining assumptions
Jerry Leichter
Credit card #s plucked out of air at FL Best Buy
David Ian Hopper via Dave Farber
Worldpay ATM system breached
Neil Youngman
Re: Iridium and Cosmos satellites collide
Ivan Jager
Risk Contained In RISKS Posting?
David E. Price
Re: Wikileaks cracks key NATO document on Afghan war
Charles Wood
Re: Google Gaffe: Gmail Outage ...
Alain Picard
Verizon curiosity
Peter Zilahy Ingerman
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Health-care: The Computer Will See You Now (Anne Armstrong-Cohen)

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Fri, 6 Mar 2009 12:59:32 PST

In considering one of our classic double-edged RISKS swords, Anne
Armstrong-Cohen in today's issue of *The New York Times* discusses the risks
of doctors having *less* involvement with patients as a consequence of the
push to develop paperless health-care that is heavily dependent on online
facilities.  Yes, electronic medical records (EMRs) can avoid illegible
handwriting and enable doctors to share patients' records more easily.  "In
short, the computer depersonalizes medicine.  It ignores nuances that we do
not measure but [that] clearly influence care. ...  A box clicked
unintentionally is as detrimental as an order written illegibly -- maybe
worse because it looks official.  ... So before we embrace the inevitable,
there should be more discussion and study of electronic records, or at a
minimum acknowledgment of the down side.  A hybrid may be the answer --
perhaps electronic records should be kept only on tablet computers, allowing
the provider to write or draw, and face the patient.  The personal
relationships we build in primary care must remain a priority, because they
are integral to improved health outcomes.  Let us not forget this as we put
keyboards and screens within the intimate walls of our medical homes."

As always, human intelligence is critical.  So are well-designed and easily
usable human interfaces that allow human intelligence to prevail --
especially in the presence of erroneous online information!


Turkish Airline disaster and the Altimeter

turgut kalfaoglu <turgut@kalfaoglu.com>
Thu, 05 Mar 2009 09:58:44 +0200

As you probably know, a Boeing 737-800 with 127 passengers and seven crew
crashed near Schiphol airport in the Netherlands, killing nine and injuring
many others.  The details are starting to emerge that the left altimeter was
faulty, and that from 2000 feet, it notified the autopilot that they were
suddenly at -8 feet. Autopilot immediately cut the power to the engines,
stalling it in mid air.  Due to the weather, the pilots had to rely on their
instruments and could not see what was wrong until the stall indicators came
on.

What I would like to know is that how software testing is done at Boeing.  I
fail to see how the software would not spot a problem and carry out the
landing:

1) If the two altimeters are reading very different readings,
2) If one of the altimeters switches from reading 2000 feet to -8 feet
   instantly,
3) If one of the altimeters reads a negative number?

If the software had warned them, I'm sure these pilots would not have
died, along with several passengers.

  [Somewhat similar comment from Ben Blout.  Also, there has been extensive
  discussion on this topic around the Net.  Having two of anything always
  suggests the problem of what to do what they disagree.  (Les Lamport's
  paper on Buridan's Ass comes to mind [RISKS-10.44].)  That problem
  suggests that having THREE might be a better strategy, and seeking
  consensus.  But sanity checking is also a good idea, and trusting absurd
  readings is not wise.  Perhaps the biggest problem is again that
  autopilots and people are not infallible, but the lack of synergy between
  the two can be even more debilitating.  PGN]


Britain's Chinook helicopters unusable for years due to software

Mark Brader
Thu, 5 Mar 2009 18:55:40 -0500 (EST)

  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7923341.stm
It says here that in 1995 the Royal Air Force ordered Mark 3 Chinook
helicopters "with a modified cockpit computer system in order to reduce
costs.  But the aircraft have never been able to fly..." and the plan now is
to downgrade them to Mark 2 models for use next year.

Mark Brader, Toronto, msb@vex.net


Conviction in attempted 229 million GBP theft

Mark Brader
Thu, 5 Mar 2009 19:08:54 -0500 (EST)

This case was briefly noted by Tom Van Vleck in Risks-23.81 in 2005.  In
that year, British police made a number of arrests in the case of a plan to
steal huge sums of money from accounts at the British office of the Sumitomo
Mitsui bank by transferring it into their accounts in various countries.
Their basic trick was to plant keylogger software on the bank's computers,
exposing login names and passwords to them.

