Subtitle: Glitch kept radio station from relaying storm alert Associated Press, in the *Baltimore Sun*, 23 Jul 2002 According to the National Weather Service, an Emergency Alert System designed to enable WTOP in Washington DC to forward warnings of dangerous weather conditions to small radio stations in up to 28 counties failed on 28 Apr 2002, just before a deadly tornado struck Southern Maryland. The warning was intended for 31 DC-area counties, more than the system was programmed to accommodate. The storm system spawned a strong tornado that cut through Southern Maryland, causing five deaths, an estimated $120 million in damage and destroying much of downtown La Plata. [PGN-ed]
A federal court has awarded a Pensacola business $3.6 million in damages from Gateway, which had accidentally distributed the wrong phone number for customer complaints to more than 275 Gateway stores. The error dated back to 1999, when someone at Gateway erred by using the 800 prefix instead of the correct 888 prefix for the company's toll-free customer complaint line. The wrong number was also posted on Gateway's Web site, listed on Internet billings and included on a form distributed to more than 100,000 Gateway customers. Mo' Money, which manufactures and distributes promotional items, said it contacted Gateway six days after the calls began, but that it took the computer company more than two years to fix the problem. "It was a nightmare," says Mo' Money president Cliff Mowe. "We had as many as 8,000 extra calls a month, and these were all angry people You couldn't get them off the line because the only number they had was ours. You'd have to explain it and go through it, and a lot of times they'd call you right back anyway." [Associated Press, 19 Jul 2002; NewsScan Daily, 20 July 2002] http://apnews.excite.com/article/20020719/D7KS83F82.html
Police show up only to find infected WebTVs. A new virus has hit some WebTV devices, and its effects could have ramifications for the emergency phone network. Reportedly, once an attachment is opened using the WebTV set-top box, the virus dials 911. A customer service supervisor at Microsoft confirms that 18 customers have called in to report the suspicious WebTV behavior. WebTVs now go by the name MSNTV, but older brands still have the WebTV branding. According to Microsoft, both units are affected. http://www.techtv.com/news/security/story/0,24195,3392631,00.html [PGN adds: see also http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/TechTV/techtv_911virus020723.html ]
An explanation of the necessity for a Voter Verified Physical Audit Trail for Electronic Balloting Systems by Rebecca Mercuri, Ph.D. Professor of Computer Science at Bryn Mawr College Electronic voting info: http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Phone: 609/895-1375, 215/327-7105 Many of the new voting products now being purchased in the US are self-auditing in that they produce ONLY an internal electronic audit of the ballots cast. Some of these machines have been sold with trade secret protection such that it is not possible to INDEPENDENTLY examine the machines for correct operations (except perhaps under court order, and even there the examination may be required to be sealed or not disclosed). This situation, which is becoming more common as fully-electronic (DRE/kiosk) voting systems are introduced, means that the voters as well as the poll workers and election officials have NO WAY to verify that their ballots are recorded, transmitted and tabulated properly. Machines have failed in actual use and independent recounts have not been provided. (See reports in press accounts.) Some systems re-create a set of ballots, on paper, AFTER the election, which is presented for recount purposes. Since this set of ballots is self-generated, errors in the equipment may be reflected in the self-audit, with the appearance of being correct. There is no way to determine whether this after-the-fact paper reflects the true contents of the ballots cast. Only if the voter has the opportunity to review the paper generated at the time of voting, that will be used in the recount, is an independent audit possible. In the same way, if the system is used to self-report its stored ballots, its true error rate can not be ascertained. It is essential, therefore, that voters be able to create a physical or paper ballot that is deposited at the polling place when their vote is cast. This ballot, which can be scanned in or hand-counted since it is human-readable, would be used to verify any machine- generated tallies produced from electronic (DRE) voting systems. Only in this way can the voters be assured that their ballot will be available for an independent recount. Congress is now in conference on the Voting Rights Act bills H.R. 3295 and S. 565. The Senate bill refers to "audit capacity" and "error rate" although the House bill does not mention these specifically. It is imperative that the compromise bill refer to a "physical audit capacity" or even more specifically a "voter verified independent physical audit capacity" (or audit trail) in order to prevent self-auditing systems from continuing to be accepted and used for elections in the United States. Further explanation follows below: All Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems must provide a physical audit trail that is reviewed by the voter at the time their ballot is cast. (DRE voting systems are those that are constructed as to be self-contained, where the voter makes ballot choices that are directly entered onto electronic data recording devices. These would include stand-alone kiosks as well as networked machines.) The physical audit trail could consist of a printout that the voter can examine independent of any computerized display. If a voter determines, at the time of balloting, that the printout does not reflect the votes they just cast on the machine, there must be a procedure where the electronic and paper ballot can both be voided and another opportunity to vote allowed. The reviewed and accepted printout would be deposited into a ballot box for subsequent optical scanning or hand-counting in order to produce the true results for the election. Totals provided by the DRE devices can be used to provide early returns, but the final result (in case of dispute) should be determined from the paper ballot set. The voter-verified physical ballots must be those which are used and preserved as the permanent audit trail for the election. Since it is, in principle, impossible to verify that a computational device is free from programming errors or nefarious code, no electronic voting system can be verified for 100% accuracy, reliability, and integrity. It is also, in principle, impossible for a computational device to provide full fail-safe internal verification, hence any ballot audit produced from self-stored data could reflect errors or manipulation that occurred between the time the voter cast their ballot and the time the ballot was recorded. Errors and manipulation of ballots can also occur if data is transmitted between devices or over networks. It is essential, therefore, that each voter provide an independent check of their ballot at the time of voting, using human-readable media as the manual audit capacity for the voting system. Confidence in the electronic recording devices can be assured only if the voters have an independent way of verifying that their ballots were cast and submitted for counting (and re-counting) as intended.
