Please try the URL privacy information feature enabled by clicking the flashlight icon above. This will reveal two icons after each link the body of the digest. The shield takes you to a breakdown of Terms of Service for the site - however only a small number of sites are covered at the moment. The flashlight take you to an analysis of the various trackers etc. that the linked site delivers. Please let the website maintainer know if you find this useful or not. As a RISKS reader, you will probably not be surprised by what is revealed…
'Rip Off Britain—Holidays' is a popular BBC TV consumer rights programme. [This is another instance of the old calendar confusion between U.S. and elsewhere, which keeps arising in RISKS: month/day/year vs day/month/year; whereas year/month/day is less common, it is much less ambiguous, and mathematically sound. In RISKS, we long ago decided on dd/MON/year. PGN] This week—in Series 4 Episode 7—it featured a young family who had previously visited the USA and now wanted to visit again. Their previous Esta Visas had expired so they applied online for new ones—at cost. However the new Visas were refused. When they enquired the only reason given was that they had apparently over-stayed their visas on their last visit. In its inimitable way Homeland Security (whoever) were adamant that the refusal was correct. The family were equally adamant that they had done nothing wrong. They were also in danger of losing all of their holiday bookings because their travel insurance wouldn't pay out over 'visa refusal issues.' Eventually after help from the BBC it transpired that when they had departed from JFK Airport the previous time the date was 08-01-2013, i.e., 8th January 2013. A few days afterwards their Esta Visas then expired. All well and good, right? Well no!! At the date of their departure from JFK a new computer system had just been implemented by a British company. And in an amount of mind-boggling incompetence the system had been set up to record departure dates in the UK format of day-month-year. However the US authorities had interpreted these dates as month-day-year. This meant that as far as the US was concerned they had departed on August 1st 2013—effectively overstaying their visas. What is even more mind boggling is that the US authorities would not believe that such a mistake had been made. It was only after the intervention of the BBC (see the programme) that the US agreed to look into the case. Even then the family had to provide a large number of documents including their passports, old ticket receipts, etc., to prove that they had in fact left the USA within the validity of their Esta visas. The programme is at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06wp9pk if you have access to play it.
*The Boston Globe* recently changed distributors for its print edition, and the cutover has not gone well. Delivery problems with *The Boston Globe*’s new circulation service affected up to 10 percent of newspaper subscribers, and it could take four to six months before service returns to normal, the Globe reports. http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2016/01/04/boston-globe-delivery-problems-could-last-months-distributor-says/mv1aQZYpZMIdva1YfPKg3N/story.html ...at least 2,000 subscribers have canceled their Globe subscriptions as a result of the delivery debacle, which the parties blame both on a shortage of drivers and software that mapped out paper routes confusingly. http://www.bu.edu/today/2016/whither-newspapers-or-should-that-be-withered/ ...many of ACI’s new delivery routes lack any logical sequence, leaving drivers criss-crossing communities and making repeated trips to the same neighborhoods. http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/01/03/deliveries/wrEYnoz9F6XFEZeIkTzMQL/story.html “We were crossing intersections that we had crossed just a few minutes before to deliver newspapers in one section of Brookline, then back to the other,” she said. “It was, it was dizzying. It was not arranged in a geographical way. And I can see why any new driver would have a difficult time getting to the right location.” https://www.wbur.org/2016/01/05/boston-globe-delivery Boston Globe owner John W. Henry was forced to issue this public apology/explanation: https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/01/05/apologize-our-loyal-readers/S0uNqQOjkx3UD7jD3WbbgL/story.html The new distributor is based in California, and apparently has no experience with the maze of twisty little passages that is our road network in New England. RISK 1: Test your software in the target environment. RISK 2: Don't cutover everything at once.
