The Risks Digest

The RISKS Digest

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Volume 9 Issue 57

Thursday 4 January 1990

Contents

o Self-Service ordering in retail establishments
Russell McFatter
o Programming Languages and Romanian Dictators
Eric Haines
o `Credit Card' found from 13th Century
Steve Crocker
o Risks of computerfax
Steve Elias
o Password Security: A Case History, by Bob Morris and Ken Thompson
PGN
o "What Really Happened Oct. 13"
Joe Morris
o The risks of not learning?
Al Arsenault
o RAND has not received "AIDS Information Disk"
Correction from Jim Gillogly
o Call for Papers -- 13th National Computer Security Conference
Jack Holleran
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Self-Service ordering in retail establishments

Russell McFatter <russ@GARP.MIT.EDU>
Fri, 22 Dec 89 17:34:13 est
In RISKS Digest 9.56, Roy Smith talks about delays waiting for computerized
card catalogs (and that it was sometimes faster to use the old-fashioned
approach).

I find that one of the best advantages of electronic self-service is that
it usually provides FASTER service than waiting for a human operator;
A good example is bank ATM's.  (I can usually park my car, go inside the
bank, transact my business, and be back in the car and on my way before
the FIRST car in the drive-thru line has left).

Usually, the speed-up advantage for these cases is offset by a loss in
convienience.  Two examples:

(1) Most Service Merchandise catalog showrooms in the area have one or more
"Silent Sam" self-service ordering stations.   These are (basically) dumb
terminals which can collect your name and address, take orders, and will even
tell you if a particular item is out of stock or that only the "display" item
remains.  (Amazingly, the inventory counts seem to be reasonably
accurate!).  However, the station does not print a reciept; the receipt
gives you, at least, the "guaranteed" time that your order will be filled
by.  Without the reciept, you have no idea how long you'll be waiting, and
if the order is delayed or forgotten, you have nothing with which to claim
the "reward" usually offered for these cases.

(2) Burger King is experimenting with a self-service ordering system called
"Touch and Go": an ATM-like device with the complete Burger King menu on a
large touchpad display.  Posters and a nearby video player encourage
customers to "avoid long lines" and use the "simple" Touch-and-Go system.
The machine takes your order, takes your money, and gives you a change and
your receipt; you then proceed to the "Touch and Go" area at the counter to
pick up the food.  (It even takes/gives pennies!!)

When I first tried this at the Acton store, I was impressed at the smarts
(if you order a "breakfast" item at dinnertime, for example, a voice and
CRT display both tell you that "this restaurant is not serving breakfast
at this time").  Then I tried to order a double cheeseburger with "ketchup
only"; and found it impossible.  I mentioned this to one of the employees
while placing my MANUAL order, and was told that the software was going to
be upgraded shortly to allow special orders.  The machine was the only one
of its kind and was being market-tested in the Acton, MA store.

A few weeks go by, and sure enough, an extra option is added to let you
customize individual items.  So I order the double cheeseburger again,
and press the "Have It Your Way" button.  New options appear on the
CRT:  "Adjust Ketchup" and "Adjust Pickle".  Both are set to "normal", so
I touch "Adjust Pickle" and set "Pickle" to "None".  Great, an
electronically-ordered "ketchup only" double cheeseburger at last!

What do I actually get?  A double cheeseburger with ketchup and mustard.
Seems that mustard is normal on a double cheeseburger, and Touch-and-Go
offers no way to turn it off.   I bring the burger up to the counter where
they acknowledge this, and replace the cheeseburger for free.  "I'm glad
you brought it back," the salesperson tells me.  "This has been happening a
lot.  The machine goes on the road next week; we'll be glad to be rid of
it."

--- Russ McFatter  [russ@alliant.Alliant.COM]

"Have It Your Way" and "Touch-and-Go" are (undoubtedly) trademarks of
Burger King Corporation, for what it's worth.  Std. disclaimer applies.


Programming Languages and Romanian Dictators

Eric Haines <erich@eye.UUCP>
Fri, 29 Dec 89 08:50:32 est
This somewhat cryptic paragraph is from "Romanians Talk of Life Then and Now"
by Russell W. Baker, in the Christian Science Monitor, December 27th, 1989:

    Dragos Vaida, an associate professor of mathematics at the University
    of Bucharest, told how he had published a book on computer science,
    but was obligated to change the title because it referred to
    programming languages.  Elena Ceausescu, who was in charge of
    technology, was against computer science, he said, because it gave the
    people technical knowledge that could be used against the dictatorship.

