http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hereford-worcester-20731949 Admittedly, the system did work twice, but it sounds to me as if there was inadequate backup....
Baltimore issues speed camera ticket to motionless car By Scott Calvert, The Baltimore Sun, 12 Dec 2012 <firstname.lastname@example.org> http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-speed-camera-stopped-car-20121212,0,6559038.story Owner calls it "shockingly obvious" his car was not moving An automatic speed camera citation was issued to a car owned by Daniel Doty for going 38 in a 25. But there was a problem, as his car was standing still. (Baltimore Sun video) The Baltimore City speed camera ticket alleged that the four-door Mazda wagon was going 38 miles per hour in a 25-mph zone — and that owner Daniel Doty owed $40 for the infraction. But the Mazda wasn't speeding. It wasn't even moving. The two photos printed on the citation as evidence of speeding show the car was idling at a red light with its brake lights illuminated. A three-second video clip also offered as evidence shows the car motionless, as traffic flows by on a cross street. The camera that wrongly ticketed Doty on April 24 is in Northeast Baltimore in the 1700 block of E. Cold Spring Lane, at the intersection with Hillen Road. It is the seventh city speed camera that The Baltimore Sun has shown to have produced inaccurate citations bearing erroneous speed readings. Doty's is the first case in which the vehicle was clearly stationary. City officials gave no explanation for how it happened. Doty, a lawyer who lives in Lauraville, said he and his wife were amazed that the ticket was issued, calling it "shockingly obvious" from the images that the car was stopped. He has challenged the ticket and is scheduled to appear in District Court on Friday. "It was like someone was so obviously asleep at the switch," he said Wednesday. "I thought that was not supposed to happen." The city's speed camera contractor, Xerox State and Local Solutions, says each potential citation goes through two layers of review to weed out any that have a deficiency, such as an illegible license plate. Then a Baltimore police officer must review the citation before approving it for issuance to the vehicle owner. Each citation says the officer swears or affirms that the car was going at least 12 mph over the speed limit "based on inspection of the recorded images." The officer's signature is also printed. The Sun asked city officials why Doty's ticket was issued. Transportation Department spokeswoman Adrienne Barnes offered no explanation but said the agency would have more to say at Friday's meeting of a task force set up by Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake to study the city's entire speed and red light camera program. The city has 83 speed cameras and 81 red light cameras. It isn't clear from the signature on the citation which police officer reviewed Doty's ticket, and police spokesman Anthony Guglielmi didn't say when asked, but added, "The department finds any error unacceptable." The department has said that a single officer can review up to 1,200 citations in a given day. Xerox spokesman Chris Gilligan did not address Doty's citation. He noted in a statement that a "system-wide audit of the Baltimore photo enforcement program is ongoing and has resulted in implementing an additional manual review of citations at all camera locations." The Sun recently published an investigation focusing on the city's speed camera program, which has generated more than $48 million since it began three years ago. The investigation found that citations can be inaccurate and that judges routinely throw out tickets for a range of problems. The Sun has also shown that it is impossible for motorists to verify the alleged speeds with the information printed on tickets issued by Baltimore County, Howard County and the State Highway Administration. Since the articles' publication, several lawmakers have called for changes to the state law that governs the way the city and other jurisdictions operate speed camera programs. Gov. Martin O'Malley said Tuesday that state law bars contractors from being paid based on the number of citations issued or paid—an approach used by Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Howard County and elsewhere. "The law says you're not supposed to charge by volume. I don't think we should charge by volume," O'Malley said. "If any county is, they need to change their program." [Also noted by Jeremy Epstein: Of course, one could argue that it was hurtling through space with the rest of the earth at hundreds to millions of MPH (depending on what you include or exclude in the measurement), but earthbound traffic laws are generally written in terms relative to the speed of the earth. PGN] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/rosenwald-md/post/speed-camera-nabs-car-stopped-at-light/2012/12/14/e4818514-45fe-11e2-8061-253bccfc7532_blog.html?hpid=z4 http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-speed-cameras-police-response-20121213,0,546779.story
Wells Fargo's website buckles under flood of traffic http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9234957/Wells_Fargo_39_s_website_buckles_under_flood_of_traffic
Another day in the big city.... Tech Outages: Facebook Offline, Gmail and Google Services Down <http://www.frequentbusinesstraveler.com/2012/12/tech-outages-facebook-offline-gmail-and-google-services-down/> Gmail, which has gone down multiple times in the past several years, was down earlier today. The outage included other Google services such as Google Play, Google Drive, Google Calendar, and Chrome Sync. Some Chrome browser users reported on Twitter that loading Gmail would crash their browsers during the outage. It was not clear as to how many users were impacted. Some did report that they were able to use Gmail. [...]
