Ars Technica <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 11:39:01 PST
Ars Technica, via Tom Van Vleck—who sent this to RISKS after walking on the beach, when he heard five tremendous booms that turned out to be the result of offshore supersonic testing of an F-35c.
Ken Knowlton <email@example.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 09:49:01 -0500
Tech Dirt via Paul Robinson <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 12:10:06 +0000 (UTC)
An article in Tech Dirt  "Frequent Errors In Scientific Software May Undermine Many Published Results" notes that a number of technical articles being submitted to scientific and technical journals for analysis and/or peer review may have unknown errors because the scientific analysis used to determine the results is often using custom software written by the scientist - or more likely, by his or her research assistant - who is not trained in writing software or may not be qualified to do so, and as a result, the expected error rates for such software can be expected to be much higher than even the typically abysmal rate of 15-20 defects per 1000 lines of code that professionals suffer with. Or rather, I mean "that with which professionals suffer" since you're not supposed to end a sentence with a preposition.
This potentially raises the odds that the results have serious, possibly even critical errors in the results, making them questionable or even downright worthless, by a large factor, and may result in serious misapplication of resources as some results may be badly skewed or even outright incorrect.
Iain Thomson <email@example.com>
Date: Saturday, January 30, 2016
[Note: This item comes from friend David Rosenthal. DLH]
Iain Thomson, The Register, 27 Jan 2016 [PGP] lights you up like a Vegas casino, says compsci boffin <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/27/nsa_loves_it_when_you_use_pgp/>
Although the cops and Feds wont stop banging on and on about encryption, the spies have a different take on the use of crypto.
To be brutally blunt, they love it. Why? Because using detectable encryption technology like PGP, Tor, VPNs and so on, lights you up on the intelligence agencies' dashboards. Agents and analysts don't even have to see the contents of the communications—the metadata is enough for g-men to start making your life difficult.
"To be honest, the spooks love PGP," Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at the International Computer Science Institute, told the Usenix Enigma conference in San Francisco on Wednesday. "It's really chatty and it gives them a lot of metadata and communication records. PGP is the NSA's friend."
Weaver, who has spent much of the last decade investigating NSA techniques, said that all PGP traffic, including who sent it and to whom, is automatically stored and backed up onto tape. This can then be searched as needed when matched with other surveillance data.
Given that the NSA has taps on almost all of the internet's major trunk routes, the PGP records can be incredibly useful. It's a simple matter to build a script that can identify one PGP user and then track all their contacts to build a journal of their activities.
Even better is the Mujahedeen Secrets encryption system, which was released by the Global Islamic Media Front to allow Al Qaeda supporters to communicate in private. Weaver said that not only was it even harder to use than PGP, but it was a boon for metadata—since almost anyone using it identified themselves as a potential terrorist.
"It's brilliant!" enthused Weaver. “Whoever it was at the NSA or GCHQ who invented it give them a big Christmas bonus.'' [...]
Dewayne-Net RSS Feed: <http://dewaynenet.wordpress.com/feed/>
Deborah Peel <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 9:56:14 PST
Thanks to "Dr. Deborah Peel" <email@example.com> for this item:
Dave Farber <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 13:23:00 -0500
Dan Goodin <email@example.com>
Date: January 26, 2016 at 9:32:18 PM EST
Dan Goodin, Ars Technica, 28 Jan 2016 http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/01/israels-electric-grid-hit-by-severe-hack-attack/
Israel experienced a serious hack attack on its electrical grid that officials are still working to repel, the head of the country's energy minister said Tuesday.
"The virus was already identified and the right software was already prepared to neutralize it," Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz told attendees of a computer security conference in Tel Aviv, according to this article published Tuesday by The Times of Israel. "We had to paralyze many of the computers of the Israeli Electricity Authority. We are handling the situation and I hope that soon, this very serious event will be over—but as of now, computer systems are still not working as they should."
The "severe" attack was detected on Monday as temperatures in Jerusalem dipped to below freezing, creating two days of record-breaking electricity consumption, according to The Jerusalem Post. Steinitz said it was one of the biggest computer-based attacks Israel's power infrastructure has experienced, and that it was responded to by members of his ministry and the country's National Cyber Bureau. The energy minister didn't identify any suspects behind the attack or provide details about how it was carried out.
News organizations reporting Steinitz' comments gave no indication the attacks on Israel's power grid resulted in any power disruptions. A representative for Israel's Electricity Authority said some of its computer systems had been shut down for two days in response to the attack.
