The RISKS Digest
Volume 9 Issue 23

Tuesday, 12th September 1989

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

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Risks of RISKS: A bug in sendmail and multiple copies of RISKS-9.22
with help from Bill Sommerfeld and Jeff Schiller
RF susceptibility of electronics
Pete Lucas
Some background on the French Farce
Dave Horsfall
Organizational Accreditation for Computer Assurance: Some Ideas
Frank Houston
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Risks of RISKS: A bug in sendmail and multiple copies of RISKS-9.22

Peter Neumann <>
Fri, 8 Sep 1989 14:44:44 PDT
Some of you were fortunate in receiving just one copy of RISKS-9.22, but the
reported record thus far is TWELVE.  Apparently the mailing stumbled on a bug
in SENDMAIL that gets activated only rarely on LONG lists (but never before for
RISKS on the Sun CSL.SRI.COM — although I had just added a bunch of new
addresses before mailing out RISKS-9.23!).

The RISKS list is LONG despite my continual efforts to consolidate multiple
addresses at the same site through redistributions and BBoards, with
considerable volunteer help from around the net as well (for which I am
enormously grateful — for example, Ted Tso on behalf of MIT readers and Marc
Shannon unwedging the BITNET LISTSERVers have been active far beyond any
reasonable expectations).  I hope that the few of you who still get private
copies can convert to other means of reading RISKS.

Thanks to all of you who reported the multiple mailings, some even observing
from the time stamps that the problem had to be at the CSL end.  (Surprisingly,
nobody asked if I would CATCH 22 before it went any further.)  Unfortunately
the repetitive mailing started happening late Wednesday afternoon, and we did
not get a chance to kill it until Thursday morning when SENDMAIL was still
merrily trying to send out even MORE copies!  Sorry.

Yes, this is just another risk of running RISKS.  (Some of you may remember a
few years ago getting two or three copies of one issue due to a system crash in
the middle of processing the list.)  But for this one there may be some help.

The following message from Bill Sommerfeld was very helpful.

  Date: Thu, 7 Sep 89 00:10:57 -0400
  From: Bill Sommerfeld <wesommer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU>
  Subject: Retransmissions of RISKS Forum noticed

  I noticed that we got several copies (nine, as of last count) of Risks
  9.22 at Bloom Beacon today.

  There is a bug in sendmail that causes it to dump core (with a longjmp botch)
  in the middle of processing long mailing lists, with the result that the
  addresses earlier in the list tend to get multiple copies.             Bill

     [Bill enclosed a patch, which I omit, that was due to Jeff Schiller of
     MIT Telecommunications.  I thought SENDMAIL users might be interested,
     but did not want to bother eveyone with the code.  However, Jeff's comments
     in the code should be quite interesting to you all as an example of a
     subtle timing problem.    Many thanks to Bill (and Jeff)...    PGN]

    **  JIS: We change the global variable ReadTimeout to be 5
    **      minutes. This variable is used by the lowlevel routine
    **      sfgets to determine how long to wait for input.
    **      when we get our greeting we return ReadTimeout to its
    **      previous state. IMPORTANT: The older code I replaced
    **      used a separate timeout (via a setjmp and longjmp)
    **      this LOSES REAL BIG if the 5 minute timeout goes off
    **      for then sfgets gets its stack unwound and leaves
    **      a lingering event that will eventually cause a longjmp
    **      to some ancient stack history, sendmail then dies horribly.
    **      This usually happens only when dealing with large mailing
    **      lists ("xpert" in this case > 200 recipients), which is
    **      the LAST place you want to dump core, for then the queue
    **      files are out of date and LOTS of people get a duplicate
    **      copy of the message that was in progress.

