The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 28 Issue 41

Tuesday 16 December 2014

Contents

Power outages hit federal buildings in D.C. - CNN.com
Gabe Goldberg
"Lenovo recalls more than 500,000 power cords due to spark, burn risk"
Ian Paul via Gene Wirchenko
Copenhagen Lighting the Way to Greener, More Efficient Cities
Monty Solomon
Sen. Wyden: No Hackdoors!
Henry Baker
Sony Hack Reveals Health Details on Employees and Their Children
Deborah Peel
The triumph of hope—or hype?—over experience
Donald B. Wagner
"Sony admits employees' personal data may have been compromised by breach"
Steve Ragan
Alberta health-records systems woefully inadequate
Darcy Henton
When strong passwords are the fake front behind a hollow system
Jeremy Epstein
"Your cell phone number: To give or not to give"
Galen Gruman
"NSA spy program targets mobile networks worldwide"
Marc Ferranti
"A shadowy consortium opposes your Internet privacy"
Simon Phipps
Verizon's Encrypted Calling App Comes Pre-Hacked for the NSA
Joshua Brustein
Some Drawbacks in Tapping the Phone to Deposit a Check
Monty Solomon
Phone Scam Nets Almost $2,000 from BU Student
Monty Solomon
Amazon glitch leads to rush over 1p 'bargains'
*The Telegraph* via Gabe Goldberg
Some TLS variants vulnerable to version of POODLE (CVE-2014-8730)
Bob Gezelter
"The Turla espionage operation infected Linux systems with malware"
Lucian Constantin
"Over 30 vulnerabilities found in Google App Engine"
Lucian Constantin
Multiple Microsoft items
Woody Leonhard via Gene Wirchenko compiled by PGN
7 Largest U.S. Districts to Teach Computer Science
Josh Lederman via ACM TechNews
Scholarships for Women Studying Information Security
Jeremy Epstein
We Can't Trust Uber?
NYTimes via Matthew Kruk
Re: This Net was Made for You and Me
Peter Houppermans
Re: SmartDriver: a 16-year-old can see the risks
David Brodbeck
Geoffrey Keating
Stasi Santa on the Shelf: NSA's Dream Naughty/Nice Daemon
Pinto/Nemorin via Henry Baker
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Power outages hit federal buildings in D.C. - CNN.com

Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Mon, 15 Dec 2014 13:18:58 -0500
Several federal buildings in downtown Washington lost power for a short time
Monday morning as a result of a "transformer explosion" at the Office of
Personnel Management, according to D.C. Police Spokesman Araz Alali.

Outages were reported at the White House, State Department and Federal
Reserve. Other departments that experienced outages Monday included the
General Services Administration (GSA), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Labor Department, according to Alali. The Smithsonian Metro
station also experienced an outage.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/15/politics/federal-buildings-power-outages/

Economy of scale infrastructure:
  one failure point hits six large buildings plus a subway station.


"Lenovo recalls more than 500,000 power cords due to spark, burn risk" (Ian Paul)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Fri, 12 Dec 2014 09:55:38 -0800
Ian Paul, PCWorld, 10 Dec 2014
Nearly half a million Lenovo laptops in the U.S. need to swap out
their power cord ASAP after Lenovo recalls the LS-15 AC adapter
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2858013/computer-hardware/lenovo-recalls-more-than-500000-power-cords-due-to-spark-burn-risk.html

  [We could laugh about this one—how could anyone get a power cord wrong?
  et al—but this one has a hidden risk.  Power cords are rather generic.
  Do you have any old power cords kicking around?  I know I do.  I have kept
  some from old equipment that I have tossed.  How long will these power
  cords be around?  GW]


Copenhagen Lighting the Way to Greener, More Efficient Cities

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Tue, 9 Dec 2014 07:16:27 -0500
Urban areas around the world are installing wireless networks of street
lamps and sensors that could ease traffic congestion and reduce carbon
emissions.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/business/energy-environment/copenhagen-lighting-the-way-to-greener-more-effecient-cities.html


Sen. Wyden: No Hackdoors!

