The RISKS Digest
Volume 7 Issue 45

Wednesday, 7th September 1988

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

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o Cheater software
Rodney Hoffman
Nancy Leveson
o Re: Risks Digest 7.44
Jerome H. Saltzer
o Display of telephone numbers
Bruce O'Neel
o Telephones and privacy
C.H. Longmore
o Gambling with video arcade machines
Mike Blackwell
o Video Games
Ed Nilges
o Wembley-on-the-Motown
Jeffrey R. Kell
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

"Cheater software"

Rodney Hoffman <>
6 Sep 88 08:06:50 PDT (Tuesday)
>From a story by Kim Murphy in the Sept. 3 'Los Angeles Times':

   General Dynamics Corp. was accused of using "cheater software" and 
   other fraudulent practices to falsify tests and supply defective 
   components for the U.S. Navy's Phalanx anti-missile gun system and 
   the Standard Missile program.

   In a lawsuit filed in Los Angeles federal court, one former and four 
   current General Dynamics employees — technicians, supervisors and
   quality-control specialists — accused the St. Louis-based defense 
   contractor of encouraging its employees to engage in widespread test
   falsifications that may have compromised the integrity of the two 
   weapons systems....

   A "cheater software" computer program allows company technicians to 
   begin running a test, then abort it and obtain a passing reading, the 
   suit contends....

   [more on other, non-software-related means used to falsify tests]

"COMPASS REPORT in RISKS 7.40 (Bev Littlewood via Brian Randell)"

Tue, 06 Sep 88 16:58:42 -0400
Wait a minute.  I have been tarred with an opinion that I do not have and
have never espoused.

>Nancy Leveson's remarks are just as bad, although possibly more amusing.
>Nancy told the story of her encounter with an engineer who wanted to know
>what number to fill in for the probability of the event labeled "software
>failure" on a fault tree.  Leveson tried to explain that there was no number
>but he persisted.  Finally she answered, "Just write 1.0."
>Leveson is LITERALLY correct - the software will ultimately fail with certainty
>- but the engineer is asking a responsible question.  He wants to know how 
>frequently the software will fail so that he can make scientifically informed
>judgments to aid in the engineering decisions he must take.

I did not say his question was irresponsible, only that it was unanswerable
at this time with the confidence that he wants.  Since we cannot measure
such low reliability numbers, then these types of systems should not be built 
to depend on the correct operation of the computer, i.e., the fault tree 
should take the conservative view of assigning 1.0 to the probability of 
failure of the software and, therefore, the builders will be required to show 
that the system is safe even if the software fails.  For example, a fully 
automated nuclear power plant safety system or fly-by-wire aircraft might be 
considered safe enough if there are usable and reliable back-up systems that 
do not rely on proper operation of a computer.   The problem with the Airbus
320 appears to be that they are relying on the computers and not taking the
need for back-up systems seriously.  The same, unfortunately, is also true
for the nuclear power plant design that the engineer I was speaking with
was evaluating.

>Thus far I suppose we are not in too great disagreement with the likes of 
>Cullyer and Leveson.  

How did my opinions on the subject (which were never stated in the original
message from Jon Jacky) and John Cullyer's get lumped together?  I am not
usually accused of agreeing with anyone :-).

>They seem to think that this is due in some way to defects in statistical
>methodology and that we should therefore have no more truck with statistics 
>(and statisticians?).  

I have never made such a statement or implied this.  I am in favor of 
research in software reliability (and safety) measurement and in its use 
currently for systems that do not involve loss of life and therefore
do not require very low numbers and high confidence.

>Improvement of statistical methodology will not
>be able to dent this problem.  But that does not mean that Cullyer-type 
>'certification' can be used instead (unless he means by this a assurance that
>the failure rate is ZERO - and I do not believe this is the case).  Rather
>it means that we are in a genuine impasse, and perhaps ought to face the 
>unpalatable view that we should not be building systems which require a 
>reliability which is not assurable.

Most systems are not 100% safe, nor does society require them to be.  We
usually require only an acceptable level of safety.  The problem is in
Bev's equating failure-free and safe.  Making them failure-free would
certainly work, but it is not necessary.  For example, aircraft are not
failure-free, but they seem to have a safety level that is acceptable
to society.  What we need to eliminate is catastrophic failure modes, not
necessarily ALL failure modes.  If we had to do the latter, we would need
to abandon much of current technology.  I personally feel that there are other 
solutions (which I have written extensively about) than just not building 
systems with computers.  That is, I believe we can build adequately safe 
systems without requiring 10**-9 reliability.  Unfortunately, not many 
software engineers know enough about system safety to build such software 
systems and the system safety engineers do not understand computers.  


