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Acknowledgement Credit for the following line of reasoning is due in large part to the New Scientist reporter Duncan Graham-Rowe. The formulation here is (obviously) mine. Disclaimer The interpretation and reasoning presented here is based entirely on the publicly-available JAG briefing and Blue Ribbon Panel report documents, which I shall refer to as JAGB and BRPR respectively. Although written to be readable by non-specialists, it employs methods to be found in formal failure analysis techniques such as WBA. There may be errors in the reasoning and analysis, although I am reasonably confident that all such errors are minor. Please bring any errors you remark to my immediate attention (email usually suffices). The focus of this note is causal analysis and I have nothing to say here about social phenomena such as blame or responsibility. The Sequence of Events First, a brief review of what the JAG determined happened in the December crash. A hydraulic line ruptured in the left nacelle. This line was part of the primary flight control system hydraulics and activates the swashplate actuators. There are three such systems, in a partially redundant configuration. At the rupture point, the line was common to Systems 1 and 3; System 1 was fully disabled, System 3 was isolated in the left nacelle, but continued to function in the right nacelle, System 2 worked left and right. This event caused the nacelle transition to stop, and the PFCS reset button to illuminate in the cockpit. The aircrew pressed the reset button, as per procedure. The PFCS computer software then caused "rapid" pitch and thrust changes to be commanded and actuated. The rotors responded differentially in time, because the physical actuation authority in each nacelle was different: the right nacelle had two working hydraulic systems, and the left nacelle only one. The aircrew pressed the reset button "as many as eight to 10 times [sic]" (JAGB) during the last 20 seconds of flight. The response asymmetry and resulting flight behavior of the aircraft was directly responsible for loss of control (LOC) of the aircraft and the aircraft impacted the ground in a LOC condition. Proposed Failure Analysis based on JAGB JAGB says: "The published procedure for responding to [a hydraulic system failure as multiply indicated in the cockpit] is to press the primary flight control system reset button. When the primary flight control reset button was pressed, a software anomaly caused significant pitch and thrust changes in both prop rotors. Because of the dual hydraulic failure on the left side, the prop rotors were unable to respond at the same rate. This resulted in uncommanded aircraft pitch, roll and yaw motions, which eventually stalled the aircraft. During the last 20 seconds of the flight, the primary flight control reset logic was energized as many as eight to 10 times. This, coupled with the dual hydraulic failure, caused large prop rotor changes. These changes resulted in decreased airspeed and altitude and a left yaw. The crew pressed the reset button in their attempt to reset the system and maintain control during the emergency." This clearly says (*) that the PFCS software caused the PFCS to command "significant pitch and thrust changes" and that this software behavior was anomalous; (**) that recycling the reset button "eight to 10 times" was a causal factor (in the WBA sense) of "large prop rotor changes", which were in turn a causal factor (we might wish to infer: the sole causal factor) in the LOC. What kind of "software anomaly" can this have been? There are, according to a common taxomony of complex system failures, only a few possibilities. (I shall use the term "rotor excursion" for a one-time pitch and thrust change of the sort being talked about here, whatever that may consist in.) 1. A bug: the code did not fulfill the design specification; or 2. The software functioned as designed, but the design was incompatible with the overall PFCS control requirements (which implied for this situation that the PFCS should not command a rotor excursion); or 3. The software functioned as designed, and the design was compatible with the overall PFCS control requirements (that is, the PFCS requirements allowed or even implied that a rotor excursion should take place in this situation), but rotor excursions in this situation were not "expected" nor required by (a) the aircraft designers; (b) OPS manual; (c) crew; or 4. That although a rotor excursion may have been anticipated by designers, that the effects of multiple cycling of reset, namely, multiple rotor excursions, were not anticipated by (a) aircraft engineers; (b) OPS manual; (c) crew. I shall say "software bug" for case 1, "software design error" for case 2, "requirements failure" for cases 3 and 4. I concluded in my Risks-21.33 note that the JAG had unequivocally indicated a software bug or a software design error had occurred. I