Mike Masnick, *Techdirt*, 18 Dec 2012 So, as the deluge of hate towards Instagram got louder and louder concerning its terms of service change, the company has now come out and said that it will change the terms and, of course, that it never meant them to be read the way people were interpreting them, and that it plans to adjust the terms so that people aren't so damn angry at them. On the question of "advertising on Instagram" they note. ... http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121218/15010921430/instagram-wait-wait-thats-not-what-we-meant.shtml
http://j.mp/VfUdo6 (Slashdot via NNSquad) In Burdens of Proof: Cryptographic Culture and Evidence Law in the Age of Electronic Documents, author Jean-Francois Blanchette observes that the move to a paperless society means that paper-based evidence needs to be recreated in the digital world. It also requires an underlying security functionality to flow seamlessly across organizations, government agencies and the like. While the computing power is there, the ability to create a seamless cryptographic culture is much slower in coming."
This document provides security-related usage and configuration recommendations for Apple iOS devices such as the iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch. This document does not constitute Department of Defense (DoD) or United States Government (USG) policy, nor is it an endorsement of any particular platform; its purpose is solely to provide security recommendations. This guide may outline procedures required to implement or secure certain features, but it is also not a general-purpose configuration manual. http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/os/applemac/Apple_iOS_5_Guide.pdf In case you have an i<anything>—but 37 pages!
Declan McCullagh, CNET news, 23 Dec 2012 Revealed: NSA targeting domestic computer systems in secret test http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57560644-93/revealed-nsa-targeting-domestic-computer-systems-in-secret-test/ The National Security Agency's Perfect Citizen program hunts for vulnerabilities in "large-scale" utilities, including power grid and gas pipeline controllers, new documents from EPIC show. Newly released files show a secret National Security Agency program is targeting the computerized systems that control utilities to discover security vulnerabilities, which can be used to defend the United States or disrupt the infrastructure of other nations. The NSA's so-called Perfect Citizen program conducts "vulnerability exploration and research" against the computerized controllers that control "large-scale" utilities including power grids and natural gas pipelines, the documents show. The program is scheduled to continue through at least September 2014. The Perfect Citizen files obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information Center and provided to CNET shed more light on how the agency aims to defend -- and attack—embedded controllers. The NSA is reported to have developed Stuxnet, which President Obama secretly ordered to be used against Iran's nuclear program, with the help of Israel. U.S. officials have warned for years, privately and publicly, about the vulnerability of the electrical grid to cyberattacks. Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a congressional committee in February: "I know what we [the U.S.] can do and therefore I am extraordinarily concerned about the cyber capabilities of other nations." If a nation gave such software to a fringe group, Dempsey said, "the next thing you know could be into our electrical grid." Discussions about offensive weapons in the U.S. government's electronic arsenal have gradually become more public. One NSA employment posting for a Control System Network Vulnerability Analyst says the job involves "building proof-of concept exploits," and an Air Force announcement in August called for papers discussing "Cyberspace Warfare Attack" capabilities. The Washington Post reported last month that Obama secretly signed a directive in October outlining the rules for offensive "cyber-operations." "Sabotage or disruption of these industries can have wide-ranging negative effects including loss of life, economic damage, property destruction, or environmental pollution," the NSA concluded in a public report (PDF) discussing industrial control systems and their vulnerabilities. The 190 pages of the NSA's Perfect Citizen files, which EPIC obtained through the Freedom of Information Act last week, are heavily redacted. At least 98 pages were completely deleted for a number of reasons, including that portions are "classified top secret," and could "cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security" if released, according to an accompanying letter from Pamela Phillips, chief of the NSA's FOIA office. [...]
http://j.mp/TT2gY4 (Slashdot via NNSquad) "The principal engineer for Nokia's WP7 and WP8 devices, Justin Angel, has demonstrated, in rather frank detail, how to pirate Windows 8 Metro apps, how to bypass in-app purchases, and how to remove in-game ads.
