The Europeans are trying to set up their own GSM, and are shooting up satellites like crazy. Except they appear to have miscalculated the orbits: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28910662 Don't know if a computer failure is involved. The ones already up there have mysterious power outages: http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/41643galileo-glitches-remain-a-mystery Sounds like my laptop.... Disaster in digitalization costs four lives Spiegel Online, a German news site, is reporting that an explosion that happened in the northern German city of Itzehoe in March 2014 and killed four people was due to a computer error: http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/explosion-in-itzehoe-war-eine-computerpanne-schuld-a-986011.html When transferring the plans for how the gas mains run from their previous, analogue form to a digital mapping system, it seems that a few were missed. Or perhaps it was a problem of the times: the maps were digitalized in 1977, according the the radio and TV station NDR: http://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/Fehlerhafte-Karte-fuehrte-zu-Explosion-in-Itzehoe,itzehoe222.html. A ditch digger ruptured a gas line that was not on the map—the ensuing explosion killed one worker and three people in the houses affected, and injured 15 others, including the operator of the digger. Six houses were rendered unusable. The popular "news"paper Bild has an aerial picture of the damage: http://www.bild.de/regional/hamburg/itzehoe/edv-umstellung-fuehrte-zu-gas-explosion-37229888.bild.html The city is now busy comparing the digital maps with the analog ones (that are still around) looking for possible other missing gas lines. The moral of the story: Triple check digitalizations that could affect lives, and don't throw out the analogue stuff. Prof. Dr. Debora Weber-Wulff, HTW Berlin, Treskowallee 8, 10313 Berlin +49-30-5019-2320 http://www.f4.htw-berlin.de/people/weberwu/
Marc Schneider, Billboard, 25 Aug 2014 http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/6229251/sony-twitter-bomb-threat-hackers-playstation-service An American Airlines flight carrying Sony Online Entertainment president John Smedley was diverted on Sunday after a hacker group dubbed the Lizard Squad used Twitter to call in a bomb scare. Earlier in the day, the group claimed responsibility for a denial-of-service attack that knocked out Sony's PlayStation Network. The bomb threat began with a tweet directed to American Airlines from Lizard Squad that specified the flight number and its destination. Lizard Squad @LizardSquad .@AmericanAir We have been receiving reports that @j_smedley's plane #362 from DFW to SAN has explosives on-board, please look into this. 1:29 PM—24 Aug 2014 Unaware of what Lizard Squad was doing, Smedley continued to tweet about his flight issues to his 40k-plus followers. “Awesome. Flight diverted to Phoenix for security reasons. I hate American Airlines'' Something about security and our cargo. Sitting on Tarmac. During this time, the hackers began mocking Smedley. "Hey haven't heard from you in an hour, is everything alright?" they snarked. The group also tried to get the hashtag #PrayForFlight362 to trend, and they appear to be linking themselves with both Anonymous and ISIS, the Islamic group responsible for the beheading of journalist James Foley. Lizard Squad @LizardSquad Follow Today we planted the ISIS flag on @Sony's servers #ISIS #jihad pic.twitter.com/zvqXb2f5XI 11:03 AM—24 Aug 2014 Smedley later acknowledged the diversion and said he would not discuss further. "Justice will find these guys," he said. American Airlines said on Twitter that it was aware of the threat and the FBI confirmed with Reuters that it was investigating. "We're attempting to slam Sony back into the ground," the Lizard group said early Sunday. The DoS attacked worked and overwhelmed the system with traffic, causing a brief outage, however, Sony said that no personal data had been stolen from users.The feds are also looking into the disruption in service to Sony's gaming system, which occurred just hours before. Sony released the following statement: "The PSN and Sony Entertainment Network are back online and people can now enjoy the services on their PlayStation devices. The networks were taken offline due to a distributed denial of service attack. We have seen no evidence of any intrusion to the network and no evidence of any unauthorized access to users' personal information. We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience caused by this issue." A 2011 attack on the PSN Sony Entertainment Network caused a breach of personal data for around 77 million users. MUSICSTRAT, Digital Music Consultant, P: 212.734.2240 email@example.com
