The RISKS Digest
Volume 24 Issue 23

Tuesday, 4th April 2006

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

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Three days of San Francisco BART upgrade crashes
Nashville airport X-ray baggage screeners offline: "software glitch"
Carl G. Alphonce
IT Corruption in the UK
Jerome Ravetz
"Invisible fences" pose risks for dogs from coyotes
Philipp Hanes
Computer problems with voting system
Danya Hooker via Dana A. Freiburger
eFax/J2 opens door to expensive Joe-jobbing
Dallman Ross
Fake E-Mail Topples Japan Opposition Party
Hans Greimel excerpt
Al Macintyre
Maplin gives "How To..." advice on Wireless Networks
Chris Leeson
Rootkit: erosion of terms?
Rob Slade
Error bounds on estimated probabilities
Jacob Palme
Re: Excel garbles microarray experiment data
Przemek Klosowski
Re: It's now a crime to delete files
Crispin Cowan
Re: The Spider of Doom
Steve Summit
Re: The 2005 Helios B737 Crash - A test for Don Norman...
Martyn Thomas
Tom Watson
Eric T. Ferguson
Re: Man is charged $4,334.33 for four burgers
Mark Feit
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Three days of San Francisco BART upgrade crashes

<"Peter G. Neumann" <>>
Fri, 31 Mar 2006 07:12:11 PST

BART has been attempting a software upgrade to modernize the software
controlling its rapid transit system.  Unfortunately, computer system
problems were responsible for a combination of system-wide slowdowns and
shutdowns on three consecutive days (Monday/Tuesday/Wednesday), including
during rush hours.  The first two days' problems resulted from observed
potential safety failures of the new software.  The third day's problems
resulted from an attempt to revert to a backup system — which apparently
overloaded a network switch, which crashed the computer system.  The new
supposedly self-correcting software had passed all of its tests on the
previous Sunday, but evidently the testing was incomplete.  (This upgrade is
only part of what is thought to be a carefully phased multiyear
modernization that is expected to take at least another five months.)

  [Sources: PGN-ed from an item in the *San Francisco Chronicle*,
  30 Mar 2006, the *San Jose Mercury*, 30 Mar 2006
  and Computerworld, 31 Mar 2006.]

Nashville airport X-ray baggage screeners offline: "software glitch"

<"Carl G. Alphonce" <alphonce@cse.Buffalo.EDU>>
Fri, 31 Mar 2006 21:22:23 -0500

As reported at

  A software glitch knocked out the computerized X-ray machines at Nashville
  International Airport for five hours Friday, causing long lines and flight

No indication of what the glitch might be.  The article goes on to state:

  David Beecroft, who oversees security operations at Nashville for the
  federal Transportation Security Administration, said all
  U.S. international airports were alerted because the company that supplies
  the software for the Smiths Heimann X-ray detectors also serves several
  other airports.  But TSA spokeswoman Laura Uselding later said other
  airports were not notified because the situation in Nashville was an
  isolated event. The discrepancy could not be immediately resolved.

There are two discrepancies as I see it.  Was this an isolated event or one
that affected screening machines at several airports?  Were several airports
alerted or not?

Also some questions come to mind.  If there was a problem, why would only
*international* airports be alerted (shouldn't domestic baggage be screened
with correctly functioning equipment)?  Were these machines perhaps only
used at intl airports (this isn't clear from the story)?

Carl Alphonce, Dept of Computer Science and Engineering, University at Buffalo
Buffalo, NY 14260-2000 716-645-3180 x115

IT Corruption in the UK

<Jerome Ravetz <>>
Sun, 2 Apr 2006 11:59:43 +0100

The 2 Apr 2006 issue of the Sunday Times has an article by the distinguished
journalist Simon Jenkins, 'Desperate Dispatches from the banana republic of
Great Britain'.  There he lists a number of multi-million pound scams.  I
have told him by way of consolation that in the U.S.A. they multi-billions.
Here was one item that he missed!