will give my precise reasoning forthwith and I believe that reasoning is correct. However, after consulting and analysing BRPR, I see reason now to doubt the truth of the conclusion. JAGB Quotes In the light of these possibilities, following comments from JAGB are relevant. The briefer is Maj. Gen. Berndt, assisted by Lt. Col. Wainwright on aircraft technical matters. If unascribed, the quotes are from Maj. Gen. Berndt. A. "an anomaly in the control logic in the computer software control laws which caused rapid and significant changes to prop rotor pitch each time the primary flight control system reset logic was energized." B. "This anomaly rendered procedures outlined in the [...] NATOPS flight manual ineffective." C. "This mishap was not the result of human factors." D. [in response to a query: "what does "anomaly" mean exactly?"] "An anomaly [here] means that something happened that was not supposed to happen, and whether that's a fault of design or structure or composition, manufacture or installation, [Maj. Gen, Berndt] do[es] not know." E. [Lt. Col. Wainwright] "The question was what should have happened when the PFCS button was reset with the dual hydraulic failure. The short answer is absolutely nothing." F. "The recommendation has been to address the anomaly within the system that caused the aircraft to accelerate and decelerate with rapid pitch changes over a short period of time." G. [Wainwright] "The [reset] button is multipurpose. In this particular case, it should have done nothing. [...] Because of the logic, it lights up. But when you press it, other than putting the light out, it shouldn't have really done anything at all. Interpreting the Quotes: Reasoning to bug or software design error Quote A clearly says that the anomaly in software-implemented control logic in software caused rotor excursions. It also says that these excursions happened upon each reset. Quote D says that something happened because of the software-implemented control logic that was not supposed to happen. One of these has the form "A caused B", the other "something with property P happened because of A". We may presume that the rotor excursions were the sole relevant causal consequence of the anomaly; I conclude that the rotor excursions happened and were not supposed to. It does not yet tell us what requirement is referred to by "not supposed to". It gives us a choice between 1, 2, and 3(a), but does not distinguish between them. Quote B entails that one of 3(b) or 4(b) was the case. Quote C appears to be inconsistent with the other information. (**) implies that recycling the button appears to be a causal factor in LOC. Now, either the pilots recycled the button because (i) it was NATOPS manual procedure to do so, or because (ii) it was their choice to do so. Either (i) or (ii), whichever is the case, is a causal factor in recycling the button, which itself is a causal ancestor of the LOC. But both (i) and (ii) fall within the domain commonly termed "human factors". Hence it appears that human factors phenomena were causal ancestors of the LOC. That is in direct contradiction to Quote C. The Marines' testimony appears to be inconsistent. (That may be because they are not speaking as precisely as I am trying to.) Quote G lets us distinguish somewhat between our choice of 1, 2, or 3(a). It says that pressing the button should have done "nothing", that is, it should not have caused a rotor excursion. That clearly suggests that the design was not compatible with control system requirements, and rules out 3(a). It was therefore a software bug or a software design error. This is the conclusion contained in my Risks-21.33 analysis. Quote F puts the anomaly "in the system". Design specification is not normally considered part of the system by most engineers (although I have argued elsewhere that this may be mistaken), so I take this quote to support (in the sense of giving extra credence to) the conclusion that there was a software bug or software design error. Software Reparatory Measures It should now be clear what reparatory measures would be recommended by a professional software engineer on the basis of this conclusion. The control software can be regarded as providing a "service", a particular functionality, to the PFCS. In the case of a failure of type 1, the behavior did not provide the service specified in the software design. In the case of a failure of type 2, the software provided the function specified in the design, but this was not the service that the rest of the PFCS required. General prophylactic measure for these cases are: M.1) For software bugs. Inspect software against design specs; test software against design specs; remove bugs. M.2) For software design errors. Inspect software design against PFCS design; perform integrated PFCS bench tests; remove incompatibilities between software behavior and PFCS expected behavior It is significant, therefore, that neither of these two standard