Henry Baker <hbaker1@pipeline.com>
Tue, 16 Dec 2014 06:10:13 -0800
Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) is a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
With hackers running rampant, why would we poke holes in data security?
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1215-wyden-backdoor-for-cell-phones-20141215-story.html

* Tech 'back doors' for law enforcement are bad for personal data, and bad
  public policy

* U.S. surveillance programs have been costing tech firms billions in lost
  market share

* 'If you're building a wall with a hole in it, how much are you going
  invest in locks and barbed wire?'

Hardly a week goes by without a new report of some massive data theft that
has put financial information, trade secrets or government records into the
hands of computer hackers.

The best defense against these attacks is clear: strong data encryption and
more secure technology systems.
  [ambiguous, with BOTH meanings relevant: we need more more-secure systems!]

The leaders of U.S. intelligence agencies hold a different view.  Most
prominently, James Comey, the FBI director, is lobbying Congress to require
that electronics manufacturers create intentional security holes --
so-called back doors—that would enable the government to access data on
every American's cellphone and computer, even if it is protected by
encryption.

Unfortunately, there are no magic keys that can be used only by good guys
for legitimate reasons.  There is only strong security or weak security.

Americans are demanding strong security for their personal data.  Comey and
others are suggesting that security features shouldn't be too strong,
because this could interfere with surveillance conducted for law enforcement
or intelligence purposes.  The problem with this logic is that building a
back door into every cellphone, tablet, or laptop means deliberately
creating weaknesses that hackers and foreign governments can exploit.
Mandating back doors also removes the incentive for companies to develop
more secure products at the time people need them most; if you're building a
wall with a hole in it, how much are you going invest in locks and barbed
wire?  What these officials are proposing would be bad for personal data
security and bad for business and must be opposed by Congress.

In Silicon Valley several weeks ago I convened a roundtable of executives
from America's most innovative tech companies.  They made it clear that
widespread availability of data encryption technology is what consumers are
demanding.

It is also good public policy.  For years, officials of intelligence
agencies like the NSA, as well as the Department of Justice, made misleading
and outright inaccurate statements to Congress about data surveillance
programs—not once, but repeatedly for over a decade.  These agencies
spied on huge numbers of law-abiding Americans, and their dragnet
surveillance of Americans' data did not make our country safer.

Most Americans accept that there are times their government needs to rely on
clandestine methods of intelligence gathering to protect national security
and ensure public safety.  But they also expect government agencies and
officials to operate within the boundaries of the law, and they now know how
egregiously intelligence agencies abused their trust.

This breach of trust is also hurting U.S. technology companies' bottom line,
particularly when trying to sell services and devices in foreign markets.
The president's own surveillance review group noted that concern about
U.S. surveillance policies “can directly reduce the market share of
U.S. companies.''  One industry estimate suggests that lost market share
will cost just the U.S. cloud computing sector $21 billion to $35 billion
over the next three years.

Tech firms are now investing heavily in new systems, including encryption,
to protect consumers from cyber attacks and rebuild the trust of their
customers.  As one participant at my roundtable put it, “I'd be shocked if
anyone in the industry takes the foot off the pedal in terms of building
security and encryption into their products.''

Built-in back doors have been tried elsewhere with disastrous results.  In
2005, for example, Greece discovered that dozens of its senior government
officials' phones had been under surveillance for nearly a year.  The
eavesdropper was never identified, but the vulnerability was clear: built-in
wiretapping features intended to be accessible only to government agencies
following a legal process.

Chinese hackers have proved how aggressively they will exploit any security
vulnerability.  A report last year by a leading cyber security company
identified more than 100 intrusions in U.S. networks from a single cyber
espionage unit in Shanghai.  As another tech company leader told me,  “Why
would we leave a back door lying around?''

Why indeed.  The U.S. House of Representatives recognized how dangerous this
idea was and in June approved 293-123, a bipartisan amendment that would
prohibit the government from mandating that technology companies build
security weaknesses into any of their products.  I introduced legislation in
the Senate to accomplish the same goal, and will again at the start of the
next session.

Technology is a tool that can be put to legitimate or illegitimate use.  And
advances in technology always pose a new challenge to law enforcement
agencies.  But curtailing innovation on data security is no solution, and
certainly won't restore public trust in tech companies or government
agencies.  Instead we should give law enforcement and intelligence agencies
the resources that they need to adapt, and give the public the data security
they demand.

Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) is a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.


Sony Hack Reveals Health Details on Employees and Their Children

"Dr. Deborah Peel" <dpeelmd@patientprivacyrights.org>
Sun, 14 Dec 2014 23:34:36 +0000
On top of everything else, the Sony data breach revealed employees'
sensitive health information:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-11/sony-hack-reveals-health-details-on-employees-and-their-children.html.
Top Sony executives saw lists of named employees who had costly medical
treatments and saw detailed psychiatric treatment records of one employee's
son.

Like last year's revelation by AOL's CEO, it shows US corporations look at
employees' health information and costs. By `outing' the fact that 2 of
AOL's 5,000 employees had premature infants whose treatment cost over $1
million each, the CEO violated the employees' rights to health information
privacy. See:
http://patientprivacyrights.org/2014/02/revelations-aol-boss-raise-fears-privacy/

Trusted relationships simply cannot exist if individuals have no right to
decide who to let in and who to keep out of pii. Current US technology
systems make it impossible for us to control personal health data, inside or
outside of the healthcare system.

Do you trust your employer not to snoop in your personal health information?
How can you trust your employer without a `chain of custody' for your health
data? There is no transparency or accountability for the sale or use of our
health data, even though Congress gave us the right to obtain an Accounting
for Disclosures (A4D) for disclosures of protected health data from EHRs in
the 2009 stimulus bill (the regulations have yet to be written).  And we
have no complete map that tracks the millions of places US citizens' health
data flows. See: TheDataMap<thedatamap.org>.

There is no way to know who sees, sells, or snoops in our health data unless
whistleblowers or hackers expose what's going on.  Our personal,
identifiable health data is in millions of data bases unknown and
inaccessible to us.  Both the Bush and Obama Administrations support this
privacy-destructive business model on the Internet and in the US health care
system.

The US health data broker industry consists of over 100,000 health data
suppliers covering 780,000 live daily health data feeds. See:
http://patientprivacyrights.org/2014/01/ims-health-files-ipo-legal/ ).

THE GREATEST DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE LACK OF CONTROL OVER PII IS THE LOSS OF
TRUST--- TRUSTED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PEOPLE, COMPANIES, AND GOVERNMENTS
ARE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT PERSONAL CONTROL OVER PII.

Both Angela Merkel and Jennifer Lawrence spelled out the deep and persistent
effects of violating personal boundaries:

* Angela Merkel's reaction to Obama spying on her:
  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2475792/Angela-Merkel-leads-anger-Obama-US-spying-EU-summit.html

* Jennifer Lawrence's reaction to the wide release of intimate photos:
http://www.independent.ie/entertainment/movies/movie-news/loss-of-privacy-is-taking-a-huge-emotional-toll-jlaw-30749675.html

Both spoke of the deep emotional pain and costs of betrayal, and of being
unable to trust or feel safe following such serious boundary
violations. Trust is truly impossible unless individuals can set
boundaries. People, companies, and governments must respect and honor
individuals' rights to control access to personal information to be
trusted. Violating boundaries destroys trust and relationships between
people and between nations.

Sadly, even though the modern world's concept of 'privacy' comes from our
nation, from US Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis' concept of privacy,
and later in the computer age from Wallis Ware's concept of Fair Information
Practices, the US has lost its way and is destroying both freedom and the
right to be let alone.

Among the Western Democracies, has the United States become the world's most
intrusive surveillance state?

Do we have control over any information about ourselves?  Or is every bit or
byte of data about us collected, held, and sold by millions of hidden data
bases?  Learn more about the `world's leading' health data broker:
http://patientprivacyrights.org/2014/01/ims-health-files-ipo-legal/


The triumph of hope—or hype?—over experience

"Donald B. Wagner" <zapkatakonk1943.6.22@gmail.com>
Sun, 7 Dec 2014 11:03:04 +0100
"But, the technocratic wish is so strong, hospitals and governments are
mindlessly rushing forward anyway."

In the Wild West, a cowboy was one who, if he had to go one mile north,
would walk two miles south to get a horse so he could ride there.