In a recent *Private Eye* (#1154, 17 March 2005, p.4) we have the following
item, starting:

``How appropriate that Mapeley, the company that does most of its business
through secretive tax havens — hotbeds of money laundering, terrorist
financing and tax dodging — should win the contract to manage the 70-odd
`authentication by interview' centres at which the Passport Service will vet
and biometrically test new applicants in the interests of national

*The Eye* goes on to remind readers of Mapeley's questionable record as
financial manipulators.  For readers of RISKS, it is more interesting that
the UK government has chosen this firm — which at best has no experience
whatever in the field — to manage the introduction of a controversial,
untried, rapidly developing and highly sensitive technology.  In that anyone
with the most elementary prudence would recognise that the ID card scheme
will immediately attract hackers, criminals and terrorists to come in on the
ground floor, this contract is evidence for the genuineness of the Blair
government's commitment to security.

Jerry Ravetz, 111 Victoria Road, Oxford OX2 7QG James Martin Institute for
Science and Civilization, Oxford +44 [0]1865 512247

"Invisible fences" pose risks for dogs from coyotes

<"Philipp Hanes" <>>
Tue, 04 Apr 2006 17:03:50 +0000

The cited article concerns dogs that are given electrically activated
collars to keep them in their virtually enclosed yards.  Unfortunately,
coyotes — who obviously don't have the collars — can easily enter the
dogs' yards, and have been reportedly killing dogs.  [PGN-ed; This situation
is another variant on attempting to solve one problem without considering
others, in this case considering the confinement problem without remembering
the intrusion problem, which is sometimes seen in simple-minded computer
security approaches — as is its converse.]

  [Moral: Bilateral perimeter (de)fences are more effective than border
  collars for border collies?  PGN]

Computer problems with voting system (Danya Hooker)

<"Dana A. Freiburger" <>>
Fri, 31 Mar 2006 07:09:52 -0600

Computer problems caused the University of Wisconsin-Madison Student Council
to throw out online votes cast this week for campus offices, but retained
votes cast for two referendums on the same ballot.  The cause of the problem
may have been a "little-used, multiple-name tool has worked in prior
elections but may have been corrupted by a database upgrade several months
ago."  The main risk appears to be the lack of testing of the voting system
prior to the vote (along with no testing after a major software upgrade).

The parallels with the world of voting machines are obvious: the voting
system needs to be tested and certified BEFORE voting occurs.

Six thousand votes for Student Council seats will be tossed out, but votes
cast for two referendums will be counted, under a plan approved by the
Associated Students of Madison on Wednesday night.  [...]
[Source: Students plan to toss council votes after glitch
  Danya Hooker,, *Wisconsin State Journal*, 31 Mar 2006]

eFax/J2 opens door to expensive Joe-jobbing

<"Dallman Ross" <>>
Thu, 30 Mar 2006 02:24:02 +0200

eFax, which is owned by (a.k.a. "jFax"), recently sent
me a member e-mail containing the following text:

> eFax Tip for Easier Faxing
> How to send a fax by e-mail
> 1. Open a new e-mail.
> 2. Add fax number (including country code) to
> "".
> 3. Attach the document you wish to fax.
> (supported file types
> <!
> efax/twa/page/supportedFileTypesPopup> )
> 4. Send e-mail. We'll convert the attachment and fax it for you.
> You'll receive a confirmation e-mail once the fax has been delivered.
> Example
> 1. You want to send a fax to London (UK's country code: 44)
> 2. Fax number is (0) 20 7555 1234
> 3. You would type:

Sounds neat, you say?  I thought so too, for a second or two.  Then it
dawned on me: how will they know whom to bill?

The answer seems to be that they bill member accounts based simply on the
From-address!  That is, if Mr. Joe-Jobber with a nit to pick against you
knows that you have an eFax or j2 account and knows or guesses the e-mail
address you use with that service, he can send a spate of bogus (or real)
faxes using your address and clear your account or bank balance!

One acquaintance of mine tested this with his j2 account.  No prior
registration for this service was required.  He simply e-mailed as above,
and his account was debited 10 cents and the fax was sent.

There does not seem to be any way to disable e-mail addresses from this
service, for anyone with an eFax or j2 account.  One can, of course, change
the registered e-mail address used with the service, however.

What an accident waiting to happen this is, all in the name of "convenience"!

