Peter Denning correctly observes: The fundamental theorem of arbiters is: There is no fixed time bound for the arbiter to make its choice. It may make things a bit clearer to phrase this as follows. A designer of a circuit that has an arbiter has two choices: 1. Have his circuit wait arbitrarily long for the arbiter to make up its mind, thereby guaranteeing that his digital circuit elements will operate digitally, "seeing" only 0's and 1's. 2. Bound the length of time the circuit waits for the arbiter, thereby introducing the possibility that his digital circuit will behave like an analog circuit, with 1/2's flowing along the wires, and do strange things. Peter then asserts: Lamport showed how to achieve fair mutual exclusion without any requirement that references to memory cells are arbitrated (1974). While perhaps correct, this statement is misleading. The bakery algorithm achieves mutual exclusion without assuming any arbitrated access to memory. However, reading a memory cell that may be written while it is being read requires that the reader have an arbiter. (The reader needs an arbiter to decide whether the change from 0 to 1 occurred before or after a read operation.) In fact, the mutual exclusion problem is characterized by the fact that any solution requires an arbiter. (It is a testimony to Dijkstra's insight that certain requirements set down in his original 1965 paper, apparently regarded as irrelevant and omitted by others in later statements of the problem, are necessary to distinguish mutual exclusion from theoretically easier problems that can be solved without an arbiter.) As Peter observes, the only way to build a computer that is safe from "arbitration failure" is by making choice 1, which means that the computer must turn off its clock while waiting for an arbiter to decide. Note that the computer can't keep its clock ticking while waiting for the arbiter to make up its mind, since it would then require another arbiter to decide within the current clock cycle whether or not the first arbiter had made up its mind. I know of no computer that turns off its clock in this way. Moreover, doing so necessarily eliminates the possibility of fault-tolerance. Omission faults can be detected only by time-out, which means by keeping a clock running. Thus, a system that is impervious to arbitration failure cannot be fault-tolerant. Thus, Peter's Conclusion: we know how to build fair arbiters and how to design circuits that are free of synchronization errors. is again perhaps correct, but misleading. We know how to design those circuits, but we also know that they are impractical. Having said all this, I should now add that the situation, although hopeless, is not serious. We cannot make circuits with no theoretical possibility of arbitration failure, but we can make them with no practical possibility of such failure. By arguments that would constitute a proof to a physicist, and a joke to a mathematician, I think one can show that if a circuit has normal reaction time of order T0, then an optimimum arbiter has probability about e^(-T/T0) of not having reached a decision by time T. It appears possible to build such an optimal arbiter. Thus, by simply allowing enough time for the arbiter to decide, the probability of an arbitration failure can be made negligibly small. Of course, note the "can be". How many of the engineers designing digitial circuitry are aware of the problem? Once, in the late 70's or early 80's, I had the horrifying experience of spending 1/2 hour trying to explain the problem to computer designers at Bendix, with an utter lack of success. Leslie Lamport P.S. People interested in the arbiter problem might like to read my unpublished paper "Buridan's Principle", available by request.
Peter Denning is absolutely right (in Risks 10.42) to correct the claim that "it is impossible to build a fair arbiter." However, the fact that reliable arbiters are possible is quite different from saying that they are implemented in most systems. As Denning's "fundamental theorem of arbiters" shows, the interface between an asynchronous system and a clocked system is a source of unreliability (not unfairness) and it is not possible to eliminate glitches except by eliminating the interface (using an entirely asynchronous system). The probability of glitches can be reduced, but only by reducing the performance of the interface (lengthening the decision time). The original writer might well have been assuming clocked systems (which are, after all, the vast majority of digital systems in the world) in which case there is an important kernel of truth to the original claim of impossibility, even though it is indeed technically incorrect. --Mark Day
Excerpted from the 9/21/90 San Jose Mercury-News: PHONE BILL'S WRONG NUMBER: $8.7 MILLION Chicago (AP) — Cori Ward's mother got a little defensive when she received a phone bill for three weeks' service — $8.7 million. "She says, 'I only called my sister,'" said Ward, who handles her elderly mother's bills. The bill from Illinois Bell should have read $87.98, not $8,709,800.33. ... Ward said she had a hard time explaining the mistake to the phone company. The error occurred when someone incorrectly typed a "correction" into the computer system, said Larry Cose, a Bell spokesman.
