When Dave deBronkart tried to transfer his medical records from Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center to Google Health, a new free service that lets patients keep all their health records in one place and easily share them with new doctors, he was stunned at what he found. Google said his cancer had spread to either his brain or spine -- a frightening diagnosis deBronkart had never gotten from his doctors -- and listed an array of other conditions that he never had, as far as he knew, like chronic lung disease and aortic aneurysm. A warning announced his blood pressure medication required "immediate attention." It turns out that Google Health uses information from billing records, which can be inaccurate, undated, and was never intended to be used by doctors. Transferring existing paper records could take years and hundreds of millions of dollars. Insurance data, by contrast, is already computerized and far easier and cheaper to download. But it is also prone to inaccuracies, partly because of the clunky diagnostic coding language used for medical billing, or because doctors sometimes label a test with the disease they hope to rule out, medical technology specialists say. Ironically, Beth Israel has one of the most advanced electronic medical records systems in the country, with clinical records carefully tended by doctors and accessible to patients on a secure website. But Google Health prefers providers send information in coded form to build the list of patient's medical conditions so the program can guide patients to additional information on the Internet about each disease using links. The neatly packaged billing codes are easier to link to than the mix of medical terms and standard language doctors use in their clinical records. [Source: Lisa Wangness, *The Boston Globe*, 13 Apr 2007] http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2009/04/13/electronic_health_records_raise_doubt/ [I used this case in beginning a keynote talk I gave on identities, trust, and trustworthiness at NIST on 15 Apr 2009 for the IDtrust 2009 conference. It was highly relevant, and came up several times during the talk. My slides are online on my website and on the IDtrust site. PGN] http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/idtrust09+x4.pdf [Incidentally, an earlier article by Stephen Smith in *The Boston Globe*, 9 Apr 2009, noted that more than 338 Massachusetts hospital patients "suffered perilous falls, got the wrong medication, or had medical instruments left inside them." On the other hand, almost 2/3 of those involved falls. PGN] http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/04/09/hospital_patient_mishaps_top_300/
A Canadian woman driving a small car was involved in a car crash. Investigators found that she likely would have survived if not for her laptop, which had been placed unsecured in the back seat and which flew forward and hit her in the back of the head. http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/04/15/bc-surrey-laptop-crash-kills-woman.html [It actually might make some sense for laptops to be in cases and anchored with seatbelts -- particularly the new Mac Airbooks. PGN]
Once again we are reminded of the fragility of our infrastructures -- this time fiber-optic cables and accessible manhole covers. Ten cables were severed at four different locations in the wee hours of the morning of 9 Apr 2009. At least 50,000 landline telephone customers and many others had their service seriously disrupted by fiber-optic cuts that also affected cell-phone service and Internet connectivity in Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and San Benito counties. It impacted hospitals, businesses, banks, 911 calls to police and fire departments, computerized medical records, ATMs, and ubiquitous use of credit and debit cards. [Source: Long article by Nanette Asimov, Ryan Kim, and Kevin Fagan, *San Francisco Chronicle*, 10 Apr 2009; PGN-ed] With pervasive physical and logical vulnerabilities, sophisticated malware such as Conficker, and `normal accidents', we really need to consider our infrastructures much more holistically.
