The RISKS Digest
Volume 15 Issue 10

Friday, 8th October 1993

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

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o Wiretap Laws and Procedures
Dorothy Denning
o Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Wiretap Laws and Procedures

Dorothy Denning <>
Fri, 24 Sep 1993 16:49:45 -0400 (EDT)
The following article on wiretap laws and procedures was written in response
to the many questions and misunderstandings that have arisen about wiretaps in
the context of escrowed encryption as well as Digital Telephony.  This article
may be distributed.    Dorothy Denning

                        WIRETAP LAWS AND PROCEDURES

                   Donald P. Delaney, Senior Investigator
                           New York State Police

                  Dorothy E. Denning, Professor and Chair
             Computer Science Department, Georgetown University

                      John Kaye, County Prosecutor
                      Monmouth County, New Jersey

        Alan R. McDonald, Special Assistant to the Assistant Director
        Technical Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

                           September 23, 1993

1.  Introduction

Although wiretaps are generally illegal in the United States, the federal
government and the governments of thirty seven states have been authorized
through federal and state legislation to intercept wire and electronic
communications under certain stringent rules which include obtaining a court
order.  These rules have been designed to ensure the protection of individual
privacy and Fourth Amendment rights, while permitting the use of wiretaps for
investigations of serious criminal activity and for foreign intelligence.

This article describes the legal requirements for government interceptions of
wire and electronic communications and some of the additional procedures and
practices followed by federal and state agencies.  The legal requirements are
rooted in two pieces of federal legislation: the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (Title III of the Act (hereafter "Title III")), passed in
1968, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), passed in 1978.
Title III established the basic law for federal and state law enforcement
interceptions performed for the purpose of criminal investigations, while FISA
established the law for federal-level interceptions performed for intelligence
and counterintelligence operations.  We will first describe Title III
interceptions and then describe FISA interceptions.

2.  Title III Interceptions

Title III, as amended (particularly by the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986), is codified at Title 18 USC, Sections 2510-2521.  These statutes
provide privacy protection for and govern the interception of oral, wire, and
electronic communications.  Title III covers all telephone communications
regardless of the medium, except that it does not cover the radio portion of a
cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the handset and
base unit.  The law authorizes the interception of oral, wire, and electronic
communications by investigative and law enforcement officers conducting
criminal investigations pertaining to serious criminal offenses, i.e.,
felonies, following the issuance of a court order by a judge.  The Title III
law authorizes the interception of particular criminal communications related
to particular criminal offenses.  In short, it authorizes the acquisition of
evidence of crime.  It does not authorize noncriminal intelligence gathering,
nor does it authorize interceptions related to social or political views.

Thirty seven states have statutes permitting interceptions by state and
local law enforcement officers for certain types of criminal
investigations.  All of the state statutes are based upon Title III
from which they are derivative.  These statutes must be at least as
restrictive as Title III, and in fact most are more restrictive in
their requirements.  In describing the legal requirements, we will
focus on those of Title III since they define the baseline for all
wiretaps performed by federal, state, and local law enforcement

In recent years, state statutes have been modified to keep pace with rapid
technological advances in telecommunications.  For example, New Jersey amended
its electronic surveillance statute in 1993 to include cellular telephones,
cordless telephones, digital display beepers, fax transmissions,
computer-to-computer communications, and traces obtained through "caller-ID".

Wiretaps are limited to the crimes specified in Title III and state statutes.
In New Jersey, the list includes murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery,
bribery, aggravated assault, wrongful credit practices, terrorist threats,
arson, burglary, felony thefts, escape, forgery, narcotics trafficking,
firearms trafficking, racketeering, and organized crime.

Most wiretaps are large undertakings, requiring a substantial use of
resources.  In 1992, the average cost of installing intercept devices and
monitoring communications was $46,492.  Despite budget constraints and
personnel shortages, law enforcement conducts wiretaps as necessary, but
obviously, because of staffing and costs, judiciously.