It strikes me that the auditing of the Palm Beach electronic voting machines doesn't even reach the level of care applied to Las Vegas slot machines. Slot machines are governed by a Nevada state agency and are continually inspected at random. The inspectors pull a machine out of service, check that the circuit boards are the correct, legally-certified boards that are supposed to be in the machine, and read the PROMs. The state has enough access, and knowledge of the design, to verify not only the program that is supposed to be running on the hardware, but the hardware itself. That "proprietary-hardware/trade-secrets" excuse wouldn't get one of those Palm Beach machines within ten feet of a casino floor in Nevada.
All kinds of radio stations — both Web-based and traditional over-the-air broadcasting stations — have to pay copyright royalties to songwriter associations, but only the Web stations are required to pay a new performer's fee that goes to record companies. At a rate of seven-hundredths of a cent per song per listener, the fee is expected to undo the economic viability of almost all of the 10,000 Web radio stations now in existence. The 200 stations that have already ceased operations include nonprofit stations at UCLA, NYU, and other colleges and universities, and people seem to be punching different calculators to attack or defend what's going on: Congressman Rick Boucher (D, VA) is introducing a bill in support of small Webcasters and says its goal is "to make sure that Webcasters who measure their revenues in the tends of thousands are not put out of business by a copyright payment requirement in the hundreds of thousands."; using a different calculator, Hilary Rosen of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) says that most college stations won't owe more than $500 a year, and adds, "Given our problems with digital piracy on university servers, it is almost comical that they have the nerve to complain about $500." [*USA Today*, 21 Jul 2002; NewsScan Daily, 20 July 2002] http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2002-07-21-radio_x.htm
http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/283688 Cuts like a knife, SSHarp http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=59&a=11 SSH for fun and profit http://segfault.net/~stealth/ssharp.pdf
As a horse-racing fan, there are a couple of WWW based message boards that I post to. Some of these have "Dirty word" filters, on one of which each mention of the horse Dr. Fager (the only horse to win Eclipse "Horse of the year" awards in 4 different categories in one year) got rejected by the DW filter. Why, you ask? It took me a while to figure out but the DW filter was treating the the horse's name as "<derogatory term>" + "er"! Danny Lawrence, Tiassa Technologies Inc., A Lotus Business Partner [Long ago, horse's names were restricted to something like 13 characters, because of technical restrictions on old-style tote-boards. Perhaps now we will next see horse-name restrictions that ban certain undesirable substrings. And perhaps other sports will ban players with offensive names — unless those players are willing to change their names. PGN]
There's a very little step we can do to very effectively fight this and many other problems: just use PGP. * Just PGP signing an e-mail is enough to ensure that the e-mail content is not altered without notice. * Just PGP encrypting is enough to ensure that the e-mail content cannot be filtered. Pascal_Bourguignon http://www.informatimago.com/ [PGP SIGNATURE deleted by PGN, as is his custom for RISKS.]
