The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 27 Issue 82

Saturday 29 March 2014

Contents

Reconsidering Malaysian MH 370
PGN
A prosecution trend to watch out for: liking a Facebook post
Privacy Surgeon
Smart key, pretty dumb: Chevy Volt
Tim Duncan
Carmaker Misled Grieving Families on a Lethal Flaw
NYT
CASL destined to be challenged on grounds it violates Charter rights: lawyers
Brian Jackson via Gene Wirchenko
NSA: Fixing Internet vulnerabilities compromises national security
Henry Baker
Police Keep Quiet About Cell-Tracking Technology
Jack Gillum via Monty Solomon
Can You Trust 'Secure' Messaging Apps?
Molly Wood via Monty Solomon
Previewing e-mail in Outlook can lead to malware infection
Lewis Morgan via Gene Wirchenko
Third-Party Hotel Booking Sites Can Mislead Consumers
Alina Tugend via Monty Solomon
Obama to Call for End to N.S.A.'s Bulk Data Collection
Charlie Savage via Monty Solomon
Turkey Moves To Block Twitter At The IP Level
Lauren Weinstein
Turkey blocks Google's DNSs
tkalama
Closing the Gap to Human-Level Performance in Face Verification
Taigman et al. via Monty Solomon
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Reconsidering Malaysian MH 370

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Wed, 26 Mar 2014 17:01:07 PDT
Understanding of the saga of Malaysian MH 370 is still considerably murky.
The currently plausible seems to be that the plane apparently suffered some
sort of electrical technological failure with fire and intense smoke, or
perhaps human-aided catastrophic failure mode that might have eventually led
to the incapacitation of the crew (and presumably everyone on board) --
despite all of the aircraft's would-be modular redundancy.  In its last few
hours, the autopilot had evidently been enabled (only a single button push
is required to continue on the existing course), and the plane apparently
then continued to fly without any crew member's assistance until it ran out
of fuel somewhere in the south Indian Ocean.  Even with the limited radar
and electronic tracking, computation of the exact location of its demise is
subject to many real-time variables (winds, altitude, temperature, and so
on) in a very remote area.  Very little seems known about the reasons for
and effects of the earlier large changes in direction (an initial zig and
then zag) and altitude (up and then down).  There are still many unanswered
questions—as to the cause, the reasons for the initial zig-zag (perhaps
the pilot frantically tried to head toward an emergency landing on the
nearest island with a landing strip), how the crew became disabled, and
whether the sequence of unanticipated events unfolded, with perhaps some
combination of inadvertent and/or malicious human actions involved.  It
appears that unanticipated accidental causes, possibly with together pilot
inability to cope with overwhelming circumstances, are sufficient to explain
most of what happened, although the possibility of some malicious human
actions is still not out of the question.  The Malaysian government and
other geopolitical forces certainly contributed to the overall confusion.

In response, some people have suggested that black-box data should be
transmitted in real time to reliable remote repositories (truly cloud
servers?).  That might have been very effective in this case, to help
determine the initial series of events, although it might not have helped to
pinpoint the site of the ultimate crash site—where adequate satellite
communication coverage may not have existed, and where the data may have
been simply overwritten after the subsequent hours of continued flight.


A prosecution trend to watch out for: liking a Facebook post

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Tue, 25 Mar 2014 13:40:22 PDT
  [Thanks to Simon Davies <simon@privacy.org> for spotting this one.  PGN]

UK police action over "liking" a Facebook post could signal a dangerous
prosecution trend
http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/uk-police-action-over-liking-a-facebook-post-could-signal-a-dangerous-prosecution-trend/

  [like a look?  look alike?  MITI likes arose?  PGN]


Smart key, pretty dumb: Chevy Volt

Tim Duncan <tim@duncan.cx>
Tue, 25 Mar 2014 14:46:56 -0400
What if you don't want your Smart Key to automatically unlock the doors of
your Chevrolet Volt when it gets within three feet of the car? Well,
unfortunately, Chevrolet (General Motors) apparently never thought about
this scenario as they didn't design in a way to turn off this feature.