I have seen many stories like this one—a form of social engineering against top C-level executives, with mind boggling sums stolen, for which no current insurance system can pay them back. Actually I am somewhat happy to see this happening. In my career, C-level executives have been 99% responsible for my day jobs having inadequate security, and violations of protections against breaches, because they have been in absolute denial of security advisories from me, my IT-co-workers, and outside IT-security vendors. If anything can teach them to become risk-educated, this epidemic may. This particular outfit is using this kind of story as an effective marketing technique. For similar recent stories from them, see: https://blog.knowbe4.com/ceo-fraud-costs-boeing-vendor-54-million-dollars https://blog.knowbe4.com/credit-union-chilling-ceo-fraud-story https://blog.knowbe4.com/scam-of-the-week-phish-with-hidden-sting https://blog.knowbe4.com/paychex-60-of-hacked-smbs-are-out-of-business-6-months-later > Date: Monday, January 25, 2016 9:50 AM > From: Stu Sjouwerman [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org] The Belgian Crelan Bank was the victim of a 70-million euro (75.8M U.S.) fraud that was launched from another country. They claim (PDF) this CEO Fraud was discovered during an internal audit and does not affect their viability. The bank said: "As a result of these facts, we took additional, exceptional measures to strengthen our internal security procedures. We informed the justice department and we are investigating this incident. Existing customers are not impacted." Luc Versele, CEO of Crelan was quoted: “Looking at our historic reserves, Crelan can shoulder this fraud without any negative impact for our customers and affiliates. We are still viable and our total capital is 1,1 Billion Euro.'' CEO Fraud, also called Business Email Compromise is the next cybercrime wave, as per the FBI who recently warned that this has cost small and medium enterprises 1.2 billion dollars in damages between October 2013 and August 2015. C-level employees, especially CEOs and CFOs, have to be aware of the various techniques the scammers are using to trick them into wiring out large amounts of money. Most small and medium enterprises do not know that they are not FDIC-insured like consumers, and that their cyber security insurance (if they even have it) also may not cover this specific type of fraud, because no IT infrastructure was compromised. What you can do about it: 1. Alert your execs. These scams are getting more sophisticated by the month and be on the lookout. 2. Review your Wire Transfer security policies and procedures. 3. Grab this Social Engineering Red Flags PDF, print and laminate it, and give it to your C-level execs (free). 4. Read the IC3 Alert in full, and apply their Suggestions For Protection. You can find it here. Copy and paste this link in your browser to get to their website: https://www.ic3.gov/media/2015/150122.aspx? Obviously all your employees need to be stepped through effective security awareness training to prevent social engineering attacks like this from getting through. Find out how affordable this is for your organization today and be pleasantly surprised. [...]
Before my response proper, two comments: (1) I apologize in advance for what probably could be considerably shorter. (2) I expect that most readers of this list will agree that we can't foresee all of the holes in a system, so even the best system we can make, will only be secure until we discover the ways it is flawed. (This list teaches humility, but it's pretty damn funny at times, too.) [I have removed all the interstitiated comments from Sizemore. If this is confusing, please refer back to RISKS-29.22. PGN] I'm responding as a systems designer and developer, with some work in the security-related aspects of other areas. I'm not a security researcher, but believe that security requires an holistic approach. I'm not an expert, so don't take my comments as authoritative. Don't expect the people who participated in a problem's creation, to be the ones to solve it. ;-) Complete "security" isn't obtainable. We can only approach it, we can never truly reach it. We can't prove consistency in mathematics from within a system (Godel's theorem), we can't prove that a message was received without error (although we can be sure with vanishingly small probability of error), and there is no such thing as scientific "proof" (so the best we can do is a well-accepted theorem). It's all relative. So what does "truly secure" mean? We don't even have a good definition of ideal security. Worse, your security isn't my security, so any definition is relative to specific users. (BTW, Multics was tres cool.) Yes we could get very close to security if the system were open, but no system is completely open. We may get to observe the design process, but we don't have enough eyes to see it all the way to implementation and to manufacturing. Even if most actors are both ethical (whatever that means) and competent (again), there are always some bad actors. It's a long way from a specification to a product, and I can't completely trust that there are enough eyeballs to catch all of the mistakes and the mischief. How do I know that the circuit I bought from a supplier is the same one that was specified and designed? (Paranoia is an occupational hazard here.) The benefits from installing backdoors and from compromising the design might be worth that process, too. Do you know any such consortium you wouldn't also expect to be paranoid and mistrusting, also? I don't think that anyone has thus discovered or concluded, but we have to work in a presumed hostile environment. So we develop mechanisms for exchanging keys in the clear, for doing secure computations in the open, for saving keys when memory can't be securely erased, and so on. These procedures can be reviewed. We're surrounded by the (presumed) enemy, but we must move forward as best we can. The nature of the beast is that every aspect of the system is not *completely* trustworthy, and that no component is completely reliable. I often avoid flash memory, for example, because I don't have a lot of confidence that it can be erased (due to load-leveling mechanisms with unpublished interfaces). Of course, a spinning magnetic disk might have some malicious circuit in it, to capture private data, but I've just concluded that it's less likely. Not much, but that's all I've got to work with. So I just include the risk in the release notes, and do what I can. One big problem with depending on "secure" hardware is that it violates a principle I consider axiomatic: at least half of the risk is from the "inside". A detective knows that the murderer in a homicide case was probably close to the victim. A forensic accountant knows that the thief was probably on the inside, or at least had an accomplice on the inside. You (the statistical "you") are more likely to die at the hands of your countrymen than because of foreign enemies. And so on. I couldn't bring myself to trust all of the insiders, and I'd still spend half my security time looking for the threat from the inside. Finally, after years of working with both hardare and software, I