Dallman Ross - plug-in for procmail

Fake E-Mail Topples Japan Opposition Party

<"Peter G. Neumann" <>>
Sun, 2 Apr 2006 12:02:49 PDT

Japan's opposition party suffered a fresh humiliation Friday when its
leadership resigned en masse over a fake e-mail scandal, handing Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi an uncontested grip on power in his last six
months in office.  ...  Party leader Seiji Maehara and his lieutenants
stepped down after the party's credibility was torpedoed by one of its own
lawmakers, who used a fraudulent e-mail in an apparent attempt to discredit
Koizumi's ruling Liberal Democratic Party.  [Source: Hans Greimel,
Associated Press, 31 Mar 2006; PGN-excerpted.  TNX to Lauren Weinstein for
noting this one.],0,191417.story?coll=sns-ap-nationworld-headlines

<Al Macintyre <>>
Tue, 28 Mar 2006 01:30:24 -0600 is an e-mail address with the IRS where we can forward
e-mails that we think fraudulently claim to come from the IRS.  Example
scams include: claim that a tax refund is owed you

Maplin gives "How To..." advice on Wireless Networks

<"LEESON, Chris" <>>
Mon, 3 Apr 2006 14:20:04 +0100

I dropped in to one of my local Maplin ( stores today.
While standing in the queue, I noticed a leaflet entitled "How to...Create a
wireless network".

It was full of useful information (the 5 most important advantages of a
wireless network are, apparently, no messy cables; no need to drill holes;
simple to expand for more users; the ultimate freedom - Internet anywhere in
your house of garden; no need to open up your PC to install hardware).

Alas, absolutely nothing about the risks of a wireless network, and nothing
on how to secure one. Bear in mind that this is supposedly a "how to...",
not an advert.

They did, however, offer a link ( with more
information. When I got back to the office I tried the link, hoping for a
more complete set of instructions dealing with the issues - after all, there
is a limit to what can be put on an A4 sheet.

The further information consisted of the phrase "DETAILS TO FOLLOW...". I
waited for a few minutes just in case there was a flash animation loading or
a page redirect being especially slow. Then I checked the page source. No
flash, no redirect - they just hadn't uploaded the page.


1. Pushing technology without due regard to security (a common topic in
   RISKS, alas).
2. Publishing literature with web links in. but not having them ready when
   the literature is released, does not reflect well on a company.

Rootkit: erosion of terms?

<Rob Slade <>>
Tue, 04 Apr 2006 12:57:53 -0800

Wearing my "glossary guy" hat, one of the things I've noticed is how
difficult it is to come to complete agreement on the precise definition of
many terms that are used in infosec.  There are, for example, three quite
distinct meanings for the term "tar pit."  (And that's in terms of
networking alone.)  (It is highly unlikely that we will ever be able to
reduce the number of tar pit definitions to one: all the definitions came at
about the same time, and all are important and equally valid.)

However, what really irks me is when defined and agreed upon terms start
being misused, sometimes to the point where the original term becomes
useless.  There is, of course, "hacker."  (And I've given Hal a diatribe
about "zero day" which will probably be coming out in the next ISMH.)

The latest endangered term seems to be "rootkit."  A rootkit has been
defined as programming that allows escalation of privilege or the option to
re-enter the compromised system with greater ease in the future.  Often
rootkits also contain functions that prevent detection of, or recovery from,
the compromise.

Starting with the recent Sony "digital rights management" debacle, the
general media now seems to be using "rootkit" to refer to any programming
that hides any form of information on a system, and specifically any
functions that impede the detection of malware.  The latest reports are that
Bagle and other malware/virus families now contain "rootkits."
Antidetection features in viruses are nothing new: there was a form of
tunneling stealth implemented in the Brain virus 20 years ago.  Therefore,
to use the term rootkit to refer to this activity can only degrade the value
of the term.

It has been difficult to ensure that infosec specialists can at least talk
to each other and exchange useful information.  However, this may not last
much longer if our "precious verbal essences" become contaminated.

Error bounds on estimated probabilities

<Jacob Palme <>>
Sun, 2 Apr 2006 11:17:40 +0200

Martyn Thomas (RISKS-24.19) asks about the use of error bounds on estimated

There is actually one researcher, Love Ekenberg, who has built a theory of
error bounds on probability estimates, and also developed software to help
in evaluating different alternatives where such error bounds are used.

His software is described at

Jacob Palme <> (Stockholm University and KTH)

Re: Excel garbles microarray experiment data (Malcolm, RISKS-24.21)

<Przemek Klosowski <>>
Fri, 24 Mar 2006 22:57:58 -0500

  While working on a joint UK / German product development we discovered
  that the 'standard' separator employed in many German CSV files is the
  semi-colon ';' - I do not know why.