Sean Nealon, Hacking Gmail with 92 Percent Success, UCRiverside, 20 Aug 2014 UC Riverside assistant professor is among group that develops novel method to attack apps on Android, and likely other, operating systems RIVERSIDE, Calif. (www.ucr.edu)—A team of researchers, including an assistant professor at the University of California, Riverside Bourns College of Engineering <http://www.engr.ucr.edu/>, have identified a weakness believed to exist in Android, Windows and iOS mobile operating systems that could be used to obtain personal information from unsuspecting users. They demonstrated the hack in an Android phone. The researchers tested the method and found it was successful between 82 percent and 92 percent of the time on six of the seven popular apps they tested. Among the apps they easily hacked were Gmail, CHASE Bank and H&R Block. Amazon, with a 48 percent success rate, was the only app they tested that was difficult to penetrate. The paper, "Peeking into Your App without Actually Seeing It: UI State Inference and Novel Android Attacks <http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~zhiyunq/pub/sec14_android_activity_inference.pdf>," will be presented <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/chen>Friday, Aug. 22 at the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium in San Diego <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14>. Authors of the paper are Zhiyun Qian <http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~zhiyunq/>, of the Computer Science and Engineering Department at UC Riverside; Z. Morley Mao <http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/>, an associate professor at the University of Michigan; and Qi Alfred Chen <http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~alfchen/>, a Ph.D. student working with Mao ... http://ucrtoday.ucr.edu/24266 Geoff.Goodfellow@iconia.com http://geoff.livejournal.com
Candice So, *IT Business*, 25 Aug 2014 http://www.itbusiness.ca/article/facebook-patching-vulnerability-that-could-force-iphones-to-make-calls
InfoWorld, Jeremy Kirk, 26 Aug 2014 More than two million of the devices on the Internet may be vulnerable to hackers monitoring their Internet traffic, Trend Micro says http://www.infoworld.com/d/networking/netcore-netis-routers-serious-risk-hardcoded-passwords-249140
[Note: This item comes from friend David Rosenthal. DLH] (via Dave Farber) Ryan Gallagher, The Surveillance Engine: How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google, 25 Aug 2014 https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton/ The National Security Agency is secretly providing data to nearly two dozen U.S. government agencies with a `Google-like' search engine built to share more than 850 billion records about phone calls, e-mails, cellphone locations, and Internet chats, according to classified documents obtained by The Intercept. The documents provide the first definitive evidence that the NSA has for years made massive amounts of surveillance data directly accessible to domestic law enforcement agencies. Planning documents for ICREACH, as the search engine is called, cite the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration as key participants. ICREACH contains information on the private communications of foreigners and, it appears, millions of records on American citizens who have not been accused of any wrongdoing. Details about its existence are contained in the archive of materials provided to The Intercept by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden. Earlier revelations sourced to the Snowden documents have exposed a multitude of NSA programs for collecting large volumes of communications. The NSA has acknowledged that it shares some of its collected data with domestic agencies like the FBI, but details about the method and scope of its sharing have remained shrouded in secrecy. ICREACH has been accessible to more than 1,000 analysts at 23 U.S. government agencies that perform intelligence work, according to a 2010 memo. A planning document from 2007 lists the DEA, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency as core members. Information shared through ICREACH can be used to track people's movements, map out their networks of associates, help predict future actions, and potentially reveal religious affiliations or political beliefs. The creation of ICREACH represented a landmark moment in the history of classified U.S. government surveillance, according to the NSA documents. “The ICREACH team delivered the first-ever wholesale sharing of communications metadata within the U.S. Intelligence Community,'' noted a top-secret memo dated December 2007. “This team began over two years ago with a basic concept compelled by the IC's increasing need for communications metadata and NSA's ability to collect, process and store vast amounts of communications metadata related to worldwide intelligence targets.'' The search tool was designed to be the largest system for internally sharing secret surveillance records in the United States, capable of handling two to five billion new records every day, including more than 30 different kinds of metadata on e-mails, phone calls, faxes, Internet chats, and text messages, as well as location information collected from cellphones. Metadata reveals information about a communication—such as the TO and FROM parts of an e-mail, and the time and date it was sent, or the phone numbers someone called and when they called—but not the content of the message or audio of the call. ICREACH does not appear to have a direct relationship to the large NSA database, previously reported by The Guardian, that stores information on millions of ordinary Americans' phone calls under Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Unlike the 215 database, which is accessible to a small number of NSA employees and can be searched only in terrorism-related investigations, ICREACH grants access to a vast pool of data that can be mined by analysts from across the intelligence community for `foreign intelligence'—a vague term that is far broader than counterterrorism. ...