  [We were ready to do a major upgrade on SENDMAIL anyway, so I held off
  on distributing this message awaiting the inclusion of the fix.  But
  in the process of trying to rebuild our SENDMAIL, a NEW old bug was
  found, so I am sending RISKS-9.23 to get this news to you — albeit with
  some trepidation, and with the mailing list split in twain.   I hope no
  one gets run over by the twain.  PGN]

RF susceptibility of electronics

"Pete Lucas - NERC Computer Services U.K." <>
Thu, 07 Sep 89 10:53:51 BST
Medical electronics not RF-proof - doesn't surprise me one bit. It's not just
the medical electronics that get troubled this way.  There was a case some
years back where the fire alarms of a large London hospital were triggered by
low level RF (from walkie-talkie radios operating at about 440 to 470MHz - the
Police band).  A policeman standing in the hospital foyer could easily trigger
the alarms if he used his radio.  The threat to life of an `accidental'
trigerring of fire alarms and the disturbance to treatments consequent on
patient evacuation is just as great as direct perturbation of the medical
equipment itself.

Manufacturers of electronic equipment just don't realise how RF-hostile the
world is.  I can crash my IBM PS/2 by operating a 5-watt handheld UHF radio in
the same room.

Some background on the French Farce

Dave Horsfall <>
Tue, 12 Sep 89 13:04:25 est
On the off chance that no-one else has provided this, I came across
some background information on the infamous French Farce.  Here are
some extracts from "The Australian", Tue Sep 12, 1989:

    The ministry said the mixup occurred because a central computer
    misread magnetic bands on some 41,000 files [ mag stripes? ].
    ... the amount of the fines was not affected by the mishap,
    meaning that speeding tickets were transformed into pimping
    offences but carried only a F360 fine.

    Motorists ticketed for failing to stop at a red light were
    fined for "importing unauthorised vetinary medications",
    while those whose only offence was crossing a solid white
    line on the road were charged with "night fishing in a place
    reserved for fish breeding".

                                     [May the Farce be With You!  PGN]

Organizational Accreditation for Computer Assurance: Some Ideas

Frank Houston <>
Tue, 12 Sep 89 13:49:45 -0400
Some food for thought.  Some decades ago hospitals and the medical professions
suffered credibility problems both within the health care industry and with the
public.  The industry attempted to solve these problems through the process of
accreditation, which has so far proved fairly successful.  I suggest that this
model could be effective for software development.  Rather than just
prescribing development protocols or requiring exhaustive testing, or certified
practitioners, or relying on product history, why not combine these into a
comprehensive evaluation?  The results could establish a basis for confidence
that an organization produces quality software.

Some preliminary thoughts on the model:





     1.  Credentials (of personnel and management:  e.g.,
education, experience, PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION, etc.)

     2.  Process (of software development, a la SEI evaluation

     3.  Product (independent evaluation and test of)

     4.  Performance (safety and reliability records on released


     Multidimensional evaluation factors (four to start) avoids
the "single scoreboard" syndrome of maximizing the quantity being
measured regardless of its relevance to performance.

     Criteria are not entirely orthogonal, therefore each
criterion provides a safety net to catch problems that one or
more of the other criteria might miss.

     Acquiring a significant body of data, a statistical basis
for correlating performance with the other criteria.

     Flexible evaluation criteria and flexible standards to allow
for continual improvement.

     Establishing a historical reference for measuring progress
toward the goal, to reduce the incidence of ...


     Requires significant investment of time and effort to
establish credibility.

     Requires cooperation from major customers.

     Requires a substantial corps of volunteer firms that are
willing to fund the accreditation process by paying subsantial
dues to the accrediting organization.

     Requires that dues paying members be committed to the
accreditation process, that is, be willing to accept negative
outcomes and strive to achieve the standards set by the
accrediting organization.


Such a model has worked for hospitals and health care
organizations, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
Care Organizations (JCAHO, formerly JCAH).  The Joint Commission
at one time was so strong that accreditation was a significant
factor in eligibility for Medicare payments.

The College of American Pathologists carries on a similar
accreditation for clinical laboratories.

Neither of these examples is perfect, but they do work to the
extent that they force their members to focus on important
success factors and continually measure and report the quality of
their products and services.  Thus, the accreditation body
obtains a window on the norms of practice and can stimulate
improvement where necessary.  The ultimate lever for
accreditation is the willingness of paying customers, Medicare, to
accept accreditation as a sufficient guarantee of quality


Frank Houston, FDA/CDRH

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