"Sumit Suman recently visited a site, did not sign up for anything, did not connect via social media, but got a personal email from the site the next day. Here's how they did it. I've learned that there is a "website intelligence" network that tracks form submissions across their customer network. So, if a visitors fills out a form on Site A with their name and email, Site B knows their name and email too as soon as they land on the site." - Darren Nix http://j.mp/T9oJxP (42 Floors via NNSquad)
[FYI—Just as higher temperatures "unify" different forces & particles in physics, the ongoing march of information technology "unifies" different human rights: the 3D printer makes the 2nd Amendment a part of the 1st Amendment. I would imagine that newly proposed gun legislation will require prior background checks before purchasing of a 3D printer and the registration of all 3D printers with the ATF. DMCA redux?] Andy Greenberg, Forbes Staff, 19 Dec 2012 http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/12/19/3d-printing-startup-makerbot-cracks-down-on-printable-gun-designs/ 3D-Printing Firm Makerbot Cracks Down On Printable Gun Designs You have the right to bear arms. But you don't necessarily have the right to upload them. In the wake of one of worst shooting incidents in American history, the 3D-printing firm Makerbot has deleted a collection of blueprints for gun components from Thingiverse, its popular user-generated content website that hosts 3D-printable files. Though Thingiverse has long banned designs for weapons and their components in its terms of service, it rarely enforced the practice until the last few days, when the company's lawyer sent notices to users that their software models for gun parts were being purged from the site. One letter forwarded to me by Thingiverse user Michael Guslick, for instance, explained that a design for an AR-15 trigger guard he uploaded to the site violated its rule that users not “collect, upload, transmit, display or distribute any User Content [that] promotes illegal activities or contributes to the creation of weapons. ... In exercising our policy enforcement discretion, we have decided to remove the content as of today.'' When I checked Thingiverse earlier this month for gun components, it was easy enough to find firearm parts such as the `lower receivers' for several models of semiautomatic rifles and handguns. Those designs had sparked controversy by potentially circumventing gun laws: The lower receiver is the `body' of a gun, and its most regulated component. So 3D-printing that piece at home and attaching other parts ordered by mail might allow a lethal weapon to be obtained without any legal barriers or identification. Guslick, a Wisconsin IT administrator whose experiments with a 3D-printed AR-15 lower receiver drew attention to the issue of 3D-printable weapons earlier this year, speculated that the removal of the files was linked with the Newtown, Connecticut gun massacre that killed 20 children and seven adults in an elementary school last week. “Correlation is not causation, but it seems pretty clear that the tragic shooting in [Connecticut] last week is the impetus for removal of some designs on Thingiverse,'' he wrote to me in an email. But Guslick pointed out that several gun-related items remained on the site, including a Glock magazine and Ruger pistol grip. “I'm not sure if those are targeted for takedown as well, or if only AR-15 compatible designs are being removed (given that the popular rifle has been utterly demonized in the media over the past few days, I suppose that may be plausible).'' Makerbot, for its part, included no mention of the Newtown shootings in a statement sent to me about the gun takedowns. “Makerbot's focus is to empower the creative process and make things for good,'' writes Makerbot spokesperson Jenifer Howard. “Thingiverse has been going through an evolution recently and has had numerous changes and updates. Reviewing some of the content that violates Thingiverse's Terms of Service is part of this process.'' In the past, Makerbot chief executive and founder Bre Pettis has remained ambivalent about guns on Thingiverse, which has become the world's most popular sharing platform for 3D-printing files. When I asked him about the issue last month, Pettis pointed to the terms of service ban on weapons, but added that the site goes largely unpoliced. He was more explicit in a blog post last year: “The cat is out of the bag. And that cat can be armed with guns made with printed parts.'' That freewheeling outlook contrasted with other 3D printing services like Shapeways, which bans the uploading of even gun-like toys more than 10 centimeters in length. Makerbot's move to follow suit may have also been inspired in part by a group calling itself Defense Distributed, which announced its intention to create an entirely 3D-printable gun in August and planned to potentially upload it to Thingiverse. In early December the group posted a YouTube video of its first experiment with an AR-15 built from a 3D-printed lower receiver. (The 3D printed piece broke after six shots.) In response to Makerbot's crackdown, Defense Distributed founder Cody Wilson wrote to me in an e-mail, saying that the group plans to create its own site for hosting `fugitive' 3D printable gun files in the next few hours.