Automatic Number ID: Great Idea! (RISKS-7.44)

Jerome H. Saltzer <Saltzer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU>
Tue, 6 Sep 88 13:47:33 EDT
In "Automatic Number ID: Great Idea!", Patrick Townson makes several
good arguments favoring Automatic Number Identification (ANI).  I
agree that on balance ANI will be a good thing once the novelty wears
off and people become accustomed to the new rules of the game.  But
Townson may be carrying a good argument a little too far when he

>   As for legitimate reasons to not want your number displayed to
>   the called party, I can't think of any.

I assume that he took that somewhat polar position in order to draw
out suggestions for legitimate reasons, so here are a couple of cases
in which maintaining the privacy of the caller does seem to make some

     1.  Hotlines (e.g., drug-abuse and suicide) and police
     department tip numbers depend on anonymity of the caller to
     perform a function that is usually considered to have some value
     to society.  Some police departments maintain a line separate
     from 911 (which often has an ANI feature) just for this purpose.
     If the caller of a hotline knew that the calling number would be
     automatically recorded, at least some of the information that
     flows in this way would dry up, and some of the help dispensed
     this way would not be.  (The technique of dialing a prefix code
     to block automatic number identification caters to this
     requirement.  I doubt that many hotlines would take Townson's
     hard-nosed approach and refuse to accept a call from a
     prospective suicide who has blocked ANI.)

     2.  When a private party calls on a "big organization," (for
     example, making ten queries to stock trading companies about their
     commission rates in anticipation of opening one account) there is
     an understandable preference for not leaving one's number,
     simply to avoid unwanted followup calls (e.g., from hungry
     brokers).  Again, the ANI-blocking prefix satisfies this
     requirement, because no hungry stockbroker is going to refuse a
     call that sounds like it comes from a promising prospect.

Townson's polar position might be plausible if you assume telephones
are answered only by private individuals.  He is well-advised to
refuse anonymous calls to his bulletin board and welcome to refuse
them at his private phone.  But I believe that the need for blocking
ANI remains for other situations.


Re: Display of telephone numbers on receiving party's phone

Tue, 06 Sep 88 17:30:25 EDT
I much prefer using a prefix ( *21 say) only when you WANT the number
to be known, rather than when you DO NOT want the callee to see it.


Re: Telephones and Privacy

C H Longmore <>
Tue, 6 Sep 88 20:28+0100
Patrick Townson's article in RISKS 7.44 states:

> Having ANI implemented will simply make it too inconvenient for most of the
> low-life scum who hide behind their telephone to continue their practices.
> As for legitimate reasons to not want your number displayed to the called 
> party, I can't think of any. Again, you have to make the analogy of going
> to see someone in person. It is completely unfair and unrealistic to say 
> that you have the right to disturb someone at whatever they were doing and 
> that they in turn have no right to demand to know who you are.

How could you apply this to a situation where [as in the UK] certain police
forces operate systems whereby people can give information to the police
*anonymously* by calling a device as simple as an answering machine?

How could you apply it to a situation where a potential customer wishes to
obtain a quote by phone *without* running the risk of that company using the
information so gained to apply the hard-sell.

Can you imagine someone using a confidential medical advice line (such as an
AIDS advisory service) if there was a possibility of the call being easily

How many people would telephone up the Samaritans if their number wasn't

In the UK these are not problems....  yet.  Our current telephone network is
not capable of supporting these features....  yet.

It *should* be possible to conceal your own telephone number from the person
you are calling..  however, it is also the right of the person receiving the
call to refuse to communicate with anybody who does not want his/her telephone
number revealed.  The latter is easy enough to implement....  a simple
user-settable switch on the telephone is all that is needed.

The 'privacy' argument has two sides....  it is the right of an individual
*not* to have their phone number displayed, but it is also the right of the
individual *not* to answer anonymous calls.  A problem to which the solution
seems easy enough....  (now prove otherwise!)

                              Conrad H Longmore
   Computer Science Dept, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK.


Gambling with video arcade machines

Tue, 6 Sep 1988 17:34-EDT
I was once called to be an expert witness in a case involving gambling
with video poker machines. The case never went to trial, but I did gain
some insight as to how they work.