The attack comes five weeks after Ukraine's power grid was successfully disrupted in what's believed to be the world's first-known hacker-caused power outage. Researchers still aren't sure if the malware known as BlackEnergy was the direct cause of the blackout, but they have confirmed the malicious package infected at least three of the regional power authorities that were involved in the outage. Researchers have since said the attack was extremely well coordinated.
[Bill Stewart noted that Dan Goodin's article indicated that the electric grid itself wasn't affected - the hack attack was against the Electricity Authority, which is a regulatory agency, not the actual power production organization, much less the power equipment. PGN]
Paul Venezia <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 21:03:34 -0800
Paul Venezia, InfoWorld, 25 Jan 2016 In the age of social media, it's not necessarily in a company's best interests to provide clear and concise controls over information access. http://www.infoworld.com/article/3025351/cloud-computing/accidental-sharing-the-plague-of-the-always-connected-era.html
Via Facebook, a friend invited me to a surprise birthday party for her sister last week, and I perchance ran into her a few days later. We chatted about this and that, then I asked about the surprise party. Her demeanor changed as she described the difficulty in using Facebook to invite people without alerting her sister to the event. She wasn't certain she succeeded, but after spending more than an hour painstakingly reviewing everything she could find relating to who might be able to view the event, she decided that she'd done all she could and fired it off.
Of course, it came back to her sister anyway, possibly because someone inadvertently shared it on their own timeline.
It's not only social media; it extends to all kinds of consolidated cloud services as well. This is how a father buys his child an iPad and signs in with his Apple ID to buy a few apps. Later on, he discovers that his child has seen every text message he's sent and received, every picture taken, and various other items that perhaps shouldn't be on his daughter's iPad. He only discovered this because someone called his iPhone and her iPad started ringing too.
To a significant degree, the tech world is blind to the real-world frustration and damage its "conveniences" can cause.
It's not realistic to expect the general population to fully understand all of the moving parts that can lead to problems like this, to have to inspect every new device, every new setting, every new app function or feature, and so forth.
In an ideal world, the technology would adapt to our needs, not the other way around. Unfortunately, it seems that those who are developing that technology don't think that controlling access to communication is a priority.
Woody Leonhard <email@example.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 09:39:00 -0800
When edge cases bite:
Woody Leonhard, InfoWorld, 27 Jan 2016 ... appointments that span midnight—and the change is coming to Outlook 2013 and Outlook 2016 http://www.infoworld.com/article/3026608/microsoft-windows/microsoft-says-odd-behavior-in-outlook-2010-calendar-is-a-feature-not-a-bug.html
Poster Jon999_ in the Microsoft Answers forum describes it succinctly:
After the [new KB 3114570] update is installed, Calendar appointments that span midnight (i.e., appointments that start on one day before midnight and end the next day after midnight) appear in Day and Week calendar views as if they were all-day appointments, as a small bar at the top of the day column instead of covering the appropriate hours. Additionally, the end time of such appointments shows up wrong (as 00:00, regardless of the actual end time) in all views including Month view. Prior to this Update, such appointments of <24 hours duration appeared as expected, covering the appropriate hours. Uninstalling this update removes the error.
There were additional problems for Windows 10 users because Win10's lovely forced update feature made the uninstalled update re-install itself over and over.
Last week, in the same thread, Microsoft employee Gabriel Bratton dropped something of a bomb. He explained that the observed behavior wasn't a bug but a feature
[People who schedule meetings crossing midnight were not pleased.]
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 9:50:07 PST
Fox Channel 4 Now, WFTX Fort Myers/Cape Coral, had this item: http://www.fox4now.com/news/hacking-into-supervisors-of-elections-office
Al Stangenberger <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 13:10:05 -0800
A recent article about the controversy over the safety of foods containing GMO's reports questions on one Italian researcher's findings: http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/01/anti-gmo-research-may-be-based-on-manipulated-data/
The last paragraph highlights a problem with on-line journals:
> Seralini is back with a study purportedly showing that GMO-based food is > harmful to cows. But the journal he published it in allowed its domain > registration to expire, meaning the paper (and every other one in the > journal) has simply vanished.