Probably because Germans use 'decimal comma' instead of 'decimal
point' between the integer and fractional parts of a floating point
number, thus interfering with the use of comma in CSV files.  The
period is used for grouping of digits, i.e. every three digits.

  [Also noted by George M. Sigut.  This is a very old problem that has
  been noted in RISKS on numerous occasions.  It keeps recurring.  PGN]

Re: It's now a crime to delete files (Peterson, RISKS-24.20)

<Crispin Cowan <>>
Wed, 29 Mar 2006 11:47:19 -0800

> The 7th Circuit made two remarkable leaps. First, the judges said that
> deleting files from a laptop counts as ``damage''.  Second, they ruled that
> Citrin's implicit ``authorization'' evaporated when he (again, allegedly)
> chose to go into business for himself and violate his employment contract.

This actually makes perfect sense to me, on both counts. File deletion is
damage, and both the laptop and the data seem to have been the property of
IAC at the time that he chose to destroy the data.

Imagine sacking a developer, and the developer deletes all the source code
he has written during his employment before leaving the building.  Such data
vandalism is justifiable only if you also plan to return all wages paid
during employment, and even then the employer should have the choice.

More over, depending on the terms of the employment contract, Citrin may not
even have had a right to a copy of the data for himself.

Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.

Re: The Spider of Doom (RISKS 24.22)

<Steve Summit <>>
Sat, 01 Apr 2006 17:24:22 -0500

  "one particularly troublesome external IP had gone in and deleted *all* of
  the content on the system [...], Google's very own web
  crawling spider.  ...  the CMS authentication subsystem didn't take into
  account the sophisticated hacking techniques of Google's spider."

I can see Joe Loughry's tongue in his cheek pretty clearly from here, but it
might not be obvious to a casual reader that this was manifestly *not* a
"hacking" attempt by Google.  That a simple and naive traversal of some
hyperlinks could cause content to be deleted makes it pretty obvious that
something was badly wrong with the site's editing and access-control model.
Needless to say (or, it *ought* to be needless, but is actually pretty
needful), security that assumes that visitors *will* have cookies and
JavaScript enabled, that can be compromised if these features are disabled,
is no security at all.  That content could have been inadvertently deleted
by any visitor to the vulnerable website; google's spider just happened to
get to it all first.

RE: The 2005 Helios B737 Crash ... (RISKS-24.22)

<"Martyn Thomas" <>>
Sat, 1 Apr 2006 15:25:08 +0100

Why is it necessary for the cabin pressurisation switch to have the property
that it is possible to leave it set to manual, accidentally, on takeoff?

Wouldn't a thorough hazard analysis reveal the risk, and normal systems
engineering (reducing risk ALARP) eliminate it?

Surely it would be safer if all settings defaulted to normal on start-up,
and required explicit setting to hazardous positions. Are there other such
known traps on commercial aircraft?

Re: The 2005 Helios B737 Crash - A test for Don Norman... (R-24:22)

<"Tom Watson" <>>
Mon, 3 Apr 2006 14:42:26 -0700

While we all speculate on the cause of the error, if the pilots were in
communication with the engineering department of the airline, it seems that
the ground people might want to say to the flight deck crew something like
"Oxygen Now!!" then diagnose the problem.  If the flight deck people had
oxygen (they were by recollection communicating with the ground people),
this might have brought them to their senses so they could solve the

I guess it stems from the "If you are up to your ass in Alligators, you
forget that the original objective was to drain the swamp!" syndrome.
Sometimes you drain the swamp before dispatching the alligators, and suffer
the consequences.  — Tom Watson Generic Signature (I'm
at work now)

The 2005 Helios B737 Crash (Re: RISKS-24.22)

<noone <>>
Mon, 03 Apr 2006 15:53:03 -0400

One aspect of the Helios B737 crash not discussed by either Peter Ladkin or
Don Norman (RISKS-24.22) is the relatively short interval available for
the crew to discern the problem and take corrective action.

According to a published accident report
( the airplane
climbed from Larnaca airport, at sea level, to 34,000 feet in approximately
19 minutes.  That means an average rate of climb of nearly 1,800 feet per
minute (FPM).  Normally jets climb rapidly from takeoff to 10,000 feet in
order maintain a speed of 250 knots or less, then enter a cruise climb with
higher airspeed and better fuel economy, although air traffic control can
require deviations.  I was unable to find any more detailed information
about the climb profile of this particular flight.