Donald B. Wagner, Jernbanegade 9B, DK-3600 Frederikssund, Denmark
Tel. +45-3331 2581  http://donwagner.dk


"Sony admits employees' personal data may have been compromised by breach" (Steve Ragan)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:11:26 -0800
Steve Ragan, CSO, 16 Dec 2014
Weeks later, Sony Pictures is telling employees what they already
know about the scope of data that was compromised by attackers
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2859830/security/sony-admits-employees-personal-data-may-have-been-compromised-by-breach.html


Alberta health-records systems woefully inadequate (Darcy Henton)

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Sun, 7 Dec 2014 21:21:05 PST
Darcy Henton, Alberta moves on integrated health records system,
*Calgary Herald*, 5 Dec 2014

The current set of 12 separate medical-record systems is “woefully
inadequate'', lacking interoperability, some are still manual.  [PGN-ed]
http://calgaryherald.com/news/politics/alberta-health-records

  [Thanks to DKross.]


When strong passwords are the fake front behind a hollow system

Jeremy Epstein <jeremy.j.epstein@gmail.com>
Mon, 8 Dec 2014 10:53:33 -0500
http://hackaday.com/2014/12/07/bad-code-results-in-useless-passwords/

Short version: wireless access point comes with a strong and seemingly
random password, but with major vulnerabilities including a world accessible
list of hashed passwords suitable for offline cracking, an insecure use of
cookies for authentication, and a convenient command injection attack.

Why am I not surprised?


"Your cell phone number: To give or not to give" (Galen Gruman)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Fri, 12 Dec 2014 09:48:32 -0800
Galen Gruman, Mobile Edge, InfoWorld, 12 Dec 2014
More and more companies assume your phone is your second-factor
authentication, raising potential for abuse
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2854033/internet-privacy/your-cell-phone-number-to-give-or-not-to-give.html

selected text:

I was updating my company 401(k) information last week, and the website
wanted me to provide my cellphone number. It didn't say why, nor did it
explain how it would use that information. A conference I signed up for also
wanted my cellphone number, again with no explanation or context.

In both cases, I left the field blank, but it's getting harder to do so
these days, as more and more services require a cellphone number, ostensibly
to text confirmations such as for second-factor authentication or call if
suspicious activity is detected on your account.

We don't have two-line cellphones in the United States, and if there were
they'd be confined to the same carrier and probably cost twice as much as a
single-line plan.

  [I thought of the idea of two-line cellphones myself.  I would give out
  one number for normal use and keep the other for emergency use.  That one,
  I would give out to very few.  If busy, I would ignore a call on the first
  line, but on the second, I would answer.  It seems to me that this could
  be very useful, so why don't we have this?  GW]


"NSA spy program targets mobile networks worldwide" (Marc Ferranti)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Tue, 09 Dec 2014 11:28:56 -0800
Marc Ferranti, InfoWorld, 8 Dec 2014
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2856066/security/nsa-spy-program-targets-mobile-networks-worldwide.html

opening text:

The NSA has conducted a covert campaign to intercept internal communications
of operators and trade groups in order to infiltrate mobile networks
worldwide, according to the latest revelations from documents supplied by
Edward Snowden.


"A shadowy consortium opposes your Internet privacy" (Simon Phipps)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Mon, 08 Dec 2014 11:56:53 -0800
Simon Phipps, Open Sources, InfoWorld, 8 Dec 2014
A cabal of communications companies wants to kill a new Internet
standard that will make your Web experience faster and safer
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2855738/internet-privacy/consortium-opposes-your-privacy.html

opening text:

Google researchers have devised a replacement for the HTTP protocol that
carries the World Wide Web. By default, it's encrypted end to end, it's very
fast, you're probably already using it, and Google is offering it as the
basis for the next version of HTTP. It's called SPDY (yes, "speedy") and as
with the Road Runner, Wile E. Coyote is trying to catch and kill it.


Verizon's Encrypted Calling App Comes Pre-Hacked for the NSA (Joshua Brustein)

Henry Baker <hbaker1@pipeline.com>
Fri, 12 Dec 2014 10:35:46 -0800
Joshua Brustein, *Business Week*,  11 Dec 2014
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-12-11/verizons-new-encrypted-calling-app-comes-prehacked-for-the-nsa

Verizon is the latest big company to enter the post-Snowden market for
secure communication, and it's doing so with an encryption standard that
comes with a way for law enforcement to access ostensibly secure phone
conversations.