Click and Clack (Tom and Ray on NPR's Car Talk) had a caller this morning saying that her Vesta tire-pressure warning system goes off whenever she drove on a particular stretch of highway. After a little grilling, it turns out she was passing the NSA complex at Fort Meade. C&C concluded it had to be Radio Frequency Interference, and wondered whether it affects only Vestas, or perhaps other late-model cars with the newly mandated wireless sensors that might operate on the same frequency. [This was in MD. If it also happens in VA (e.g., near Langley), there might be Vestal Virginians calling in as well. PGN]
http://www.effi.org/blog/2009-04-09-EVoting-Supreme-Admin-Court.html Electronic Frontier Finland (EFFI), 9 Apr 2009 Kirjoittaja: Antti Vaha-Sipila, Huhtikuu 9, 2009 The Supreme Administrative Court has ruled on the Finnish municipal elections of 28 october 2008, in which an e-voting system was piloted. In its decision, the court sided with the complainants, overturning an earlier decision of Helsinki Administrative Court, and the decisions of the municipal central elections committees to confirm the election results. As a result, the three municipalities that took part in the Finnish e-voting pilot must now hold new elections as soon as possible. As the e-voting pilot has ended and the law authorising e- voting expired in December 2008, the new elections will use a traditional paper ballot system. The Supreme Administrative Court decision was based on two issues: first, the voting instructions that the voters had received by mail were incorrect, and second, the user interface of the e-voting terminals was deemed to be flawed. The voting process utilised a smart card given to each voter, and upon premature removal of the card, the voting terminals gave no indication that the vote was not cast. As the system did not use a voter-verified paper ballot, voters might have been left with an impression that the vote had in fact been cast. It is notable that the Court did not address the general lawfulness of e-voting. According to the Finnish law authorising e-voting, electronic ballot boxes would need to be archived until the next election. These electronic ballot boxes contain encrypted information on who voted and how. This poses a risk to voter secrecy. However, the Court refused to rule on whether this is unlawful, or whether the electronic ballot box would need to be destroyed. In addition, the Court did not address the question whether an e-voting system would need to be more transparent. A significant amount of system design in the Finnish e-voting pilot were declared 'trade secrets', and the system source code is closed. The Court decision still leaves an open question whether paperless, 'black box' e-voting systems could be fielded in the future. [Many other sources are cited on the EFFI website. PGN]
[Thanks to Gene Spafford for spotting this one. PGN] A CIA agent testified before the Election Assistance Commission. His position (or perhaps the CIA's?): electronic votes are not secure and can be altered -- and are being altered in some locales. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/226/story/64711.html
Phillip Porras, Hassen Saidi, and Vinod Yegneswaran, Technical Report, Addendum Release Date: 08 March 2009, Last Update: 4 April 2009 Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, 333 Ravenswood Avenue Menlo Park CA 94025 USA This addendum provides an evolving snapshot of our understanding of the latest Conficker variant, referred to as Conficker C. The variant was brought to the attention of the Conficker Working Group when one member reported that a compromised Conficker B honeypot was updated with a new dynamically linked library (DLL). Although a network trace for this infection is not available, we suspect that this DLL may have propagated via Conficker's Internet rendezvous point mechanism (Global Network Impact). The infection was found on the morning of Friday, 6 March 2009 (PST), and it was later reported that other working group members had received other DLL reinfections throughout the same day. Since that point, multiple members have reported upgrades of previously infected machines to this latest variant via HTTP-based Internet rendezvous points. We believe this latest outbreak of Conficker variant C began first spreading at roughly 6 p.m. PST, 4 March 2009 (5 March UTC). In this addendum report, we summarize the inner workings and practical implications of this latest malicious software application produced by the Conficker developers. In addition to the dual layers of packing and encryption used to protect A and B from reverse engineering, this latest variant also cloaks its newest code segments, along with its latest functionality, under a significant layer of code obfuscation to further hinder binary analysis. Nevertheless, with a careful mixture of static and dynamic analysis, we attempt here to summarize the internal logic of Conficker C. ... http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/addendumC/ New: Free Detection Utilities Conficker C P2P Snort Detection Module http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/contrib/plugin.html Conficker C Network Scanner http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/contrib/scanner.html [Phil Porras and his colleagues have done an amazing job in reverse engineering and analyzing Conficker. See the Malware Threat Center, Cyber Threat Analytics, and BotHunter. PGN]
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20090417p2a00m0na004000c.html A 10-year-old boy in Kyoto was able to purchase cigarettes from a vending machine equipped with face identification technology, it has been found. Kyoto Prefectural Police conducted an experiment with the cooperation of the boy, who had bought cigarettes from a vending machine this February. Neither the Ministry of Finance, which had approved the use of such machines in lieu of those that read Taspo I.C. cards stored with personal identification information, nor the manufacturer of face identification vending machines have heard of other instances in which elementary school children have been misidentified as adults. According to police, the boy confessed that he had purchased cigarettes from a vending machine when he was questioned by his father about the cigarettes he had in his possession, and the father then contacted the juvenile division of Kyoto police. Early this month, police asked the boy to re-enact what he had done at the vending machine in question. The boy stood on the frame of his bicycle to move closer to the camera installed in the machine, pressed the "confirm" button, and was identified as an adult. Face identification vending machines determine a person's approximate age from the size of their eyes and mouth and their bone structure. If a buyer is not identified as an adult, they must present a driver's license. Designed to prevent minors from buying cigarettes, 5,200 such vending machines have been in operation across Japan since the system's use was approved in July. Kyoto police know of at least five instances in which junior high school students were misidentified as adults. "We plan to push the Ministry of Finance and vending machine manufacturers to make efforts to prevent minors from buying cigarettes from vending machines," said police. "We are currently investigating the cause," said a representative of the vending machine manufacturer. "We are constantly upgrading our software to meet increasingly tough standards. The vending machine in question has also been upgraded." It is unclear, however, whether the boy was able to make purchases after the upgrade. The legal smoking age in Japan is 20.