What I'm curious about is what the new unoffensive title could have been.  If
Elena was upset about computer science in general, why wasn't the book simply
banned?  Or was she upset that people might learn about "programming
languages", which to her might sound like mind control?  Strange story.

Eric Haines - wrath.cs.cornell.edu!eye!erich


`Credit Card' found from 13th Century

<crocker@TIS.COM>
Wed, 27 Dec 89 16:47:49 -0500
The last paragraph suggests the RISKS were the same 700 years ago.

[From The Times (London) Saturday, December 23, 1989 by Simon Tait,
Arts Correspondent]

A seal, which would have been the equivalent of cheque card, passport
and credit card rolled into one for the person who lost it more than
700 years ago, has been found by archaeologists working in Oxford.

Mr. David Dawson, of the Oxfordshire County Museum, Woodstock, where the seal
will go on display, said: "This was a personal seal which would have been
carried round everywhere by the owner.  He would have been lost without it, and
it is a rare thing to find because it would normally have been destroyed on his
death."

What makes the small, corroded and fragile 13th-century seal unique is that it
was found in premises known, through records in the Bodleian Library, to belong
to the seal's owner.

It bears the legend `S' ROGERUM COMENORE CLICI, indicating that the seal
(sigillum) belonged to Roger of Cumnor, clerk or priest, who worker as a
lawyer.  The site is on the corner of Hollybush Row in Oxford, on which Halls
Brewery stood most recently, which is being developed by Grosvenor Square
Property Developers.

Roger who gave two buildings on it to Oseney Abbey in 1265, during the reign of
Henry III, according to the Bodleian Library.  The seal was found in a ditch
between the two buildings.

Mr. Brian Durham, a member of the Oxford Archaeological Unit which made the
discovery during excavations last week, said: "The new find could be a forgery
but the more likely explanation is that it is his early seal, which he lost
when he was actually living in the house.  You can picture him hunting
unsuccessfully for it."

"Since he worked, in effect, as a solicitor, he would have had to alert
everyone to the fact that the seal could have been stolen and used for
forgeries.  Then he would have had to have a different seal made."


Risks of computerfax

<eli@pws.bull.com>
Fri, 29 Dec 89 09:25:15 -0500
Commercial email to fax gateways are beginning to hit the market.  I've been
faxing email for people for many months, and one problem which recurs is people
supplying me with incorrect fax numbers.  I usually try a voice call first, to
ensure that the destination phone number is indeed answered by a fax machine.
Occasionally it is not, and I am forced to confuse the innocent person who
answers.  Often, the person can supply me with the correct fax number.

This problem is compounded with fully automated computerfax systems.  Some
computerfax hardware is able to detect voice on the line, and hence "do the
right thing": don't call again, and return an error.  Some computerfax systems
do not properly detect voice, and they might redial the phone number N times
before returning an error.

One solution might be to use computerfax hardware that has the capability to
play digitized voice and ask the recipient to press touch tones to indicate his
annoyance level!  Most computerfax hardware does not have this capability,
unfortunately.

A risk is that blue network meanies would purposely ask for a fax to be
delivered to a non-fax number, in order to cause an "annoyance".  Annoyance
calls are illegal.  I wonder whether the computerfax machine owner is liable
for such calls, or whether the sender is responsible?  (comp.dcom.telecom cats
can probably answer this question.)

We've seen the uproar in Washington about junk faxes...  Computerfax opens the
door for an email user to cause junk fax, intentionally or unintentionally.

Steve Elias  508 671 7556


Password Security: A Case History (Bob Morris and Ken Thompson)

"Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Wed, 3 Jan 1990 16:21:49 PST
I just happened to be rereading the above cited paper (CACM, 22 11, Nov 1979,
pp. 594-7), and stumbled upon Bob Morris' tale about discovering the password
file spewing out instead of the message of the day file on each new login,
because two people were editing the two files in the same directory and the
editor used the same temporary file names for both of them (MIT's CTSS, early
1960s).  Yes, it really happened.  But since this case is often cited as a
piece of apocrypha, I thought it might be worth mentioning here, particularly
for the younger folks for whom 1979 (not to mention the early 1960s) is
prehistory.

   [That is the paper that describes preencryptive attacks on the encrypted
   password file.]