2.1  Application for a Court Order

All government wiretaps require a court order based upon a detailed showing of
probable cause.  To obtain a court order, a three-step process is involved.
First, the law enforcement officer responsible for the investigation must draw
up a detailed affidavit showing that there is probable cause to believe that
the target telephone is being used to facilitate a specific, serious,
indictable crime.

Second, an attorney for the federal, state, or local government must work with
the law enforcement officer to prepare an application for a court order, based
upon the officer's affidavit.  At the federal level, the application must be
approved by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney
General, any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney
General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division
designated by the Attorney General.  At the state and local level, the
application must be made and approved by the principal prosecuting attorney of
the state (State Attorney General) or political subdivision thereof (District
Attorney or County Prosecutor).  The attorney must be authorized by a statute
of that state to make such applications.

Third, the attorney must present the approved application ex parte (without an
adversary hearing) to a federal or state judge who is authorized to issue a
court order for electronic surveillance.  A state or local police officer or
federal law enforcement agent cannot make an application for a court order
directly to a judge.

Typically, a court order is requested after a lengthy investigation and the
use of a "Dialed Number Recorder" (DNR).  The DNR is used to track the
outgoing calls from the suspect's phone in order to demonstrate that the
suspect is communicating with known criminals.

Title III requires that an application for a court order specify:

   (a) the investigative or law enforcement officer making the
       application and the high-level government attorney authorizing
       the application;

   (b) the facts and circumstances of the case justifying the
       application, including details of the particular offense under
       investigation, the identity of the person committing it, the
       type of communications sought, and the nature and location of
       the communication facilities;

   (c) whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried
       and failed or why they would likely fail or be too dangerous;

   (d) the period of time for the interception (at most 30 days -
       extensions may be permitted upon reapplication);

   (e) the facts concerning all previous applications involving any of
       the same persons or facilities;

   (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, the
       results thus far obtained from the interception.

The process of making an application for a court order is further restricted
by internal procedures adopted by law enforcement agencies to ensure that
wiretaps conform to the laws and are used only when justified.  The following
describes the process for the FBI and the New York State Police.

2.1.1  FBI Applications

In order for an FBI agent to conduct an interception, the agent must follow
procedures that go well beyond the legal requirements imposed by Title III and
which involve extensive internal review.  In preparing the affidavit, the FBI
agent in the field works with the field office principal legal advisor and
also with an attorney in the local U.S.  Attorney's Office, revising the
documentation to take into account their comments and suggestions.  After the
documents are approved by field office management, they are submitted to the
Department of Justice's Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO) in the Criminal
Division and to the FBI Headquarters (HQ).  At FBI HQ, the documents go to the
Legal Counsel Division (LCD) and the Criminal Investigative Division (CID).
Within the CID, they are sent to the program manager of the criminal program
unit relating to the type of violation under investigation, e.g., organized
crime.  The program manager determines whether the subjects of the proposed
interception are worthy targets of investigation and whether the interception
is worth doing.  Attorneys in the FBI's LCD and the DOJ's OEO further refine
the documents.

After the documents are approved by the DOJ's OEO and by FBI HQ, they are
referred to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (or above), who reviews the
documents and signs off on them.  At this point, the DOJ authorizes the local
U.S. Attorney's Office to file the final version of the documents
(application, affidavit, court order, and service provider order) in court.
The U.S. Attorney's Office then submits the documents and the DOJ
authorization to a federal judge.  The entire process can take as long as a

The following summarizes the people and organizations involved in the
preparation or approval of the application and the issuance of a court order:

   1.  FBI agent
   2.  FBI field office attorney (principal legal advisor)
   3.  FBI field office management
   4.  Attorney in local U.S. Attorney's office
   5.  DOJ Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO)
   6.  FBI HQ Legal Counsel Division (LCD)
   7.  FBI HQ Criminal Investigative Division (CID)
   8.  DOJ Deputy Assistant Attorney General (or higher)
   9.  Federal District Court judge