[From someone contributing anonymously to Dave Farber's IP] A paper that speaks to market failure is at: http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5370/type,1/ Given that we know that perimeter defenses are ineffective illusions in cyberspace, to what market should regulation be targeted to have the most desirable impacts? Would it be the market for devices, operating systems, network infrastructure, application software and services, on-line content? All of the above? "A new Federal approach to cybersecurity will fail if it does not elicit actions that the private sector will not otherwise perform. Government intervention in response to market failure can include regulation (or the threat of regulation) or subsidy. Both have limitations, but both are preferable to inaction. We are at the end of a long era of deregulation, an effort that was initially beneficial but it went too far in the last Administration. Finding a new and more balanced approach will not be easy. The intellectual heritage of deregulation lives in assertions such as any regulation to improve security will hurt innovation. Like all lobbyist mantras, it contains a grain of truth while being fundamentally and dangerously wrong. Innovation is a complex process, and simple statements about cause and effect deserve only skepticism." Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now
There is a saying in the North of England of 'nowt for owt' (rhyming with 'out'). That is 'there is nothing for free.' I have just been sucked into an unwanted near 48-pound annual premium membership subscription by Amazon and there is no way to unsubscribe. I use Amazon.com to purchase various items of interest about four times a year. I'm never in a hurry to receive these. Just now I attempted to purchase a book and was offered the cheapest deal from Amazon with no packing or postage if I signed up for a 'free' trial of their new premium next day membership. This was easy to do, unsurprisingly. The p&p charges were then zeroed in my basket details - but then I received a response saying that payment had been declined by VISA. Hmm - payment for a 'free' trial offer - I smelt a rat. It also stated that an email had been sent - which I found was headed: "Payment Declined for Amazon Prime Free Trial Membership." The rat started to smell bad. I checked my account details and noticed that I had on my account a number of credit cards - all but one - now out-of-date. One of these latter had been used for the 'free' payment - LUCKILY. The email also stated that after the 'free' trial that my card would be charged 47.97 pounds for a one-year full membership!!!! I searched the web site and could find no information about this premium membership - only that I had inadvertently joined it. Worryingly I could NOT find any way to unsubscribe. My only solution to this situation was to delete ALL of my cards' details from my account. And I resolved NEVER to use Amazon again. Their loss. By this time - and running out of my time at the Internet cafe - I was very angry. The rat stank to high heaven. I trusted Amazon with my VISA card details and they attempted to suck me into an annual - and assumedbly ever increasing - membership that I had no need for. Let others be warned - if you smell a rat with a web site stop and investigate further before submitting credit card details.
Recently, my bank was taken over by another bank. As a consequence of this take-over, I was issued a new credit card. The card needed to be activated by an 'activation code' which was sent in a separate letter a few days after I received the card. To activate you need to call a toll-free number, enter the number of your credit card, the activation code and your date of birth. I tried to activate twice and both times it failed without telling me the reason for failure. I was advised to call the bank's customer service desk. This morning I called the service desk and was asked the last eight numbers of the card, my full address (including the post code) and my date of birth. I was then told my date of birth was incorrectly recorded in the system and that this was the reason for activation failure. The nice lady at the service desk then activated my card without asking for the activation code. I'm sure you can see the holes in the system here: I can steal a card, phone the service desk and tell them the date of birth is not what is in their system (the full address and postcode is printed on both letters and thus is also in my possession) and have the card activated. How can the bank check my DoB over the phone? If they had asked me to give them the activation code at least that would mean I would have to steal two envelopes: the one with the CC and the one with the activation code.
So here's an entry in the Bad Website Security Question derby: "What sports team do you most like to see lose?" This appeared for online banking services for a local northeast US regional bank. If one knows anything about pro sports rivalries in the Northeast, there's maybe two to five potential answers to that question that would cover 90% or more of respondents. (And the bank even sponsors by name a pro sports arena in a northeast city.) At least it isn't a password-retrieval question. It's an extra factor required for authentication in addition to the regular password. So it can't compromise my account, but the security it provides is quite illusory.
