Airbus's A380 megajet is now two years behind schedule, reports *BusinessWeek*, which goes on to say 'Use of incompatible programs takes the rap, but behind that is a management team cobbled together from formerly separate companies.' http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/oct2006/gb20061005_846432.htm
The Canadian government announced a stimulus program for their lobster fishery, with a toll-free number that embarrassingly had an incorrect area code, resulting in solicitations for "nasty girls". The president of the Prince Edward Island Fisherman's Association put a reverse spin on the situation: "Maybe it would have been good if the people calling the sex line would have heard the fishing issues, giving them a bit of an education." [Source: Ian Austen, *The New York Times*, 28 Sep 2009, National Edition, B5]
Moday morning my wife was trying to log in to her Kaiser online account. The server was obviously very busy; her login attempts failed repeatedly with timeouts. The new items on the Kaiser home page were two links to H1N1 information. These appeared to be the cause of the problem. The links could have been placed on the members' home page, available only after logging in. RISK: making information available to the general public instead of members only can lead to server overload. - Tony Lima (who, by the way, is otherwise quite happy with Kaiser) Prof. Tony Lima, Dept. of Economics, CSU, East Bay, email@example.com http://www.cbe.csueastbay.edu/~alima (510) 885-3889
UK's Ministry of Defense 3-volume guide to avoiding leakage of sensitive data, itself a restricted document, has been leaked. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1218315
Blue Cross physicians warned of data breach; Stolen laptop had doctors' tax IDs The largest health insurer in Massachusetts is warning roughly 39,000 physicians and other health care providers in the state that personal information, including Social Security numbers, may have been compromised after a laptop containing the data was stolen in August from an employee of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association's national headquarters in Chicago. The breach involves "tens of thousands'' of physicians nationwide, although the precise number is unclear, according to a national Blue Cross-Blue Shield spokesman. Thirty-nine affiliates feed information about providers into a database maintained by the association's national headquarters. Massachusetts doctors were not notified by letter until yesterday, because state Blue Cross-Blue Shield officials said they did not at first know what kind of data were on the stolen laptop. They said the data did not contain any information about patients or personal health records. [Source: Kay Lazar, *The Boston Globe*, 3 Oct 2009] http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/10/03/blue_cross_physicians_warned_of_data_breach/
Flying -- more precisely, checking flight status -- is a wonderful way to learn how not to design systems. I was scheduled to fly from Pittsburgh to Newark; my flight was scheduled to depart at 6:22pm. That itself is probably a case of letting precision exceed accuracy; indeed, the departure board at the airport showed a scheduled departure time of 6:25pm. Other flights, though, did have times like 6:29 or 7:31 shown; admittedly, those were from different airlines. But why would my airline show one time on its schedule and web status, and another at the airport? When I got to the airport, around 4:00, I saw that the 3:15 flight hadn't left yet: "delayed", no time shown. I went to the gate, but saw neither a plane nor a gate agent. Odd, especially since the web showed that the incoming flight had indeed arrived in Pittsburgh on time. When someone eventually showed up, I asked if I could still get on the 3:15 flight. "Oh, that left a long time ago." I asked why it was still on the displays. He immediately got on his radio to ask that it be deleted. The status displays aren't database-driven? I checked my flight again; it showed as on time. It showed as on time even when the inbound plane was running 1.5 hours late. Well, not quite; the inbound plane was listed as departing 1.5 hours late, but arriving on time, only four minutes after it was supposed to leave Newark. Hmm, no sanity checks in that display. And my flight? Even after the inbound flight departed, 2.25 hours late, it still showed an on-time departure, about 1.5 hours after the web claimed the inbound equipment will arrive. Note that the web site actually has a link to the inbound flight's status, so some database *knew* which plane was involved. And the airport display? It showed the flight as "delayed", but still with a departure time that wa earlier than the plan's arrival time. The gate agent told me never to trust the web site. I forbore to point to the airport displays, because at that point one of her colleagues was wondering why their information showed that the inbound plane was still taxiing at Newark, well after it should have been in the air. She replied "maybe someone forgot to enter the update". I arrived home about two hours late, musing about systems design. Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
After the deadly Metro train crash in June, the Washington Metro system reconfigured trains so that the older ("1000 series") train cars were no longer at the ends of trains, where they were in the deadly crash. The idea, as described at the time, was to put them in the middle of the train, since the newer cars have greater survivability in a crash. The problem is, there was no engineering to support this hypothesis. According to the WashPost, it was a pure PR move, and in fact Metro doesn't know if the move made the trains safer or less safe. They were mostly concerned about the appearance of doing something to address risk, lest the public (and the localities that fund Metro) decide that the lack of action meant Metro didn't care. The RISK is that when something that looks to the public like an engineering action has no engineering basis, we may get results that are counterproductive. There's minimal direct computer risk in this particular action, although other postings have noted computer and technology risks elsewhere in the Metro system. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/26/AR2009092602684.html?hpid=topnews