Note added later: The paragraph I quoted contains a URL which specifically addresses the vanishing journal issue:
(Thunderbird stripped out the URL when I copied the passage, another minor risk, I guess. Al)
Al Mac <email@example.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 12:41:55 -0600
I believe that there are over 1 million new ID theft victims in the USA each year, just with income tax fraud, and that number will probably climb ... I am not yet a victim, knock wood, but I frequently have to battle social engineering assaults, and I have been notified of more than one breach of my PII.
I do not know how safe it is to use this site, when some attacks are man-in-the-middle of Internet connections.
From: Federal Trade Commission [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org] Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 11:49 AM To: email@example.com Subject: Report identity theft and get a personal recovery plan at IdentityTheft.gov
<http://consumer.ftc.gov?utm_source=govdelivery> Federal Trade Commission Consumer Information
Report identity theft and get a personal recovery plan at IdentityTheft.gov <http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/report-identity-theft-and-get-personal-recovery-plan-identitytheftgov?utm_source=govdelivery>
Nicole Fleming, Consumer Education Specialist, FTC
Millions of people are affected by identity theft each year. It might start with a mysterious credit card charge, a bill you don't recognize, or a letter from the IRS that says you already got your refund - even though you didn't.
If someone uses your information to make purchases, open new accounts, or get a tax refund, that's identity theft. Recovering from identity theft often takes time and persistence. That's why today's announcement from the FTC is a big deal: New features at IdentityTheft.gov make it easier to report and recover from identity theft.
Fred Cohen <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 03:17:24 -0800
Perhaps we should say that "truly secure computing" is an ill-defined term. However, without hardware support, two things are apparent:
Rule 1: Who runs first wins. Rule 2: Rule 1 fails when the first move makes an imperfect move.
It's just like chess in this way.
> Presumably some consortium of government and corporate organizations could > fund the initial work on the premise that as volume rose on marketing > these relatively secure systems at commodity scale, the revenues and > security benefits would reward their efforts handsomely.
The mechanism is called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and TPMs are present in enormous volume in commodity computers of all sorts. This is based on the Trusted Computing Group's efforts that stem from the work on cryptographic checksums for integrity protection of the 1980s and on a lot of other related things.
> It's possible that at some point researchers determined that security > through software alone was at least possible, if, perhaps, really difficult, > but I never encountered reports of such a discovery.
Again, the term "security" is ill defined. We can indeed achieve ill-defined outcomes with software.
In effect, the hierarchy of hardware and recursive software embedding is the same thing. You can do as well in software as in hardware, but it's easier to make unbreakable enforcement mechanisms in hardware because you can control less complicated finite state machines to great effect and physically limit interactions (at the level of the digital - analog interaction is still present of course).
> If this has happened, I would appreciate one or more pointers to the > relevant literature. ...
The hardware architecture is present, but the industry lacks the desire and ability to use it well.
This starts with the problem of defining what you want (i.e., "security" is an ill-defined term) and continues to the problem of designing something that does that (complexity is problematic, particularly in multiprocessing / multi-threaded environments with overt and covert communication between things you may want to keep separated in some ways).
Remember that we also tend to network these devices. Two perfectly secure devices (meeting some specification such as limited information flow) when connected may violate the flow controls of each other, thus a combination of "secure" things may produce an "insecure" thing. The was all shown in the 1980s. If you want a secure system (from an information flow limiting perspective) you can readily have one by [physically isolating it (to some level of signal strength at some distance for all signal types and frequency ranges). But these systems are of almost no use today.
The term "architecture" that you use is far more complex a thing than the things you are discussing. Security architecture crosses many boundaries. For an example you might want to look at http://all.net/Arch/index.html
Al Mac <email@example.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 20:12:21 -0600
* Michael Marking talks about insider threats in hardware design.
We have had Manchurian Chips in ATM machines and voting machines. That's where you can run all kinds of tests, based on the hardware design and never discover that some additional features have been added, unless you have some way to test every conceivable combination. With voting machines, that also involves moving your hands in combinations which make no logical sense..
In one case, a factory, manufacturing ATMs, was burglarized. Afterwards, everyone assumed that the only damage was some stuff they stole. Only later, it was found that they had gotten into ATM design to add additional features.
The original design served the needs of financial institutions and their customers. The new design also served the needs of crooks desiring to steal from the institutions and their customers. A crook could visit the ATM, put in their code (unknown to the institution) and get paper out listing customer accounts, PIN#s, and available balances. The crooks could put that info on bogus cards, then withdraw as much as the bank allows in a day, until customer account drained.