Threat Level from Wired.com http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/04/pins.html Hackers have crossed into new frontiers by devising sophisticated ways to steal large amounts of personal identification numbers, or PINs, protecting credit and debit cards, says an investigator. The attacks involve both unencrypted PINs and encrypted PINs that attackers have found a way to crack, according to an investigator behind a new report looking at the data breaches. The attacks, says Bryan Sartin, director of investigative response for Verizon Business, are behind some of the millions of dollars in fraudulent ATM withdrawals that have occurred around the United States. "We're seeing entirely new attacks that a year ago were thought to be only academically possible," says Sartin. Verizon Business released a report Wednesday that examines trends in security breaches. "What we see now is people going right to the source ... and stealing the encrypted PIN blocks and using complex ways to un-encrypt the PIN blocks." [From Dave Farber's IP distribution. Thanks to Dave for many fascinating items. PGN]
In RISKS-25.61, John Sebes reiterated the expert's condemnation of security by obscurity (SBO). I for one, would certainly not challenge the validity of what Mr. Sebes and others say -- within context. However, I have two social-engineering type speculations as to why the SBO myth won't die. First and foremost, nearly all governments, businesses, and academic institutions continue to embrace SBO. On the day when the news reports that NSA, IRS and Citibank open source all their software, and universities chip in with their GPA counting software; all to invite scrutiny for vulnerabilities, then I'll start to believe. Next, as an engineer I'm trained to always check the limiting cases. Suppose all the world's software, or even a substantial fraction of it, was made open source? I can't even guess how many zeroes to put on the number of lines of code in question. 9? 12? 15? Then, the obscurity shoe would shift to the other foot. Benevolent hackers would have their efforts diluted to almost nothing. Only a tiny fraction of the code would benefit from adequate inspection by open source enthusiasts. Malevolent hackers need only find unscrutinized corners of obscure applications to find something to exploit. The average number of pairs of eyes scrutinizing each line of code would be much less than one. It would be disastrous. Even on a much smaller scale, say the source code of the Windows OS, it seems likely that malevolent hackers inspecting the code would greatly outnumber the benevolent ones; especially, when considering the animosity towards Microsoft exhibited by the open source community. I believe that most of them don't *want* Windows to be secure; nor NSA nor IRS for that matter. Consider the plight of a manager responsible for the security of any attractive target software, and faced by the prospect of whether to open source the code. The code *might* benefit from the efforts of benevolent hackers, but it would *certainly* suffer from the attentions of malevolent ones. Within certain context, I can easily accept the arguments against SBO and for open source. The context would be a relatively small block of code (such as a voting machine, an encryption algorithm, or an OS kernel) and an open source community motivated to work, and work hard, on the benevolent side. Outside that context, I'm far from being convinced that SBO is a myth.
The e-maps where I live mark anything long and shiny (creek beds, landslides) as "road", and anything not (roads underneath trees) as "not a road". This combined with no concept of "vertical discontinuity", and any staircase could become the "best road". At least nobody's managed to drive off the _bottom_ of my cliff (Risks 24.13). I.e., there probably will be slightly less fatalities if the GPS destination is at the top of the cliff instead of the bottom.
A followup to my question in RISKS-25.55 about languages and/or libraries that reduce the problems caused by incorrect / insecure software arising from type mismatches in weakly typed data represented as strings. Google has recently announced an open-source library that tackles one consequence of this problem: cross-site scripting. It is part of a web page templating system, and it embodies a lot of domain-specific knowledge about the syntax and nesting of the various languages found in web pages. http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2009/03/reducing-xss-by-way-of-automatic.html
Enterprise Engineering (EDOC'09) SoEA@EE'09 is organised in conjunction with the 13th International Enterprise Computing Conference (EDOC) on September 1st, 2009, Auckland, New Zealand. The goal of the SoEA@EE'09 workshop is to clarify the relationship between business process management and service provisioning. The objective is twofold: (i) To characterise the strong relationship existing between Business Process Management (BPM) and Service oriented Enterprise Architecture (SoEA) (ii) To develop concepts and methods to assist the engineering and the management of Service-Oriented Enterprise Architectures (SoEA) and their support systems. The Call for Papers can be downloaded from the SoEA@EE'09 Web site : http://crinfo.univ-paris1.fr/users/nurcan/SoEA@EE_2009/ Selmin Nurcan, SoEA@EE'09 co-organiser Paper submission: May 31, 2009 [See the website for full details. PGN]
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