FYI—The "militarization" of U.S. state and local law enforcement has gone far beyond body armor, assault rifles, night vision goggles and IED-resistant troop carriers complete with desert camouflage. This militarization has also extended to surveillance technologies such as drones, security cameras with facial recognition, automated license plate readers, cell tower spoofers (Stingray), etc., and "fusion centers" to share all of this warrentlessly-acquired data. The idea that Grand Rapids, MI, would need an intelligence "fusion center" seems right out of Michael Moore's wonderful 1995 movie "Canadian Bacon", in which a local sheriff (played by John Candy) starts a war with Canada. The U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security apparently didn't realize that "Canadian Bacon" was intended to be a farce. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Bacon - - - - https://www.aclusocal.org/one-year-after-snowden/ One year after Snowden, local surveillance remains shrouded in secrecy Posted on June 5, 2014 Nicole A. Ozer, ACLU of California One year ago today, whistleblower Edward Snowden confirmed that the NSA was secretly engaged in a massive program of warrantless surveillance of the American people. Since then, the ACLU has worked both in the courts and in Congress to halt the agency's abuses of power and violations of our constitutional rights. But the NSA isn't the only agency guilty of dragnet surveillance without oversight. ***State and local governments*** have adopted surveillance technology at an astonishing rate, often without the public's oversight and approval, and in some cases even hiding their use from the courts. Just like the NSA, our state and local agencies need to be transparent and accountable to the people they serve. Today, state and local law enforcement agencies have access to a wide range of surveillance technologies, from drones to automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems to facial-recognition smartphone apps. These tools can potentially be used to infringe upon our fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of expression and association, tracking our location, associations, and more. Yet all too often agencies not only acquire and use these technologies without a robust public debate but work hard to keep them secret. This secrecy prevents valuable public input into limits and safeguards to prevent potential harms. It also undermines the principles of transparency and accountability that are essential to our democratic system. We shouldn't need a *local* Edward Snowden in order to ensure that public debate and oversight accompany any proposed use of surveillance technology. Instead, we should insist upon it up front. We need our cities and counties to adopt ordinances requiring local oversight of surveillance technology, appoint privacy oversight committees, and place legal limits on how data collected can be used. And we need our state government to not just go through the motions of considering a wide range of privacy-enhancing bills but actually turn those bills into law. Other states have already decided, after public debate, that the unrestricted use of technologies such as ALPRs or drones is not worth the fiscal or civil liberties cost. Why is California lagging behind? So one year after the Snowden revelations started, we should celebrate the growing efforts to end the federal government's unconstitutional surveillance programs—but we should also make sure that we don't just rein in the NSA and call it good. Making sure that state and local agencies also respect individual rights and the democratic process is also essential, both for its own sake and in order to influence the federal conversation. It's time to remind our government that it is supposed to be transparent to the people, all the time—not just when an Edward Snowden forces it to be. Nicole A. Ozer is director of technology and civil liberties at the ACLU of California. Follow Nicole on Twitter. - - - - http://phillydeclaration.org/2014/04/02/confirmed-pa-state-police-purchased-controversial-stingray-surveillance-technology-last-year/ Confirmed: PA State Police Purchased Controversial StingRay Surveillance Technology Last Year By Dustin Slaughter The Declaration has learned that Pennsylvania State Police have been in possession of a highly-controversial type of surveillance technology, known as StingRay, since December of 2013. The purchasing order, obtained by The Declaration through a PA Right-to-Know request filed in February, is with a highly secretive company based in Melbourne, Florida named Harris Corporation. The documents indicate that State Police purchased two of the devices last year at a total cost of $232,772, likely through federal ***homeland security grant funding***. The use of this powerful domestic surveillance technology is coming under increasing scrutiny—and criticism—for its ability to trick cell phones within a targeted radius into connecting to the device by posing as a fake cell tower. The easily-portable device can rest inside a police cruiser, for instance, and once a StingRay gathers a phone's “International Mobile Subscriber Number” (IMSI) and serial data, the phone can be singled out for closer scrutiny, including real-time location tracking. More details on the State Police purchase: last year, authorities obtained the latest version of the technology, HailStorm, an “upgrade” to StingRay which, if used in combination with a software named Pen-Link, enables authorities to communicate directly with cell service carriers over an Internet connection to