Jonathan Moore of Hove, England, described as an "IT expert", has been sentenced for using a computer to forge 12,472 pounds worth of train tickets that he used for his daily commute to London. The ongoing fraud was eventually detected by a ticket inspector who noticed that Moore's ticket was not quite the right color. Designs for over 70 tickets were found on his laptop. According to the customer services director at the train operating company, "It is a tribute to our quick-witted staff that this thief was caught out. Fare dodgers are robbing the rail industry of 400 million pounds a year." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/sussex/8287111.stm http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6858680.ece
*The Inquirer* reports that a virus infestation in the electrical grid control room of Integral Energy (Australia) was controlled by replacing the Windows-based control consoles with the development systems that run Linux. The SCADA systems themselves run Solaris, and the control consoles only are used as X Window displays, so the replacement didn't require reprogramming. This appears to be a case where diversity of implementations and plug compatibility (Windows + X replaced by Linux + X) allowed greater resilience than either alone. However, the fact that the SCADA systems run Solaris is of scant comfort - while perhaps not as strewn with viruses as Windows, it's still not risk-free. http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1556944/linux-saves-aussie-electricity
[From Saul Hansell's blog, *The New York Times*, 20 Aug 2009] The world's savviest hackers are on to the "real-time Web" and using it to devilish effect. The real-time Web is the fire hose of information coming from services like Twitter. The latest generation of Trojans - nasty little programs that hacking gangs use to burrow onto your computer - sends a Twitter-like stream of updates about everything you do back to their controllers, many of whom, researchers say, are in Eastern Europe. Trojans used to just accumulate secret diaries of your Web surfing and periodically sent the results on to the hacker. The security world first spotted these new attacks last year. I ran into it again while reporting an article in Thursday's Times about a lawsuit meant to help track down the perpetrators of these attacks. By going real time, hackers now can get around some of the roadblocks that companies have put in their way. Most significantly, they are now undeterred by systems that create temporary passwords, such as RSA's SecurID system, which involves a small gadget that displays a six-digit number that changes every minute based on a complex formula. If your computer is infected, the Trojan zaps your temporary password back to the waiting hacker who immediately uses it to log onto your account. Sometimes, the hacker logs on from his own computer, probably using tricks to hide its location. Other times, the Trojan allows the hacker to control your computer, opening a browser session that you can't see. ... http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/how-hackers-snatch-real-time-security-id-numbers/
Years ago, I developed the bad habit of using the same "medium-security password" on lots of different Web sites. I first started doing this around a decade ago, when Web site data breaches were far less frequent and far less professionally executed than they are now. Still, that's a bad excuse for forming a bad habit, which it took a real kick in the pants to get me to break. That kick in the pants came a couple of weeks ago, when I inadvertently posted my password to my blog for the world to see (more on that under separate cover). After realizing what had happened, I spent every available moment for several days logging into ten years' worth of Web sites, many of which I haven't used in a long, long time but still had personal information about me stored on them, and changing my password on all of them. This prompted me to write two articles on my blog which may be of interest to RISKS readers: * In http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/300pw, I discuss why password reuse is a bad idea (the fact that I had to spend days changing my password on over 300 Web sites is only one of many reasons) and offer advice on how to avoid it without having to remember different, random password for hundreds of Web sites. * My marathon password-changing journey gave me the opportunity to look at how well passwords are secured at a large number of Web sites in many different application domains. In http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/pwshame, I've published my "Password Security Hall of Shame" of the sites I encountered with poor password security. I am interested in hearing feedback from others about these articles so that I can make them better. In particular, I'd love to add other noteworthy pieces of advice to my article about managing the seemingly inevitable juggernaut of Web passwords, and I'd also like to add to the Hall of Shame any other sites with poor password security of which people are aware. Please feel free to post comments on my blog or email me.
There is a bug in the current version of the WordPress blogging platform (and probably in all versions since 2.8.0) which can cause hidden text to be inadvertently published in a blog entry without the user's knowledge. In a nutshell, sometimes when text is pasted into the WordPress WYSIWYG editor, an invisible copy of the text is pasted into the editor without the user's knowledge. This invisible text is published along with the blog entry, and although it is not visible on the user's blog, it is visible to search engines and to syndicators which strip HTML style attributes. The exact conditions under which the bug occurs are not yet known. This is not a terribly serious security hole as these things ago, but it is real and needs to be addressed. Unfortunately, the maintainers of WordPress do not seem to be taking it particularly seriously; despite having been notified about the issue over a week ago, they have not yet acknowledged that it has security implications or committed to fixing it. I've posted more details about the issue on my blog at http://blog.kamens.brookline.ma.us/~jik/wordpress/wpbug.