* PGN wrote of architecture which allows legacy code to run in confined environments.
IBM came out with such a system in the 1990s, a year or two before the AS/400 was launched, which also supported that. These platforms supported multiple partitions with different OS, human languages. The primary partition controlled how much disk space, and other hardware resources, were allocated to each secondary partition, each of which ran their own OS. These #s could be adjusted later. There were commands we could use in one environment to access others. I remember M36, which was an OS running S/36 OS inside an AS/36.
We moved to a much faster system, with better security, using less electricity, costing less to lease, and did not have to change any of our old software. The only problem was our ERP vendor which tried to argue that their contract supporting perpetual upgrades, with no more $ investment, so long as we stayed on a 36, was no longer running on a 36. We needed to work with them, because the ERP would only run on a machine with a serial # for which they gave us a PIN#.
When we ran backup from the main partition, it included 100% of M36 as a single object. Our PCs also had access to a "special drive," which was a partition on the AS/36. PCs were backed up to that "special drive," with each backup named after PC-involved, then all of that was another single object in the AS/36 backup. Restore from backup put everything back the way it was, at backup time.
I thought it was way cool, that a multi-national company (my day job was NOT one) could have main partition in English for technicians to manage the whole system from, with other partitions in French, Spanish, Portuguese, etc. serving their people in other nations, without the need to hire IT people in those places, or use tech support, except thru HQ. With the cross-partition tunnels, employees could access the familiar software and file structures, with the data of other corporate divisions. There were aps, where you send an invoice where customers & vendors see the info in THEIR language. Shipping goes thru customs @ some border crossing, and the paperwork is in THEIR language.
Mark Thorson wrote:
* I agree that a capability architecture would be preferable to the eggshell-thin protection model used today, but viable capability architectures were not available (or not with high confidence that they were ready) when the present architectures arose,
I disagree. The PC (micro computer) was launched in the 1970's. Its architecture totally ignored what had been developed on mini-computers in the 1960's and mainframes before that. I am not sure when midrange started. It also had that architecture.
In the 1980's, companies started to connect PCs to minis, midrange, and mainframe, forcing us to go to the current egg shell architecture, for the overall company network.
* and it's too late now to change the course of history.
I agree. The current approach dominates because people want the cheapest possible, not the most secure possible.
Most people, who own and drive automobiles, learn by their second car that life time operation cost can be higher than purchase cost, so their shopping around needs to find one with good gas mileage, good warranties, good service, few break downs, etc. Most people never learn that about computing.
John Levine <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: 26 Jan 2016 00:41:39 -0000
The BEC frauds I've seen could all have been stopped by really simple measures like always confirming transfers by a phone call to the phone number on file for the boss (not the one in the message of instructions) or code words that have to appear in the message.
Unfortunately, there's a lot of either tunnel or magical thinking that I'm too busy or too important to have to pay attention to this stuff. Oops.
Al Mac <email@example.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 18:53:31 -0600
I totally agree. All BEC stories, I have seen so far, involve either:
* Top C-people who are security brain-dead;
* Or lower level personnel who are scared to question commands apparently issued from CEO.
Mark E. Smith <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 17:06:56 -0800
Amos Shapir wrote, "While Mark E. Smith's ideas are laudable, I'm afraid the end result might be a political version of Wikipedia."
And that would differ from our current system in what way?
Shapir: "'The will of the people' is not a very well defined term, and rather unreliable. It has been shown time and again to be very susceptible to cheap tricks."
The same is true of juries, however most people don't seem to think that having elected judges make all decisions themselves would be an improvement.
Shapir: "What we need is a way to make elected officials behave like responsible adults; I'm not sure there is a provable scheme to ensure that."
There isn't. RISKS has many illustrations of how security schemes can be broken. Power corrupts and the more power a person is given, the more temptation to corruption will confront them. In order to have elected officials act more responsibly, it might be a good idea to start by removing their sovereign immunity so that they could easily be held personally accountable for their actions. This nation once fought a revolution to rid ourselves of a sovereign, but somehow forgot to discard the concept of sovereign immunity at the same time.
The Framers agreed with you, Amos. They feared the "mob and rabble" they believed unfit to govern, and therefore wrote an undemocratic Constitution that vested power not in the people, but in big land-owners, many of whom had taken part in the genocide of Native Americans to obtain their land and whose only right to it was a charter from a foreign sovereign, and who owned slaves to work their land. Surely slavers and mass murderers could be trusted to make better decisions than ordinary people, or at least to make decisions that would primarily benefit other slavers and mass murderers.