strengthen real-time location tracking. The Declaration is now in the process of filing a new information request for any contractual agreements with Nebraska-based Pen-Link. In addition to PSP's Hailstorm upgrade, the agency also bought Harpoon `amplifier' antennae. This gives authorities the ability “to project its surveillance signal farther or from a greater distance depending on the location of the targets,'' according to Ars Technica. Organizations such as the ACLU have rightly criticized the use of these devices as legally problematic, citing its use by federal and local law enforcement as a violation of the Fourth Amendment's General Warrant clause, because of its ability to scoop up phone data within a given radius from people not under investigation. An Electronic Frontier Foundation amicus brief submitted in a landmark case last year challenging the government's use of the StingRay called the device “the biggest technological threat to cellphone privacy that you don't know about.'' The device is quite often used without a warrant. Furthermore, its full capabilities are rarely disclosed when investigators seek warrants from judges. A federal magistrate judge in the Southern District of Texas, when authorities approached him requesting use of the device for electronic surveillance in an ongoing investigation, became one of the few judges who denied a warrant on the grounds that law enforcement wasn't specific enough about their intended use of the device. Crucially, Judge Brian L. Owsley also noted that the government provided no explanation regarding how they would handle captured cell data swept up from “seemingly innocent cell phone users.” Linda Lye, a staff attorney for the ACLU of Northern California, says of the government's willful obfuscation in front judges: By withholding information about this technology from courts in applications for electronic surveillance orders, the federal government is essentially seeking to write its own search warrants. It stands to reason that the same obfuscation by state and local police agencies could be occurring, including in Pennsylvania. The questionable legality of these devices extends beyond authorities deceptively attempting to gain judicial permission for StingRay use. In 2003, Miami-Dade police purchased devices to surreptitiously monitor activists protesting at a world trade conference, according to procurement records obtained by Ars Technica. The Declaration made repeated inquiries to a State Police media liaison seeking details including: Whether the agency is using the devices primarily for counter-terrorism purposes or a broader spectrum of investigations; what privacy and data retention policies the agency may or may not have implemented; and whether or not sharing agreements with other state law enforcement agencies exist. PSP has not responded. Record requests filed by The Declaration to both the Pittsburgh Police Department and Philadelphia Police Department seem to indicate that Pittsburgh police have no contractual agreements with Harris Corporation; a response from Philadelphia police is pending. We will continue our attempts to learn more about PA law enforcement's use of this device, and will update our readers accordingly. - - - - http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/07/local-spying-is-part-of-the-national-surveillance-web/ Local Spying is Part of the National Surveillance Web The OffNow campaign primarily focuses on action against federal surveillance programs. But with the line between federal, state and local law enforcement becoming increasingly blurred, Americans also need to pay attention to local actions to see and understand the big picture. Take for example a new program law enforcement agencies in Grand Rapids, Mich. recently implemented. According to a MLive/The Grand Rapids Press report, downtown businesses now offer the Grand Rapids Police and Kent County Sheriff's Department ***live access to their outdoor surveillance cameras***. The two agencies are tapping into private video feeds from existing cameras mounted on the exterior of private commercial buildings downtown, the Kent County emergency management coordinator said. Previously, police would request video from private feeds during the course of a criminal investigation. Now, police will be able to monitor the feeds in real time from county and city dispatch centers. According to the report, local officials plan to pursue Department of Homeland Security grants to “expand the surveillance capability downtown with new and upgraded equipment.'' Obviously, this raises serious privacy concerns for residents of Grand Rapids, but how does it tie into the larger surveillance state? With the rapid evolution of information sharing between local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, locally gathered information won't remain `local' for very long. Fusion centers already exist across the United States. As the Department of Homeland Security describes them, “State and major urban area fusion centers serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners.'' Fusion centers make up part of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) a consortium that includes the NSA, FBI, Department of Defense and many others. The ISE facilitates information sharing, officially for `national defense'. But we know through leaked Snowden documents that federal agencies share large amounts of illegally gathered information with state and local law enforcement. and it has no connection with national defense at all. State and local law enforcement also share information `upstream' to these federal agencies. Simply put, when local governments seize the power to watch you, that information will ultimately end up in the hands of federal agencies most certainly trying to monitor the actions, communications and movement of virtually every person on earth. Add to this an FBI facial recognition program coming online this year and you have an Orwellian nightmare scenario. As the technology improves and facial recognition ”learns” to identify more people, federal agencies will gain the capability to track your every movement, in real time, through networks of cameras like the ones in Grand Rapids. The evolution will likely progress something like this. 1. Local businesses install cameras. 