The RISKS Digest
Volume 21 Issue 79

Tuesday, 27th November 2001

Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

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Harry Potter related risks
Richard Akerman
Phone banking hiccups
Geoffrey Brent
Risks of the space character in Unix filenames
Diomidis Spinellis
FBI: home-grown terrorists
Misdirected criticism of Google
Chris Adams
Gary McGraw
Re: Mobile phone jamming
Markus Kuhn
Re: Stupid virus filters
Leonard Erickson
Re: Let's get really paranoid about e-mail and spam
Skip La Fetra
REVIEW: "The CISSP Study Guide", Ronald L. Krutz/Russell Dean Vines
Rob Slade
Info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Harry Potter related risks

<Richard Akerman <>>
Fri, 23 Nov 2001 19:51:14 -0400

I went to see the Harry Potter movie.  There was a long line at the box
office, but none for the self-serve machines, so I went ahead and used the
self-service (which I prefer anyway).  No problem, I got to the final screen
showing the price, it asked me to swipe my credit card and I did.  Then I
waited... and waited.  The screen stayed up and the card reading device just
kept saying "WELCOME / BONJOUR" over and over again.  Eventually an employee
came up and told me that the machines weren't working - in fact their entire
computer system was down - the long line at the box office was because no
one could purchase tickets.

 * Risk 1: Kiosks that let you get to final purchase stage even though
   purchasing is not possible.
 * Risk 2: Employees who don't move to prevent access to such kiosks quickly
 * Risk 3: A ticket office that shuts down completely when the computers are

However, the end result, while risk-full, was actually handled quite
gracefully.  After waiting in line for a while, I went back to check on the
kiosk, and a different employee said a ticket had printed out when the
computers came back up, and he had given it to the manager.  I showed my
credit card to the manager and he gave me my ticket.

Risk 4: A kiosk that stores a transaction and then completes it many minutes
later when the main computer system/network comes back up!

However, kudos to the quick-thinking second employee, who handled the
situation of an unexpected ticket coming out of the kiosk fairly well.

  [Sort of a rushin' roulette-like situation?  Perhaps a Pottery-wheel?  PGN]

Phone banking hiccups

<Geoffrey Brent <>>
Tue, 27 Nov 2001 14:22:36 +1100

On 5 Nov 2001, I tried to use the National Australia Bank's phone banking
system to transfer money from my cheque account to pay off my credit card.

As prompted by the automated menu system, I entered my user number and PIN,
and requested this transfer. Only after I'd confirmed the transfer was I
told "phone banking is unavailable at this time, your transaction could not
be processed." I called back later in the day, this time successfully
completing the desired transfer.

Some weeks later I received my latest credit-card statement... and
discovered that *both* transactions had in fact been processed, despite the
message I received first time around.

Besides the obvious annoyance value and possible inconvenience of
transferring more money than I'd intended, this behaviour strikes me as a
security weakness. From the user end, a system that requests password data
but is unable to provide the services that password should access looks
suspiciously like a password- grabber. A system that accepts a password and
tells the user that no transaction has been made, while debiting their
account, looks even more suspicious.

Legitimate software should, wherever possible, avoid resembling malware --
even in its failure modes. Training users to accept suspicious behaviour as
the norm makes the system much more vulnerable to deliberate abuse.

Geoffrey Brent

Risks of the space character in Unix filenames

<Diomidis Spinellis <>>
Thu, 22 Nov 2001 23:50:39 +0300

The root of the problem reported in the "Glitch in iTunes Deletes Drives
(Solomon, RISKS-21.74)" article is the default way the Unix shell handles
filenames with embedded spaces.  Although a space can legally appear in a
Unix filename, such an occurrence is not usual; Unix filenames tend to be
terse, often even shorter than a single word, (e.g. "src", "doc", "etc",
"bin") so they can be swiftly typed.  A number of more recent and supposedly
user-friendly operating systems like the Microsoft Windows family, and, I
understand, the MacOS, use longer and more descriptive file names
("Documents and Settings", "Program Files").  Many of these filenames
contain spaces; the ones I listed are by default used by Windows 2000 as the
location to store user data and application files (the equivalent of
/home/username and /bin under Unix).