The Hollywood-like plan failed only because they got the details wrong as
they attempted the invalid transfers totaling 229,000,000 pounds sterling.

The case is in the news again now because the ringleader has now been
convicted.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7909595.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7926294.stm

Mark Brader, Toronto, msb@vex.net


Altimeter and autopilot possible cause of plane crash near Schiphol

Ben Blout <bdbnew@MIT.EDU>
Wed, 4 Mar 2009 12:08:45 -0500 (EST)

I read an interesting article from the BBC, headlined "Altimeter 'had role'
in air crash".  In reporting a news conference conducted by Dutch Safety
Board chairman Pieter van Vollenhoven, the article reads in part:

  ...the plane had been at an altitude of 595m (1950ft) when making its
  landing approach to Schiphol airport.  But the altimeter recorded an
  altitude of around ground level.  The plane was on autopilot and its
  systems believed the plane was already touching down, he said.

  The automatic throttle controlling the two engines was closed and they
  powered down. This led to the plane losing speed, and stalling.

I am surprised that an autopilot would throttle back engines based on only
one instrument, the altimeter.  I would have assumed additional criteria
would need to be met - perhaps having weight on the landing gear.

The article raises other interested points, and can be found here:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7923782.stm


Normal Accidents and Black Swans

Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>
Wed, 4 Mar 2009 12:03:14 -0500

We've often discussed Perrow's "Normal Accidents" on this list.
Fundamentally, Perrow characterizes systems along two axes: Degree of
coupling and complexity or linearity vs. nonlinearity of interactions.
Systems in the fourth quadrant - high coupling, nonlinear - are inherently
prone to disasters.

In his article at:
	http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/taleb08/taleb08_index.html

Nassim Nicholas Taleb has a different but related analysis.  (He
concentrates on failures in the financial markets, but the lessons are much
broader.)  The dimensions Taleb identifies are nature of the probability
distribution (thin-tailed versus heavy or unknown tails) and complexity of
the cost, particularly the sensitivity of the cost of finding yourself in a
particular state for small variations in that state.  Taleb's 4th quadrant
is characterized by systems in which rare events dominate the total cost.
In these systems, statistical methods fail: We don't actually know the
probability distributions; we can only estimate them from events.  But
getting estimates of rare events requires huge numbers of observations.
Because most of the cost is in rare events, which never make it into our
observations, any estimate we make of expected costs is meaningless.

The connection to Perrow's work is through the complexity of cost axis.
Both of Perrow's characterizations of his fourth quadrant go directly to
this complexity.  Along the other axis, Perrow is specifically talking about
rare, outlier accidents - not the small, common, and understood problems
that systems are designed to handle, and do handle for years at a time with
no problems.  In eliminating those, he gets exactly to the rare but costly
events.

Taleb has a book out - The Black Swan - which I haven't read - but intend to
after reading this article.  -- Jerry


Building-Security-In Maturity Model: BSIMM

Gary McGraw <gem@cigital.com>
Thu, 5 Mar 2009 06:17:51 -0500

the BSIMM model went live today ahead of schedule http://bsi-mm.com. and
the *WSJ* broke the story:
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/03/04/new-effort-hopes-to-improve-software-security/

The first phase in our endeavor to bring some science to software security
is at a close. Our science-y approach started with some anthropology several
months ago. We asked nine firms to tell us about their software security
group (SSG), its inception, its activities, and the success it has
achieved. The result is the Building Security In Maturity Model authored by
Gary McGraw, Brian Chess (Fortify), and Sammy Migues, which is out for
public use at http://bsi-mm.com.

Please take a look at BSIMM. If you run or are active in a software security
group, look at it like a yardstick. Consider the activities listed versus
what your organization is doing.

We want to emphasize that we could not have done this without active
participation by the nine firms we interviewed. The data in BSIMM is their
data. Data from the interviews we conducted were used to build the model
from scratch. The examples included with the activities are real
examples. After building BSIMM, we scored each organization using it.  The
individual scorecards, although unreleasable, are fascinating. They provide
a unique glimpse into how local culture, perhaps as much or more than
business imperatives, drive the approach to software security.  Suffice it
to say, for now, that the carrot is once again shown to be mightier than the
stick.