2. Local police gain access for `emergency' situations only. 3. Local police expand the definition of emergency. 4. Federal agencies provide funding and information sharing becomes a tacit part of the agreement. 5. Federal agencies have unlimited access to locally gathered data. Essentially, the federal government can create a surveillance web across the country using state and local law enforcement to maintain and run the system. To thwart the surveillance state, you need to not only watch the goings-on in Washington D.C., you must also pay close attention to your state capitol and city hall. Mike Maharrey
Henry Baker worries about the new White House CyberSec Coordinator arguing Why Lack of Tech Know-How Helps > FYI—Technical ignorance is an advantage? Perhaps Michael Daniel should > start doing brain surgery tomorrow? > Michael Daniel exhibits the hubris of those whose VerbalSAT >> MathSAT. I worry about the hubris of those who think that technical expertise is required. Why should a Math SAT be a relevant variable? Our most difficult security issues are really policy and societal issues. These require expert knowledge of policy and society. I have served on several National Academy committees on security. I invariably find that the technical issues are reasonably well understood: the difficulties are in implementation, or sometimes in assessing the complex interactions of security versus usability versus privacy (among others). The head of Cybersecurity is not going to be writing code or determining encryption schemes. The head will be determining policy, making those difficult tradeoffs, and trying to figure out how to get sensible proposals through the gamut of our representative system of government, limited budgets, and lack of authority over the disparate agencies and private companies. I wouldn't want Michael Daniel to do surgery on my brain, but I might very well want to consult him to help determine whether we should have mandatory reporting of medical error, or how government policies might be altered to provide a more efficient and effective medical system. Similarly, I assure all of you that you do not want me coding security systems, but that doesn't mean that my policy advice should be ignored. (Gee, if that were true, I could have saved a lot of days of committee work.) Rather than concern about technical ability, I applaud Daniel's comments: "Being too down in the weeds at the technical level could actually be a little bit of a distraction," Daniel, a special assistant to the president, says in an interview with Information Security Media Group. "You can get enamored with the very detailed aspects of some of the technical solutions," he says. "And, particularly here at the White House ... the real issue is to look at the broad, strategic picture and the impact that technology will have." He is absolutely right. To many people keep insisting on complex proofs of the quality of cypher systems, only to have them bypassed by insiders, or by keystroke loggers which don't care how complex the password is, or for that matter, by dedicated, intentioned workers who find the security requirements so onerous that they take shortcuts, help their colleagues share terminals and accounts, and do whatever it takes to get the job done, thereby weakening the strict security that some technocrat has imposed. (As at the security conference I attended at Google in an open conference room in an otherwise secure facility, where the security gurus propped open the locked door so people could get to the toilets. So much for high security.) Math and technical skills are not sufficient knowledge for policy making. High level executives need a different level of skills than the average RISKS commenter. Different skills are required for the multiple complex layers of CyberSecurity. Don Norman, UC San Diego Design Lab firstname.lastname@example.org www.jnd.org
Let's not lose sight of one of the really big risks here: Google claims to track your location but it does so very inaccurately—you should not rely on this "data", even if it does come from a computer. Just one example: I took a look at the link given to see my own tracking information. According to what I see there, at a little past 7 am, I was four blocks from my apartment (about 20 minutes before I actually left it). Subsequent to this, apparently I was going down the east side of Manhattan when I suddenly jumped across the East River into Brooklyn for a while before jumping back across the river to Manhattan. Furthermore, during the day when I never left the floor where I work, Google had me traveling to locations a block or two away. It seems it's not exactly tracking my location but making a guess about it based on my proximity to a signal repeater or something like that. In the case at which I looked, it was egregiously wrong but the errors could easily be more subtle than this.