As Unix-style tools and relevant applications are increasingly ported to run
under Windows (see for example [1, 2, 3] and my Windows outwit tool suite
described in [4]) or natively run under Mac OS X, problems and associated
Risks arise.  The main reason is that some often-used Unix shell constructs
fail when applied to filenames containing a space character.  Unfortunately,
these constructs appear in many existing programs, and even in the writings
of the original system developers, who, in all fairness, could not have
foreseen how their tools would have been used 25 years after their

Technically, the problem manifests itself when field splitting (the process
by which the shell splits input into words) is naively applied on the output
of an expansion that generates filenames with embedded spaces.  Consider the
following example, appearing on page 95 of one of the classic texts on Unix
programming [5]:
  for i in ch2.*
    echo $i:
    diff -b old/$i $i

The above code will compare all files matching the ch2.* pattern in the
current directory with copies presumably stored in the directory called
"old".  Consider what will happen when the code is applied to a file called
"ch2.figure" (notice the space between the word figure and the "3").
The shell variable i will be set to the correct filename, but then the shell
will execute the "diff" command with the following argument list
(customarily passed to C programs in the argv array):
  argv[0] = "diff"
  argv[1] = "-b"
  argv[2] = "old/ch2.figure"
  argv[3] = ""
  argv[4] = "ch2.figure"
  argv[5] = ""

and diff will complain
  diff: extra operand
as more than two filenames were passed as arguments.  This happens,
because words are expanded by most Unix shells in the following order:
  1. Parameter (including variable) expansion, command substitution.
  2. Field splitting.
As a result, the variable $i is first expanded into "ch2.figure 3" and
then the result is split into fields for further processing or for
passing them as arguments to a command.

The most common dangerous constructs that can appear in step 1 are variable
references (e.g. $PATH, $word) and commands inside backquotes (e.g. `find
. -type f -name 'ch2.*'`).  These dangerous constructs are quite common,
appearing among other places in the original article describing the Bourne
shell [6] (for i in * do if test -d $d/$i [...]), in other scripts in the
reference of the original example [5 p. 141, 143], and even in quite recent
work by the same authors [7, p. 149].  It is also prevalent in existing
operating system tools; I counted 43 occurrences of one suspicious pattern
("$*") in a NetBSD source tree, 8 in a FreeBSD command path, and 49 in the
shell scripts of a Mandrake Linux distribution.  The Unix world is
definitely not ready to deal with filenames containing the space character.

Avoiding this problem is not trivial.  A radical solution would be to change
the value of the shell's "internal field separator" (IFS) variable.  This
variable contains the characters that shell uses to split words.  Its
default value is "<space><tab><newline">.  This solution however would break
more things than it would fix, since most scripts expect words to be
separated by spaces.  As an example the construct "A='ls -l';$A" would not
work.  The most practical solution is to manually enclose variables inside
double quotes when using them in contexts where only a single word is
normally expected.  The shell will still expand the variable inside the
quotes, but will treat the result as a single word.  Thus the offending part
in the original example should have been written as:
  diff -b "old/$i" "$i"
In addition, whenever a shell script uses the variable $* to obtain the
values of all parameters passed to a script, the $* variable should be
replaced by the variable $@, again inside double quotes.  Thus the
common code pattern
  for arg in $*
should be written as
  for arg in "$@"
Interestingly, Kernighan and Pike were aware of the $* problem and the above
solution since 1984; they aptly characterize the "$@" solution as "almost
black magic" [5 p. 161].

Still, these changes will not correctly handle filenames with embedded
whitespace returned from a command substitution.  In this case, temporarily
changing the IFS variable before executing a command may be the only
feasible solution.  The following example illustrates this approach:
  # Save original IFS
  # Set IFS to newline
  # The find command might output filenames with spaces
  wc -l `find . -type f`
  # Restore original IFS

By searching existing shell scripts for the patterns I described and
applying the suggested changes most problems can be solved.  Other scripting
languages like Tcl and, to a lesser extend, Perl may also have problems
dealing with filenames with spaces.  Similar approaches (appropriate quoting
in Perl "eval" blocks and use of the "list" command in Tcl) can be used to
avoid these problems.