2.1.2  New York State Police Applications

Within the New York State Police, electronic surveillance is conducted by
Senior Investigators in the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI).  In
preparing an affidavit, the investigator works with the District Attorney's
Office (or, in the case of a federal investigation, the U.S.  Attorney's
office) and with the BCI Captain of the investigator's troop.  (Wiretap
applications can be made and approved by the State Attorney General, but this
is unusual.)  The Captain assesses whether review by Division Headquarters is
necessary and confers with the Assistant Deputy Superintendent (ADS) or
Headquarters Captain for final determination.  If Headquarters review is
deemed necessary, then all documentation is sent to the ADS along with a
memorandum, endorsed by the Troop Unit Supervisor and the Troop or Detail
Commander, requesting approval.  If Headquarters review is deemed unnecessary,
then the memo is sent without the documentation.  Once the ADS and District
Attorney (DA) approve the application, the DA submits the application to a
judge who grants or denies the court order.

2.2  Issuance of a Court Order

Not all judges have the authority to grant court orders for wiretaps.  In New
Jersey, for example, only eight judges are designated as "wiretap judges" for
the entire state.  These judges are given special training to be sensitive to
personal rights of privacy and to recognize the importance of telephone
intercepts for law enforcement.

Before a judge can approve an application for electronic surveillance and
issue a court order, the judge must determine that:

   (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
       has committed, or is about to commit an offense covered by the law;

   (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
       concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;

   (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
       or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous;

   (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from
       which, or the place where the communications are to be
       intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in
       connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased
       to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.

In addition to showing probable cause, one of the main criterion for
determining whether a court order should be issued is whether normal
investigative techniques have been or are likely to be unsuccessful (criterion
(c) above).  Electronic surveillance is a tool of last resort and cannot be
used if other methods of investigation could reasonably be used instead.  Such
normal investigative methods usually include visual surveillance, interviewing
subjects, the use of informers, telephone record analysis, and DNRs.  However,
these techniques often have limited impact on an investigation.  Continuous
surveillance by police can create suspicion and therefore be hazardous;
further, it cannot disclose the contents of telephone conversations.
Questioning identified suspects or executing search warrants at their
residence can substantially jeopardize an investigation before the full scope
of the operation is revealed, and information can be lost through
interpretation.  Informants are useful and sought out by police, but the
information they provide does not always reveal all of the players or the
extent of an operation, and great care must be taken to ensure that the
informants are protected.  Moreover, because informants are often criminals
themselves, they may not be believed in court.  Telephone record analysis and
DNRs are helpful, but do not reveal the contents of conversations or the
identities of parties.  Other methods of investigation that may be tried
include undercover operations and stings.  But while effective in some cases,
undercover operations are difficult and dangerous, and stings do not always

If the judge approves the application, then a court order is issued specifying
the relevant information given in the application, namely, the identity of the
person (if known) whose communications are to be intercepted, the nature and
location of the communication facilities, the type of communication to be
intercepted and the offense to which it relates, the agency authorized to
perform the interception and the person authorizing the application, and the
period of time during which such interception is authorized.  A court order
may also require that interim status reports be made to the issuing judge
while the wiretap is in progress.

2.3  Emergencies

In an emergency situation where there is immediate danger of death or serious
physical injury to any person, or conspiratorial activities threatening
national security or characteristic of organized crime, Title III permits any
investigative or law enforcement officer specially designated by the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General, or by
the principal prosecuting attorney of any state or subdivision thereof, to
intercept communications provided an application for a court order is made
within 48 hours.  In the event a court order is not issued, the contents of
any intercepted communication is treated as having been obtained in violation
of Title III.

In New York State, even an emergency situation requires a court order from a
judge.  However, the judge may grant a temporary court order based on an oral
application from the District Attorney.  The oral communication must be
recorded and transcribed, and must be followed by a written application within
24 hours.  The duration of a temporary warrant cannot exceed 24 hours and
cannot be renewed except through a written application.