http://j.mp/TWlSHc (*Atlantic* via NNSquad) "Speaking through his publicist, Freeman denied making any statement regarding the shootings. "He said the actor's camp was trying to determine the origin of the hoax statement," reported The Wrap's Todd Cunningham. If you were on Facebook or Twitter over the past two days, you probably saw some permutation of this meme being shared ..." - - - Not only was the viral quote attributed to Morgan false, but I will add that in the 21st century, attempting to suppress information in such a manner can only attract more attention, and is technically impossible as well.
http://j.mp/ZeQn2W (htmlist.com via NNSquad) "Someone has devised a relatively simple way of defrauding Amazon.com and they require very little hard information to pull it off. While this story is still developing, I'm writing this up in an effort to make Amazon aware of the problem and hopefully help them tighten their call center and live chat security." - Chris Cardinal
CRYPTO-GRAM, December 15, 2012, by Bruce Schneier Chief Security Technology Officer, BT, email@example.com http://www.schneier.com A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise. For back issues, or to subscribe, visit <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>. It's a feudal world out there. Some of us have pledged our allegiance to Google: We have Gmail accounts, we use Google Calendar and Google Docs, and we have Android phones. Others have pledged allegiance to Apple: We have Macintosh laptops, iPhones, and iPads; and we let iCloud automatically synchronize and back up everything. Still others of us let Microsoft do it all. Or we buy our music and e-books from Amazon, which keeps records of what we own and allows downloading to a Kindle, computer, or phone. Some of us have pretty much abandoned e-mail altogether... for Facebook. These vendors are becoming our feudal lords, and we are becoming their vassals. We might refuse to pledge allegiance to all of them—or to a particular one we don't like. Or we can spread our allegiance around. But either way, it's becoming increasingly difficult to not pledge allegiance to at least one of them. Feudalism provides security. Classical medieval feudalism depended on overlapping, complex, hierarchical relationships. There were oaths and obligations: a series of rights and privileges. A critical aspect of this system was protection: vassals would pledge their allegiance to a lord, and in return, that lord would protect them from harm. Of course, I'm romanticizing here; European history was never this simple, and the description is based on stories of that time, but that's the general model. And it's this model that's starting to permeate computer security today. Traditional computer security centered around users. Users had to purchase and install anti-virus software and firewalls, ensure their operating system and network were configured properly, update their software, and generally manage their own security. This model is breaking, largely due to two developments: 1. New Internet-enabled devices where the vendor maintains more control over the hardware and software than we do—like the iPhone and Kindle; and 2. Services where the host maintains our data for us—like Flickr and Hotmail. Now, we users must trust the security of these hardware manufacturers, software vendors, and cloud providers. We choose to do it because of the convenience, redundancy, automation, and sharability. We like it when we can access our e-mail anywhere, from any computer. We like it when we can restore our contact lists after we've lost our phones. We want our calendar entries to automatically appear on all of our devices. These cloud storage sites do a better job of backing up our photos and files than we would manage by ourselves; Apple does a great job keeping malware out of its iPhone apps store. In this new world of computing, we give up a certain amount of control, and in exchange we trust that our lords will both treat us well and protect us from harm. Not only will our software be continually updated with the newest and coolest functionality, but we trust it will happen without our being overtaxed by fees and required upgrades. We trust that our data and devices won't be exposed to hackers, criminals, and malware. We trust that governments won't be allowed to illegally spy on us. Trust is our only option. In this system, we have no control over the security provided by our feudal lords. We don't know what sort of security methods they're using, or how they're configured. We mostly can't install our own security products on iPhones or Android phones; we certainly can't install them on Facebook, Gmail, or Twitter. Sometimes we have control over whether or not to accept the automatically flagged updates—iPhone, for example—but we rarely know what they're about or whether they'll break anything else. (On the Kindle, we don't even have that freedom.) I'm not saying that feudal security is all bad. For the average user, giving up control is largely a good thing. These software vendors and cloud providers do a lot better job of security than the average computer user would. Automatic cloud backup saves a lot of data; automatic updates prevent a lot of malware. The network security at any of these providers is better than that of most home