Excerpted from the Maryville/Alcoa (Tenn.) _Daily Times_, September 10, 1990, p.1. : ALCOA Worker Killed Donnie W. Britton, 48, of Madisonville, a 24-year employee of ALCOA, died shortly before noon Saturday at UT Hospital following an accident at ALCOA's North Plant. Elton Jones, ALCOA's director of public relations, said Britton, an electrician, was working on an overhead crane that was not operating when the crane's tray grab, the part that hangs down and lifts trays of coils (of aluminum sheet), was struck by the top of a coil being transported at ground level by an automated guided vehicle. The impact caused the crane to move toward Britton who was crushed between an access platform on the crane and the personnel lift he had used to reach the crane ....... This looks to me like (1) poor work practice and (2) poor a.g.v. design. Comments? Brad Dolan, Science Applications International Corp (my opinions) email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org
I came across this in a news digest. As you can see it is attributed to UNIX Today: "To combat the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis, the Pentagon is planning a two-pronged, high-tech defense using UNIX- based laptops. Using meteorological-type programs, the laptops could quickly determine how widespread the attack will be, where the troops can safely be deployed and how quickly they should be moved. The information would then be fed into UNIX-based PCs, and field commanders would run a variety of attack scenarios. A full meteorological model, able to forecast likely future wind conditions over the entire risk area, could be generated within 60 seconds. [UNIX Today, 9/17/90]" Field commanders using UNIX? Meteorological models in 60 seconds on a Unix-based laptop? Tom Beattie att!hoqaa!twb email@example.com [Whether it's cold, or whether it's hot, weather is weather, whether or not. It's known as whethering the storm. PGN]
>Martyn Thomas reports: <>According to Electronics Weekly (Sept 12th, p2): [...] >In fact, he has contradicted his own assertion that the AEgis system was >responsible by pointing out the shortcomings in human judgement, human >psochology, and human I/O. The principal (and significant) shortcoming >of AEgis in this scenario is that its database apparently did not >include a readily available schedule of commercial airline flights for >the region in which AEgis was deployed. I was one of the principal designers of the MMI for Aegis so I have read the past and current discussions on this subject with some interest. A couple of years ago PGN posted a summary of some remarks I made on the subject of the Aegis MMI at an informal sidebar to one of the sessions of the 5th International Workshop on S/W Specification; I won't repeat them here - interested readers are referred to the Risks archives. [See RISKS-8.74, 26 May 1989. It was a really fine item, and it also appeared in ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, vol 14, no 5, July 1989, pp. 20-22. PGN] Here, I only want to interject a comment on the more recent post extracted above. It is certainly true that Aegis as originally deployed did not include a database of commercial flight data. I recall some informal discussions about that possibility at the time. Our Navy customer had not specified anything like that in their requirements, but the possiblity was mentioned by me (and others), none-the-less. There were several reasons why it was not further pursued: (1) Philosophic disagreements on the nature of probable Aegis employments. In a blue-water, all out conflict, commercial flight data processing would be irrelevant and unused. The Navy did not want to spend scarce development funding on what they perceived of as marginal requirements. It is my personal perception (shared, I'm sure, by many others) that the armed services tend to design systems for "pure" threats and scenarios. Aegis was conceived of as providing defense for the carrier task force in open water conflicts. The then recent experiences of employing missile cruisers in close in the Gulf of Tonkin (NORSAR and PIRAZ, specifically) seemed to be regarded as an aberration: "Vietnam was a mistake; we won't make that mistake again; no more confused little conflicts for the U.S." We often heard the sentiment that we (Navy and contractor jointly) did not want to be guilty of the oft repeated mistake of designing