But even among the genocidaires and slave owners, there were some who foresaw that times can change and that change could not only be necessary, but beneficial. As Thomas Jefferson said, "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants." And that was straight from the horse's mouth, as they say. ;)
If the people are unreliable and susceptible to cheap tricks like election campaigns (not that the billions spent on getting out the vote is cheap), then why bother to have elections at all? If we want to retain elections to indicate that we have a democratic form a government, then we have to actually count the votes, to make the electoral process transparent and verifiable, and to give the voters the final say so that the popular vote cannot be ignored or overridden. Putting the lipstick of sham elections on the pig of tyranny will never improve the quality of life for the majority in this country. Giving the people a real voice in their own affairs might. Iceland happens to be doing very well, thank you, although I'm sure their democratic form of government sends shudders through the blackened hearts of the US military-industrial-Congressional elite.
Simson Garfinkel <email@example.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 21:31:43 -0500
> [This is another instance of the old calendar confusion between U.S. and > elsewhere, which keeps arising in RISKS: month/day/year vs day/month/year; > whereas year/month/day is less common, it is much less ambiguous, and > mathematically sound. In RISKS, we long ago decided on dd/MON/year. PGN]
I recommend using ISO-8601 as a date format — YYYY-MM-DD.
Not only does this have an advantage of being an international standard, but it also has the advantage of sorting properly when used in a filename. No other date format sorts properly.
[Simson, This has cropped up several times in RISKS. It would be nice, but you and I are among the *sort* of folks who care. PGN]
Larry Sheldon <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 18:52:19 -0600
> "delivery disaster caused by software"
... caused by mismanagement, bad design, inadequate testing and probably many more HUMAN.
In the 1960s I worked on a team that designed the first functional mechanical system for publishing AND DELIVERING telephone books in California and Nevada in some of the toughest neighborhoods from an algorithmic challenge viewpoint.
Twisty little mazes? Like San Francisco, and its front-doors-on-alleys and cockamamie street alignments?
Carmel-b-the-sea? (No house numbers.)
Los Angeles with its duplicate street names (among many other things).
We and our delivery contractor produces delivery lists for the ring-and-fling areas which might run the odd-numbers for two blocks, the even numbers on a side street for a block, the odd numbers in reverse order on that street....and so one.
1960s. IBM 7074s. (10-decimal-digit fixed length words) In "Autocoder" [assembly language]. —sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Juvenal)
Thomas Leavitt <email@example.com>
Date: January 25, 2016 at 2:39:49 PM EST
... with the rise of Uber, and more importantly, self-driving, dispatched vehicles (owned by Uber or whoever), the question of how Uber and other services co-operate with police department surveillance efforts becomes very important. If most of us wind up not using our own cars to move around, and instead, basically call cars on demand, these license plate databases and tracking systems will ultimately become vastly less useful for this type of unwarranted (literally) surveillance.
As a counter, once the police obtain access to Uber's records, they potentially have access to a vast wealth of other information (see article below) that might otherwise be difficult to obtain (such as your full address book, and information about your location even when not driving).
Interestingly, while this seems to be a topic of conversation that everyone leaps to when self-driving cars and transportation on demand come up, several searches, several pages deep, yield nothing on the topic of police surveilliance and Uber.
Dick Mills <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 13:17:14 -0500
In RISKS-29.22 Peter Ladkin said, "Is it progress to replace critical independent systems with interdependent systems subject to single points of failure? Almost every standard for critical systems warns you not to do it, but that's what we've done."
It is a symptom of overly reliable electric supply. The longer people go without a significant blackout, the less important they value resilience. Other places in the world, reportedly Mumbai, experience up to 5 outages per day and their citizens and businesses are so resilient that they hardly notice.
The remedy IMO, would be to stage deliberate blackouts as training drills. Pilots must drill on simulators. Firemen must drill on their skills every week. The public and commercial businesses are never offered the opportunity to drill and practice for electrical outages.
In a blackout drill, every one of the "surprises" mentioned in Roger Kemp's narrative would have been exposed. The public is then free to choose to improve their resilience or not, but they could no longer claim surprise.
Al Mac <email@example.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 04:09:21 -0600
I wonder if it is legal for them to install jamming equipment in their home, to create a cell phone GPS dead zone for their property. They could run it except when they want to call out.