2.4  Execution of a Court Order

2.4.1  Installation of a Wiretap

To execute a court order for a wiretap, the investigative or law enforcement
officer takes the court order or emergency provision to the communications
service provider.  Normally, the service provider is the local exchange
carrier.  When served with a court order, the service provider (or landlord,
custodian, or other person named) is mandated under Title III to assist in the
execution of the interception by providing all necessary information,
facilities, and technical assistance.  The service provider is compensated for
reasonable expenses incurred.  In light of rapid technological developments
including cellular telephones and integrated computer networks, the New Jersey
statute also requires the service provider to give technical assistance and
equipment to fulfill the court order.  This requirement has not yet been
tested in court.

Normally, the government leases a line from the service provider and the
intercepted communications are transmitted to a remote government monitoring
facility over that line.  In many cases, the bridging connection is made
within the service provider's central office facility.  Alternatively, a law
enforcement agency may request the service provider to give the "pairs and
appearances" (a place to connect to the suspect's line) in the "local loop"
for the suspect's phone.  A law enforcement technician then makes the

When a suspect's telephone is subject to change (e.g., because the person is
attempting to evade or thwart interception), then a "roving" wiretap, which
suspends the specification of the telephone, may be used.  In this case, prior
to intercepting communications, the officer must use some other method of
surveillance in order to determine the exact location and/or telephone number
of the facility being used.  Once determined, the location or telephone number
is given to the service provider for coordination and prompt assistance.  The
officer may not intercept communications randomly in order to track a person
(random or mass surveillance is not permitted under any circumstances).

2.4.2  Minimization

Once any electronic surveillance begins, the law enforcement officer must
"minimize" — that is, attempt to limit the interception of communications to
the specified offenses in the court order.  Prior to the surveillance, a
federal or state attorney holds a "minimization meeting" with the
investigators who will be participating in the case to ensure that the rules
are followed.

Minimization is normally accomplished by turning off the intercept and then
performing a spot check every few minutes to determine if the conversation has
turned to the subject of the court order.  This avoids picking up family
gossip.  Special problems may arise where criminals communicate in codes that
are designed to conceal criminal activity in what sounds like mundane
household discussion.  If an intercepted communication is in a code or foreign
language, and if someone is not reasonably available to interpret the code or
foreign language, then the conversation can be recorded and minimization
deferred until an expert in that code or language is available to interpret
the communication.  Should a wiretap fail to meet the minimization parameters,
all of the evidence obtained from the wiretap could be inadmissible.

2.4.3  Recording

All intercepted communications are to be recorded when possible.  As a
practical mater, law enforcement officers make working copies of the original
tapes.  In many instances at the state and local level, the originals are
delivered to the prosecutor's office and maintained in the prosecutor's
custody.  The copies are screened by the case officer for pertinent
conversations (e.g., "I'll deliver the dope at 8:00 pm.").  A compilation of
the relevant conversations, together with the corroboratory surveillances
often provides the probable cause for search warrants and/or arrest warrants.

2.4.4  Termination of Electronic Surveillance

Electronic surveillance must terminate upon attainment of the objectives, or
in any event within 30 days. To continue an interception beyond 30 days, the
officer, through a government attorney, must apply for and be granted an
extension based upon a new application and court order.

When the period of a court order, or extension thereof, expires, the original
tapes must be made available to the issuing judge and sealed under court
supervision.  The tapes must be maintained in such fashion for 10 years.

2.5  Notification and Use of Intercepted Communications as Evidence

Upon termination of an interception, the judge who issued the court order must
notify the persons named in the order that the interception took place.
Normally, this must be done within 90 days, but it may be postponed upon
showing of good cause.  If the judge determines that it would be in the
interest of justice to make portions of the intercepted communications
available to the subjects, the judge may do so.

The contents of the communications may not be used as evidence in any trial or
hearing unless each party has received a copy of the application and court
order at least 10 days in advance of the trial, and has been given the
opportunity to move to suppress the evidence.  A motion to suppress the
evidence may be made on the grounds that it was not obtained in complete
conformance with the laws.