You know, it's fun to be cute or to pun, but not when it causes the RISKS digest to mislead and misinform. When two otherwise intelligent people, K C Knowlton and our esteemed moderator decide to be cute, they should check the facts first. Taking lines out of context is bad. Writing about something of which you know nothing is worse. Both Knowlton and Neumann decided to have fun with the poor little Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) and its new president, John Maeda. John was quoted in a Lexus ad of all places saying "the more complex the design, the simpler the interface will be." Sounds right to me! Alas, not to our esteemed commentators. RISD is one of the world's best conventional design schools. Many of us in the design community are delighted that John has taken over: he will take it out of "conventional". John Maeda is from the MIT Media Lab and one of he world's best designers with a best-selling book entitled "Simplicity." But our esteemed commentators couldn't resist stating that his quote meant oversimplification and reduction to absurdity. Shame on both of you. You read a message in the quotation that was not there. The trick in design is to get it just right: neither too simple nor too complicated. Moreover, I have argued that complexity is good -- it is complicated that is bad. Simplicity does not mean simple-minded. Maeda has made this point many times in his professional writing and talks. The real quote is that of Einstein who said that everything should be as simple as possible, but no simpler. It is the "but no simpler" part of the quote that people forget, but it is the most important. Simplicity needs to be context sensitive. The average driver needs a very simple control for the auto. The skilled driver wants more control, so a bit less simplification. And the technicians need to be able to get into the guts of the stuff, so they need even less simplification. Yes, he more complex the underling machinery, the more sophisticated the interface design has to be to tame that complexity so it is at just the right level for whatever person is using it at the moment. Making something easy to use and understand often requires increased complexity beneath the surface to make that posible. Hence, the fact that the human interface code takes up a considerable portion of the code base of any software system. These are issues Maeda and RISD do understand. Different people have different needs. The real story requires a book (and John has written one). Look folks, don't make up RISKS that do not exist. we have enough real ones to cope with. Don't take isolated quotations out of context. And please don't write about topics in which you are not expert. Don Norman, Nielsen Norman Group, Northwestern University, and KAIST (S. Korea) firstname.lastname@example.org www.jnd.org/
Don, I think you have overreacted, and even misunderstood my comments. And you evidently do not believe in causal logic in English. "The more complex the design, the simpler the interface will be." implies a causality: If a design is more complex, it follows that the interface will inherently be simpler. That is sheer and utter nonsense. Ken was undoubtedly reacting to the reality that complex systems often have inappropriately over-complex interfaces. On the other hand, if Maeda had said, "If a design must inherently be more complex (because of the intrinsic complexity of the requirements -- for example, management of fault tolerance and safety and survivability usually adds significantly more complexity), the interface had very well better be simple." then I would have been comfortable. Actually, I have high respect for Maeda and RISD, and would prefer to think that he was misquoted by the typically nontechnically savvy admen-istrators. PGN]
>[... ( ...But the secret of success is giving the appearance of >simplicity that implicitly masks the inherent complexity.) PGN] I have a theory that the amount of complexity of a closed system remains constant. For example, long ago computers were very complex to use and maintain, but certainly by today's standard they were pretty simple. Today, computers have become so complex as to often defy understanding, but even my 86-year-old Dad can use one. Bluejay Adametz, CFII, A&P, AA-5B N45210
It's historical. Disc drive specifications have been in decimal since the 1950s, whereas the 1024-byte kilobyte is from the 1970s.
Gene Wirchenko reported on 11 Sep 2009 on the comparison of Pigeons and the Internet to transmit data. I am bothered by the confusion in the news item between latency and bandwidth: "took one hour and eight minutes to fly the 80 km [...] with a data card strapped to his leg. In that time, just two per cent of the data was sent over the Internet." Surely we should launch a whole series of pigeons to calculate the bandwidth? By the way, Rocky Mountain Adventures uses pigeons to send data sticks of photos to their home base. See http://odeo.com/episodes/25042064-Pigeon-Protocol-Finds-a-Practical-Purpose
> However, that does not inhibit someone other that the originator from > making an informed and educated decision, based on engineering principles, > that the product requires updating or replacing. True, but technically you can't objectively prove it. Point to a software program and all you can really say is that these bits - which look like any other bits - need replacing. Or this code needs replacing because it needs to perform a different function than it does or because the function is wrong. But there will be nothing there you can show that is quantitatively different from anything else which would indicate evidence of the defect other than you claiming there is one, which again, is going to be your opinion and no more. The possibility of failure in a software package can be no less deadly than that of any other failure in a device or item under the same sort of usage or operation, e.g., a software failure in a pacemaker can be as fatal as having bad wiring. Bad software in a car's engine could be as serious as a stuck gas pedal or a failed brake pedal. But where's the objective proof to make the claim? There really isn't any, it's just an opinion. Evidence of failure that has happened is real and can be shown, but unlike rust on a bridge, there nothing "there" to show where the failure point is in a piece of software. Again, all bits look alike, there are no obviously corroded or "rusty" ones you can single out for repair or replacement. The difference is that for the real world, we can point to and objectively show the rust in a bridge, the corrosion in wiring, the break in a rubber hose, the molecular discohesion in a framistat (the latter is a fictional example for something that hasn't been invented yet, but we will someday have and use.) But inaccurate or incorrect functionality in a computer program can only be shown by errors in some output or damage in something else; the software has nothing intrinsic in and of itself to show that it is in error or operates improperly except for, unfortunately, someone's opinion that the software is wrong or inadequate.
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