users. Feudalism is good for the individual, for small startups, and for medium-sized businesses that can't afford to hire their own in-house or specialized expertise. Being a vassal has its advantages, after all. For large organizations, however, it's more of a mixed bag. These organizations are used to trusting other companies with critical corporate functions: They've been outsourcing their payroll, tax preparation, and legal services for decades. But IT regulations often require audits. Our lords don't allow vassals to audit them, even if those vassals are themselves large and powerful. Yet feudal security isn't without its risks. Our lords can make mistakes with security, as recently happened with Apple, Facebook, and Photobucket. They can act arbitrarily and capriciously, as Amazon did when it cut off a Kindle user for living in the wrong country. They tether us like serfs; just try to take data from one digital lord to another. Ultimately, they will always act in their own self-interest, as companies do when they mine our data in order to sell more advertising and make more money. These companies own us, so they can sell us off—again, like serfs -- to rival lords...or turn us in to the authorities. Historically, early feudal arrangements were ad hoc, and the more powerful party would often simply renege on his part of the bargain. Eventually, the arrangements were formalized and standardized: both parties had rights and privileges (things they could do) as well as protections (things they couldn't do to each other). Today's Internet feudalism, however, is ad hoc and one-sided. We give companies our data and trust them with our security, but we receive very few assurances of protection in return, and those companies have very few restrictions on what they can do. This needs to change. There should be limitations on what cloud vendors can do with our data; rights, like the requirement that they delete our data when we want them to; and liabilities when vendors mishandle our data. Like everything else in security, it's a trade-off. We need to balance that trade-off. In Europe, it was the rise of the centralized state and the rule of law that undermined the ad hoc feudal system; it provided more security and stability for both lords and vassals. But these days, government has largely abdicated its role in cyberspace, and the result is a return to the feudal relationships of yore. Perhaps instead of hoping that our Internet-era lords will be sufficiently clever and benevolent—or putting our faith in the Robin Hoods who block phone surveillance and circumvent DRM systems—it's time we step in in our role as governments (both national and international) to create the regulatory environments that protect us vassals (and the lords as well). Otherwise, we really are just serfs. A version of this essay was originally published on Wired.com. http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/feudal-security/
Against Security: How We Go Wrong at Airports, Subways, and Other Sites of Ambiguous Danger, by Harvey Molotch, Princeton University Press, 278 pages, $35 Security is both a feeling and a reality, and the two are different things. People can feel secure when they're actually not, and they can be secure even when they believe otherwise. This discord explains much of what passes for our national discourse on security policy. Security measures often are nothing more than security theater, making people feel safer without actually increasing their protection. A lot of psychological research has tried to make sense out of security, fear, risk, and safety. But however fascinating the academic literature is, it often misses the broader social dynamics. New York University's Harvey Molotch helpfully brings a sociologist's perspective to the subject in his new book "Against Security." Molotch delves deeply into a few examples and uses them to derive general principles. He starts "Against Security" with a mundane topic: the security of public restrooms. It's a setting he knows better than most, having authored "Toilet: The Public Restroom and the Politics of Sharing" (New York University Press) in 2010. It turns out the toilet is not a bad place to begin a discussion of the sociology of security. People fear various things in public restrooms: crime, disease, embarrassment. Different cultures either ignore those fears or address them in culture-specific ways. Many public lavatories, for example, have no-touch flushing mechanisms, no-touch sinks, no-touch towel dispensers, and even no-touch doors, while some Japanese commodes play prerecorded sounds of water running, to better disguise the embarrassing tinkle. Restrooms have also been places where, historically and in some locations, people could do drugs or engage in gay sex. Sen. Larry Craig (R-Idaho) was arrested in 2007 for soliciting sex in the bathroom at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, suggesting that such behavior is not a thing of the past. To combat these risks, the managers of some bathrooms—men's rooms in American bus stations, in particular—have taken to removing the doors from the toilet stalls, forcing everyone to defecate in public to ensure that no one does anything untoward (or unsafe) behind closed doors. Subsequent chapters discuss security in subways, at airports, and on