Verizon Voice Cypher, the product introduced on Thursday with the encryption
company Cellcrypt, offers business and government customers end-to-end
encryption for voice calls on iOS, Android, or BlackBerry devices equipped
with a special app.  The encryption software provides secure communications
for people speaking on devices with the app, regardless of their wireless
carrier, and it can also connect to an organization's secure phone system.

Cellcrypt and Verizon both say that law enforcement agencies will be able to
access communications that take place over Voice Cypher, so long as they're
able to prove that there's a legitimate law enforcement reason for doing so.
Seth Polansky, Cellcrypt's vice president for North America, disputes the
idea that building technology to allow wiretapping is a security risk.
"It's only creating a weakness for government agencies," he says.  "Just
because a government access option exists, it doesn't mean other companies
can access it."

Phone carriers like Verizon are required by U.S. law to build networks that
can be wiretapped.  But the legislation known as the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act requires phone carriers to decrypt
communications for the government only if they have designed their
technology to make it possible to do so.  If Verizon and Cellcrypt had
structured their encryption so that neither company had the information
necessary to decrypt the calls, they would not have been breaking the law.

Other companies have designed their encryption in this way, including AT&T,
which offers encrypted phone service for business customers.  Apple and
Android recently began protecting content stored on users' phones in a way
that would keep the tech companies from being able to comply with requests
from law enforcement.  The move drew public criticism from FBI Director
James Comey, and some security experts expect that a renewed effort to stir
passage of legislation banning such encryption will accompany Silicon
Valley's increased interest in developing these services.

Verizon believes major demand for its new encryption service will come from
governmental agencies conveying sensitive but unclassified information over
the phone, says Tim Petsky, a senior product manager for Verizon Wireless.
Corporate customers who are concerned about corporate espionage are also
itching for answers.  "You read about breaches in security almost every week
in the press," says Petsky.  "Enterprise customers have been asking about
ways to secure their communications and up until this point, we didn't have
a solution."

There has been increased interest in encryption from individual consumers,
too, largely thanks to the NSA revelations leaked by Edward Snowden.  Yahoo
and Google began offering end-to-end encrypted e-mail services this year.
Silent Circle, a startup catering to consumer and enterprise clients, has
been developing end-to-end voice encryption for phones calls.  Verizon's
service, with a monthly price of $45 per device, isn't targeting individual
buyers and won't be offered to average consumers in the near future.

But Verizon's partner, Cellcrypt, looks upon selling to large organizations
as the first step toward bringing down the price before eventually offering
a consumer-level encryption service.  "At the end of the day, we'd love to
have this be a line item on your Verizon bill," says Polansky.

It's still not clear how big the potential market for consumer-level
encryption services is.  Chris Soghoian of the ACLU's speech, privacy, and
technology project, believes that Verizon's approach is unlikely to have
wide appeal because of Verizon's decision not to keep out law enforcement.

Many people in the security industry believe that a designed access point
creates a vulnerability for criminals or spies to exploit.  Last year
reports surfaced that the FBI was pushing legislation that would require
many forms of Internet communication to be wiretap-ready.  A group of
prominent security experts responded strongly: "Requiring software vendors
to build intercept functionality into their products is unwise and will be
ineffective, with the result being serious consequences (PDF) for the
economic well-being and national security of the United States," they wrote
in a report issued in May.

Verizon's service might well have drawn praise from security experts in the
past, Soghoian says, but the past year of revelations about government
surveillance has changed the atmosphere.  "Today, to roll this out with a
backdoor, that's inexcusable, he says."  With encrypted phone services being
developed to be inaccessible to anyone, he says, "It's tough to see how
Verizon can compete here when they're designing a product that is less
secure."

Brustein is a writer for Businessweek.com in New York.


Some Drawbacks in Tapping the Phone to Deposit a Check

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Sun, 7 Dec 2014 15:13:50 -0500
As the service catches on, it becomes increasingly important for customers
to compare the terms of mobile deposit services that different banks offer.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/your-money/some-drawbacks-in-tapping-the-phone-to-deposit-a-check.html


Phone Scam Nets Almost $2,000 from BU Student

Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Mon, 15 Dec 2014 11:31:04 -0500
http://www.bu.edu/today/2014/phone-scam-nets-almost-2000-from-bu-student/


Amazon glitch leads to rush over 1p 'bargains' (*The Telegraph*)

Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Mon, 15 Dec 2014 11:54:36 -0500
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11292999/Amazon-glitch-leads-to-rush-over-1p-bargains.html

...what could go wrong? It's like programming stock trades would be, risky.