systems to meet the requirements of the last war. The risk, of course, was and is that we could fail to institutionalize what some of us so painfully learned from our experiences. (2) Logistic/design problems relating to the complexity of flight data processing (keeping track of commercial flight plans and correlating real-time tracks with possible flight plans). The Navy did not then (nor I presume does it now) have any facilities aboard tactical vessels for obtaining and distributing commercial flight plan data. The resources required are significant, both personnel and computational. At the time, the Navy was under intense pressure to reduce manning requirements for the Aegis ship. I also doubt whether the UYK-7 technology of the day could have handled the computational load required. There also would have had to be additional communciations bandwidth dedicated to the distribution, update, and coordination of flight data. In those days, digital bandwidth to ships was extremely limited (it almost certainly still is). The point is that the issue of designing Aegis to handle commercial flight data was addressed and rejected as not cost-effective. Whether one agrees with this specific decision or not, the general point is that no military system (or any system) can be designed to deal with all contigencies that someone thinks of as appropriate. All the ideas that the anyone on the team came up with got discussed, some were selected, some were not. As always, the operational users wound up having to make do with a system that was not optimized for the environment in which they found themselves and whose limitations neither they nor the policy decision makers who directed them fully understood. I am still not sure whether any of the "what-ifs" represent design flaws or shortcomings.
> the Pentagon's finding was not that nobody > was responsible for the [Vincennes] mistake, but that no *blame* > was attached to the captain and crew as a result of it... > The [military's] job is to carry out the policies of > their government, and if innocent people get hurt, that is > the policy- makers' problem.... Since the Vincennes' very mission was to keep the Gulf safe for civilian traffic, the point argued by Henry here, even were it elsewhere valid, in fact weighs against his argument that Captain Rogers' reasonably decided to risk civilian life. As for the the general case, there certainly are regulations drawn up in international law, that protect civilians from risk, even in battle. (An air embargo against Iraq cannot now be *enforced* under this sort of international law.) Likewise, a suit filed in international court in Costa Rica against the U.S., for its bombing of a civilian mental hospital in Grenada, was *settled* by the U.S. (albeit without admission of blame). In brief, the U.S. would have had to show sufficient probable cause for the bombing, by objective standards, had trial been reached. <>>In the case of the Vincennes, it cannot be disputed that a mistake <>>was made. The Pentagon found no human responsible for it, so it <>>must have been a mechanical error. > This statement is in error. Please, READ THE REPORT . . . > The board found that Captain Rogers made a correct decision to fire > based on the data that he had available to him. The data was generated by computer, and the misinterpretation of screens that occurred was deemed foreseeable (and was forgiven) in the circumstances. I fail to see even a small error in my claim, let alone a capitalized error. Given the facts, which we agree on, it is a matter of definition as to whether we say that the computers "made" the decision to shoot, which is the definition I assert as a matter of commonsense and law. <>>Such decisionmaking is de facto *governed* by computer: without <>>computer prompts, no retaliatory decision at all would be taken; > Again, incorrect. Decisions to fire were made long before we > had computers — they are not required to make these decisions. Well, yes, but I'm not saying that mistaken visual identification is a computer error, I'm talking about decisionmaking taken by commanders whose only inputs are computer screens of information. There's a qualitative difference, though I agree that drawing the line meaningfully is not easy, it's clear to me that momentary decisions taken in the Vincennes windowless control room are properly deemed computer-governed.