airplanes; at Ground Zero in lower Manhattan; and after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Each of these chapters is an interesting sociological discussion of both the feeling and reality of security, and all of them make for fascinating reading. Molotch has clearly done his homework, conducting interviews on the ground, asking questions designed to elicit surprising information. Molotch demonstrates how complex and interdependent the factors that comprise security are. Sometimes we implement security measures against one threat, only to magnify another. He points out that more people have died in car crashes since 9/11 because they were afraid to fly—or because they didn't want to deal with airport security—than died during the terrorist attacks. Or to take a more prosaic example, special "high-entry" subway turnstiles make it much harder for people to sneak in for a free ride but also make platform evacuations much slower in the case of an emergency. The common thread in "Against Security" is that effective security comes less from the top down and more from the bottom up. Molotch's subtitle telegraphs this conclusion: "How We Go Wrong at Airports, Subways, and Other Sites of Ambiguous Danger." It's the word *ambiguous* that's important here. When we don't know what sort of threats we want to defend against, it makes sense to give the people closest to whatever is happening the authority and the flexibility to do what is necessary. In many of Molotch's anecdotes and examples, the authority figure—a subway train driver, a policeman—has to break existing rules to provide the security needed in a particular situation. Many security failures are exacerbated by a reflexive adherence to regulations. Molotch is absolutely right to hone in on this kind of individual initiative and resilience as a critical source of true security. Current U.S. security policy is overly focused on specific threats. We defend individual buildings and monuments. We defend airplanes against certain terrorist tactics: shoe bombs, liquid bombs, underwear bombs. These measures have limited value because the number of potential terrorist tactics and targets is much greater than the ones we have recently observed. Does it really make sense to spend a gazillion dollars just to force terrorists to switch tactics? Or drive to a different target? In the face of modern society's ambiguous dangers, it is flexibility that makes security effective. We get much more bang for our security dollar by not trying to guess what terrorists are going to do next. Investigation, intelligence, and emergency response are where we should be spending our money. That doesn't mean mass surveillance of everyone or the entrapment of incompetent terrorist wannabes; it means tracking down leads—the sort of thing that caught the 2006 U.K. liquid bombers. They chose their tactic specifically to evade established airport security at the time, but they were arrested in their London apartments well before they got to the airport on the strength of other kinds of intelligence. In his review of "Against Security" in "Times Higher Education," aviation security expert Omar Malik takes issue with the book's seeming trivialization of the airplane threat and Molotch's failure to discuss terrorist tactics. "Nor does he touch on the multitude of objects and materials that can be turned into weapons," Malik laments. But this is precisely the point. Our fears of terrorism are wildly out of proportion to the actual threat, and an analysis of various movie-plot threats does nothing to make us safer. In addition to urging people to be more reasonable about potential threats, Molotch makes a strong case for optimism and kindness. Treating every air traveler as a potential terrorist and every Hurricane Katrina refugee as a potential looter is dehumanizing. Molotch argues that we do better as a society when we trust and respect people more. Yes, the occasional bad thing will happen, but 1) it happens less often, and is less damaging, than you probably think, and 2) individuals naturally organize to defend each other. This is what happened during the evacuation of the Twin Towers and in the aftermath of Katrina before official security took over. Those in charge often do a worse job than the common people on the ground. While that message will please skeptics of authority, Molotch sees a role for government as well. In fact, many of his lessons are primarily aimed at government agencies, to help them design and implement more effective security systems. His final chapter is invaluable on that score, discussing how we should focus on nurturing the good in most people—by giving them the ability and freedom to self-organize in the event of a security disaster, for example—rather than focusing solely on the evil of the very few. It is a hopeful yet realistic message for an irrationally anxious time. Whether those government agencies will listen is another question entirely. Amazon link to book: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/069115581X?ie=UTF8&tag=counterpane&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=069115581X or http://tinyurl.com/co7rm43 This review was originally published at reason.com. http://reason.com/archives/2012/12/12/unsafe-security
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