prophylactic measures was recommended by the BRPR. Quote from the BRPR The BRPR section on software is short and worth quoting in full. [begin quote] The fly-by-wire flight control system is highly dependent on high-quality computer hardware and software. The logic that is the basis for the many flight control laws and algorithms must be consistent with the overall requirement for FO/FS. This implies that if the aircraft suffers any single failure in the electrical, mechanical or hydraulic parts of the system, there cannot be any software logic characteristic or failure that would result in an unsafe condition. The integrated flight control system must be designed, analyzed, and tested with these facts in mind. Boeing has the lead role in development and testing of the integrated flight control system. Their Philadelphia facility has the capability to conduct integrated hydraulics, flight loads, and software testing using the Flight Control System Integration Rig. Before the mishap, the facility had limited pilot-in-the-loop capability. During the downtime, and in response to the preliminary mishap investigation results, Boeing has upgraded the capabilities of the integrated simulation facilities and is in the process of validating a set of off-nominal and failure scenarios that had been checked only by analysis during the 1996 validation and verification of the flight software. Boeing also has begun validating all flight control system emergency procedures with pilot-in-the-loop simulation runs. In addition, the company is holding an integrated flight control system review, with participation from "graybeard" experts from within and outside the company to review the requirement and the implementation of the requirements in the design. Conclusion: The North Carolina mishap identified limitations in the V-22 Program's software development and testing. The complexity of the V-22 flight control system demands a thorough risk analysis capability, including a highly integrated software/hardware/pilot-in-the-loop test capability. Recommendation: Conduct an independent flight control software development audit of the V-22 program with an emphasis on integrated system safety. Recommendation: Conduct a comprehensive flight control software risk assessment prior to return to flight. Recommendation: The V-22 Program should not return to flight until the flight procedure and flight control software test cases have been reviewed for adequacy and have been evaluated in the integrated test facilities. [end quote] Analysis of the BRPR Section on Software Reliability There is nothing in the commentary or recommendations that implies M.1 or M.2. This is remarkable. Instead, the report emphasises integrated system safety, and integrated test facilities (in which they appear to emphasise pilot-in-the-loop testing). Standard system-safety and risk assessment involve identification and analysis of hazards, including assessing the likelihood of a hazard condition, and identifying the likelihood that an accident will result from a specific hazard. The hydraulic failure is a specific hazard; they say from this hazard "there cannot be any software logic characteristics or failure that would result in an unsafe condition". They do not say "result in an accident", or "result in an unsafe condition or accident". This suggests that they believe that more factors were involved in the accident than the software logic alone. >From the JAGB, we concluded that there was a bug or a software design error that caused behavior that resulted, along with multiple resets and the asymmetric physical response of the rotors, in the LOC, which itself resulted in the accident. An informal WB-Graph of the accident according to the analysis of JAGB would contain the following chains of causal factors. (To obtain a partial graph from these chains, superimpose identically labelled features, e.g., "PFCS behavior" in the first three chains. I emphasise: the WB-Graph will be partial.) C1) HF -> multiple resets -> PFCS behavior -> dynamic behavior of AC -> -> LOC -> Accident C2) Physics of AC design and configuration -> dynamic behavior of AC C3) PFCS intentional design -> PFCS behavior C4) PFC anomalies -> PFCS behavior C5) Software subsystem design anomalies or bugs -> PFC anomalies Prophylactic measures are supposed to break the causal chains somewhere. Integrated testing including pilot-in-the-loop enables C1 to be broken by modifying the human behavior that led to the multiple resets, by changing or modifying procedures. C2 cannot be broken, because it is physically necessary, although the specific behavior can thereby be changed. No recommendation is made here to do this. Likewise C3 cannot be broken, because it represents physical necessity: PFCS design will causally result in behavior of the PFCS whenever the PFCS is activated (although of course it will not if the PFCS is never activated). PFCS design may be changed, to result in different