2.6  Reports

Within 30 days after the expiration or denial of a court order, Title III
requires that the judge provide information about the order to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO). Each year the Attorney
General (or a designated Assistant Attorney General) must report, on behalf of
the federal government, to the AO a summary of all orders and interceptions
for the year; reports for state and local jurisdictions are made by the
principal prosecuting attorney of the jurisdiction.  The AO then integrates
these summaries into an annual report: "Report on Applications for Orders
Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic
Communications (Wiretap Report)" covering all federal and state electronic
surveillance, including wiretaps.  The 1992 report is about 200 pages and
includes information about each interception authorized in 1992, update
information for interceptions authorized in 1982-1991, and summary statistics.
The summary statistics include the following data (numbers in parenthesis are
the 1992 figures):

   (1) number of interceptions authorized (919), denied (0), and
       installed (846)

   (2) average duration (in days) of original authorization (28) and
       extensions (30)

   (3) the place/facility where authorized (303 single family dwelling,
       135 apartment, 3 multi-dwelling, 119 business, 4 roving, 66
       combination, 289 other)

   (4) major offenses involved (634 narcotics, 90 racketeering, 66
       gambling, 35 homicide/ assault, 16 larceny/theft, 9 kidnapping,
       8 bribery, 7 loansharking/usury/extortion, 54 other)

   (5) average number of (a) persons intercepted (117), (b)
       interceptions (1,861), and (c) incriminating intercepts (347)
       per order where interception devices were installed

   (6) average cost of interception ($46,492)

   (7) type of surveillance used for the 846 interceptions installed
       (632 telephone, 38 microphone, 113 electronic, 63 combination)

   (8) number of persons arrested (2,685) and convicted (607) as the
       result of 1992 intercepts

   (9) activity taking place during 1992 as the result of intercepts
       terminated in years 1982-1991, including number of arrests
       (1211), trials (280), motions to suppress that are granted (14),
       denied (141), and pending (37), and convictions (1450) (there is
       a lag between interceptions, arrests, and convictions, with many
       arrests and most convictions associated with a wiretap that
       terminated in one year taking place in subsequent years)

Most of the above data is broken down by jurisdiction.  Of the 919 authorized
intercepts, 340 (37%) were federal.  New York State had 197, New Jersey 111,
Florida 80, and Pennsylvania 77.  The remaining 114 intercepts were divided
among 18 states, none of which had more than 17 intercepts.  During the past
decade, the average number of authorized intercepts per year has been about

Individual law enforcement agencies also require internal reports.  For
example, the New York Sate Police requires that each week, the Troop or Detail
Captain prepare a report summarizing the status of all eavesdropping activity
within the unit, including the productivity and plans for each electronic
surveillance installation and a brief synopsis of pertinent activity.  This is
sent to the New York State Police Division Headquarters Captain who prepares a
report summarizing the status of all eavesdropping installations.

One of the reasons for the significant amount of post wiretap reporting is to
provide a substantial record for legislatures when considering whether or not
to reenact or modify wiretap statutes.

3.  FISA Interceptions

Title 50 USC, Sections 1801-1811, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) of 1978, covers electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes (including counterintelligence and counterterrorism).  It governs
wire and electronic communications sent by or intended to be received by
United States persons (citizens, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, corporations, and associations of U.S. persons) who are in the U.S.
when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes; nonconsensual wire intercepts that are
implemented within the U.S.; and radio intercepts when the sender and all
receivers are in the U.S. and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes.  It does not cover intercepts of U.S. persons who are overseas
(unless the communications are with a U.S. person who is inside the U.S.).
Electronic surveillance conducted under FISA is classified.

FISA authorizes electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents of
foreign powers for foreign intelligence purposes.  Normally, a court order is
required to implement a wiretap under FISA.  There are, however, two
exceptions.  The first is when the communications are exclusively between or
among foreign powers or involve technical intelligence other than spoken
communications from a location under the open and exclusive control of a
foreign power; there is no substantial risk that the surveillance will acquire
the communications to or from a U.S.person; and proposed minimization
procedures meet the requirements set forth by the law.  Under those
conditions, authorization can be granted by the President through the Attorney
General for a period up to one year.  The second is following a declaration of
war by Congress.  Then the President, though the Attorney General, can
authorize electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without a
court order for up to 15 days.