concluded long ago that there is no bright line between them. They're both parts of bigger systems, and you can't make secure hardware without secure software and vice versa. Even more, the applications are part of the same system as the kernels and drivers and other platform components, and I suspect that you can't have a provably secure platform any more than you could have a provable secure application, unless it's all taken together along with the user environment and so on. We can move toward the "secure horizon", but it's like steering a ship by the stars, we won't ever reach it. I completely agree that a secure architecture would *greatly* increase the difficulty of routine penetration activities. I believe, however, that there is little incentive in many quarters to develop such architectures. There are some good, isolated efforts to develop better systems. I like SELinux, for example, but even the folks at the NSA can't agree on whether or not we should have backdoors in systems. If the President and the director of the NSA and the joint chiefs of staff came down on the side of "no backdoors", there'd still be some effort from the inside to sabotage the effort, I promise. Even when good (though imperfect) solutions exist, security is almost always an inconvenience, if not an impediment to profits, control, and dominance, so the use of the solution is restricted. It would be easy for Google to prevent a lot of spyware from running on Android devices, for instance, but it's not in their best interests to do it. Your average user can't even be bothered to create a random password, never mind to configure access permissions. Most network routers offer SPI firewalls, but how many work in the opposite direction, to prevent, say, the images from your surveillance cameras from escaping to the outside? So what we have to work with are some good components we can use along with some necessary bad components to build systems which we hope are secure. In this day and age, you still can't trust most software, and most customers, users, and employers in practice will put security near the bottom of their priorities list, making it uneconomical to build more secure (or more reliable) systems. Even when I've been asked to do security audits, the customers usually don't care about many of the conclusions. An audit is most of the time merely another checklist item. Yes, I know many of the vulnerabilities are highly unlikely to be significant, but even the glaring ones are ignored often as not. Ultimately, because most people don't care—at least enough to pay the price --, the markets don't support better components or better products. While I'm waiting for all of those secure platforms, I'll continue to develop for the insecure environments available to me now. I'm not holding my breath. I'll support the components which are secure, but security is too often a weakest link thing: if you bar one window, the burglar will enter through a different window, and few people want to live with bars on *all* of their windows. In other words, we have no choice but to work in handicapped environments. "Excuse me, Mr Burglar, please wait a moment while I locate my revolver and load it..." It's a cracker's festival out there, and they're not going to hold the party while we get our acts together. Sometimes our jobs are more like emergency room activities than they are like preventative medicine, but the patients keep coming into the doors. Meanwhile, I've never seen a good, practical definition of security, which isn't subject to interpretation. To me, efforts like the various trusted computing initiatives are great, but without the interpretation they sound like a lot of mumbo-jumbo. What they don't say is deafening. I'm convinced that many of the behind-the-scenes motives aren't really about security at all, but, rather about marketing, DRM (for one's own "intellectual property", anyway), profits, and such. Honestly, I like formal methods, but in the real world they haven't yet arrived at practicality. Look at the various military efforts to define and to organize security and to develop secure systems: They're sometimes awesome, we can learn from them, but they change every few years because every previous version has proven inadequate (not necessarily wrong, more often only limited). Yes, the military are often still fighting the previous war, not the current one, but they have unlimited budgets (by our standards), significant incentives, better and enforceable organizational abilities... and they're still trying to find -- let alone to hit—the target. (Don't mean to pick on them, they're just a good example. Don't see many better practical examples, actually.) I make a prediction: computer-related security will be as different X years from now as it is now from where it was X years ago. Remember when virus checkers and owner/group/world permissions were advanced stuff? Today's secure system is tomorrow's quaint example of naive misperceptions. Misperceptions will be shown, in time, to be universal. Hopefully, we can laugh at ourselves when we're ready to leave these lives for the next ones. Nicky, Your questions are reasonable, and, frankly, I don't think they're addressed well in any of the books or journals on my shelves (or on my computer). Only rarely does the scope of the analysis include the complete political and economic dimensions of the context. I don't mean to sound arrogant or dismissive of your inquiry, but (in case it doesn't show) I've grown cynical and frustrated over the years, not so much because of the technologies (this if fun stuff!) but because of the politics. I'm *sure* (sarcasm here...) that if the job were left to us technologists, theorists, engineers, and scientists, and taken away from the sociopathic oligarchy, then things would be *much* better in the world.
While Mark E. Smith's ideas are laudable, I'm afraid the end result might be a political version of Wikipedia. "The will of the people" is not a very well defined term, and rather unreliable. It has been shown time and again to be very susceptible to cheap tricks. What we need is a way to make elected officials behave like responsible adults; I'm not sure there is a provable scheme to ensure that.
Ars Technica via NNSquad http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/01/how-to-search-the-internet-of-things-for-photos-of-sleeping-babies/ Shodan, a search engine for the Internet of Things (IoT), recently launched a new section that lets users easily browse vulnerable webcams. The feed includes images of marijuana plantations, back rooms of banks, children, kitchens, living rooms, garages, front gardens, back gardens, ski slopes, swimming pools, colleges and schools, laboratories, and cash register cameras in retail stores, according to Dan Tentler, a security researcher who has spent several years investigating webcam security. "It's all over the place," he told Ars Technica UK. "Practically everything you can think of." We did a quick search and turned up some alarming results ... If industry can't deal with this correctly, government will try to force the issue *their* way. And you know what *that* means.
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