Some TLS variants vulnerable to version of POODLE (CVE-2014-8730)

"Bob Gezelter" <gezelter@rlgsc.com>
Tue, 09 Dec 2014 08:24:17 -0700
F5 Networks has disclosed that some TLS implementations appear vulnerable to
a variant of the POODLE attack, previously reported as viable against SSLv3.
Check your TLS implementation and options thereof.  This vulnerability has
apparently been assigned as CVE-2014-8730, however, not all of the databases
have been updated to reflect the description of this vulnerability.  The
announcement from F5 Networks is at:
https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/cve-2014-8730-padding-issue-8151 Bob
Gezelter, http://www.rlgsc.com


"The Turla espionage operation infected Linux systems with malware" (Lucian Constantin)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Tue, 09 Dec 2014 11:30:46 -0800
Lucian Constantin, InfoWorld, 9 Dec 2014
A newly identified Linux backdoor program is tied to the Turla cyber
espionage campaign, researchers from Kaspersky Lab say
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2857184/security/the-turla-espionage-operation-also-infected-linux-systems-with-malware.html


"Over 30 vulnerabilities found in Google App Engine" (Lucian Constantin)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Fri, 12 Dec 2014 09:24:51 -0800
Lucian Constantin, InfoWorld, 9 Dec 2014 Security researchers escaped the
Java sandbox on the cloud platform and executed code on the underlying
system
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2857515/cloud-computing/over-30-vulnerabilities-found-in-google-app-engine.html


Multiple Microsoft items (Woody Leonhard, compiled by PGN)

Gene Wirchenko <genew@telus.net>
Mon, 15 Dec 2014 10:12:39 -0800
"Microsoft falls short—again—in communicating about Windows,
  10 patch KB 3020114", Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 9 Dec 2014
The problem isn't with the bug, it's with the way Microsoft handled
the bug. Redmond still hasn't updated the KB with a workaround
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2857273/operating-systems/microsoft-finally-clarifies-problems-with-windows-10-patch-kb-3020114.html

"Botched KB 3004394 triggers error messages, but no response from Microsoft"
That's not the only bad patch in yesterday's release: There's also an
easily fixed error that prevents KB 3002339 from installing
Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 10 Dec 2014
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2858014/operating-systems/botched-kb-3004394-triggers-uacs-diagnostic-tool-error-0x8000706f7-amd-catalyst-driver-fail-defende.html

Botch brigade: KB 2553154, 2726958 clobber Excel ActiveX while KB
3011970 Silverlight, KB 3004394 Root Cert both pulled
KB 3008923 crashes IE, KB 3002339 still hanging on install, KB
2986475 still pulled—but there's a small silver lining
Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 11 Dec 2014
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2858280/microsoft-windows/botch-brigade-kb-2553154-2726958-clobber-excel-activex-kb-3011970-silverlight-kb-3004394-root-cert.html

It's official: If you installed KB 3004394, you need to uninstall the
patch manually
Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 11 Dec 2014
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2858738/microsoft-windows/microsoft-recommends-that-you-uninstall-botched-patch-kb-3004394.html

"Microsoft releases 'Silver Bullet' patch KB 3024777 to eliminate KB 3004394"
Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 12 Dec 2014
More information unfolds about the Windows Root Certification patch
and its foibles
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2859115/microsoft-windows/microsoft-releases-silver-bullet-patch-kb-3024777-to-eliminate-botched-patch-kb-3004394.html

Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 15 Dec 2014
Windows 7 hit by rash of bogus 'not genuine' reports, validation code
0x8004FE21; Windows 7 is suddenly telling users it isn't genuine—and it
has nothing to do with Windows being stolen
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2859267/operating-systems/windows-7-hit-by-rash-of-bogus-not-genuine-reports-validation-code-0x8004fe21.html