Computer programming can't possibly be a trade: trades have much higher standards. This quote attributed to Gerald Weinberg is even truer now than when he allegedly said it in the 1970's: "If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker that came along would destroy civilization." And that was in the days when the woodpecker had to fly to the tree to start pecking away. The question is not whether we are going to see catastrophic collapses of our software / network infrastructure, but when.
[via Dave Farber] Computer technologies have been conceived of decades before they became real, and we understood that once certain levels of logic gate density, or memory speed, or communications bandwidth became accessible, specific things that were previously sci-fi would suddenly be available in stores. The same is true of aircraft. The gating technology for air vehicles is battery energy density. Since the 1930s we have been stuck with combustion engines that produce about 2 kilowatt-hours of motive energy per kilogram of fuel (being about 20% efficient.) Electric propulsion today is more efficient, but is limited by battery technology to about 0.2 kWh/kg. We need to start having the sort of discussions referred to in Sipus' article, because *when* batteries reach 1 or 1.5 kWh/kg things will change drastically. It won't be just toys and police surveillance. The futurists like NASA's Mark Moore have been looking at what's practical, and it is pretty exciting for transportation on demand with far less impact on the planet than surface-based systems create. Since I work mostly in acoustics, I've been involved in discussions for several years on how to characterize the sound from new kinds of aircraft. These efforts are just beginning—but for once, the designers realize that being perceived as quiet is key to their acceptance. "Quiet" is not the same as "not loud" and we are just now learning how to measure these things. To their credit, NASA uses human listeners to judge how noisy things are rather than some sound level meter intended for measuring how damaging some sound might be to hearing. We can take a NIMBY approach, or we can engage the industry as it develops and steer what we want from it. Given the slow pace of battery technology, it will be some time before this happens. I have no doubt that restricting traffic to very specific routes and altitudes in real time will be part of the recipe. With the level of navigation and computing available today, this is almost trivial if all vehicles are cooperating in the system. By the time energy-dense electric propulsion is practical, this will not seem far-fetched. The "next generation" aeronautics effort at NASA, the "Transformational Flight" program committee at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and a lot of other smart folks are looking at the opportunities and the problems that remain to be solved. But energy density and public acceptance remain the gating factors. I would encourage people to look above the horizon a little and figure out what is desired in 10, 20, 50 years from now rather than spending all their time keeping the buzzy drones out of their backyard this week. The tradeoff discussions about privacy, safety, noise and all the other points need to happen, but it is not just about drones as they are envisioned today. What would you do if the Uber of 2034 were a pod that settled silently on a nearby rooftop or back lot and took you where you wanted to be without having to travel on roads or rails?
How does this verification work when I do not have a cellphone (smart or dumb)?
> If this passes, I'm moving to LA, changing my name to Mr. Lucky Ticket, and > running in their elections. My platform is we need many more and much > larger prizes. Change your name to: Above, None Of The and you will win in a landslide. The only problem being that you will probably be at the TOP of the ballot. [For newer readers of RISKS, I note that this is the opposite situation from the person who had the automobile license plate "NO PLATE". He wound up receiving all the tickets for the vehicles that had no license plate, because that's what the police wrote in the license field on each ticket. PGN]
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