As a final note, BSIMM is a data-driven model. The model will improve when
more real-world data are added.

sammy, gem and brian


An insider attack... in the police

<Jeremy Epstein>
Fri, 06 Mar 2009 08:34:39 -0500

Even police forces aren't immune from insider attacks that compromise
personnel information.

http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=security&articleId=9129023

Jaikumar Vijayan, *Computerworld*, 5 Mar 2009

In a demonstration of how no organization is immune from insider threats,
the New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF) office is notifying about 80,000
current and former NYPD officers of the potential compromise of their
personal information after a civilian employee recently stole storage media
containing the data.

A sample alert posted on the pension fund site identified the individual as
an employee of the PPF and said he was arrested Feb.  27 after a security
breach at one of the pension fund's disaster recovery sites.

At the time of the arrest, the individual was discovered to be in possession
of "certain business records" containing data about retired and active
members of the NYPD. The compromised data included Social Security numbers,
names, addresses and bank account information, the statement said.

"Even though the property was recovered, we cannot assure you that the
information was not compromised," the statement said regarding why it
was sending out the notifications.  [...]

Jeremy Epstein, Senior Computer Scientist, SRI International
1100 Wilson Blvd, Suite 2800, Arlington VA  22209  703-247-8708


Diebold delete button for erasing audit logs (Kim Zetter)

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Wed, 4 Mar 2009 11:03:24 PST

Kim Zetter, Diebold Voting System Has 'Delete' Button for Erasing Audit Logs
*Wired News*, 3 Mar 2009

An investigation by California's secretary of state into why a product made
by e-voting system vendor Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold
Election Systems) lost about 200 ballots in Humboldt County during the
U.S. presidential election revealed the presence of a "clear" button in some
versions of the machine's Global Election Management System (GEMS) software
that allows someone to permanently erase audit logs from the system.  The
secretary of state's report says the logs "contain--or should
contain--records that would be essential to reconstruct operator actions
during the vote tallying process."  The proximity of the clear button to the
"print" and "save as" buttons raises the risk of the logs being erased
accidentally, and the system provides no warning to operators of the danger
of clicking on the button.  Premier/Diebold retained the button despite an
apparent warning from a system developer, and though the button was removed
from subsequent iterations of the software, the version with the button is
still used in three California counties and other U.S. states.  The report
says that under the voting system standards "each of the errors and
deficiencies in the GEMS version 1.18.19 software...standing alone would
warrant a finding by an Independent Testing Authority (ITA) of 'Total
Failure' (indicated by a score of 1.0) had the flaw been detected."  The
California report's findings bring up issues about the auditing logs on
voting systems made by other vendors, and about what course of action states
that use the Premier system will follow now that they are aware that their
voting software fails to produce a sufficient audit trail to guarantee the
integrity of an election.
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/03/ca-report-finds.html


Re-examining assumptions

Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>
Mon, 2 Mar 2009 18:47:06 -0500

A recent paper submitted to Usenix HotSec:
"Do Strong Web Passwords Accomplish Anything?" -
http://www.usenix.org/events/hotsec07/tech/full_papers/florencio/florencio.pdf

re-opens points that "we all know the answers to".  In this case, the
question is just how strong a password has to be.  It's accepted wisdom that
passwords must be taken from large character sets and be long.  However, the
attacks that led to these conclusion were off line: That is, the attacker
could try passwords at any speed for as long as he wanted (for example, by
stealing the file of hashed passwords and then generating passwords and
computing their hashes).  However, this is not a realistic attack against
web-based systems. An on-line guessing attack can be detected and blocked
easily.

In fact, the most dangerous attacks - phishing, keylogging -- are no less
effective against strong passwords than against weak ones.  There is an
attack (bulk guessing against all accounts) that can be useful against weak
passwords, but the authors show that there are alternative defenses that are
probably much better from a UI point of view than requiring stronger
passwords.

