.. Was the Result of Cascade of Failures Danny Hakim, Reid J. Epstein, and Stephanie Saul The New York Times, 26 July 2020 National Edition front page continued in pp.22-23.
Stuggles to get the new high-text voting system working, failures to detect check marks instead of ‘X’, a huge management problem, barrage of partisan blame-throwing, Reps blame Fulton County (Atlanta, Dems), Dems blame just another Rep effort to disenfranchizes Dems, problems still unresolved six weeks later, with no signs of any improvements for November. “It has become increasingly clear that what happened in June was a collective collapse.” [Seriously PGN-ed, but the entire article is really scary and ominous.]
Russia's GRU military intelligence agency has carried out many of the most aggressive acts of hacking in history: destructive worms, blackouts, and — closest to home for Americans—broad hacking-and-leaking operation designed to influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Now it appears the GRU has been hitting U.S. networks again, in a series of previously unreported intrusions that targeted organizations ranging from government agencies to critical infrastructure.
This from Facebook. Anyone know the background? Any guesses what this is about? Cover for drug deals? There don't seem to be any explanations on the web.
Washington State Department of Agriculture, with Stephanie Marshall and 14 others.
Today we received reports of people receiving seeds in the mail from China that they did not order. The seeds are sent in packages usually stating that the contents are jewelry. Unsolicited seeds could be invasive, introduce diseases to local plants, or be harmful to livestock.
Here's what to do if you receive unsolicited seeds from another country:
[In need of VV education? DL]
Kim Wehle: Congress needs to appropriate money to the states every year exclusively for elections. The last serious influx of federal funding for equipment occurred in 2002. How many of us are using computers or flip phones from 18 years ago? I would like to see modern encryption technology brought to bear on voting so that, just like we conduct private and sensitive bank transactions on our phones, we vote on our phones safely and securely. This would address much of the fraud and the suppression concerns from both sides of the aisle.
The risks? Greed, hubris, patterns, personality…
Most big car insurers offer apps that monitor your driving, and one start-up requires it. The trade-off in privacy is a premium that could be substantially cheaper for safe drivers.
Same old, same old: except here you're the product and the customer.
The inconveniences of convenience.
“Problem 1: Anybody can email you. And they do.” True. Email account content can resemble a litter box. Delivery, while not 100%, surpasses snail mail speed and cost-effectiveness. Caveat emptor for anything that is free. Without authenticated credential provenance, via a nationalized (or global) identity, authorization, and maintenance mechanism, random and arbitrary recipient address email transmission is no-go.
“Problem 2: Important stuff gets lost.” True. Check your SPAM folder for important content mischaracterized by the latest attempt to automatically pick fly poop from a pepper pile. Filters are like rocket science: they intimidate the unskilled and uninitiated discouraging use.
“Problem 3: Your email isn't really private.” True. Corporate email service provider terms of service (aka, privacy policies) routinely authorize collection, exploitation, followed by the unfortunate involuntary breach (via hack or negligence) of said collected or transmitted email content.
Some entities (government security agencies specifically) might find interest in the names/email addresses of dissidents—see the recent Twitter hack of Geert Wilders. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/twitter-says-hackers-accessed-dutch-politicians-inbox/2020/07/23/b979af96-ccd2-11ea-99b0-8426e26d203b_story.html.
That “Hey” may partially mitigate these foundational email features to suit certain clientele (or their investors) does not diminish technological risk exposure.
It turns out that PDF cryptographic signatures do not protect the entire contents or visual appearance of the file. Which makes them utterly pointless.
If troubleshooting doesn't work, it's a known issue and you can get a replacement
> Probably junior programmers get this boring grunt work: senior programmers > get to do more interesting jobs, like writing new code! […]
Ahh, no. This was the customer tolerance level, to which IBM managed. As I recall, IBM alternated fixup releases (nothing new add, so more stable) and improvement releases (sorta beta test).
I think there's an unmentioned risk: that of an EU boondoggle. :-)
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