A little (much-needed) humor [ WHAT REALLY HAPPENED OCT. 13 ]

Joe Morris (jcmorris@mitre.org) <jcmorris@mwunix.mitre.org>
Wed, 03 Jan 90 11:29:01 EST
The following appeared in yesterday's (1/2/90) Wall Street Journal in a
summary of some of the more absurd events of the past year.  The sad part
of it is that too many people might take the story as literal truth...while
others ignore questions of security as unnecessary makework.

  WHAT REALLY HAPPENED OCT. 13:

  Arthur Cashin, a Paine Webber trader at the New York Stock Exchange, writes
  a daily market letter with a touch of the wacky.

  The Monday after the Friday-the-13th plunge, when traders were still
  wondering if the market would crash again, Mr. Cashin explained what really
  happened Friday:

  "At about 2:25 (EDT) a nine-year-old named Lance, sitting hunched over
  his Nintendo machine in Hohokus, N. J., opened the wrong door in a game
  of "Mario Brothers."  Once the door was open the computer virus escaped
  and immediately began calling in sell orders to the New York Stock Exchange's
  DOT system.  The virus was programmed to enter the orders in alphabetical
  order based on industry, so it began with airlines and ended with the
  zoysia grass distributers (which were least affected by the sell-off)."

  "Is that what happened?  Well, no!  But that is what you will probably hear
  from a variety of academics and self-appointed experts as regulators
  review Friday's events."


The risks of not learning?

Al Arsenault <AArsenault@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL>
Wed, 3 Jan 90 07:58 EST
During the Fall 1989 semester, I taught a computer security class at a
local college.  Most of the students were junior or senior CS majors.

One of the questions on the final exam was "Describe one advantage that
passwords have over biometric devices (e.g., retinal scanners, fingerprint
readers) as an authentication mechanism."

I was expecting answers along the lines of 'passwords are more acceptable
to users in most cases than sticking their eyes up to a slot', since I had
spent a lot of time covering Saltzer and Schroeder's eight design principles,
one of which is 'psychological acceptability' of mechanisms to users.  (Other
acceptable answers existed - e.g., with biometrics, one must deal with both
false positives and false negatives - there's a chance the real person will
be rejected.)

One student's answer:  "Passwords have the advantage that it's easier to let
my friend use my account.  If the system uses biometric devices for user
authentication, I have to be there when he logs in, to get him on to the
system.  But, if the system uses passwords, I can just tell him my password,
and don't have to be there - he can login at his leisure."

So much for that one-week unit on 'Individual Accountability'.
                                                                Al Arsenault


RAND has not received "AIDS Information Disk"

Jim Gillogly <jim%blaise@rand.org>
Tue, 19 Dec 89 16:12:39 PST
In RISKS 9.55 it was reported that a local radio news broadcast said that RAND
had been hit with the AIDS virus [sic].  This is not correct.  We have not seen
the "AIDS Information Disk" here.  There was a flurry of activity from the
press when AP reported that we had warned our researchers to be on the lookout
for the Disk in their incoming mail (true).  I talked to several TV stations,
passing on the information that it's not infectious (i.e. isn't a virus), and
that it underlines the fact that everybody should make frequent backups and be
careful what they stick into their computers.
                                                         Jim Gillogly
  [Also noted by Jim Guyton, guyton@rand.org]


Call for Papers --- 13th National Computer Security Conference

Jack Holleran <Holleran@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL>
Sat, 23 Dec 89 08:59 EST
                        CALL  FOR  PAPERS:
           13th NATIONAL COMPUTER  SECURITY CONFERENCE
     Sponsored by the National Computer Security Center and
       the National Institute of Standards and Technology

Theme:    Information Systems Security:  Standards - The Key to the Future
Date:                   OCTOBER 1-4, 1990
Location:                WASHINGTON, D.C.

This conference provides a forum for the Government and the private sector to
share current information that is useful and of general interest to the
conference participants on technologies, present and future, that are designed
to meet the ever-growing challenge of telecommunications and automated
information systems security.  The conference will offer multiple tracks for
the needs of users, vendors, and the research and development communities.  The
focus of the conference will be on: Systems Application Guidance, Awareness,
Training, and Education, Ethics and Issues, Evaluation and Certification,
Innovations and New Products, Management and Administration, and Disaster
Prevention and Recovery.  We encourage submission of papers on the following
topics of high interest:

Systems Application Guidance
    -    Access Control Strategies
    -    Achieving Network Security
    -    Building on Trusted Computing Bases
    -    Integrating INFOSEC into Systems
    -    Preparing Security Plans
    -    Secure Architectures
    -    Securing Heterogeneous Networks
    -    Small Systems Security