It's all to easy to remember the results of papers without remembering the
assumptions that went into them.  In a field such as computer science where
order-of-magnitude changes in parameters critical to results are common over
fairly short periods of time, this is a dangerous way to work!


Credit card #s plucked out of air at FL Best Buy

David Ian Hopper <imhopper@gmail.com>
March 2, 2009 9:09:03 AM EST

  [From Dave Farber's IP]

Clever.  Try walking into your local Best Buy with an iPhone, and see what
networks you can hop on...

http://www.bestbuy.com/store/550/

 - - ---------------

The following advisory applies to customers who shopped at the Best Buy
located at 1880 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd in West Palm Beach, FL in November and
December 2008.

An employee at Best Buy's 1880 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd in West Palm Beach, FL
allegedly stole credit card information during November and December 2008
using an unauthorized personal device. Best Buy learned of the theft on
Jan. 5, 2009. With the cooperation and assistance of store management, the
employee was identified and taken into federal custody by the Secret Service
on Jan. 7, 2009.  That person is no longer employed by Best Buy.

Although none of Best Buy's electronic systems were compromised by this
former employee's actions, Best Buy believes that approximately 4,000 people
could have been affected by this law enforcement authorities and all
relevant payment card brands have been notified of the incident and Best Buy
is fully cooperating with all investigations.

In addition, Best Buy is sending letters to customers who may have been
affected by this fraudulent activity, notifying them of the situation and
encouraging them to review their account statements and monitor their credit
reports. ...

Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now


Worldpay ATM system breached

Neil Youngman <n.s.youngman@btinternet.com>
Mon, 2 Mar 2009 08:15:22 +0000

This security breach at Worldpay appears to have 2 unique features. First,
the crackers had sufficient access to raise the limits on payment cards and
second, the cracked cards were used in a coordinates attack by footsoldiers
in 49 different cities worldwide.

http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=1197
http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2008/12/22/daily24.html
http://www.itpro.co.uk/609793/royal-bank-of-scotland-s-worldpay-hit-by-atm-scam


Re: Iridium and Cosmos satellites collide (Knowlton, RISKS-25.59)

Ivan Jager <aij+@mrph.org>
Thu, 5 Mar 2009 15:15:09 -0500

I found this article gives quite a bit of insight into how the satellites
could have crashed: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1314/1

Basically, the US military keeps their high accuracy tracking data secret,
and the low accuracy data they publish didn't even make Iridium 33 and
Cosmos 2251 look like a likely collision. Of course, even the high accuracy
data only gives a probability, and the military doesn't have enough
resources (mostly constrained by trained personnel) to analyze all possible
collisions. Even if they did, it seems Iridium didn't even have a plan in
place for dealing with likely collisions. Or perhaps they were more like,
"Lalala, we're going to pretend that can't happen because we can't afford to
deal with it." And of course there's the Russians, who left a derelict
satellite where it would intersect many other orbits, and launched both
satellites which collided.  Basically, everyone involved is to blame to some
extent.

I guess sometimes it is cheaper to take risks and let everyone else deal
with the consequences.


Risk Contained In RISKS Posting?

"David E. Price, SRO, CHMM" <price16@llnl.gov>
Thu, 5 Mar 2009 09:37:16 -0800

Be careful which active links you click, even in RISKS postings.

The recent posting about the Wikileaks cracking of encryption of documents
found on a U.S. Pentagon server <Wikileaks cracks key NATO document on
Afghan war> highlights a risk in quoting URLs without adding precautionary
statements.

The original posting contained a statement saying "Altogether four
classified or restricted NATO documents of interest on the Pentagon site
were discovered to share the 'progress' password.  Wikileaks has decrypted
the documents and released them in full:" followed by URLs to pages which I
assume lead to downloadable documents.

I assume this statement means that at least one the linked documents was/is
classified, but it may indicate only a suggestive teaser. (No, I didn't
follow the links...)

Anyone who works in a classified environment and downloads one of the
purported classified documents could have contaminated their unclassified
computer system (and associated proxy servers and spam scanning servers,
etc.) with classified information.

This would result in a large isolation and cleanup effort, requiring at
least the local sub-net to be taken offline for some time.