Orders for wiretaps are granted by a special court established by FISA.  The
court consists of seven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice
of the United States.  Judges serve seven-year terms.

3.1  Application for a Court Order

Applications for a court order are made by Federal officers and require
approval by the Attorney General.  Each application must include:

  (1) the Federal officer making the application;

  (2) the Attorney General's approval;

  (3) the target of the electronic surveillance;

  (4) justification that the target is a foreign power or agent of a
      foreign power (except no U.S person can be considered a foreign power
      or agent thereof solely based on activities protected by the First
      Amendment) and that the facilities or places where the surveillance
      is be directed will be used by the same;

  (5) the proposed minimization procedures, which must meet certain
      requirements to protect the privacy of U.S. persons;

  (6) the nature of the information sought and type of communications
      subjected to surveillance;

  (7) certification(s) by the Assistant to the President for National
      Security Affairs or other high-level official in the area of
      national security or defense (Presidential appointee subject to
      Senate confirmation) that the information sought is foreign
      intelligence information and that such information cannot
      reasonably be obtained by normal investigative methods;

  (8) the means by which the surveillance will be effected;

  (9) the facts concerning all previous applications involving the same
      persons, facilities, or places;

 (10) the period of time for the interception (maximum 90 days or,
      when the target is a foreign power, one year);

 (11) coverage of all surveillance devices to be employed and the
      minimization procedures applying to each.

Some of the above information can be omitted when the target is a foreign

Within the FBI, the process of applying for a court order under FISA is as
exacting and subject to review as under Title III.  The main differences are
that under FISA, the FBI Intelligence Division is involved rather than the
Criminal Investigative Division, the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review (OIPR) is involved rather than either the U.S. Attorney's Office or the
DOJ Criminal Division, and the application is approved by the Attorney General
(or Acting Attorney General) rather than by a lower DOJ official.

3.2  Issuance of a Court Order

Before a judge can approve an application, the judge must determine that the
authorizations are valid; that there is probable cause to believe that the
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power and that the facilities or places where the surveillance is be directed
will be used by the same; and that the proposed minimization procedures meet
the requirements set forth in the law.  If the judge approves the application,
an order is issued specifying the relevant information from the application
and directing the communication carrier, landlord, custodian, or other
specified person to furnish all necessary information, facilities, and
technical assistance and to properly maintain under security procedures any
records relating to the surveillance.

3.3  Emergencies

In an emergency situation, the Attorney General or designee can authorize the
use of electronic surveillance provided the judge is notified at the time and
an application is made to the judge within 24 hours.  If such application is
not obtained, then the judge notifies any U.S. persons named in the
application or subject to the surveillance, though such notification can be
postponed or forgone upon showing of good cause.

3.4  Use of Intercepted Communications as Evidence

Like Title III, FISA places strict controls on what information can be
acquired through electronic surveillance and how such information can be used.
No information can be disclosed for law enforcement purposes except with the
proviso that it may only be used in a criminal proceedings under advance
authorization from the Attorney General.  If the government intends to use
such information in court, then the aggrieved person must be notified in
advance.  The person may move to suppress the evidence.

3.5  Reports

Each year, the Attorney General must give the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AO) a report of the number of FISA applications and the
number of orders and extensions granted, modified, or denied.  In 1992, there
were 484 orders.  Since 1979, there has been an average of a little over 500
FISA orders per year.

Because intercepts conducted under FISA are classified, detailed information
analogous to that required under Title III is not reported to the AO, nor made
available to the public.  However, records of Attorney General certifications,
applications, and orders granted must be held for at least 10 years, and the
Attorney General must inform two Congressional oversight committees of all
surveillance activity on a semiannual basis.  These committees are the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on


We are grateful to Geoffrey Greiveldinger for many helpful suggestions on an
earlier draft of this report.

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