Innovations and New Products
    -    Approved/Endorsed Products
    -    Audit Reduction Tools and Techniques
    -    Biometric Authentication
    -    Data Base Security
    -    Personal Identification and Authentication
    -    Smart Card Applications
    -    Tools and Technology

Awareness, Training and Education
    -    Building Security Awareness
    -    Compusec Training:  Curricula, Effectiveness, Media
    -    Curriculum for Differing Levels of Users
    -    Keeping Security In Step With Technology
    -    Policies, Standards, and Guidelines
    -    Understanding the Threat

Evaluation and Certification
    -    Assurance and Analytic Techniques
    -    Conducting Security Evaluations
    -    Covert Channel Analysis
    -    Experiences in Applying Verification
    -    Formal Policy Models
    -    Techniques

Management and Administration
    -    Accrediting Information Systems and Networks
    -    Defining and Specifying Computer Security Requirements
    -    Life Cycle Management
    -    Managing Risk
    -    Role of Standards
    -    Security Requirements

Disaster Prevention and Recovery
    -    Assurance of Service
    -    Computer Viruses
    -    Contingency Planning
    -    Disaster Recovery
    -    Malicious Code
    -    Survivability

Ethics and Issues
    -    Computer Abuse/Misuse
    -    Ethics in the Workplace
    -    Individual Rights
    -    Laws
    -    Relationship of Ethics to Technology
    -    Standards of Ethics in Information Technology


BY FEBRUARY 16, 1990:  Send eight copies of your draft paper* or panel
suggestions to one of the following addresses.  Include the topical category
of your submission, author name(s), address, and telephone number on the cover
sheet only.

    1.  FOR PAPERS SENT VIA        National Computer Security Conference
          U.S. or Foreign             ATTN:  NCS Conference Secretary
         Government  MAIL             National Computer Security Center
              ONLY:                   Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

    2.   FOR PAPERS SENT VIA       National Computer Security Conference
         COMMERCIAL COURIER           c/o NCS Conference Secretary
       SERVICES (e.g.-FEDERAL         National Computer Security Center
         EXPRESS, EMERY, UPS,         911 Elkridge Landing Road
              etc.):                  Linthicum, MD  21090

    3.  FOR Electronic Mail:  NCS_Conference@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL   (1 copy)

BY MAY 4, 1990: Speakers selected to participate in the conference will be
notified.

BY JUNE 22, 1990:  Final, camera-ready papers are due.

 * Government employees or those under Government sponsorship must so identify
their papers.

For additional information on submissions, please call (301) 850-0272.

     To assist the Technical Review Committee, the following is required for
all submissions:

        Page 1:     Title of paper or submission
                           Topical Category & keywords
                           Author(s)
                           Organization(s)
                           Phone number(s)
                           Net address(es), if available
                           Point of Contact
     Additionally, submissions sponsored by the U.S. Government must provide
the following information:
                        U.S. Government Program Sponsor or Procuring Element
                        Contract number (if applicable)
                        U.S. Government Publication Release Authority
                           (Note:  Responsibility for U.S. Government
                            pre-publication review lies with the author(s).)

      Page 2:      Title of the paper or submission
        -last       abstract
                    The paper   (Suggested length:  6 pages, double columns)

     A Technical Review Committee, composed of U.S. Government and Industry
Computer Security experts, will referee submissions only for technical merit
for publication and presentation at the National Computer Security (NCS)
Conference.  No classified submissions will be accepted for review.

     Papers drafted as part of the author's official U.S. Government duties
may not be subject to copyright.  Papers submitted that are subject to
copyright must be accompanied by a written assignment to the NCS Conference
Committee or written authorization to publish and release the paper at the
Committee's discretion.  Papers selected for presentation at the NCS
Conference requiring U.S. Government pre-publication review must include,
with the submission of the final paper no later than June 22, 1990 to the
committee, a written release from the U.S. Government Department or Agency
responsible for pre-publication review.  Failure to comply may result in
rescinding selection for publication and for presentation at the 13th NCS
Conference.

     Technical questions can be addressed to the NCS Conference Committee
through the following means:

            Phone:                   (301) 850-0CSC  [0272]

            Electronic Mail:         NCS_Conference@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL

            Government Mail:         National Computer Security Conference
                                       National Computer Security Center
                                       Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

            Commercial Carriers:     National Computer Security Conference
                                       c/o NCS Conference Secretary
                                       National Computer Security Center
                                       911 Elkridge Landing Road
                                       Linthicum, MD  21090

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