Interesting story about a woman who can't take her key with her surfing
(because it isn't water proof) and can't lock it in her car either because
it will automatically unlock her doors if she does.

http://techpageone.dell.com/downtime/smart-key-pretty-dumb/


Carmaker Misled Grieving Families on a Lethal Flaw

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Wed, 26 Mar 2014 11:41:37 -0400
Hilary Stout, Bill Vlasic, Danielle Ivory and Rebecca R. Ruiz
*The New York Times*, 24 Mar 2014

It was nearly five years ago that any doubts were laid to rest among
engineers at General Motors about a dangerous and faulty ignition switch. At
a meeting on May 15, 2009, they learned that data in the black boxes of
Chevrolet Cobalts confirmed a potentially fatal defect existed in hundreds
of thousands of cars.

But in the months and years that followed, as a trove of internal documents
and studies mounted, G.M. told the families of accident victims and other
customers that it did not have enough evidence of any defect in their cars,
interviews, letters and legal documents show. Last month, G.M. recalled 1.6
million Cobalts and other small cars, saying that if the switch was bumped
or weighed down it could shut off the engine's power and disable air
bags. ...

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/business/carmaker-misled-grieving-families-on-a-lethal-flaw.html


CASL destined to be challenged on grounds it violates Charter rights: lawyers (Brian Jackson)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Tue, 25 Mar 2014 12:54:39 -0700
Brian Jackson, *IT Business*, 24 Mar 2014
http://www.itbusiness.ca/news/casl-destined-to-be-challenged-on-grounds-it-violates-charter-rights-lawyers/47627

opening text:

Canada's regulations to limit unwanted e-mail messages from businesses have
been four years in the making, but if organizations representing the
business community get their way, it could unravel much faster than that.

Canada's Anti-Spam Legislation (CASL) is set to come into effect July 1 and
requires businesses to receive consent from consumers before sending them
commercial messages via e-mail or any other digital channel. But members of
the business community and lawyers critical of the new law say the first
organization fined by the enforcement regime will likely challenge it in
court on the basis that it violates the Charter's protection of free
speech. In this case, it would be a limitation on commercial speech.


NSA: Fixing Internet vulnerabilities compromises national security

hbaker1 <hbaker1@pipeline.com>
Fri, 21 Mar 2014 15:26:34 -0700 (GMT-07:00)
Richard Ledgett, Deputy Director of the NSA, recently responded to Edward Snowden in a 30-minute TED Talk interview with Chris Anderson:

https://www.ted.com/talks/richard_ledgett_the_nsa_responds_to_edward_snowden_s_ted_talk

also on YouTube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLNXIXingyU

Although this interview has been covered in the press, so far the articles
I've seen missed an important exchange between Ledgett and Anderson.

At ~7:40 into this interview, Chris asked Richard about the NSA's BULLRUN
program to weaken Internet encryption standards, and then at ~27:30 Chris
asks about the NSA's exploitation of existing Internet vulnerabilities.
Richard never directly answered the question about weakening encryption, but
he did declare that the NSA discloses to vendors the "overwhelming majority"
of vulnerabilities that the NSA finds.  Of course, no actual statistics were
given about the number of vulnerabilities that were disclosed, nor how long
the NSA took before such disclosures were made, nor how ethical it would be
for the NSA to leave US citizens, companies, banks, and state & local
governments at continuing risk of attacks from the vulnerabilities that the
NSA preferred not to disclose.

But Ledgett emphatically claimed that Snowden's disclosures of these
vulnerabilities compromised national security, thus equating "Internet
vulnerabilities" with "national security"; i.e., it is the NSA's policy to
preserve Internet vulnerabilities in the interest of "national security".

Nine months after Snowden's disclosures, I'm still trying to get my head
around how an agency of the U.S. government which is paid by my tax dollars
and which is sworn to protect me, arrogantly thinks that keeping me, my
identity, and my computers vulnerable to all the bad actors in the world is
somehow improving my "national security".