7 Largest U.S. Districts to Teach Computer Science (Josh Lederman)

"ACM TechNews" <technews@hq.acm.org>
Mon, 8 Dec 2014 11:37:16 -0500 (EST)
Josh Lederman, AP item, via ACM TechNews, Monday, December 8, 2014

The U.S.'s seven largest school districts, which include New York City, Los
Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Las Vegas, Houston, and Fort Lauderdale, are
joining more than 50 other school districts to start offering introductory
computer science to all of their students.  In addition, the College Board,
which runs the Advanced Placement (AP) program, is introducing a new course
called AP Computer Science Principles that will launch in the fall of 2016.
President Barack Obama has long wanted to make the U.S. more competitive
with other countries in computing, science, and math education, but his
efforts have been limited by Congress, which has not acted upon most of the
president's proposals on education.  In an effort to bypass Congress, Obama
has sought to use his convening power to get communities and companies to
help.  The new course will focus on encouraging women and minorities to
start training for careers in computers.  In order to meet the teaching
demand, charitable groups are pledging $20 million to train more teachers in
computer science by the start of the 2015 school year.  "While no one is
born a computer scientist, becoming a computer scientist isn't as scary as
it sounds," Obama says.
http://orange.hosting.lsoft.com/trk/click?ref=3Dznwrbbrs9_5-d148x2c248x060880&


Scholarships for Women Studying Information Security

Jeremy Epstein <jeremy.j.epstein@gmail.com>
Sun, 14 Dec 2014 16:12:02 -0500
Since 2011, Applied Computer Security Associates, sponsor of the ACSAC and
NSPW conferences, has offered scholarships for women in security-related
undergraduate and masters' degree programs through the Scholarships for
Women Studying Information Security (SWSIS, www.swsis.org).

Thanks to a $250,000 4-year contribution by Hewlett-Packard company in early
2014, ACSA expanded our program to award 11 scholarships for the 2014-15
academic year. The Committee on the Status of Women in Computing Research
(CRA-W), an arm of the Computing Research Alliance, led selection of
scholarship winners.  Information about the 11 SWSIS Scholars (scholarship
winners) is available at www.swsis.org.

ACSA, CRA-W, and HP are pleased to announce that applications for 2015-16
scholarships are open Dec 15 2014 - Feb 15 2015.

To apply, an applicant must provide:
* An essay describing her interest and background in the information
  security field.
* A current transcript.
* A resume or CV.
* At least two letters of reference (typically from faculty members).
* Her university name and class status.

The scholarship is renewable for a second year subject to availability of
funds, given proof of satisfactory academic progress.  Preference is for US
citizens or permanent residents; funds are available for use at any US
campus of a US university.

More information at www.swsis.org or swsis@swsis.org

Jeremy Epstein, Director, Scholarship Programs
Applied Computer Security Associates, Inc.

Rebecca Wright, CRA-W Director for SWSIS
Computing Research Association Committee on the Status of Women in
Computing Research


We Can't Trust Uber?

"Matthew Kruk" <mkrukg@gmail.com>
Mon, 8 Dec 2014 06:23:54 -0700
We need to know how our data is being used.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/opinion/we-cant-trust-uber.html

  [If you are not following the Uber story, you might also look at this:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/technology/ubers-system-for-screening-drivers-comes-under-scrutiny.html
  thanks to Monty Solomon.  PGN]


Re: This Net was Made for You and Me (Julian Assange), RISKS-28.40

Peter Houppermans <peter@houppermans.net>
Sun, 07 Dec 2014 21:21:19 +0100
I just like to occasionally throw this one in the fire ..

> It is now a journalistic cliché to remark that George Orwell's *1984*
> was `prophetic'. The novel was so prophetic that its prophecies have
> become modern-day prosaisms.  Reading it now is a tedious experience.

It would then be a good start to stop referring to George Orwell's
"1984", because that is a very roundabout way to arrive at the concept
that Orwell's book was based on - why not go to the source?

The basis for "1984" was the late 18th century concept of the Panopticon,
developed by one Jeremy Bentham.  The Wikipedia entry provides enough data
to see just how insidious that concept is for a normal society, especially
one very important aspect: the concept was developed for a PRISON.

Call me fickle, but I very much prefer not to be treated as a prisoner.