I believe Henry failed to observe a key point in the navy review of the Vincennes incident. The Assistant Anti-Air warfare officer failed to set the range gate for the IFF unit to allow for the changing distance to the target. Consequently instead of pinging the transponder on the A300, they were pinging an F-14 on the ground at Bandar Abbas. Also no consideration was given that F-14 lack an anti-ship capability. The Radar operator also mis-read his screen, interpreting range for altitude, and also was unaware of the fact that a civil air corridor ran through the gulf, and that the A300 was in fact in the center of the corridor. The Vincennes lacked VHF radios to interrogate Iranian Civil air also. Civilian aircraft at 33,000 feet are also by definition well clear of ships, and probably would not even be able to identify them without optical instruments. As I read the Navy report, there were two distinct personnel failures by Vincennes crew, compounded by Inability to interrogate the A300. The Navy review board faulted the design of the screens for not presenting information in a clear manner. Heat of battle was also considered a mitigating factor. What is not understood by readers of Risks, is the Persian gulf is an exteremely busy commercial zone. Hundreds of Planes and Boats ply those waters every day. To shoot at every moving target is negligent on our part. THese systems are designed for high intensity combat with dozens of combatants and numerous inbound threats. Trying to pick out a single hostile among hundreds of non-combatants is a much more difficult task. The Iran-Iraq war contrary to one readers opinion was not WW2. In WW2, there were clear sides. CLearly marked hostile zones and very few nuetrals. WW2 was also a total war. No tactic was untried save for Gas. THe Iran Iraq war was a relatively small war between tow neighbors in a very crowded environment. Interjecting High strung war ships into such an environment was only bound to cause such errors. THe Stark had made a type 2 error. Actually hostile, Failed to shoot. THe Vincennes made a type 3 error. Actually Civil, Did shoot. I am sure in the mind of the captain of the Vincennes was the court martial of the Stark's captain and his claim that the electronic systems had failed to identify the threat, increasing the probablity now of a type 3 error. While the Navy review board did reccomend changes involving Man-machine interfaces, knowledge of commercial routes, Addition of VHF radios and upgrading of the IFF system. I feel the fundamental error was placing military vessels into a environment crowded with non-combatants. These vessels are designed to fight WW3, not police brush-fire wars. This was a major problem for US troops in Vietnam also.
The excellent book recommended by M.Minow is available in paperback for $12.95. The reference is Murray, Charles & Cox, Catherine B. Apollo, The Race to the Moon. Simon & Schuster, 1989. ISBN 0-671-90625-X R.I.Cook firstname.lastname@example.org
After 246 days (5891 hours), your message could not be fully delivered. ^^^ ^^^^ <==PGN It failed to be received by the following address(es): email@example.com (host: nuhub.acs.northeastern.edu)... Problems usually are due to service interruptions at the receiving machine. Less often, they are caused by the communication system. Your message follows: Received: from HERCULES.CSL.SRI.COM by helios.northeastern.edu id aa00705; 21 Jan 90 11:11 EST Received: by hercules.csl.sri.com at Sat, 22 Sep 90 13:26:33 -0700. (5.64+/XIDA-22.214.171.124) id AA28066 for oneil%NASA-JSC.CSNET@RELAY.CS.NET From: RISKS Forum <firstname.lastname@example.org> Date: Sat, 22 Sep 1990 13:26:31 PDT Subject: RISKS DIGEST 10.42 RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Saturday 22 September 1990 Volume 10 : Issue 42 RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Wednesday 22 September 1990 Volume 10 : Issue 42 [Northeastern has always been an interesting host.] [By the way, I am sorry about the 81-character line ending with Volume 10 : Issue 42 where many of you could not read the "2" at the end. Yes, I know, Issue 43, also. Mark Brader <email@example.com> pointed this out to me, and I replied with a comment such as how on double-digit Wednesdays and occasionally Saturdays in September my masthead lead could run over 80 characters (in Volume 10 and from now on, unless I am on my toes, as I was in RISKS-10.36.) (I've shortened the line by one character in this issue, so now it is just Wednesdays in September 1991, etc., that I'll have to watch out for. I'll set my calendar program to remind me, if I am still running RISKS then.) PGN] "... when the moon is in the third quarter? :-)" says Mark. "[Jupiter's] satellites are invisible to the naked eye and therefore can have no influence on the Earth and therefore would be useless and therefore do not exist." — Francesco Sizi, quoted by T. Cox
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