The NSA has apparently taken up Saddam Hussein's tactics and decided to use
me—and you and every American citizen with a computer—as a "human
shield" against terrorists.  Any damage to our identities and bank accounts
are merely collateral damage and acceptable losses in this war on
terrorists, drug dealers and paedophiles.  In the best gung-ho
Vietnam-war-like bravado, "we [the NSA] had to destroy the Internet in order
to save it".

At the very minimum, the NSA's view is an exceedingly provincial and warped
view of "national security".

It's time for these NSA guys/gals to "come out of the cold" and get a real
job in the commercial sector to help to actually protect each and all of us
from those bad actors on the Internet.


Police Keep Quiet About Cell-Tracking Technology (Jack Gillum)

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Wed, 26 Mar 2014 11:41:37 -0400
Jack Gillum, Associated Press, 22 Mar 2014

Police across the country may be intercepting phone calls or text messages
to find suspects using a technology tool known as Stingray.  But they're
refusing to turn over details about its use or heavily censoring files when
they do.

Police say Stingray, a suitcase-size device that pretends it's a cell tower,
is useful for catching criminals, but that's about all they'll say.

For example, they won't disclose details about contracts with the device's
manufacturer, Harris Corp., insisting they are protecting both police
tactics and commercial secrets. The secrecy - at times imposed by
nondisclosure agreements signed by police - is pitting obligations under
private contracts against government transparency laws.

Even in states with strong open records laws, including Florida and Arizona,
little is known about police use of Stingray and any rules governing it.

A Stingray device tricks all cellphones in an area into electronically
identifying themselves and transmitting data to police rather than the
nearest phone company's tower. Because documents about Stingrays are
regularly censored, it's not immediately clear what information the devices
could capture, such as the contents of phone conversations and text
messages, what they routinely do capture based on how they're configured or
how often they might be used. ...

http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/police-quiet-cell-tracking-technology-23016515


Can You Trust 'Secure' Messaging Apps? (Molly Wood)

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Sun, 23 Mar 2014 00:23:45 -0400
Molly Wood, *The New York Times*, blog, 19 Mar 2014

It's officially a post-Snowden and post-WhatsApp world, and my inbox is
filled with pitches from companies promoting their secure messaging
apps. But can you trust them?

As the messaging wars heat up, security seems to be the big differentiator
-the levels of security range from "military grade" to lightweight,
depending on the app. But all of them have one thing in common, said the
cryptographer and security expert Bruce Schneier: You shouldn't use them if
your life is on the line.

Mr. Schneier said when it comes to evaluating the security of a secure
messaging app, the real question lies in why you need it. ...

http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/can-you-trust-secure-messaging-apps/


Previewing e-mail in Outlook can lead to malware infection (Lewis Morgan)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Tue, 25 Mar 2014 12:56:23 -0700
Lewis Morgan, IT Governance, 25 Mar 2014
Microsoft 'zero day' vulnerability
http://blog.itgovernance.co.uk/microsoft-zero-day-vulnerability-previewing-emails-in-outlook-can-lead-to-malware-infection-2/

opening text:

On 24 March Microsoft released details about a vulnerability in Microsoft
Word that can be used to infect computers with malware. The disturbing part
however, is that computers can be infected from just 'previewing' an e-mail
in Microsoft Outlook.


Third-Party Hotel Booking Sites Can Mislead Consumers (Alina Tugend)

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Sun, 23 Mar 2014 00:23:45 -0400
Alina Tugend, *The New York Times*, 21 Mar 2014

This is the situation: Customers search for a particular hotel and click on
a link. They think they've landed on the official hotel website, but
unknowingly they really have arrived at an unrelated site of a hotel booking
company.

They're promised great deals - and warned that rooms are going fast - but it
turns out these so-called bargains are often worse than what's offered
directly by the hotel. Many people have discovered this practice the hard
way. Randy Ratliff, a lawyer in Kentucky; Debbie Greenspan, a hospitality
expert in Maryland; and dozens of other people have posted comments online
saying they were duped when they thought they were booking rooms on hotel
websites, only to wind up fighting credit card charges from companies they
had never heard of. ...