behavior, of course, and this is what I take to be the purpose of risk assessment: how to mitigate the consequences of the hazard through PFCS change. C4 may be broken by removing anomalies; similarly C5 may be broken by removing anomalies in the software subsystem. In a thorough safety audit, all chains that could be broken would be considered. But the BRPR speaks nowhere above of breaking C4 and C5, because nowhere is anything approaching M.1 or M.2 suggested. The BRPR concentrates instead on C1 (integrated testing with pilot-in-the-loop) and modifications in C3. (We may presume that modifications concerning chain C2 are all considered in another section of the report.) Comparing with the goals of the report and the qualifications of the panel members, this selection is comprehensible only on the hypothesis that these chains C4 and C5 aren't in fact there. But the JAG report implied that they were. Well, are they or aren't they there? JAGB says yes, BRPR implies no. Suppose they are not there, and that the PFCS functioned as designed and expected by its engineers. What would the accident scenario look like, consistent with the other information provided by JAGB? Considering the taxonomy 1-4, I think only three possibilities present themselves. One possibility, suggested by Peter Neumann, is that the basic behavior with single reset was known, but the behavior with multiple resets was not considered either in the NATOPS flight manual procedure definition, or by the designers. The effects of multiple resets was not known. The resulting behavior turns out to interact badly with the asymmetric hardware response and resulted in this incident in the LOC. The second possibility is that the behavior even of a single reset was not considered in the integrated control systems. It was known by PFCS engineers that a rotor excursion would be commanded, but the physical characteristics of that rotor excursion, especially the asymmetrical rotor response, had not been determined. The third possibility, and I would imagine the least likely, is that the potential behavior in this situation was generally anticipated by engineers, but not known by or to the flight crew. I believe it is known whether one of these possibilities was the case. However, it is not inferable from the public information. It is not my purpose to speculate. I shall stop here. Peter B. Ladkin <http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de> University of Bielefeld
Federal authorities arrested two Lucent scientists and a third man yesterday, charging them with stealing software associated with Lucent's PathStar Access Server and sharing it with a firm majority-owned by the Chinese government. The software is considered a "crown jewel" of the company. Chinese nationals Hai Lin and Kai Xu were regarded as "distinguished members" of Lucent's staff up until their arrests. The motivation for the theft, according to court documents, was to build a networking powerhouse akin to the "Cisco of China." The men face a maximum five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. (*USA Today*, 4 May 2001 http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-05-03-lucent-scientists-china.htm NewsScan Daily, 4 May 2001, written by John Gehl and Suzanne Douglas, editors@NewsScan.com)
Citibank(South Dakota, N.A.) sent a leaflet to its customers to "...tell you how you can limit our disclosing personal information about you." Observe what great choice Citibank customers have: [...] Categories of Nonaffiliated Third parties to whom we may disclose personal information Nonaffiliated third parties are those not part of the family of companies controlled by Citigroup Inc. We may disclose personal information about you to the following types of nonaffiliated third parties: * Financial services providers, such as companies engaged in banking, credit cards, consumer finance, securities and insurance, * Non-financial companies, such as companies engaged in direct marketing and the selling of consumer products and services If you check box 1 on the Privacy Choices Form, we will not make those disclosures except as follows. First, we may disclose information ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ about you as described above in "Categories of Personal Information we collect and may disclose" to third parties that perform marketing services on our behalf or to other financial institutions with whom we have joint marketing agreements. Second, we may disclose personal information about you to third parties as permitted by law, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ including disclosures necessary to process and service your Citi Card account. [...] Sharing with Citigroup Affiliates (Box 2) The law allows us to share with our affiliates any information about your transactions or experiences with you. Unless otherwise permitted by law, we will not share with our ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ affiliates other information that you provide to us or that we obtain from third parties (for example credit bureaus) if you check Box 2 on the Privacy Choices Form. [...] The options the clients are given are non-sensical as the bank retains the right to share information "as permitted by law" with just about everybody. Let's consider Box 1. Assuming that Citibank does not break the law, if the customer does not check the box, Citibank can share personal information with third parties. If the customer checks the box, Citibank "may disclose personal information to third parties" So whether Box 1 is checked or not the effect is the same unless Citibank breaks the law in sharing information with third parties. Only in this case checking the box makes a difference. If the box is checked, the customer essentially asks Citibank to stop performing these illegal activities. Let us now consider box 2. Regardless of the state of the box, Citibank can share with its affiliates "any information about [Citibank's] transactions or experiences with [the customer]." The information that box 2 is supposed to control is information "obtain[ed] from third parties". Again if the box is not checked then this information may also be shared, while if the box is checked personal information may still be shared unless prohibited by law. Great choice! On their web site "http://www.citibank.com/privacy" Citibank claims: "6. We will tell customers in plain language initially, and at least once annually, how they may remove their names from marketing lists. ..." If the language that was used in the leaflet is "plain" then Citibank must assume that all their clients are lawyers. In fact the whole purpose of the leaflet is to *pretend* that Citibank cares about the privacy of the customers, while retaining the right to distribute the personal information of their customers in any way they like. I have no problem with that - if I want privacy I can open a dollar account with a European bank and enjoy the protection of the EU laws. I *do* object, however, to being handed a document like that which treats me like an idiot. Vassilis Prevelakis, University of Pennsylvania
Microsoft strikes banking deal [Excerpt from AP Internet news service] Microsoft Corp. on Monday announced a deal to provide banks with software designed to make their Internet transactions ultra-secure. The technology, which works in the Windows 2000 operating system, is designed to allow banks to be sure of whom they're dealing with on the Internet. It matches a security framework designed by Identrus, an alliance of 150 of the world's largest banks. The deal involves Microsoft, Unisys Corp. of Blue Bell, Pa., and Ireland-based Baltimore Technologies, which has its U.S. headquarters in Boston. Baltimore is providing its Public Key Infrastructure security system, and Unisys is providing help using the system. [Full article at: http://www.infobeat.com/fullArticle?article=406981693] No, there is no risk of me believing this will work. Maybe owners of Microsoft Encarta can find the suitable definition of the term "ultra-secure", when applied in the context of Windows 2000...?
An advertisement by Toshiba in the Australian Financial Review Monday 7 May 2001 (page 10: "Portege 3490 with Bluetooth - always ready to network") suggests that Toshiba laptops can be routinely carried on aircraft switched on, with Bluetooth devices transmitting: > "Imagine two strangers, each carrying Bluetooth-enabled Portege 3490s ... > In a fraction of a second the Bluetooth module within each detects the > presence of the other. ... And complete strangers can start playing chess > together on long flights" Apart from being misleading as laptop computers are not designed to be left on while being carried, this appears at odds with routine airline practice requiring electronic devices to be switched off during take-off. The use of radio transmitters by passengers is usually prohibited at any time on an airline. This is discussed in the Draft Advisory Circular AC 91.22 (0), FEBRUARY 2000, "PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES" from the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority: http://www.casa.gov.au/prod/avreg/newrules/download/ac/091%5F22.pdf In practice, Bluetooth's very low-power spread-spectrum transmitter would be unlikely to cause interference to an aircraft's systems. However, it would be unwise to encourage Bluetooth's use on airlines until this is accepted by airline safety authorities. PS: It is possible to use a transmitter in some aircraft. Particularly when it is a hot air balloon over Parliment and you have a Senator assisting you: http://www.tomw.net.au/nt/balloon.html PPS: More on wireless: http://www.tomw.net.au/2001/wwgw.html Tom Worthington FACS; Director, Tomw Communications Pty Ltd ABN: 17 088 714 309 http://www.tomw.net.au; Vis.Prof AustralianNatlUniversity; Austrl. Computer Soc
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