Two questions need to be asked about this line of arguments: 1) What and how damage would result if e-mail was never filtered. 2) Do the opponents of this activity suffer some kind of financial loss when it it is performed, and who gains, if anyone, when it happens. As I understand it, the main purposes of the filters is to control the amount of unsolicited (usually commercial) bulk e-mail a.k.a. spam. I've seen reports that UBE is a significant contributor to network infrastructure costs, which accrue to the recipient, not the sender. The filters do seem to be having some positive (from the recipients point of view) impact on the spam problem. Some sophistication may be needed when reading the headlines in the original posting. For example, is the 'Killer App' being killed personal e-mail, or spam? Are the 'affected users' the targeted recipients or the senders of the spam? Is that the 'general utility of e-mail' to the public at large or to the spamers that is being reduced? Is this the personal communication medium called e-mail or an advertising medium called e-mail being discussed? There is a substantial risk here, but it may not be the obvious one!
Note: Written completely based on "Some Serious Word-Scrambling at Yahoo" *The New York Times*, 22 Jul 2002. The risks of this kind of re-writing are many, and the potential damage cannot be easily quantified. As the article notes, it can be humorous (when rewriting foreign languages such as French) to the more serious, to wit: - a rewritten message might trigger another filter in an non-obvious way (e.g. Carnivore, SPAM) possibly launching an uncalled for investigation (a hazard mentioned in my March talk at E-Protectit; abstract and slides at http://www.rlgsc.com/e-protectit/sorcerers.html); - damage to business relationships (and the resulting legal exposures); - damage to personal relationships. There are numerous cases where micro-parsing of statements has caused much confusion (a hazard all to familiar to high-level diplomatic translators). I do not want to prognosticate on issues such as responsibility, but it seems that there is a substantial hazard of "friendly fire" damage in such cases. In short, apparently the re-writes were not advertised and disclaimed, so who is responsible when damage occurs? Robert "Bob" Gezelter, 35-20 167th Street, Suite 215, Flushing NY 11358-1731 +1 (718) 463 1079 http://www.rlgsc.com email@example.com
Recently, while doing research on how to use the ELF (extensible linker format, or executable and linker format, depending on what you read) I discovered that the most useful information was put out by the cracker community. I found three papers that gave detailed information on how to use ELF features including example code. In one case, the intent was to allow `parasites' to be embedded in a UNIX program; in another the author was exploring binary encryption as a means of preventing forensic analysis of an attack. In the third case, the paper described ways to allow a parasite to access shared library functions. I'm not sure what to make of this. On the one hand, I don't want anyone running `parasites' on my computers. On the other hand, this information saved me a lot of digging and experimentation. Fred Gilham <firstname.lastname@example.org>
This is hardly a new topic, but it's a good reminder. Also see Doonesbury, 21 Jul 2002 at http://www.doonesbury.com -Declan > Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2002 19:17:30 -0700 > From: "Allen Hutchison" <email@example.com> > Subject: Watch your wireless configs... > > Last night I was playing around with the newest version of Lindows. I > haven't worked with the OS much to date, because it didn't have support for > my Cisco Aironet card. Since the card was the only way laptop can connect to > the network I didn't want interrupt that ability. Anyway, yesterday a > college of mine told me that Lindows now had support for wireless cards. So, > I took the plunge and installed the OS on my laptop. > > The first thing I noticed, after the installation completed, was that my > wireless card was blinking. I thought that the Lindows install had grabbed > the settings for my card before it wiped windows off the machine. So I > started trying to download software and access my network resources. Then I > noticed that the network seemed really unresponsive. I started looking more > closely at the network, and found that Lindows had not grabbed my previous > settings, and I was associated with someone else's access point. To be sure > I went to the default router address with a www browser, and found that it > was a linksys. > > Well, I thought, that isn't too strange, I have a linksys on my network too. > So I tried to log in, but it wouldn't take my password. So I tried the > default password on a linksys router "Admin" and I got in. Then I realized > that I wasn't logged into my network at all. I was getting to the net > through somebody else's access point somewhere else in the network. > > This person had never bothered to do anything to secure his network. Upon > further inspection with a sniffer, I found that I could grab all of his > traffic off the air in my office. He was using no encryption and no access > control. I could browse the shares on his computer, I could see his password > flying by. If I only knew where he lived, I could go tell him, and help him > set up something more secure. All I know, however, is a general direction > from my condo, South. > > This goes to show how important it is for vendors to stress security with > their wireless products. Information is becoming more and more of a > commodity, and the information that describes us is moving around on the > Internet every day. When we install new technology, it is the responsibility > of a vendor to explain the security consequences. It was obvious in the case > of my mysterious neighbor that he hasn't installed any security on his > network. It is quite possible he isn't even aware of the security hole he > has opened onto his