David E. Price  SRO, CHMM, Senior Consequence Analyst for Special Projects,
Global Security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P. O. Box 808  L-073
Livermore, CA  USA  94551

  [The burden of the typical unclassified RISKS reader is not on the reader.
  The burden on a classified reader reading something classified from a
  supposedly unclassified system is clearly not on The Risks Forum.  There
  is also a fundamental gap -- the folks who worry about multilevel security
  (for confidentiality and nonleakage) should also be worried about some
  form of multilevel integrity (as in the lack of dependence on less
  trustworthy people, programs, software, hardware, systems, networks, and
  so on, especially in the presence of malware, phishing, ...  PGN]


Re: Wikileaks cracks key NATO document on Afghan war

Charles Wood <j.charles.wood@gmail.com>
Tue, 3 Mar 2009 18:42:03 +0900
  (Nye, RISKS-25.59)

I just wonder if this is NATO experimenting with viral marketing?

When you read the documents, you see a press group that has developed the
current text of 'the message' including all the good things they want to say
about themselves. It is basically propaganda for the troops and for release
to interested journalists. They include a small bit about what they don't
really like to discuss, but for which a standard and reasonable answer is
supplied.

When you look at it, there is nothing in these documents that you wouldn't
get doled out continuously at innumerable press briefings and troop
briefings. Nothing secret, nothing key, nothing new - rather boring press
conference material really.

What is new and unique (I think - though perhaps earlier examples exist?) is
that the documents have been trivially located and cracked and the entire
message passed to every interested reader on the Internet.

Far more people than ever was likely now know exactly the official NATO
position and thoughts.

You don't suppose someone in NATO marketing had a bright idea do you?

I have a theory that in this life, 99% of bad stuff is caused by stupidity
and 1% by malevolence. In this case I'm prepared to even the odds quite a
lot.


Re: Google Gaffe: Gmail Outage ... (Spira, RISKS-25.59)

Alain Picard <Dr.Alain.Picard@gmail.com>
Mon, 02 Mar 2009 20:41:35 +1100

Except, of course, that e-mail is a store and forward medium, and for me a
2.5hr delay on e-mail is perfectly acceptable.  Perhaps the risk is in
people using a technology for purposes for which it is not intended?  (in
this case, as a substitute for instant messaging.)

Gmail didn't lose any mail.  For me, having a hosted e-mail system where my
mail doesn't get lost and is easily searchable certainly seems worth a 2.5hr
inconvenience every few months.  It certainly seems better performance than
every other in-house system I've used.

Now, once someone hacks and takes over your GMAIL credentials, getting your
account back.... now _that's_ a risky proposition!  :-)


"Peter Zilahy Ingerman, PhD" <pzi@ingerman.org>
Tue, 03 Mar 2009 15:36:40 -0500
Subject: Verizon curiosity

>Date: 	Tue, 03 Mar 2009 14:05:18 -0600 (CST)
> From: Verizon Online, High Speed Internet Customer Care Team
> <verizon.update.2@verizon.net>
> Subject: 	Important information about your High Speed Internet Service

Dear Verizon High Speed Internet Customer,

On MARCH 17TH, 2009, Verizon will be performing network maintenance that
will temporarily interrupt your Verizon High Speed Internet service for
approximately one hour between the hours of 11:00 pm and 8:00 am local time.
If the lights on your modem are blinking after 8:00 am local time on
November 21st, please power cycle your modem.  To power cycle your modem,
please do the following:

- Use the power switch on the back of the modem to turn off the power
- Wait 60 seconds
- Turn the modem back on.
- Wait 45 seconds to allow the modem to synchronize to the server, and then
- try reconnecting to the Internet.

Note: If your modem doesn't have an on/off switch, unplug the modem from its
power source instead of turning the modem off.

We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause and appreciate your
cooperation.

Thank you for choosing Verizon Online as your High Speed Internet service
provider.

Verizon Online Customer Care Team

  [They probably also did this LAST November 20, and just changed THAT date
  to March 17, but forgot to change the November 21 date.  PGN]
    [Yup ... exactly what happened, I think. I remember a similar message a
    few months ago. But I thought that Risks might enjoy it. I've stirred
    them up for an explanation, and will let you know.  PZI]

Please report problems with the web pages to the maintainer

Top