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/your-money/third-party-hotel-booking-sites-can-mislead-consumers.html


Obama to Call for End to N.S.A.'s Bulk Data Collection (Charlie Savage)

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Wed, 26 Mar 2014 11:41:37 -0400
Charlie Savage, *The New York Times*, 24 Mar 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-data.html

WASHINGTON - The Obama administration is preparing to unveil a legislative
proposal for a far-reaching overhaul of the National Security Agency's
once-secret bulk phone records program in a way that - if approved by
Congress - would end the aspect that has most alarmed privacy advocates
since its existence was leaked last year, according to senior administration
officials.

Under the proposal, they said, the N.S.A. would end its systematic
collection of data about Americans' calling habits. The bulk records would
stay in the hands of phone companies, which would not be required to retain
the data for any longer than they normally would.  And the N.S.A. could
obtain specific records only with permission from a judge, using a new kind
of court order. ...


Turkey Moves To Block Twitter At The IP Level

Lauren Weinstein <lauren@vortex.com>
Sat, 22 Mar 2014 15:43:25 -0700
  "In its effort to curtail access to Twitter, Turkey is getting more
  aggressive with a block of the service's IP address, according to sources
  inside Turkey as well as a DNS provider.  That means that changing their
  DNS server, whether it be Google DNS or OpenDNS, will no longer work for
  residents in the country ... But the latest move by the government will
  make it more difficult, but not quite impossible, for residents to access
  Twitter. By blocking Twitter at the IP level, DNS services will no longer
  work. Instead, citizens are being urged to access the service via VPN or
  by using the Tor anonymity network."
    http://j.mp/NE9nmr  (Techcrunch via NNSquad)

 - - -

If the government of Turkey comes knocking on the Internet Governance
door any time soon as things stand now, slam it in their face.

  [This has no end, apparently.  For example, browse on `Turkey blocks
  YouTube days after Twitter ban'.  PGN]


Turkey blocks Google's DNSs

tkalama <tkalama1@gmail.com>
Sun, 23 Mar 2014 11:07:27 +0200
[...] Many groups have voiced outrage and many have suggested manually
changing the DNS servers so that twitter can be accessed again. A day later,
Google's DNSs (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4) also have been blocked in Turkey.
Likewise, the IP addresses belonging to twitter.com have also been blocked.

Despite all these measures of censorship, the use of Twitter in Turkey has
exploded, thanks to proxy servers, alternative DNS servers, and VPN servers.

It has been said that Egypt's Mubarrak has remained in power for only 16
days after banning social networks in the country, thus Turks are hopeful
that already three of those sixteen days have already gone by.


Closing the Gap to Human-Level Performance in Face Verification (Taigman et al.)

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Sun, 23 Mar 2014 15:12:54 -0400
Yaniv Taigman, Ming Yang, Marc'Aurelio Ranzato, Lior Wolf
DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-Level Performance in Face Verification
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)

Abstract

In modern face recognition, the conventional pipeline consists of four
stages: detect => align => represent => classify. We revisit both the
alignment step and the representation step by employing explicit 3D face
modeling in order to apply a piecewise affine transformation, and derive a
face representation from a nine-layer-deep neural network. This deep network
involves more than 120 million parameters using several locally connected
layers without weight sharing, rather than the standard convolutional
layers.  Thus we trained it on the largest facial dataset to date, an
identity-labeled dataset of four million facial images belonging to more
than 4,000 identities, where each identity has an average of over a thousand
samples.  The learned representations coupling the accurate model-based
alignment with the large facial database generalize remarkably well to faces
in unconstrained environments, even with a simple classifier. Our method
reaches an accuracy of 97.25% on the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW)
dataset, reducing the error of the current state of the art by more than
25%, closely approaching human-level performance. ...

https://www.facebook.com/publications/546316888800776/
https://www.facebook.com/download/388286407980383/deepface.pdf

  [Potentially an interesting advance.  This might work fairly well for
  small groups of subjects.  But note that a 2.75% inaccuracy rate would
  represent 27,500 false identifications for each million subjects.  One
  potential question for Homeland Security: For how many known terrorists
  are there 1000 images, and for how many unknown terrorists are there any
  known images?  PGN]

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