[1] David G. Korn. Porting Unix to Windows NT. In Proceedings of the
USENIX 1997 Annual Technical Conference, Anaheim, CA, USA, January 1997.
Usenix Association.
[2] Geoffrey J. Noer. Cygwin32: A free Win32 porting layer for UNIX
applications. In Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Windows NT Symposium,
Seattle, WA, USA, August 1998. Usenix Association.
[3] Stephen R. Walli. OPENNT: UNIX application portability to Windows NT
via an alternative environment subsystem. In Proceedings of the USENIX
Windows NT Symposium, Seattle, WA, USA, August 1997. Usenix Association.
[4] Diomidis Spinellis. Outwit: Unix tool-based programming meets the
Windows world. In USENIX 2000 Technical Conference Proceedings, pages
149-158, San Diego, CA, USA, June 2000. Usenix Association.
[5] Brian W. Kernighan and Rob Pike. The UNIX Programming Environment.
Prentice-Hall, 1984.
[6] S. R. Bourne. The UNIX shell. Bell System Technical Journal,
57(6):65-84 July/August 1978.  (Also appears in volume 2 of the Unix
Programmer's Manual and in AT & T, UNIX System Readings and
Applications, volume I. Prentice-Hall, 1987.)
[7] Brian W. Kernighan and Rob Pike. The Practice of Programming.
Addison-Wesley, 1999.

Diomidis Spinellis -
Athens University of Economics and Business (AUEB)

FBI: Home-grown terrorists

<Scrounger <>>
Wed, 21 Nov 2001 22:14:30 -0800

RISKS-21.77 remarks on the FBI installing a program that logs keystrokes on
a suspect's computer "FBI targets suspects' PCs with spy virus", which I'm
sure most would agree damages it.  Of course, RISKS-21.76, in "Re: Kids'
learning game site becomes porn site (Smith, RISKS-21.74)" includes a link
to the US PATRIOT Act
which defines such damage as terrorism.  So the FBI is a terrorist
organization...  Who knew?

Misdirected criticism of Google (Re: RISKS-21.75)

<Chris Adams <>>
Tue, 27 Nov 2001 01:20:36 -0800

Google keeps improving and people are starting to find sensitive information
they put online isn't as private as they thought - they had relied on the
traditional opacity of proprietary formats to keep it out of search engines,
if they thought of it at all. The solution? Blame Google.

As if it wasn't bad enough that many normal users don't understand that
putting information online makes it available to the public, consider the
expert authority CNET quoted:

> "We have a problem, and that is that people don't design software to
> behave itself," said Gary McGraw, chief technology officer of software
> risk-management company Cigital, and author of a new book on writing
> secure software.
> "The guys at Google thought, 'How cool that we can offer this to our
> users,' without thinking about security. If you want to do this right,
> you have to think about security from the beginning and have a very
> solid approach to software design and software development that is
> based on what bad guys might possibly do to cause your program grief."

McGraw doesn't seem to understand the rule he's parroting. That maxim is
correct - people don't spend enough time considering unusual or hostile
behaviour when designing software - but he's completely wrong about the
guilty party: access control is the responsibility of the publisher, not the
indexer. Basic information theory teaches that someone can use data in any
way they choose if they can get it in any usable form - the only way to
prevent this is to keep them from getting it in the first place.  (I'm
reminded of Bruce Schneier's observation that trying to prevent this is like
trying to prevent water from being wet.)

The risks?
 - Attacking companies like Google will hinder innovation while
   doing nothing to improve actual security.

 - Misdirected blame may lead to misguided legislation like the
   proposed SSSCA, mistakes which will be enormously expensive to correct.

 - Companies will continue to rely on security experts who don't understand
   the theories behind the guidelines they repeat. Watching the server logs
   while clients were being audited by certain large firms has convinced me
   that there's almost no value in such certifications.

Misdirected criticism of Google (Adams, RISKS-21.79)

<Gary McGraw <>>
Tue, 27 Nov 2001 17:48:29 -0500

I completely agree with Chris.  In fact, I have long been a proponent of the
rule that I have been accused of "parroting" (as many of you guys know).
And I certainly hope I understand at least some of the theories behind the
guidelines.  I invite Chris to see for himself by reading "Building Secure
Software" (Addison-Wesley 2001).

I actually made a number of similar points during the long interview, but
the reporter seems to have latched on to a twisted version of what I meant.
Alas, this happens all the time.  It's one of the classic RISKS of talking
to the press!

Nevertheless, the RISK that Chris pointed out (misdirecting blame) is a
valid one and deserves some airplay here on RISKS.  I rest my case.