 From the time the cabin altitude alert went off at 12,000 feet
it would take just 6 minutes and 40 seconds to reach 24,000 feet if the
climb rate was 1,800 FPM.

The Time of Useful Consciousness (TUC) at 24,000 feet is at most 3 minutes
(,  Victims of hypoxia may
be conscious after the TUC but are incapable of taking proper corrective and
protective action, even when instructed or coached.  The TUC is further
reduced by the rate of change of altitude, by increased mental activity,
such as pilot workload in an emergency, and by exercise, such as struggling
out of a cramped cockpit seat to check circuit breakers.

Apparently the captain and co-pilot did not don their oxygen masks when the
cabin altitude alarm sounded.  The "Surviving Cabin Decompression" document
discusses incidents where pilots alerted by an explosive or rapid
decompression lost consciousness after brief delays in donning their masks.
These events are announced by unmistakable cues such as a loud bang and/or
mist forming in the cabin.

The slower loss of pressure as the accident airplane climbed appears to have
allowed hypoxia to develop without these cues.  It would probably take a few
minutes after an initial radio call to base to get qualified engineering
assistance to the microphone.  The fact that neither flight crew member
responded to the Helios engineering department instruction/question
regarding the status of the pressurization panel indicates that hypoxia was
probably far advanced by the time the instruction was given.

In the US, Federal Aviation Regulations require that whenever the airplane
is above 25,000 feet, if one pilot leaves the controls, the other must don
an oxygen mask.  The rules may be different in Greek airspace.  There are
reports (e.g.,
that this regulation is not always strictly observed.

Had the Helios co-pilot followed this rule when the captain left his seat,
this accident would have been prevented, regardless of the crew's apparent
misunderstanding of the cabin altitude alarm.  Even if he was so trained,
his hypoxia may have prevented him from performing normally.

Most depressurization incidents are resolved without fatal crashes.  This
and other depressurization accidents demonstrate how little time is
available for even fully trained, alert, and competent flight crew to don
their oxygen masks and prevent a tragedy.  The uniqueness of the warning
signal may or may not have played a role in this case; the short interval
between the first indication of trouble and complete incapacitation of the
crew certainly did so.

Re: Helios B737 Crash (RISKS-24.22)

<"Eric Ferguson" <>>
Sun, 02 Apr 2006 09:42:11 +0200

I am astonished at the underlying safety concept.

It is obvious that climbing with no pressurization and no (crew and
passenger) oygen is fatal.  Then why just issue a "warning"?

I would propose this Basic safety concept: before the system will allow
itself to move into dangerous situations, the pilot must confirm that he is
aware of the specific danger involved.

Implementation for this case: well before attaining a dangerously low cabin
pressure, the autopilot refuses to allow further climbing (even manual)
until the pilots override this barrier by confirming explicitly "we have
donned oxygen".

The same system would - in case of high altitude depressurization — initiate
an automatic rapid descent until the pilots override it with the same
confirmation. Eric T. Ferguson, Consultant for Energy and Development,
van Reenenweg 3, 3702 SB ZEIST Netherlands +31 30-2673638

Re: Man is charged $4,334.33 for four burgers (RISKS-24.23)

<Mark Feit <>>
Sat, 1 Apr 2006 09:13:00 -0500

Credit cards are relatively new things for fast food restaurants.  Just
about every one I've set foot in recently hasn't upgraded its point-of-sale
systems to integrate them beyond adding a "paid by credit" button so there
won't be cash expected in the till.  Card transactions are being handled
separately by VeriFone or similar countertop terminals which have no idea
whether you're selling French fries or Ferraris.

Transactions at countertop terminals do have a bounds check, but it happens
at the wrong point in the transaction.  The customer receipt and store copy
are printed *after* the charge has been committed to the clearing house,
leaving the cardholder with no way to approve the amount.  (Even
restaurants, which have an extra step where you add a gratuity, have this
problem, because the final figure is still un-verified by the customer.)
Even if the customer refuses to consummate the transaction by signing, it's
still a done deal and the only recourse for correcting it is to take it up
with the bank.

I suspect that's what happened in this case, and it's a very good reason to
use a real credit card instead of a debit card.

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