data. > > Something to think about. > > www.hutchison.org/allen > > FROM POLITECH — Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list > You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. > To subscribe to Politech: http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html > This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Setuid Demystified Hao Chen, Computer Science Department, University of California at Berkeley David Wagner, Computer Science Department, University of California at Berkeley Drew Dean, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium, 5-9 Aug 2002 [see next item] Abstract Access control in Unix systems is mainly based on user IDs, yet the system calls that modify user IDs (uid-setting system calls), such as setuid, are poorly designed, in-sufficiently documented, and widely misunderstood and misused. This has caused many security vulnerabilities in application programs. We propose to make progress on the setuid mystery through two approaches. First, we study kernel sources and compare the semantics of the uid-setting system calls in three major Unix systems: Linux, Solaris, and FreeBSD. Second, we develop a formal model of user IDs as a Finite State Automaton (FSA) and develop new techniques for automatic construction of such models. We use the resulting FSA to uncover pitfalls in the Unix API of the uid-setting system calls, to identify differences in the semantics of these calls among various Unix systems, to detect inconsistency in the han-dling of user IDs within an OS kernel, and to check the proper usage of these calls in programs automatically. Finally, we provide general guidelines on the proper us-age of the uid-setting system calls, and we propose a high-level API that is more comprehensible, usable, and portable than the usual Unix API. http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/setuid-usenix02.pdf [Nifty paper. PGN]
There's still time to register for 11th USENIX Security Symposium being held 5-9 Aug 2002 in San Francisco. Check out http://www.usenix.org/sec02 for detailed information and to register. This year's Symposium features the most recent developments in vb and network security. Keynote speakers Whitfield Diffie & Howard Schmidt, free vendor exhibition, the latest Research in OS Security, Access control, Hacks/Attacks, Web Security, Sandboxing, Deploying Crypto, and much more. Alex Walker, Production Editor, USENIX Association 2560 Ninth Street, Suite 215, Berkeley, CA 94710 1-510-528-8649 x33
BKWRINSP.RVW 20020601 "Writing Information Security Policies", Scott Barman, 2002, 1-57870-264-X, U$34.99/C$52.95/UK#27.50 %A Scott Barman firstname.lastname@example.org www.barman.ws/wisp %C 201 W. 103rd Street, Indianapolis, IN 46290 %D 2002 %G 1-57870-264-X %I Macmillan Computer Publishing (MCP)/New Riders %O U$34.99/C$52.95/UK#27.50 800-858-7674 317-581-3743 email@example.com %P 216 p. %T "Writing Information Security Policies" Until recently, the classic resource for those charged with writing security policies was "Information Security Policies Made Easy" (cf. BKISPME.RVW). Trouble was, that book made it a little bit too easy: the format encouraged people to use pieces without modification, and one size, in the security field, definitely does not fit all. This book, however, takes the opposite approach. While still aimed at the non-technical manager responsible for producing the policy, it uses minimal examples, concentrating on the process of policy formation. Part one looks at starting the process. Chapter one defines what policies are and why they are important, and outlines the first steps needed to proceed. A good, broad outline of what your company should have in the way of a policy comes in chapter two. Finally, the responsibilities of different departments; their activities and roles; are presented in chapter three. Part two covers the main body of security policy development. Chapter four starts out with physical security. As noted above, readers will have to go beyond the example policies given in the text, but these samples do provide a reasonable guide for what the final items should look like. Authentication and network security is dealt with in chapter five, although the telecommunications material is quite limited. Some of this lack is made up in chapter six's review of Internet policy, which goes beyond firewalls to examine training, applications, e-commerce, and other areas. E-mail use has a set of special requirements separate from those of the net, and these are addressed in chapter seven. Unfortunately, as with all too many works, the review of malware policies, in chapter eight, is weaker than the rest of the book. (Does the example policy to use "all means to prevent the spread of computer viruses" mean that you can't use Microsoft products? And why, in this day and age of "fast burner" e-mail viruses, is a signature update every thirty days deemed sufficient?) The limited technical background also contributes to the frailty of chapter nine's overview of encryption. Some policies are too broad, while there are missing areas that may need to be addressed, depending upon industry and operations. Chapter ten has very solid coverage of application development policies, which are all too often neglected in other works. Part three is concerned with maintaining the policies. Chapter eleven seems slightly off topic, as it deals with acceptable use policies. However, chapter twelve looks at the roles and responsibilities involved in compliance and enforcement. A short precis of the policy review process ends the book in chapter thirteen. While not a panacea, this book is clear, well written, and helpful. There is valuable advice packed into few enough pages that a manager should be able to read it on a cross-country plane trip. copyright Robert M. Slade, 2002 BKWRINSP.RVW 20020601 firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev or http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade
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