Re: Mobile phone jamming (Stewart, RISKS-21.78)

< (Markus Kuhn)>
24 Nov 2001 21:42:34 GMT

>... Now, as I understand it, hospitals' no-cellphone policy is based on
>the fear that the phones' radio transmissions might interfere with hospital

The above is a common misconception about how mobile phone jammers work.
They attempt to suppress reception of the base station transmitter signal by
the mobile unit receiver, as this requires orders of magnitude less energy
than jamming the other way round. The jammer only has to be slightly
stronger than the nearest base station (which is usually hundreds of meters
away and outdoors) and if properly designed and installed will not increase
ambient field levels significantly. In particular, a jammer does not have to
be anywhere near as strong as a nearby handset!

Mobile phone jammers for GSM and other standards have been on the market
for many years and the users of the handheld variants enjoy a much
longer battery lifetime than their nearby victims. The simplest GSM
jammers just wobble a carrier across the 935-960 MHz band to disrupt
the base station signal, whereas the mobile phones transmit much
stronger in the 890-915 MHz range.

The no-cellphone policies in hospitals are today mostly based on the fear
that clueless phone users might operate phones in the immediate vicinity
(with a couple of centimeters) of critical equipment. As soon as the mobile
phone is a few meters away, field strength will drop well bejond the 3 V/m
levels against which medical equipment has to be EMC immunity tested by the
manufacturers (EN 50082, IEC 601-1-2).

Markus G. Kuhn, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK
mkuhn at,  WWW: <>

Re: Stupid virus filters (Re: RISKS-21.77)

< (Leonard Erickson)>
Fri, 23 Nov 2001 16:02:27 PST

> ... Overzealous filtering is rapidly becoming a bad joke.

I had a message to some friends bouncing as containing "bad data" in the
message body or some such uninformative diagnostic.  I finally contacted my
uucp feed about it, and found that the problem was just such a filter.  But
rather than being in the *body*, the problem was in the *header*.

He was filtering for a subject of "Gunny" or "Funny joke" (I forget which)
because "too many viruses/trojans are using that subject".


Leonard Erickson (aka shadow{G})

Re: Let's get really paranoid about e-mail and spam (Hurst, R 21.78)

<"LAFETRA,SKIP (HP-SantaClara,ex3)" <>>
Sun, 25 Nov 2001 12:13:01 -0500

In RISKS-21.78, Allan Hurst relates how he opened e-mail accounts used only
for testing, and within a month started to receive SPAM.

I can confirm his story.  A few months ago I opened a HOTMAIL account which
was NEVER used for ANY purpose, and whose existence was not told to ANYBODY.
(For the curious, I intended to do some Passport testing which I never got
around to performing).

Within two weeks, this HOTMAIL account (with an unusual name — 5 characters
with an embedded numeral [the really curious can look up my "ham" radio
callsign and send me mail] was receiving pornographic SPAM.

In all of history, I have sent ONE message from this account — to — after the SPAM started.  At the present time, this
account receives roughly a half-dozen SPAM (about 90% sexual) per day.  This
account has also receive three (3) messages from HOTMAIL administration
advertising extended features (which I class as legitimate mail).

I have had friends speculate that spammers "accidentally" found this account
through a random search.  Frankly, I don't believe them, and think that it
is more likely that an "information leak" within the hosting organization
has provided this address to spammers, or that some form of packet sniffing
has found my (occasional — about every-other-week) logins to see what has
arrived at the account.  Like Mr. Hurst, I took great pains to exclude this
account from any directories or "send me mail from affiliate" selections.
Unlike Mr. Hurst, my account has NEVER been used or communicated for any

Skip La Fetra (

REVIEW: "The CISSP Study Guide", Ronald L. Krutz/Russell Dean Vines

<Rob Slade <>>
Thu, 22 Nov 2001 08:00:13 -0800

BKCISPPG.RVW   20010924

"The CISSP Study Guide", Ronald L. Krutz/Russell Dean Vines, 2001,
0-471-41356-9, U$69.99
%A   Ronald L. Krutz
%A   Russell Dean Vines
%C   5353 Dundas Street West, 4th Floor, Etobicoke, ON   M9B 6H8
%D   2001
%G   0-471-41356-9
%I   John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
%O   U$69.99 416-236-4433 fax: 416-236-4448
%P   556 p.
%T   "The CISSP Study Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security"