Re: SmartDriver: a 16-year-old can see the risks (RISKS-28.40)

David Brodbeck <david.m.brodbeck@gmail.com>
Fri, 5 Dec 2014 20:14:09 -0800
I agree with some of Richard O'Keefe's points in his post about
SmartDriver, but I wanted to add a few things I think he may have
overlooked:

> The app will lack awareness of the context.  If a child or an animal
> runs across the road in front of me, and I brake hard enough to avoid
> a death, I will be penalised for unsafe driving, not rewarded.
> Similarly, a sharp turn to avoid an accident will count as unsafe...

The insurance company probably doesn't care about the context.  If you
drive in areas where you frequently have to make sharp maneuvers to avoid
accidents, you're at a higher risk for an accident, which is what they're
really trying to measure.

> How long before your insurance company starts charging extra to
> people who don't use such an app?

Probably not long, but is that really anything new?  I drive a car that's
30 years old, and as a result pay higher rates than if I owned one that had
modern features like ABS and stability control.  I don't see that as
materially different than someone paying higher rates because they choose
not to have a phone that can run the app, or decide the app is a bad
trade-off.

I agree with his privacy concerns, and I think it'll be interesting to see
how the data actually is used in court.  There's been some controversy in
the US over the "black box" data that the on-board computers in modern cars
collect, and whether it should be admitted as evidence in court.  Of
course, that can cut both ways—as many Russians have found, having your
own record of what happened can help in exonerating you and confirming your
version of events.


Re: SmartDriver: a 16-year-old can see the risks (RISKS-28.40)

Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
06 Dec 2014 12:53:38 -0800
> The app will lack awareness of the context.  If a child or an animal runs
> across the road in front of me, and I brake hard enough to avoid a death,
> I will be penalised for unsafe driving, not rewarded.  Similarly, a sharp
> turn to avoid an accident will count as unsafe, not safe.

This misunderstands the point of the exercise.  The insurance company wants
to know if your driving is relatively more or less risky than other drivers.
If you're often suddenly braking to avoid children, or if your path on the
road looks like a slalom course, then you're at a higher risk of an
accident.  This is not making a judgment, merely an observation.

The background is that most drivers are safe drivers and don't cause
accidents, so this is a way to gain some insight into which of these safe
drivers are safer.

A similar approach could be used for computer-based risks.  For example,
most companies do not have breaches of their credit card systems, or
catastrophic security incidents, and very few have more than one.  It's
therefore very important to watch for more subtle warning signs that your
company might be more at risk.  For example, if your desktop support
department is occasionally cleaning malware off employee devices but it
seems like there was no further compromise; if 'non-critical' web servers
sometimes get compromised and have to be restored from backup; if laptops
(or desktops or backup tapes) sometimes get lost and recovered but weren't
encrypted.


Stasi Santa on the Shelf: NSA's Dream Naughty/Nice Daemon

Henry Baker <hbaker1@pipeline.com>
Mon, 15 Dec 2014 07:28:12 -0800
FYI—Santa's Workshop relocated from the North Pole to Bluffdale, UT ??
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/commentary/whos-boss

Laura Pinto and Selena Nemorin, Policy Alternatives, 1 Dec 2014
Who's the Boss?    [Long item pruned for RISKS.  PGN]
"The Elf on the Shelf" and the normalization of surveillance

The Elf on the Shelf® is a special scout elf sent from the North Pole to
help Santa Claus manage his naughty and nice lists.  When a family adopts an
elf and gives it a name, the elf receives its Christmas magic and can fly to
the North Pole each night to tell Santa Claus about all of the day's
adventures.  Each morning, the elf returns to its family and perches in a
different place to watch the fun.

After several years of observing parents and teachers sharing photos of Elf
on the Shelf dolls in various (sometimes compromising!) poses on social
media, our curiosity led us to critically examine this cultural phenomenon.

The Elf on the Shelf is a wildly popular, Christmas-themed book that comes
with a doll to reinforce the story in home and school settings.  The purpose
of this article is to explore theoretical and conceptual concerns about the
popularity and widespread educational use of The Elf on the Shelf in light
of the contemporary literature on play and panoptic surveillance. [...]

  [Long item pruned for RISKS.  The Elf is not recommended for
  surveillance-wary readers.  PGN]

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