In a typical video card machine, you put in your quarter, and earn one
card hand (five card draw or blackjack are the most common). You play
the hand (discarding and drawing new cards - no betting here, you just
get one shot), and at the end win so may points for your final hand
(from zero for a bad hand, one for two-pair, two for three-of-a-kind,
up to maybe 500 for a royal-flush). In a real gambling machine (like in
Vegas), you'll get quarters for your points - they spit right out of
the machine. In a non-gambling arcade machine, you just get free games
for your points. This is legal, no different than winning free games or
extra time at Space Invaders (in Pennsylvania, at least, playing video
poker is considered to require skill...).

What makes the arcade style card machine a gambling device is the
addition of a "knock-off" switch. This is a switch, either directly on
the machine, or wired from the bar, which zeros out the any free games.
How it works is you rack up your zillion free games, find the barkeeper
(or whoever, but this seems to usually take place in bars), and he'll
pay you one quarter for each free game you've won. Then he'll clear the
free games from the machine. It is solely the presence of this knock-off
switch that classifies the machine as a gambling device. Apparently
(though I was never able to confirm this), simply power cycling the
machine does not clear free games.

Even if a bar is not caught paying off, the game distributor can be
tried for providing machines with knock-off switches.


Video Games

Ed Nilges <EGNILGES@PUCC.Princeton.EDU>
Tue, 06 Sep 88 13:27:04 EDT
How many computer professionals have noticed the continual technical
improvement of video games in the past couple of years, and the
concomitant decline of their social and moral content?  Nintendo and
other Japanese companies, with little knowledge or care about the
effect of racial tensions on American cities, market games such as
Ninja Warriors vs. Bad Dudes, which feature a Caucasian-looking
(or Japanese) hero, fighting black villains.  The video game user
manipulates the characters in a seedy back-alley environment featuring
garbage cans and offensive comment, on the face of it, on
the state of the inner city.

Other games allow players to act as contra rebels or air force pilots,
without teaching them either the misery of dying in a jungle, or the
difficulty of qualifying to be an Air Force enlisted man, let alone

The graphics are beautiful: the content is vile.  Surely it's our
responsibility as computer professionals to protest this application
of a technology which could improve lives.  While the Japanese are to be
applauded for making technology affordable, they are to be condemned
for taking technology developed in the US, and using it to degrade people
in this way.

Perhaps the most effective thing for computer people to do is to
approach restaurant owners in their own community who operate such
machines and explain their concerns as professionals and, if applicable,
as parents.  Video game parlor operators are obviously not going to
listen, but restaurant owners may.

Re: Wembley-on-the-Motown (RISKS 7.42)

Tue, 06 Sep 88 10:11:27 EDT
(I play keyboards/synthesizer part-time aside from my "real" job...)
Any electronic musical equipment, especially anything constantly moved with
a traveling show, is far from being highly reliable.  The newest electronic
keyboards are probably the most sensitive of all.  You are fortunate to get
predictable results in a controlled (studio) environment, let alone have
a delicate piece of equipment be thrown around by the road crew, plugged
into unstable power sources and subjected to varying temperature conditions.

Original synthesizers (Moog, Arp) with their knobs, switches, and patch cords
took some time to set properly, but they did STAY SET, other than perhaps
small tuning adjustments.  The second generation could record these settings
in small internal memories, thus making the first synthesizer "programs".
The third generation was practically all digital (notably Korg, Yamaha) with
settings programmed as parameters, and internal memory grew to several K-bytes
of RAM, often with battery backup and cassette backup.  The latest generation
recreates sounds from digital samples, much like a CD Disk player.  The
Synclavier mentioned is one of the top-of-the-line of these types.  I own a
Korg DSS-1 (standard disclaimers) which has 768K RAM, a 3.5 diskette drive,
and can turn out a 48KHz sample rate at 14 bit resolution.  Very nice, but
one minor power glitch and memory is lost must be rebooted (about 30 seconds,
but rather annoying in the middle of a song).  I was once stuck on an out-of-
town job with two third-generation Poly-800's which were packed by a member
of the road crew and inadvertently left turned on (they can operate from
batteries alone) resulting in loss of memory (and cassette backup at home).

The risk of high-tech music can also be heard in CD disks.  They sound
superb when they work, but go far off into the ozone when they fail.
Quite a far cry from the brief bump of a phonograph needle skipping a groove.

I have caught myself longing for the days of the trusty piano which, with
a tuning or two a year, always got the job done.  At least in that respect, I
find it easier to relate to the techno-phobes who distrust automation.

Jeffrey R Kell, Dir Tech Services, Admin Computing, 117 Hunter Hall,
Univ of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Chattanooga, TN  37403          

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