Of late there has been a significant increase in interest in the CISSP
(Certified Information Systems Security Professional) exam and designation
produced by the (ISC)^2 (International Information Systems Security
Certification Consortium).  The CISSP exam is based on the Common Body of
Knowledge (CBK) which, as the name implies, is that information assumed to
be customarily known by those qualified or experienced in the field of
computer security.  Since the (ISC)^2 also runs courses based on the CBK,
many people seem to feel that there is some trick or secret to passing the

Krutz and Vines appear to want to foster this myth, since the first sentence
of the introduction states that this book holds the "key to unlocking the
secrets of the world of information systems security."  If true, this
assertion would make a mockery of the (ISC)^2 requirement for three years'
work experience, and the insistence that no one book holds the entire CBK.

The introduction also states that this work is intended as a preparatory
guide for CISSP students, a reference for students of other information
security courses, and a manual in security basics and emerging technologies
for security professionals.  That's a rather tall order.

For those who have seen the (ISC)^2 CBK course materials, it is immediately
obvious where the structure of the book, and most of the content,
originates.  Much of the text is in point form, following the slides used in
the CBK, with only minor expansion to explain the elements.  Discussion of
concepts is limited, and some of the detail provided is of questionable
value.  In addition, while the CBK is a substantial and useful work, the
(ISC)^2 course structure does suffer, over time, as areas are added or
amended, and the strict adherence to that order, which can be smoothed over
in a seminar, makes the book very jumpy in places.  Security management
practices, in chapter one, is rather choppy, and access control, in chapter
two, is even worse in this regard.

Each chapter covers one of the ten domains of the CBK.  These topics tend to
overlap in places, but there is little attempt to explain, reconcile, or
reference duplicated material.  Both chapter two and telecommunications and
network security, in chapter three, address intrusion detection systems, but
neither section refers to the other.  (Telecom and networks is a large
topic, and would have benefitted from some attempt at reorganization.)

Chapter four describes many details of cryptography.  While the particulars
provided are correct, the lack of background reduces the value of the text.
Security architecture and models, in chapter five, defines most of the
terms, but does not give a complete picture of the topic.  Operations
security generally involves the coordination of a number of individually
simple aspects, so chapter six deals with the topic adequately.  The same
minimalist denotation of points does not work as well for applications and
systems development, in chapter seven.  (In addition, it is disturbing to
see that discussion of viruses has been completely excluded, particularly in
view of the fact that the subject has greater representation in the CISSP
exam than in the CBK course itself.)  Again, business continuity and
disaster recovery planning involve a number of basic operations, so chapter
eight provides reasonable coverage.  Chapter nine's review of law,
investigation, and ethics is terse, but not out of line with the
requirements of the exam.  Physical security, in chapter ten, is covered
better than most other areas.

There are a number of appendices.  A glossary is taken from the old (1985)
US government glossary, with a few additions.  There is an overview of the
old "Rainbow" series of security manuals.  An essay on using the Capability
Maturity Model (CMM) with the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) will possibly be of interest to a very select
group.  There is an overview of the National Security Agency (NSA) Infosec
Assessment Methodology, a simplistic look at penetration testing, and a
ludicrously brief list of the contents of British Standard 7799.  The
examination of the Common Criteria is slightly better, but not sufficient to
address the needs of the CISSP exam.  A list of references for further study
is basically taken from the (ISC)^2 resource list with some added URLs, and
is not annotated.

Oddly, the illustrations are not copied from the CBK course, and table and
section headings relate very poorly to the surrounding text.

Practice with sample questions can be important in preparing for the CISSP
exam.  Those provided by the CBK course, and even the independent site, are very similar in tone, style, and difficulty, to
those on the exam.  The specimen questions in this book, however, are not.
The quizzes are simplistic reading checks and definition queries, with none
of the complexity of the exam, and requiring little in the way of judgment.
The full list of questions is given again in appendix C, with answers: the
solutions are sometimes explained, but often are not.

For those studying for the CISSP exam, this book does provide a guide to the
topics to be covered.  If you are confident that you know more than the book
at every point, you should be in good shape to sit the exam: if not, you
will have to get help somewhere else.  If you are studying for another
security course, or are a security professional, this work will not have
much to offer you.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 2001   BKCISPPG.RVW   20010924    or

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